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Abstract
University-industry relationships are in a state of flux. They represent important strategic issues
for universities, for industry, and for governments alike. This confluence of interests has led to
experimentation in which universities and industry seek to work together, often with strong
government support. And yet partnerships are not easy. Academics and industrialists live in two
different worlds, and universities are not known for their organizational flexibility. Some
universities appear to change flexibly, while others change more slowly and with difficulty.
The purpose of this dissertation is three-fold: to identify the nature of change taking place in
university-industry relationships; to understand the underlying factors that influence that change;
and to explore the underlying process of change. Three cases of MIT, Cambridge University, and
Tokyo University are examined to compare their experiences in developing new types of
university-industry relationships. I argue that internal and external organizational boundaries
have influenced the evolution of the new types of relationships, and that the three universities
have defined these boundaries differently.
MIT's regulated external boundaries permitted close but bounded relationships with industry, but,
on the other hand, its one-way permeable internal boundaries enabled its administration to
amplify and institutionalize initiatives. This is contrasted with Cambridge's fuzzy boundaries,
which appeared to elicit deeper and more informal and personal relationships in specific local
settings. Tokyo's apparently impermeable boundaries, in contrast, led both to formal arm's
length relationships as well as to informal but closer and invisible relationships.
The emergence of these relationships has not been a mechanical and deterministic process.
Individuals have played an active and important role through "storytelling" to persuade different
players to participate in the new relationships. Individuals also developed individual sub-stories
that explained the rationale for their own participation. I argue that there are three different types
of compatibility between role-stories as told by the players: individual role compatibility,
partnership compatibility and organizational compatibility. I then argue that it is these three types
of compatibility that have determined the overall strengths of the new behavioral patterns, their
ultimate sustainability over time and their replicability across space:
Thesis committee:
Lotte Bailyn (co-chair)
Title: T Wilson (Class of 1953) Professor of Management
D. Eleanor Westney (co-chair)
Title: Society of Sloan Fellows Professor of International Management
Michael Piore
Title: David W. Skinner Professor of Economics and Management
John E. Van Maanen
Title: Erwin H. Shell Professor of Organization Studies
-
-
i 0

Table of contents
Acknowledgement... 9
Prologue,....13
Part I: Introduction.... 15
Chapter 1: The problem... 17
Chapter 2: An analytical approach and a theoretical lens... 29
Part II: What has changed? ...51
Chapter 3: National level perspectives....53
Chapter 4: Organizational level perspectives... 93
Part III: How did these changes take place?... 135
Chapter 5: The MIT Way... 137
Chapter 6: The Cambridge Phenomenon... 163
Chapter 7: The Tokyo Story...189
Chapter 8: Contrasting across the cases.. .219
Part IV: What was the process of change?.... 225
Chapter 9: Dynamics of university-industry partnerships:
external and internal boundaries... 227
Chapter 10: Emergence of new institutional patterns: the role of
individuals in storytelling ... 241
Chapter 11: Conclusions... 249
Appendix....263
Appendix: Social construction of a dissertation...265
References........279

9Acknowledgement
I never used to think much of acknowledgements in books. I thought that authors were
hypocritical in giving credit to everyone, and they said little of importance. As I became
more engaged in my dissertation writing, I began to realize how wrong I was. A
dissertation is a social product entrusted to the hand of the author, but could not possibly
be written by the author alone. Acknowledgement also contains the most significant
information about the author whose identity is otherwise hidden.
I was also fearful about writing an acknowledgement because one has to thank people in
a given sequence. The "order" would imply a ranking that does not exist in reality,
whereas the truth is that everyone has contributed different things and it is impossible to
attach an order to the level of thankfulness I feel for them. So, I decided to follow the
social conventions: starting with my two committee chairs and two committee members
etc- and in an alphabetical order by first name for each category.
Eleanor Westney rescued me from the confusion when I came to MIT. Having come
from the practical world, I simply did not know to what theoretical groups I belonged.
She has been rescuing me ever since, and indeed almost all of my theoretical constructs
come from her quick insights in conversations that I learned to appreciate so much. It is
almost comical to remember the early days when I did not "trust" Eleanor's insights.
They came so quickly, so naturally, with such ease and with seemingly so little reflection
that I simply could not believe that they could be significant. It was only when I
discovered that I was reflecting on these quick comments of hers six months later that I
began to realize the unique gift that she has in these insights.
Lotte Bailyn was the first person who understood what my thesis was really about. It was
when she murmured "nice" with her characteristic reflective tone, that I realized that I
was saying something that she understood and that I wanted to say more along that line.
Her room was the most productive space I experienced. I would go in with few
structured thoughts and some vague ideas about how to structure them - her patient
listening skills enabled me to articulate the things in a way that I could not do on my
own. She was one of my first real "audiences" who empowered me.
John Van Maanen taught me how to be honest. In the word of Michael Piore, another
advisor, "It would be a waste if you don't get to know him while you are here"- and how
right he was. He never asked too many questions - but what penetrating questions they
were! While I was in the field and during his year out in sabbatical, I often had
imaginary conversations with him: "what would John say" became the guiding principle
for my data collection and interpretation of data. His influence went far beyond our face
to face interactions and I owe him more than he knows.
Michael Piore is a legendary advisor who never seemed to read much of anything I wrote,
but remembered exactly where I came from and where I wanted to go like magic. In a
business school environment where profit making is the unquestioned goal of most
studies, it was his values and concerns that kept me sane and honest in my endeavors in
10
which policy and public concerns were more important than private ones. He was always
three steps ahead of me - and I often had a difficult time understanding him, literally. It
took weeks for me to understand even the nature of his comments.
Four was probably the maximum advisable and practical number of advisors in a formal
committee. Had that not been the case, I would have brought several other people into
the team, each of whom contributed significantly in building the conceptual framework.
Richard Lester was one of the few professors who had active research interests in the
changing role of research universities. It was in the seminars organized in his center that
key concepts of this dissertation were born. Wanda Orlikowski had little to do with me
for my dissertation work, except that I shared her passion for thinking about agency
which kept me going back to her for small conversations. Paul Carlile was another of the
conceptual fathers who influenced my work, probably without himself knowing it. Fiona
Murray and Susan Silbey appeared late in my dissertation life, but their support and
inputs propelled me considerably in articulating my findings. Ed Roberts and Jim
Utterback provided valuable insights into the role of science for industry and the history
of MIT. John Carroll taught me the power of interpretation through my work with him as
a research assistant for his research on high hazard industry.
I owe my most sincere thanks to all the people I met in the field. Many people from the
three universities spent considerable time with me to help me make sense of their
complex settings. For the sake of confidentiality, I am unable to list the names, but they
know who they are! I only hope that I did justice to the time they gave me.
Fellow doctoral students provided the social and intellectual contexts for the birth of this
dissertation. Indeed, their collective influence can easily match those of my advisors.
We breathed ideas and lived on thoughts, where emotions and thoughts were intertwined.
Laura Black and I worked like twins - on theses that could not be more different and yet
similar. We came to MIT mid-life, looking for change, wanting more from life and all.
At the height of production, we talked to each other every couple of hours to keep going.
When I submitted my draft, she caught up quickly, and when she got her defense date, I
wanted mine. We are submitting our twin theses about a week apart.
Without Sarah Kaplan, I would have never stopped collecting data. She demanded with
characteristic clarity that it was ridiculous that I was still collecting data. She also
whipped my presentations into shape on many occasions. On rowing machines in the
gym we routinely had the most diverse conversations ranging from our epistemological
assumptions to our love lives; these conversations kept me sane and healthy through the
dissertation years. I hope I can provide similar support when she goes through hers.
Jean Jacques and Henrik provided the European perspective on life - they always seemed
well-balanced. Brad, Carsten, Deborah, JoAnn, Julie, Mike and Nils provided a powerful
dissertation support group, with each of whom I feel I shared a substantive part of my
writing. Carlos, Kate and Sean were not yet writing their dissertations, but they were the
11
"apricots" who matured with me and with whom I shared the particular brand of
institutionalism. They were the key barometers for my work.
Sharon Cayley deserves special thanks. She had the most vivid understanding of the
nightmares that we go through in finishing a dissertation, and calmed me down at the
most critical and desperate moments.
There are other dear friends who provided support in different ways. Devesh and
Sadhana who moved to Boston at the same time as me were unfailingly supportive
throughout my student days. Their children, Maya and Kunal provided the needed
distractions away from my thesis. Eriko, one of the oldest friends I have, happened to
share one year of her life with me here in Cambridge, and how wonderful and reassuring
it was to be living a couple of blocks away from her. Chikako's ability to engage
provided the most productive input when I needed it the most. Tomoko and Naoshi
helped me get adjusted to Cambridge. It was Atsuko who told me that one should remain
passionate until the last minute -because it was passion that is the secret of good writing.
Keiko deserves to be a category of her own. She is somewhere between a little sister and
a close friend, whose dissertation footsteps I carefully followed until she finished hers.
Thereafter, she became an indispensable audience for my dissertation. In a number of
phone conversations, she forced me to articulate the least formed of my ideas, what I
wanted to do and why, and above all, listened attentively, always with enthusiasm.
My family has been very supportive of my work. Grandma gave me courage to take up
studies in mid-life by saying that I still had another half of my life to look forward to!
My parents, who had long learned never to be surprised, were also the best sympathizers
when I told them the exaggerated accounts of how hard I was working. Noriko, my real
sister and her family - Yutaka, Yumiko, Ryosuke, Hiroshi and Toshio - constantly
reminded me that a dissertation was not all that life can offer.
I would also like to thank the financiers for this dissertation. The Matsushita Peace
Foundation provided the financial assistance I needed to conduct the first year of the field
work. The Industrial Performance Center provided a partial fellowship as I was writing
the thesis. Lotte Bailyn provided the needed financial assistance in my final year through
RA. Without these, I am sure I would not have been able to give my dissertation the
concentrated effort that it required.
To Quentin, I owe my life as well as this dissertation. At the beginning of my doctoral
studies, he was a professional colleague and a friend. In the course of this journey, he
became an indispensable partner for life. He was excited when I came up with new ideas,
and he was sympathetic when I got stuck. In his visits, he washed up, cooked and ironed,
while always engaging in the intellectual substance of my thesis. Most importantly, he
was one of the first to believe that I really could do it.
April 2002
Cambridge: MA
I
13
Prologue
The origin of this dissertation was Jakarta in 1992. 1 was working as an economist for the
World Bank reviewing public investments in higher education in Indonesia. Indonesia at
the time was a successful case of economic development in the eyes of many
development specialists, and there was a sense that the time was ripe for various
institutions to be ready for the next round of development. Universities were one
example of such institutions. There was a strong sense of need for better science and
technology capacity, and yet, it was not clear what kind of capacity was appropriate nor
how to build it. It was clear that Indonesia could not afford to develop and sustain
expensive fundamental sciences, but it was equally clear that the capacity needed should
not only focus on solving today's problems. Science and technology capacity had to be
future looking.
The experience taught me three things. First, the issue of what kind of science and
technology capacity to build, and how, was a universal one. In virtually all the countries
I examined, either as a model or as a case for demonstrating what to avoid, there were
debates about the role of the government in supporting universities, and the economic
rationale for supporting them.
In 1995-7, as I traveled around OECD countries to visit universities on a global
recruitment mission for the World Bank, I confirmed that most higher education systems
were undergoing some kind of reforms. Similar debates were pushing reform measures in
as diverse a group of countries as the UK and Japan, representing respectively the oldest
university systems as well as the late developers, characterized by public and private
universities. The romantic period when governments simply took for granted the need
for universities and better research capacity had ended. The question now was what kind
of capacity to build and how.
My second lesson was that, when dealing with policy and institutional issues, the only
serious instrument of analysis was comparison against other systems that are by
definition very different. While we resorted constantly to comparative analysis, it was
not clear how to conduct serious and meaningful comparisons to inform decisions. There
was also a curious lack of expertise about universities and higher education policies.
Academia believes that there is little relevant expertise outside itself, a belief fuelled by
its tradition of self-governance.
And yet, it seemed clear that most "insiders" were so embedded within their own
systems, that they brought into their analysis certain romanticism, as well as their
personal beliefs, that were often not helpful when dealing with different systems. Thus
American professors often saw the American model as the only viable one, and were
often incapable of understanding the assumptions on which their own systems were
based. Japanese professors recognized the merit of the American university system, as
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did many others around the globe, and yet, they tended to pick on particular themes they
saw as fit - without any systematic analysis.
As I consulted different "world experts" for their wisdom to help Indonesia, I came to
realize that, as a lay outsider without even a doctorate to my name, I might actually be
able to see more of the things that had become invisible to many of these professors. My
audacious plan to undertake research on universities as an outsider emerged. In doing so,
a comparative analysis of the world's most different and advanced systems made sense.
Comparing the American model, along with two other diverse systems such as the UK
and Japan became a reality.
The third lesson was that the role of universities in an economy was complicated by the
very fact that universities have often defined themselves as non-economic institutions, in
which economic interests are supposed to play the least important part. Particularly
important was to understand that universities as organizations are built upon different sets
of principles from those of business or government organizations. It seemed essential to
understand the full implications of their organizational characteristics before meaningful
policy and economic debate could be undertaken. The idea of focusing on those
university activities which came closest to outside economic bodies arose out of such a
concern. By examining university-industry relationships, I hoped to understand both the
nature of universities as organizations and the nature of change taking place.
These are the perceptions that I came with to MIT in August 1997. Four and half years
later, the following is what I found.
-
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Chapter1:
The Problem
University-industry relationships are in a state of flux. These relationships are an
important and current strategic and policy issue for universities, for industry, and for
governments alike (OECD, 2000).
Universities are looking for new ways to remain relevant actors in the knowledge
economy, which means that they need to secure funding sufficient to cope with the rising
costs of research. Industrial firms are exploring ways of keeping abreast of technological
progress in this highly uncertain, competitive and rapidly changing environment, and
regard universities as important potential partners. Governments, concerned about
national competitiveness, are looking for new models of innovation, and they are looking
to universities to play major roles in a transition to a knowledge economy.
This confluence of interests has led to unique circumstances of experimentation for
universities and industry to work together, and for governments to create supportive
environments for such partnerships.
And yet, it is not an easy partnership, because academics and industrialists live in two
different worlds. Academics are firmly embedded in the institutions of science, where
autonomy of inquiry has been deemed critical for the production of scientific knowledge.
Industrialists, on the other hand, are squarely embedded in the institutions of markets,
with their interests in science driven by its applications. There is an invisible boundary
that separates the two worlds. At the same time, governments are increasingly concerned
to establish accountability to the public about the use of public funds and therefore would
like to ensure a certain relevance and usefulness in their support of science. University-
industry partnerships thus represent a process in which the issues of academic autonomy
come head to head with the issues of accountability and relevance.
At first glance, universities do not seem to be organizations known for their flexibility.
Scholars have observed that their decision making process could be described by the
garbage-can model (Cohen et al., 1972). On the other hand, universities are
organizations that survived several centuries and therefore must exhibit some form of
flexibility, perhaps through being loosely coupled systems (Glassman, 1973; Weick,
1976). Indeed, universities seem to cover a wide range in terms of their flexibility to
change. Some universities appear to be flexible and to evolve types of university-
industry relationships effortlessly. Others change somewhat more slowly, along with
dramatic changes in overall organizational structures. The question is why some
universities are more flexible than others. Are there differences in the kind of university-
industry relationships they develop and sustain? What are the organizational
underpinnings that are relevant in shaping these changes? How do these changes actually
take place? Are organizational structures, such as those of governance, critical elements
for introducing flexibility? What is the process of change?
18
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine and compare this state of flux: to identify
the nature of institutional change taking place at the interface of academia and industry;
to understand the underlying factors that influence that change, and to explore the
processes through which new institutional patterns develop. In order to answer these
questions, a historical comparative analysis was undertaken to review and contrast the
experience of three universities: MIT, Cambridge University, and Tokyo University.
A few definitions will be helpful. By institutions, I refer to a set of rules, norms and
practices, both formal and informal, that pattern human behavior. Institutions usually
come as a nested set of related practices and routines that collectively have a certain
logic. Institutions of science, for instance, comprise a set of practices and norms, such as
scientific publications based on peer reviews and citations, that apply to scientific
endeavors and so set the basis for scientific reputations and progress.
As new types of university-industry partnerships emerge, new rules, norms and patterned
behaviors arise that had not previously existed. Some of these emergent behaviors will
be local both in time and space. They will be ephemeral changes that will eventually
disappear as projects or contracts end. Others will become institutions as they become
more stable and widespread within the university or even outside. The process by which
these patterned behaviors become more stable over time and widespread is referred to as
institutionalization.
In the reminder of this chapter, I first describe the global contexts in terms of the rise of
the knowledge economy, and demonstrate why university-industry relationships have
come to have such prominence in the minds of policy makers, industrialists as well as
university academics. Second, I describe what has been written about the phenomenon.
Third, I argue that the unanswered question of how these relationships evolve is
important and examine issues touched by the question. Fourth, I explain why the US, the
UK and Japan on the one hand, and more specifically, MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo on
the other, represent particularly interesting cases for investigation in this regard. Finally, I
summarize and describe the structure of the dissertation.
The rise of the knowledge economy
The twentieth century saw a sea change in the way the world views economic resources.
Knowledge has come to be regarded as a strategic resource and a source of competitive
advantage as distinct from capital, labor or natural resources (OECD, 1996, 2000;
Stiglitz, 1999; World Bank, 1998). It is this global interest in the transition to a
knowledge economy that places university-industry relationships in a special limelight.
What is the nature of the interest?
Academia and industry had long been two independent spheres of knowledge creation.
At the time of the industrial revolution, scientific developments contributed very little to
industrial activities(Mathias, 1970; Pavitt et al., 1977). It was only in the 19' century that
there were increasing instances of basic science supporting technological progress in
industry, or technological progress in industry informing the course of scientific agendas
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(Freeman, 1974; Pavitt et al., 1977). By the early 20 century, industrial companies,
most notably in the US were beginning to conduct their own scientific research in hope
that they could systematically capture the benefits of science, particularly in the chemical
and electrical industry (Etzkowitz et al., 1998b).
The two World Wars constituted a major turning point in the relationships between the
spheres of science and industrial applications, as policymakers as well as scientists
learned about the practical value of scientific advances, particularly for military
applications. In the US in particular, federal government maintained high levels of
funding support for scientific research in universities. The time between discovery and
commercialization gradually shortened, with increasing expectations on the part of
industrialists to make systematic use of scientific results (Etzkowitz et al., 1998b; Nelson,
1993). The perception grew that knowledge produced by science could lead to economic
value and the notions that economies were increasingly dependent on knowledge began
to be articulated as early as the 1970s (Bell, 1974), and to be popularized in the 1980s
(Toffler, 1980).
The 1980s were a pivotal period during which the institutional framework for the
university's ability to assert intellectual property rights was further refined (Katz et al.,
1990; Mowery et al., 2001). On one hand, the Bayh-Dole Act in the US set the scene by
allowing universities to apply for patents for inventions arising from federally funded
research. There were other legal developments where, for instance, molecules became
patentable, strengthening considerably intellectual property protection (Mowery et al.,
2001).
The 1980s was also the decade when the new models of regional economic development
such as Route 128 and the Silicon Valley rose and fell. While the spin-off phenomena
had been analyzed since the late 1960s (Cooper, 1971; Roberts, 1968; Roberts, 1991;
Roberts et al., 1968; Saxenian, 1994a, 1994b), it was the spin-offs' contribution to
regional economies in the otherwise stagnant 1970s that captured the imagination
(Dorfman, 1983). However, the region-wide economic downturn in the 1980s dampened
the public mood for emulating the experience (Rosegrant et al., 1992).
Another significant development in the 1980s was the first wave of interest among policy
makers, in several advanced economies, in promoting university-industry relationships
(OECD, 1984), but for different reasons in the different economies. For the US, the
1980s was a period of crisis about national competitiveness, when competition from
Japanese manufacturers was seen to be eroding American supremacy. Indeed Japanese
industrial successes became the wonder of the world, with other OECD countries
speculating whether the strong-handed industrial policy in Japan could be a model for
others to emulate (Johnson, 1982). In the US, a series of legal and regulatory changes
were introduced to enhance national competitiveness, including the Bayh-Dole Act of
1981 and the relaxation of anti-trust provisions to permit research collaboration (Mowery,
1998; Mowery et al., 1999).
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In the UK, it was a decade of wrenching economic reforms under Margaret Thatcher.
The lessons from the international experience, particularly from Japan, were examined
(Irvine et al., 1984), leading to later policies and mechanisms to develop priority science
and technology fields. For Japan, on the other hand, the issue was how to develop its
own scientific base to enable its successful manufacturers to move from being imitators
to innovators.
In the 1990s, a new kind of political support developed for investing in knowledge,
prompted by the rapid globalization (Economist, 1997; OECD, 2000) and by a decade of
prosperity in the US. The success stories of Silicon Valley and Boston's high tech cluster
were re-told as new industries such as IT and biotechnology blossomed in these regions
(BankBoston, 1997; Roberts, 1991; Rosegrant et al., 1992; Saxenian, 1994a, 1994b).
America's success was even more impressive against the backdrop of Japan's lost decade
and the market crash of East Asia in 1997 that discredited other models of economic
development and performance.
More recent analyses also portrayed Japan's industrial policy in a less favorable light
(Odagiri et al., 1993, 1996). While the full analysis of the reasons for the US success
must await the next generation of research, policy makers, who have to act today, cannot
help looking for institutions that may have supported such a spectacular spurt of
innovation. American research universities became the main target of emulation, helped
by their already global reputation in scientific performance, and with an added interest
arising from their impact on their regional economies. The new goal was to create or
become an MIT or a Stanford, in the global mood the Economist named "an outbreak of
MIT envy" (Economist, 1997).
Today, many OECD countries are scrambling to establish their strategies for the
transition into a knowledge economy (OECD, 1996), and developing countries are
actively examining the implications for their future (World Bank, 1998). Developing
better university-industry relationships appears to have become a standard prescription
within such a framework (OECD, 1996, 2000). In some countries, this is being
undertaken at a time of relatively robust economic growth, as in the UK. In other
countries, most notably Japan, building a strong knowledge economy is seen as a way out
of economic stagnation and critical for national survival.
University-industry relationships
What do we know about university-industry relationships? It is clear that university-
industry relationships have been changing dramatically in the past two decades. There is
a diverse group of authors who documented the increasing incidence of university-
industry relationships, particularly in the US. There has clearly been a steady increase in
the level and proportion of industry support for academic research, particularly in the
1980s. (Cohen et al., ; National Science Board, 2000). There have been increases in the
number of university-industry R&D centers in (Cohen et al., 1994a), university patenting
and licensing following the Bayh-Dole Act (Henderson et al., 1995; National Science
Board, 2000), large relationships with industry such as strategic alliances or multiple
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company consortia for pre-competitive research (Etzkowitz et al., 1998a). Comparative
studies also highlight the increasing importance of university-industry relationships in
other economies such as the UK and Japan (Branscomb et al., 1999; Rahm et al., 2000).
There is a strand of literature, principally by economists, that focuses on the effect of
science on industry. The verdict today is not only that academic science contributes to
industry, (Blumental et al., 1986; Klevorick et al., 1994; Mansfield, 1991, 1992), but also
that the level of contribution may have intensified over time (Cohen et al., 1998a; Cohen
et al., 1998b).
The prominence of university-industry relationships has also raised new types of concern
about their effect on the integrity of academic science. For instance, some have
demonstrated that industry supported research is more likely to be focused on shorter-
term research with less emphasis on basic science (Blumental et al., 1996; Cohen et al.,
1994b; Cohen et al., 1998b) There is also increasing evidence that secrecy and
confidentiality provisions appear to be creeping into academic research (Blumental et al.,
1997; Cohen et al., 1994b; Cohen et al., 1998b), where there may be increasing conflicts
of interest and commitment (Etzkowitz, 1996). Clearly, norms in academic science are
changing (Etzkowitz, 1998) with increasing influence of markets on campus (Slaughter et
al., 1998).
There is an emerging literature that looks at how academic science influences industry.
The traditional understanding of science-industry relationship had been based on a simple
linear model, where academic science was supposed to lead to a wide dissemination and
ultimately commercial use. In contrast, the emerging literature emphasizes the interactive
nature of the two spheres, academic science on the one hand, and industrial technology
on the other (Nelson, 1995; Rosenberg, 1982). Absorptive capacity and a certain
"connectedness" to science on the part of a firm have been demonstrated as critical for its
ability to utilize scientific discoveries effectively (Cockburn et al., 1998; Cohen et al.,
1990; Lim, 2000). It has also been argued that licensing represents only a very small and
possibly even an insignificant channel of such connections, with consulting and other
direct interaction opportunities increasingly given weight (Agrawal et al., 2002). There is
also an increasing interest to document and understand how science and technology
might co-evolve (Garud et al., 1994; Murray, 2002).
Unanswered questions: how do university-industry relationships evolve?
There is far less written on the question of how university-industry relationships evolve.
This is an interesting neglect, particularly given the current environment where
practitioners are moving full speed to foster university-industry relationships and are
living through the "how" question. I propose this question can be further unpacked into
three specific questions. First, what is the nature of change in university-industry
relationships, and more specifically what differences exist in the kinds of relationships
developed by different universities? The second question has to do with the factors that
might influence the change: is it the external environment that shapes university-industry
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relationship, or is it a university specific capacity that shapes them? Finally, what do we
understand about the process of change?
What is the nature of change? The issue of whether and the extent to which different
universities develop different interaction patterns has not received much scrutiny in the
past. It is as though all universities are assumed to have equal capacity in developing
similar relationships. And yet, clearly, the intuition is that in Silicon Valley or Route
128, some universities played critical roles that are difficult for other universities to
imitate (Roberts, 1991; Saxenian, 1994b). The irony is that government after government
is establishing its knowledge economy strategies where university-industry relationships
serve as a cornerstone, without a firm understanding of the desired nature of change in
university-industry relationships and the process. The question is whether universities
are equally capable of developing similar types of relationships with industry. Are all
partnerships with single companies or pre-competitive multiple company relationships
similar, and if not, what are the dimensions of difference? Are they similar in size, depth,
or prevalence?
What are the factors that influence change? There are three commonly cited factors
that influence the evolution of university-industry relationships: changes in government
funding, (Cohen et al., 1998a; Rosenzweig, 2001); government policies and regulatory
changes such as the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery et al., 1999), and
industrial interest for collaboration with universities. There are several underlying
arguments reflected in these factors. One would be an argument that the phenomenon is
about changing resource dependency relationships: when universities' most important
resource dependency relationships with governments change, universities are forced to
respond (Pfeffer et al., 1978). Another is an institutional argument that government
regulations and changing legitimacy in the society affect university choices (DiMaggio et
al., 1983; Meyer et al., 1977). There is a fourth factor that has to do with founding values
of universities. This is an argument that organizations adapt little, where the founding
characteristics provide the main explanation for different behaviors, functioning as
organizational "imprinting" with a lasting influence (Stinchcombe, 1968). It would be
important to examine if and how these factors influence university responses in
developing their relationships with industry.
One alternative explanation has to do with internal factors within universities. Clark,
having studied university organization for three decades concluded in his study of
entrepreneurial universities that the role of the "center" is one key ingredient for
university capacity to be entrepreneurial in an changing environment (Clark, 1998). The
governance and administrative structures are clearly one obvious factor that differentiates
universities.
Another source of variation in university organization may arise along national lines.
Organizational histories of universities show that important differences in the way
universities are organized across nations, particularly with respect to how education and
research activities are linked together (Ben-David, 1977, 1984), have large implications
on the way they engage in scientific production. What is more, though universities are
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rarely "selected out" in the sense of disappearing altogether, there is certainly rise and fall
of centers of excellence in an international sense. German universities were clearly the
model in the 19* century, taken over by the American research university model in the
20th century. The implication is that universities in a given country may have certain
similarities in terms of how they are organized, while across national borders there may
be important organizational differences. Examining universities from different countries
may provide an important insight in this respect.
What is the process of change? In order to understand what factors matter, it is
critically important to examine the process of change. Here, the key process to be
examined is the emergence of institutional patterns, or an early stage of
institutionalization for new types of university-industry relationships. More specifically,
there are three distinct levels of institutionalization. The first has to do with how a new
type of relationship might be developed in a given locale within a university and get
sustained. The second has to do with how such an initiative grows over time to have
stronger and larger spheres of influence in a give locale. The third is how such a new
relationship might become an organizational template for future initiatives.
The US, the UK, and Japan: MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo
There have been two types of "emulation" going on among nations. One centers on
economic systems motivated by economic performance. The US had a clear lead as an
industrial economy in the 50s and 60s, briefly threatened by the rise of the Japanese
model in the 70s and 80s, and again rising as a model for a knowledge economy in the
1990s. The other centers on scientific systems motivated by the effectiveness of
scientific production. American research universities have long been a model in this
respect. Interestingly, the past two decades have seen the merging of the two types of
emulation, as motivation behind scientific production became increasingly economic,
where the US represents the model, the UK a partial emulator, and Japan a late emulator.
MIT, Cambridge and Tokyo are the leaders in each national context, and are therefore
obvious candidates for organizational level comparison. If their leadership in the field of
engineering is reasonably clear, their centrality in shaping the national agenda is
unambiguous. There are several contrasting characteristics that make the comparison
even more interesting. For one thing, they represent very different governance structures:
MIT is centralized; Cambridge is decentralized, and Tokyo is supra-centralized at the
ministerial level (that is, Tokyo is a national university and legally an integral part of the
Ministry of Education and Science). This is particularly important, as the comparison
among the three may provide unique insights into the role of governance in university-
industry relationships.
They also come with important historical legacies, particularly during and after WWII,
which had a pivotal influence in establishing the role of science in their respective
societies. MIT's Radiation Laboratory was a symbol of military success, and its
experience helped shape the post WWII national science policy to its advantage. The
Radiation Laboratory also served as an important organizational template for
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interdisciplinary activities within MIT. Tokyo's aeronautical laboratories, along with
other war related research groups, on the other hand, were disbanded as a punishment for
their contribution during the war. For Cambridge, the effect was less direct and perhaps
as a result less dramatic. Individual scientists at Cambridge were drawn into national
projects located away from the university. There is an important question about the effect
of such historical legacies.
The three universities also provide interesting contrasts in their apparent level of
flexibility. MIT is a symbol of such flexibility. Over the past 20 years, it has increased
its support base from industry, experimented with several new modes of working with
industry - such as consortia, strategic alliances and educational partnerships, and seems to
be succeeding. Cambridge is quickly catching up with MIT in the level of industrial
support it receives from industry; it is transforming itself from an esteemed ivory tower
into a hub of scientific activities, with the concentration of industrial research centers
increasing over the last three decades (Marsh, 2001). These changes, however, have
taken place along with considerable reforms in the administrative infrastructure, not only
in units directly relevant to relationships with industry but also in its governance
structures where it began to shed traditions of decentralized structures and to introduce a
greater level of managerialism. In Tokyo, there have been less dramatic changes in the
overall level of industrial support, which has remained largely static in the past 5 years.
However, dramatic changes are now taking place, particularly in the organizational
infrastructure to support university-industry initiatives. Parallel with such changes,
Tokyo also expects to undergo a thorough governance reform, as it will be legally
separated from the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES) in 2004.
One caveat is that the three universities are not necessarily representative of the three
national systems, particularly with respect to the governance structures. Both MIT and
Cambridge are more extreme than the norm in their centralization and decentralization
respectively. Tokyo University shares the same supra-centralized structure with all the
other national universities, but differs from the others in its proximity to the Ministry,
given both its status and location. While the three universities do exhibit many national
characteristics, it would be dangerous to see the comparison as among the three national
systems.
Thesis structure
My findings are presented in four parts. In Part I, the introduction includes this chapter
and Chapter 2, which introduces the problem and explains my analytical approaches as
well as my theoretical lens. The subsequent three parts are organized in such a way that
each of them addresses one of my three research questions: (a) what is the nature of
change in university-industry relationships in the three systems; (b) what factors may
have influenced these changes; and (c) what are the processes of change?
In Part 11, 1 clarify the nature of change and examine several alternative explanations, in
terms of the national contexts in Chapter 3, and the organizational contexts of the three
universities, MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 contrasts the
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historical national contexts to examine the two macro-level explanations: the changing
role of the government as a funding source and a regulator; and the changing interests on
the part of industry. I conclude that all of these factors are important, but that they do not
exert their influence simply or evenly. For instance, general government funding for
universities powerfully influences university responses to seeking industrial funding;
however, university responses depend as much on their perceptions and expectations of
government funding, as they do on its actual level.
In Chapter 4, the historical organizational contexts of the three universities are reviewed
both in order to clarify and contrast the nature of changes in university-industry
relationships in the three settings, but also to examine the alternative explanation that the
differences arise largely as a result of organizational culture as defined at the time of
foundation. Here again, I find that while there are clear differences in values and norms
among the three organizations, they did not have permanent and stable cultures over time.
Rather, it is clear that historical events, such as organizational foundation, World War II
and student unrest, have powerfully influenced the organizational ethos around
university-industry relationships.
Part III focuses on the question of the factors that have influenced the changes; this is
done by means of the three case chapters on individual universities, and a summary
chapter that compares across the three cases and across all initiatives.
In Chapter 5, the experience of MIT in working with industry through consortia,
educational partnerships and strategic alliances is presented. While the initiatives at MIT
are increasingly larger in monetary scale, they remain relatively constant in the depth of
interactions, where academics and industrialists are close but have bounded relationships.
I argue that these changes have been shaped by the regulated nature and certain
permeability of MIT's external and internal boundaries. Particularly characteristic are the
administrators who have played a critical role in managing these boundaries, especially in
facilitating inter-departmental activities, which are crucial for large-scale activities.
One observation is the importance of dialectics in the evolution of these initiatives: MIT
cases provide often colorful images of academics and industrialists debating - at different
locations. Moreover, these debates appear to be critical in sustaining and replicating the
initiatives. Individuals make sense of the initiatives in light of their experiences - the
initiatives become personal. Academics and industrialists develop their respective roles
that are compatible with each other, and organizational players develop supportive roles
to accommodate the initiatives.
In chapter 6, Cambridge's experience is presented, namely the evolution of embedded
laboratories and other variations in working with single company partners, in which deep,
informal relationships have appeared to form, with information flowing back and forth
more liberally. In contrast to M7IT, there have not been as many inter-departmental
initiatives or large-scale ventures. I argue that the fuzzy external boundaries and the
relatively impermeable and partially fuzzy internal boundaries have been responsible for
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such characteristics. Cambridge also provides images of sustained dialectics, particularly
between academics and industrialists, that lead to robust and deep relationships.
Chapter 7 describes Tokyo's struggle with single company relationships, and the
emergence of multiple company relationships that are often anchored outside the
university. I argue that Tokyo's relatively impermeable organizational boundaries have
prevented the development of visible relationships based on deep interactions, but that
individual academics have formed informal and deeper relationships in less visible ways.
It is as though Tokyo has two types of organizational boundaries: formal and informal.
Interestingly, some of the informal initiatives have won more visibility or formality over
time, gaining greater permanence than the others. What characterizes these breakthrough
cases appears to be the roles of individual academics who were personally committed to
the success of the initiatives.
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the comparisons at three levels: (a) at the university
level, where the three cases are contrasted in terms of the nature of changes and the
dynamics of institutionalization; (b) at the level of institutionalized practices, where the
degree of institutionalization is reviewed; and (c) at the level of initiatives to highlight the
differences in the patterns of their longevity and replicability.
In Part IV, conclusions about how new institutional patterns emerge are laid out in two
chapters.
Chapter 9 focuses on the structure that influences university-industry partnerships and
further clarifies the nature of two types of organizational boundaries, external and
internal. External boundaries are those that separate the worlds of academics and
industrialists, although they can be defined and enacted differently, in terms of people,
knowledge, or physical space.
Internal boundaries are what separate the disciplines as represented by departments
within a single university. I argue that the manner in which these boundaries are defined
and enacted depends on the role of the administration - which can provide various
mechanisms for boundary crossing. I argue further that the administration can itself form
a separate community within a university, and the nature of academic-administrator
boundaries over time define the ethos and capacity of the administration.
Chapter 10 introduces storytelling as a metaphor for describing the role of individuals in
the the emergence of institutional patterns. I propose that institutional change may be
initiated by individuals whose primary function is to develop "powerful stories" about
why and how they, the collective, should change. Individuals progressively engage other
people in their ideas and plans, using these stories as tools for persuasion. Participants in
turn develop their own individual role sub-stories that explain the reason for their
participation. I argue that the nested nature of these stories, as well as three types of
compatibility between sub-stories, help one understand the strength of emerging
institutions.
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In Chapter 11, I present a combined framework of structuration, bringing together
structure as represented by organizational boundaries, and agency as depicted by story
telling. I argue that dialectics are particularly important at the boundaries, because that is
where stories are harder to understand because they can have different meanings to
different parties. Stories are important as a communicative device at the boundary, and
for creating new meanings and persuading people of newly created values and meanings.
Stories also have the function of institutionalizing behavior, by providing a stable reason
for coordinated behaviors. Tales of MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo are re-told through this
new lens. I end the discussion by summarizing my contributions and the scope for future
research on the one hand, and, on the other, by drawing out the implications of my
findings, including those for practitioners.
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Chapter 2:
An analytical approach:
Methods and a theoretical lens
The central research theme is the emergence of new institutional patterns during the
earliest part of the institutional change. The phenomenon to be examined is the evolving
industry-university relationship in the context of the global knowledge economy. More
specifically, my dissertation addresses three questions: (a) what are the new patterns of
industry-university relationships that have evolved or are evolving in different settings?
(b) what organizational factors could explain such patterns? (c) what are the processes
through which such changes become or do not become institutionalized?
This chapter first explains the principal methodological stance of my research:
qualitative, interpretive and based on grounded-theory. It then describes the specifics of
my analytical approach: the comparative framework, the level of analysis and the
selection of cases. Third, it explains what data I collected and how, including the issues
of validity, reliability, validation processes, possible biases, and limitations. Fourth, the
literatures that inform the underlying processes are summarized, to clarify both the
context for and the nature of my own contribution. Finally, it introduces the theoretical
lens that emerged from the analysis, which will be elaborated further in Chapters 9 and
10, following the presentation of three cases in Chapters 5 to 7.
Methodological approach: qualitative and interpretive, and grounded
theory
The phenomenon to be investigated is institutional change. Institutions are the patterns of
human behavior and include norms, rules, and practices, either formal or informal. When
institutions are changing, it therefore means that the norms of operation and the rules of
the game are changing over time and can vary across space. This is exactly where an
analogy with inanimate objects breaks down. Bouncing ping-pong balls represent a
Phenomenon that can be replicated over time and across space with reasonable accuracy
and regularity. Human behavior can be subject to changing perceptions and reasoning.
White powder can cause a very different reaction today compared with last year, and that
may also change over time as we forget the anthrax incident. In other words, institutional
change is an intricate process of human action, where observed behavioral change is not a
mechanical response to an external stimulus, but human response that can arise from
changed reasoning or habit, purposeful or otherwise. This means that the analysis must
deal frontally with evolving and multiple causal linkages; it cannot assume that causal
linkages are constant across time or space. It is essential that the researcher is placed
close enough to the phenomenon to examine the nature of change. As such, arm's length
observation without interaction, seemed to be as inadequate as a survey method.
Interaction through interviewing seemed optimal - with some supplementary-
observations.
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The other critical characteristic of institutional change is that it unfolds over a long period
of time. It therefore required tracing cases over the last 20 years and sometimes more. It
was necessary to couple interviews and observations with archival data to complement or
correct the realities as retained by human memory. The choice of qualitative approach,
based principally on interviews, aided by observation and archival data was also
appropriate given that one principal objective of the research was theory generation about
the mechanisms of institutional change. (Miles and Huberman 1994).
The analysis also takes an interpretive approach, in which my primary role as a researcher
has been to understand events in the light of local meanings and to explain their
occurrence in a language of the audience. The main reason for this interpretive approach
is that, for social phenomena, what the sociologists call social construction, or creation of
shared meanings, is fundamental (Berger and Luckman 1966). People choose their
courses of action according to their own interpretations of circumstances - rather than
basing them on some 'neutral' facts. People can see totally different meanings and have
totally different interpretations of the same circumstances, and may end up acting
differently due to their different perceptions. And yet, if new institutional patterns are to
emerge, where people assume new roles with respect to each other, they must come to
share some basic assumptions about their roles. My role as a researcher has been to
understand the meanings they saw, how they interpreted the events around them and then
how they translated those into their actions. My role was also to translate all this into a
language that is more universally shared by the research community. The idea was to
deal directly with people's "perceptions, assumptions and pre-judgments,
presuppositions" (Van Maanen 1977).
There is an emerging debate about the importance of the role of narratives in human
science. At a minimum, process tracing procedures and narrative accounts, where the
sequence of events within individual cases is traced, are considered uniquely important
for furthering the causal understanding of phenomena (George and McKeown 1985;
Mahoney 1999). Indeed this is arguably the main contribution that qualitative research
can make: clarification of the temporal sequence to verify the direction and the "how" of
causality. Cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner goes further and argues that narrative
understanding is one of two basic cognitive functions, the other being paradigmatic or
logico-scientific (Bruner 1986). Similar sentiments have led other scholars to re-examine
more rigorously the interpretative approaches around narratives (Polkinghorne 1988).
The proposition here is that narratives somehow capture the ways in which humans make
sense of their worlds. While quantitative analyses can provide information about average
causal relations and the general directions of change, case studies help to explore the
dynamics of change. I used narratives and interpretive approaches based on individual
accounts to examine these dynamics.
During institutional change, organizations and/or people rarely act independently.
Instead, they are intensely reflective and cognizant of each others' interpretations and
actions, and habitually factor those into determining their own actions. I regard such
interdependence as central to the phenomenon of institutional change: I certainly could
not select a method where data points are assumed to be independent from each other, as
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in some quantitative methods. Interdependence needed to be explicitly observed and
analyzed, for which qualitative and interpretive approaches are well suited.
Finally, I opted to take the grounded-theory approach, which is an inductive approach
that emphasizes the emergence of categories and properties from the ground up (Glaser
and Strauss 1967). It is suitable for theory generation, particularly if the causal
mechanisms are likely to depend on local meanings and perceptions. It emphasizes
"theoretical sampling" which can be revised as theories are formed in the field - in
contrast to a deductive approach and ex-ante sampling. As many case study researchers
propose, the meaning of a case is revised as the researcher's understanding deepens
(Ragin & Becker, 1992), and as the necessary data for analysis evolve during the work
itself. As argued by Bailyn, research is a cognitive process, where a continuous interplay
between the empirical and conceptual planes can enrich the result (Bailyn 1977). Indeed,
I tried to adhere to this principle even through the final round of writing.
Comparative framework
Level of analysis: Institutional change is about emergence of new rules, norms, and
practices, both formal and informal. As such it requires one to look both at how specific
changes are introduced in a given locale, and how these changes are sustained over time
and institutionalized. For this purpose, I examined emergence of institutional patterns at
three levels of analysis:
(a) groups as represented by 10-15 university-industry relationship sub-cases in each
of the three universities or a total of 40 sub-cases. The unit of data collection is
sometimes individuals as members of the groups; or sometimes groups, as
archival records on the groups were examined;
(b) new institutional patterns that get sustained over time beyond specific individuals
and replicated into new locales, as represented by 1-2 sub cases of new practices
that were "institutionalized" in each of the three organizations, such as "strategic
alliances" and "consortia" in MIT, and embedded laboratories in Cambridge or
"endowed chairs" and joint research in Tokyo. The unit of data collection is
sometimes individuals, sometimes groups; and
(c) organization as represented by three university cases, where the unit of data
collection is sometimes individuals; sometimes groups; and sometimes
organizations, as in organizational statements in the archival records; or as in
individuals consciously representing organizational plans and actions.
Types of comparison. At all levels, three distinct comparative strategies were adopted:
process tracing, structured comparison, and contrasting. The first strategy was to
examine the historical evolution and sequence of events, or process tracing and to
examine a case as a historical narrative where the main axis of comparison is over time
(George and McKeown 1985; Mahoney 1999). For group level sub-cases and
institutional pattern cases, the density of available data varied from a single interview
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with some archival data to 10 interviews with observations as well as archival analysis.
This variation in the density of data was the key shortcoming of the research and will be
discussed later. However, it is unlikely to have brought a systematic bias into the
findings, given the random manner in which the data density varied. The organizational
level case write-ups are presented in chapters 4-6 and are more "balanced" in the density
of inputs.
Second, two types of comparative approaches were used as a tool for analysis: structured
comparison and contrasting. The standard structured comparison is a method that
compares two or more cases along the same set of variables using Mill's methods of
agreement or difference (Skocpol and Somers 1980; George and McKeown 1985). The
selection of the three organizational cases in each setting was based on their position as
leading universities in each national context. For the selection of sub-cases, I take a
variant approach proposed by Locke and Thelen, the so called "apples and oranges"
comparison, where the responses of different institutional systems are treated as different
phenomena, and are examined through salient changes (Locke and Thelen 1995). Sub-
cases of emerging university-industry relationships were selected explicitly according to
this criterion of salience in each organizational context. Comparison across sub-cases
was used to highlight the mechanism of institutional change. These sub-cases were
taken together for each university to obtain an aggregate picture of the patterns of change,
and were in turn compared across universities to highlight the organizational/contextual
factors that gave rise to such patterns.
Contrasting was used as a tool for understanding the characteristics of each university
case (Skocpol and Somers 1980). For instance, comparison with MIT and Cambridge
was used as a dialectic device to highlight the essential features of Tokyo University.
This was particularly helpful in developing descriptive materials, as well as in covering
tacit and basic assumptions in each of the three universities. Based on the approach of
grounded-theory research, before I went to the field, I had merely selected three national
contexts on the basis that these were known cases where there had been and/or were on-
going changes in university-industry relationships. The selection of organizational cases
emerged after the first round of field work and the sub-cases emerged as I developed
categories and theories through the rest of field work. It is because of contrasting that I
came to observe the absence of certain phenomena, such as multiple company
partnerships in Cambridge or single company partnerships in Tokyo.
Selecting countries. There are today global expectations about the new role of research
universities in the knowledge economy, where they are to play a key role in knowledge
creation and dissemination and be the engine of growth (OECD, 2000). The US was the
earliest to set foot on this path. The successes of Route 128 and Silicon Valley led to
wider endorsement of the US model and the central role of universities in such regional
successes (Roberts, 1991; Saxenian, 1994). In the 1980s, such local successes were
overshadowed by the overall sense of economic malaise that dictated the American
economic debate. In the 1990s, the decade-long economic success of the US began to be
specifically associated with the underlying innovation systems, in which universities
played an important role. Just as the image of Japanese successes was destroyed by its
33
decade-long recession in the 1990s, the US model became a model of innovation for the
world to emulate.
The three selected nations, the US, the UK and Japan were chosen for their differing
positions in the global change in the role of research universities. The US was selected as
the original model, where the institutional model was established. The UK was a close
follower, but one in which the institutional changes made were not necessarily based on a
sense of "emulation", partly because they were so close a follower. Japan in the 1990s is
a more direct case of emulation. Just as the US examined and adopted various Japanese
systems and practices at the height of Japanese success in the 1980s, the Japanese began
to examine and adopt the American practices as they struggled with deepening economic
recession in the late 1990s. By looking at such cases, especially the Japanese one as it is
very much an on-going process, I hoped to examine more explicitly both the nature of
institutional inertia as well as how different perceptions and local meanings feed into the
process of change.
Selecting university cases. This dissertation comprises three organizational case studies,
namely of MIT, Cambridge University, and Tokyo University. The three universities
were selected after preliminary field work, as the institutional leaders that have
extraordinarily strong influence on the other universities in the three national contexts.
Each of them represents the national best in science and engineering capabilities, with
elite standing and clear reputation. They are institutions from which policy advice is
sought, as their faculty members habitually sit in government committees, and advisory
boards. They are the pace-setters in legitimating new activities, and are the ones that
establish new types of relationships with industry.
For example, MIT was the first in the US (and possibly in the world) to establish an
Industrial Liaison Program, a corporate program where member companies are given
special help in linking to faculty members of relevant research experience, which has
been emulated around the globe today. MIT was also one of the first to experience the
observable spin-off phenomena through the celebrated Route 128 phenomenon. MIT is
home to many other institutional models of working with industry that have been
emulated by the other universities, ranging from the Media Lab to an educational
innovation such as the Leaders for Manufacturing Program. MIT stands tall above all the
other universities in the number and size of strategic alliances established with individual
companies.
Similarly, Cambridge was the first university in the UK to create a science park to foster
linkages with industry. Their role in start-ups was featured as early as 1985 in a well-
known report called "the Cambridge Phenomenon." Cambridge forged close and early
ties with key industrial players such as Rolls Royce and British Aerospace. They are a
clear leader in establishing their own version of strategic alliances, called embedded
laboratories, where large corporations are invited to establish their research units in
Cambridge to ensure sustained research collaborations.
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Tokyo University was the first university to be established in Japan, and was founded
with an explicit mandate to catch up with the West. Ever since, it has been a leader in the
Japanese national system, as indicated by its top rank in all measures of activities that
involve industries, be they joint or contracted research, or industrial donations. It has also
demonstrated leadership in establishing new mechanisms such as "endowed laboratories"
to bring in more industrial resources into the university, the Center for Collaborative and
International Research, and the Technology Licensing Office.
The three cases introduce an important variation in one critical organizational parameter,
namely, governance. Governance is critically important in institutional change, because
it provides the mechanisms through which formal rules can be instituted or changed. The
configuration and the role of the central administration are likely to be key determinants
of how the university perceives the changing external settings. MIT provides a
centralized example, and indeed is more centralized than its American peers, with a
single faculty structure that bring together all academics from five schools and active
central administration that has extensive resource allocation roles. Cambridge is perhaps
the most decentralized example even within the UK, where universities have the tradition
of less active governing councils than in the US, though there have been significant
changes in the 1980s and 1990s. Tokyo University is a national university and legally an
integral part of the central ministry, making it an example of supra-centralized
governance structures.
Finally, the three universities have specific ties to each other and are cognizant of many
aspects of each other's organization. Cambridge and MIT announced a flagship
partnership in 1999 with large funding commitments from the UK government, with
specific activities just beginning to take place in 2001. Since the bulk of data collection
took place before the relationships formed on the ground, the images captured by this
research are ones that belong to "before" the partnership, and therefore can provide an
interesting basis for future comparison. Tokyo University has a more diffuse relationship
with MIT through multiple ties. Since 1997, Tokyo University and MIT have worked
together in a tri-partite partnership along with a Swiss university on global environmental
issues. The president of Tokyo University brought a team of 20 men and women to MIT
in January 2000, in an unusual one day workshop introducing their research agenda as the
first step in putting themselves on a global map. The Dean of Engineering in MIT was
the only foreigner to serve on the first external evaluation of the faculty of engineering in
Tokyo University in 1999. Cambridge was the first foreign university with which one
Tokyo University center developed a joint research project in the early 1990s, though
there are many informal ties at the level of individuals. The Cambridge-Tokyo link is less
developed than the links each has with MIT.
Selecting sub-cases. About twenty sub-cases in each university, or a total of 57 sub-
cases were selected through the field work both to establish the nature of change in each
setting, and to theorize about a generic mechanism for institutional change that is robust
across the three cases. About ten sub-cases in each university, or a total of 32 sub-cases,
were examined in greater detail with more than 3 interviews. As argued previously, there
is no reason why specific causal links will operate across all settings, and so, theorizing
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across the settings was expected to take place at a higher level of abstraction, leading to
process theories rather than specific causal theories. I selected these sub-cases on the
basis of salience as reported by key informants in each setting in accordance with the
apples and oranges approach proposed by Locke and Thelen (Locke and Thelen 1995).
They argue that salient cases reflect the way in which local institutions interact. While
the overall selection criterion of salience was applied to all three settings, different
procedures had to be used in their identification because of different availability of
information and time periods of change. For instance, the time period used to identify
such sub-cases was longer for MIT, covering 1970s through 1990s, while for Cambridge
the coverage was focused on the 1980s through the 1990s, and Tokyo the late 1980s to
the 1990s. The selection of the sub-cases was very much an emergent and iterative
process throughout the field work.
In MIT, key informants included all central academic administrators related to
engineering I and senior administrators with supportive functions to working with
industry,2 were used to identify two types of new industry-university relationships in the
last 20 years: strategic alliances and different types of consortia. All 9 cases of strategic
alliances were examined, with three cases covered in more depth. Seven specific sub-
cases of consortia were selected based on the Delphi method of soliciting 8 key
informants for their views. These were two historical precedents, (the Polymer
Processing Program in the 1970s and the Material Processing Center Collegium in the
early 1980s), and five more recent initiatives, the Media Lab, the Leadership for
Manufacturing, 42 Volts, Oxygen, Microphotonics Center. Access either in terms of
interviews or archival data was variable across cases and eventually I ended up with 90%
of the total potential interviewees approached. Other milestone events include
developments in the administrative infrastructures such as the reform of the Industrial
Liaison Office in the 1970s, the reformulation of the Technology Licensing Office in the
1980s and modifications of the Corporate Relations and Intellectual Property Councils in
the 1990s.
In Cambridge, key informant interviews and web search led to the category of
partnerships called "embedded laboratories, " and a Cambridge University Brochure that
describes industry-university relationships. From these sources, all examples of
embedded laboratories in non-medical science, and multiple-company consortia were
approached. Though the definition of embedded labs was more variable than the
strategic partnerships of MIT, 10 non-medical cases were examined. Five examples of
laboratories or centers with strong linkages with industry were examined. Since there
were no cases of consortia type arrangements where there were multiple companies
working together, examples of these were actively sought through key informants, with
two identified as a result. In terms of the administrative changes, the change in the
governance, particularly the role of the Vice Chancellor, as well as the on-going reform
of the Research Services were examined.
president, former president, dean of engineering, provost, former dean, chancellor and VP for research
2 Corporate Relations, Industrial Liaison Program, Office of Sponsored Research, Technology Licensing
Office and Intellectual Property Counsellor
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For Tokyo, the identification of emergent relationships was difficult. The lack of ready
information appeared in fact structural, with each of the four potential sources of
information severely constrained in their ability to obtain and process internal
information: central academic administrators of the university; central administrative
officers; faculty/institute level academic leaders; and faculty-level administrative officers.
Although key individuals in each of these categories related to engineering were
approached, none of them came up with either a list of exemplary industry-university
relationships, or categories of relationships.
The central academic administrators are not knowledgeable about the specifics of
relationships since most of the decisions are made at the decentralized faculty/institute
level, and there is no ready flow of information upwards. Central administrative officers
collect data and statistics about numbers and categories of the contractual forms, but
appear to have little sense about what these projects look like. Administrators at the
individual faculty level deal with administrative requests coming from faculty members,
but their work has little to do with the substance of the projects. They therefore tend to
list names of professors that they have dealt with multiple times, rather than for those
with special collaborations known for their uniqueness or success. Deans and directors
do not have a strong grasp of activities because their tenure in office is too short at 1-2
years. There is also a general lack of shared information on campus, such as campus
newsletters or magazines that report on new innovation activities. It is not uncommon for
Tokyo professor to find out about each others' work from national newspapers.
It was therefore necessary for me to undertake substantive work to come up with my own
list of sub-cases. The main approach was to start with a diverse source of contacts and
follow their advice for further contacts until a group of sub-cases were identified. I
started with the leads given by a former Tokyo University President, a former Dean of
engineering, two MIT related sources (one long-time administrator of the Japan Program
and another faculty member who has been working with Tokyo University); two Ministry
of Education and Science (MOES) sources; some specific contacts with strong UT ties,
and available (and limited) faculty background information on the web.
Through such an iterative search process, five categories of university-industry
relationships were identified as emergent and significant in the past 15 years: endowed
laboratories (15+), industry-university collaboration center/labs (2), technology licensing
offices (2); and special research groups (20+). For the endowed labs and research
committees, 3 cases each were selected for inclusion in the study. Although not easy to
find initially, the above categories were "institutionalized" in one way or the other. In
addition, four cases of consortia activities and 2 cases of relatively large-scale single
company projects were identified and examined. It was not possible to get a broader
view of the prevalence of these forms of interaction.
Data collection, validity, reliability and other biases
The data sources include interviews, documents and secondary materials, archival data,
and some observations. Overall, 297 interviews were conducted with 211 individuals. A
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majority of the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, with durations varying
from half an hour to 3 hours at a time. Tape-recording was not used either when
interviewees rejected it, or when it seemed to interfere with the interview process by
making the interviewees feel uncomfortable. On the whole, I was more careful with
industry people, who more often voiced their concern about confidentiality. All
interviews were semi-structured, with key questions evolving over time as my own theory
evolved.
Table 2-1: Number of interviewees and interviews
# of interviewees Repeat interviews Total
US 79 34 113
UK 68 20 88
Japan 65 32 97
Total 212 86 298
Interviewee selection was guided by two principles: (a) coverage of different types of
organizational actors whose differential roles and perspectives seemed important in
shaping culture and institutional logic for university-industry relationships (e.g. academic
staff, administrators and industry representatives); (b) coverage of sub-cases to represent
all salient and new types of relationships with industry in each setting.
Table 2-2: Background of interviewees
Academic Administrators Industry Government Other Total
MIT 35 21 15 0 8 79
Cambridge 34 11 16 2 5 68
Tokyo 34 8 11 7 5 65
103 40 42 9 18 212
Various documents related to individual initiatives were collected as part of the interview
process. These were complemented by archival data obtained from newspaper and
campus news articles. The extent to which archival data were available varied across the
three institutions. In MIT, the Reports to the President for the last 20 years were screened
for major events and developments, and Tech News and Press Releases were searched
extensively. Similarly, the Cambridge Reporter was extensively searched for major news
and developments. For Tokyo University, the Engineering Faculty newsletter and Tokyo
University Newsletters were reviewed.
I was a graduate student at MIT throughout the dissertation, which permitted me to
observe faculty-student interaction on a day to day basis. I had a visitor status in both
Cambridge and Tokyo University, which allowed me to observe how people interacted on
the ground albeit to a much more limited extent. Being a student at MIT, and having
faculty advisors, allowed me far more insight as well as direct observation opportunities
for university-industry interactions. The latter included seminars/conferences as well as
alliance meetings.
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Selection bias. Overall, over 90% of people initially contacted were interviewed, with
the roughly same distribution across the three universities. Concerted efforts were made
to track down the non-respondents, to avoid the possible selection bias against busiest
people who pay little attention to email requests. It was noticeably more difficult to set
up interviews with MIT professors than any other categories of interviewees. The
success rate in interviewing was 63% for the initial contacts at MIT as compared with
77% overall, and 80% based on repeated requests at MIT as compared with 90% as
shown in Table 2-3. To avoid the possibility that the busiest people were systematically
excluded from my sample of interviews, I had to be extremely active in pursuing no-
response cases, particularly at MIT. In more than cases, I contacted the professors on
multiple occasions, sometimes asking others to write to them to prompt responses. The
fact that I managed to track down as many as of these individuals as I have, probably
helped in getting a more balanced view.
Table 2-3: Success rates in interview requests
Upon multiple requests Upon single requests
MIT 71% 56%
Cambridge 94%75%
Tokyo 90%83%
Other 97%94%
Total 86%74%
There may be several reasons for this: as a graduate student at MIT, I may have been less
"interesting" for them to meet. On the other hand, I also found that some MIT professors
felt special obligations to me as MIT educators. It is most likely that these things cancel
out on balance. Another plausible explanation is that MIT professors are too busy to take
note of incoming emails for one reason or the other. This was consistent with the general
manner in which they allocated time to me, in comparison with Cambridge and Tokyo
professors, who appear to be able to be more "interested" in disruptions such as this
interview. There are other corroborating pieces of evidence: similar complaints about
inability to get responses from MIT faculty coming from a diverse range of people
including, ILP officers who are constantly in touch with the academics to set up
meetings; one industry representative resident in MIT representing a strategic alliance;
and an entrepreneur contacting MIT professors for his start-up activities. If all of these
people found it difficult to get responses from MIT professors, clearly it is not just my
student status. Interestingly, academic administrators including the President, who would
be as pressed for time as faculty, were much more accessible, possibly because of
personalized assistance from professional administrators who dealt directly with their
scheduling.
Validity and reliability. Particular attention was paid to verification of individual
accounts through triangulation and repeated interviews in order to raise validity and
reliability. However, to do so, inaccuracies and misrepresentations inherent in individual
interview accounts had to be first considered. As Van Maanen pointed out, infonnants in
the field may lie for a specific reason, be ignorant, or have tacit and taken for granted
assumptions that they may not bother to articulate (Van Maanen 1979). Where there
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were specific concerns of lies and ignorance, efforts were made to triangulate both
through interviews with different types of players who were engaged and through
archival data. Particular attention was paid to interview "bilingual" players who are
either new to the organization or otherwise have significant other experience that makes
them more sensitive to assumptions that are taken for granted within each setting.
Triangulation through multiple interviews was not a simple matter, since difference in
views/accounts could represent either inaccuracy or different perspectives. Since each
interviewee has a different role to play in a relationship, each brings in different values
and perceptions, and indeed, the identification of such differences was one of the
objectives of the research. This situation presents a methodological dilemma in
interpretation. How should the researcher interpret the difference in accounts as
inaccuracy in data rather than structural differences in perspectives? There seemed to be
no simple way of dealing with such an issue other than being mindful of the differences
in my analysis, and being conservative in my interpretations.
It is also the case that in a long interview, the interviewee may not always be consistent
with him/herself. Particular attention was paid in such cases, to "interpret" their words
against what they might have meant, rather than simply following specific words used on
the surface. Quotes were particularly carefully selected, to avoid distortion of taking
them out of context, and to ensure that they represent accurately the nuances of the
speaker, consistent with the rest of the interview.
As important was the validation of findings through repeated interviews. In each
university, several individuals were interviewed multiple times in order to verify the
findings. The most extended example is a case of one senior academic administrator,
who had the 30-year institutional perspective of central administration, with whom 10
one-hour interviews were conducted. The interviews were used to understand how he
saw various roles within the university, and how he saw the historical developments. In
later interviews, clarifying questions were asked to make sure the nuances in previous
discussions were understood correctly. In addition, the final story-line of the three cases
were tested by selected individuals in each of the three settings through discussions
during final validation interviews.
It is not clear that reliability of data collection in terms of replicability of the process is
the valid way in which to evaluate qualitative interpretive research. It is clearly the case
that "my perception" with all my experience and background helped me see what I saw.
Everyone will agree that to say that someone who spoke no Japanese would not get the
same interview data from the Japanese academics is a ridiculous test of replicability. By
the same token, someone who spoke English but had no experience of the collegiate
system in the UK may simply not be able to ask the same questions about the structure of
Cambridge. I therefore argue that the valid issue in interpretive research is to question
the verisimilitude as expressed by people who understand these contexts, and not the
replicability of data collection in a mechanical sense, which in many ways is a trivial
issue. It is the elements of the theory that have to be tested through verisimilitude,
precisely the reason why validation was taken seriously as above. The fact that the
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process of interpretation is not "replicable" leaves me with a problem that this part of my
research remains distinctly "personal" and cannot be made "public." I will discuss this
issue later as a key limitation.
Reliability of data collection within my own research is another matter altogether. While
I tried to maintain certain standards and rough structures of the interviews, the practical
realities of evolving theoretical ideas as well as details such as availability of
interviewees did introduce variations in my own data collections. Some of these were
inevitable progress, others were undoubtedly introducing noise. For instance, there were
interviews where I felt that I extracted more honest responses because of the way the
interview dynamics worked. By the same token, there were interviews where I felt I did
not get as far. Interviewing is a social process, and there is no escaping from the reality
that one shrug could make the subsequent responses different. On average, where I got
less, I probably managed to recover both from triangulation and repeated interviews.
Researcher background and exposure to the three sites. The choice of the three
universities was also guided by my personal background which provided me with
preliminary understanding of the settings, which helped enhance validity and reliability
of data collection as well as interpretation and analysis. I was an undergraduate of
physics in Oxford, UK, another university that has collegiate structures similar to
Cambridge. I had worked as a visiting researcher in an engineering laboratory in Tokyo
University in 1984 for six months and spoke the language fluently. I was a graduate
student at MIT throughout the period of this dissertation.
I had greater exposure to MIT because of my student status. I lived near MIT for four
years visiting the campus almost daily when I was not traveling, although my principal
work site was my home. My interviews at MIT were therefore evenly spread out over the
course of 2 years. I interviewed people at Cambridge through four visits: three one-week
visits and a three-month period over one summer spread out in the course of a year and
half. I visited Tokyo University four times in all spread over a year: one week, one
month, 3 weeks and 2 weeks. For both Cambridge and Tokyo, I also made final 2 day
visits in 2002 to discuss and validate my findings.
My relationship with the University of Tokyo became somewhat "clinical" in that several
of their professors began to ask for my findings and comments towards the end of my
dissertation (Schein 1995). Two professors whom I had previously interviewed visited
MIT and asked for my comments on MIT's relationships with industry and what they
might do to develop better relationships with industry in the future. There was one
occasion where several professors from the University of Tokyo had an informal
workshop on the future of higher education, where I was asked to present my findings.
These interactions were particularly informative in revealing aspects of the University
that had been hidden to me.
All in all, my understanding of MIT as an organization is more complete than those of the
other two. For this reason, I selected a couple of people from Tokyo University and
Cambridge to whom I went back towards the end of my data collection and presented and
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discussed my general understanding of how things work in their universities, to test my
understanding.
Other sources of error and biases. There were two other methodological concerns:
selection bias and sensemaking. The question of selection bias was strongest in the case
of sub-case selection for MIT consortia, and simple relationship examples for Tokyo
University. For the former, since there were so many cases, and they were so diverse,
picking up on those that are novel in some ways, was not easy. Two approaches were
taken to mitigate the effect. A careful method for case selection, based on choices made
by multiple key informants, helped in identifying a reasonable set. Secondly, for those
sub-set of consortia that anybody mentioned as innovative, I looked through their
website, at least to understand their profile of activities. Selecting the right sub-cases
within Tokyo was methodologically fraught mainly because of the lack of information
available. I am comforted by the fact that no one that I met could suggest any other and
better list of sub-cases.
Sensemaking was the second methodological problem that could bring in divergence
between how interviewees saw things at the time and their current perception of the
historical events (Weick 1995). The principal way in which I dealt with this problem
was the inclusion of "on-going" sub-cases. Whereas for the historical sub-cases, active
sensemaking of the interviewees was inevitable, since they would have thought about
what happened, what they did and why they took the actions, in light of the final
outcome. In the on-going events, the impact of individual sensemaking is less salient or
systematic, since they are not clear about where these events are leading to. To the extent
possible, I also tried to follow the sequence of events through repeat interviews, so that I
could see how "sensemaking" changed over time. While such longitudinal data
collection under the current research was neither sufficient nor systematic enough for
separate analysis of sensemaking, there was sufficient evidence that interviewees' own
sensemaking evolved over time. For this reason, I explicitly assumed throughout my
analysis that all the accounts simply reflected the interviewees' thoughts on the day of the
interview, and not necessarily their past thoughts.
It was clear in some interviews that my questions also could induce people to engage in
sensemaking. Some interviewees even thanked me for asking good questions that forced
them to think more clearly. It was clear that interviewing was too interactive a process to
avoid sensemaking on the spot. This methodological "flaw", in fact, provided the key
insight for theorizing about institutional change as will be shown in chapter 8. I therefore
reserve the full discussion of the implications of sensemaking in data collection until that
chapter. Also, given the triangulation within sub-cases from multiple sources, most of
the individual sensemaking would be treated as individual-specific perception, which is
less problematic. What is much more problematic is if there was collective sensemaking
about the history, and it is this collective sensemaking that I will address fully in chapter
10.
Finally, the non-public nature of interpretation remains a problem: I constantly used myjudgment in a way that cannot be shown explicitly. In the extreme case, if another
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person conducted this research with exactly the same interviews, and read all the
interview notes, they may arrive at different interpretations because of the different
perspectives they come with. Even though I have used verisimilitude as an alternative
criterion to validate my findings, even that process of "validation" remains opaque to
outsiders, because presumably, I don't just listen and take in all of the comments made by
these individuals met during validation interviews. Rather, I observe their reactions,
make sense of their reactions and make adjustments to the extent they seem feasible. I
will reflect upon this particular limitation, which is pervasive in qualitative research, in
chapter 11.
The literature review: institutional change, boundaries and narrative
identity
What does the existing literature tell us about the phenomenon of institutional change? I
argue that there are five strands of literature that contribute to our understanding of the
phenomenon. The first strand is the old institutionalism - or the literature pertaining to
organizational analysis in the Weberian tradition, including comparative organizations,
which provides a critical insight about the nested nature of institutions, particularly in the
context of organizations. The second strand is new institutional theory in organizational
sociology, that describes the process of institutional change that is motivated by factors
other than technical efficiency, such as legitimacy. The third strand is organizational
culture, built on the traditions of anthropologists and sociologists, that adds different
lenses to understand the nature of differences between communities such as academics
and industrialists. Fourth, practice theories provide an alternative way of looking at
boundaries between different communities, with recent works on collaboration across
boundaries. Finally, I argue that the literature on narrative identity provides a useful lens
for understanding the role of individuals.
Institutional order, logics and comparative organizations
There are many pieces of work that focus attention on the role of institutional order or
logics in the Weberian tradition. Weber's argument that the Protestant Ethics supported
the evolution of capitalism implies the existence of a coherent set of practices such as
religion, that are based upon a set of shared values or assumptions. Crozier's analysis of
a match making factory, for instance, illuminated how an organization and its
dysfunctions may reflect a wider set of French societal practices (Crozier 1967). Dore's
comparison between a Japanese factory and a British one also highlights how
organizations reflect a set of nested practices that may belong more broadly to a social
setting (Dore 1973). There are other comparative works that highlight the nested nature
of the institutions and the impact of local culture upon them (Geertz 1963; Wilson 1968).
Institutions often form higher-order societal logics, or institutional logics, such as market,
state, democracy, family or religion, which may be contradictory to each other (Friedland
and Alford 1991). The past literature on institutional logics has been helpful in
demonstrating that there have been historical changes (Fligstein 1987; Fligstein 1990;
Barley and Kunda 1992; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Thornton 2002). However, there
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has not been as much research on how these changes take place, with some exceptions
(Fligstein 1990).
Institutional change in new institutionalism
The new institutional theory in organizational sociology introduced the idea that
organizations adopt changes for reasons other than technical efficiency (Meyer and
Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). DiMaggio and Powell proposed a
framework for understanding how a group of organizations influence each other through
an isomorphic process, with a formation of an "organizational field" (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983). Organizational field is a powerful construct comprising not only
organizations within a given sector of the economy, but including regulators and other
influential bodies; these form a logical set of actors that collectively define what is
legitimate. By recognizing that the "environment" is not a separate and inert "thing" that
organizations face, but that organizations themselves constitute the environment,
institutional theory introduced a recursive mechanism of environmental influence on
organizations. The original proposition was simply that organizations would become
similar to each other through three distinct mechanisms of isomorphism: coercive,
normative, and mimetic. Subsequent theoretical refinements clarified that even
straightforward imitation can lead to innovation, given that imitators have their own
internal institutions that could distort and influence the process (Westney 1987) or that
organizations may belong to multiple organizational fields (Westney 1999), and in the
extreme, organizational fields may even form around specific issues (Hoffman 1999).
Guillen has argued that competition motivates strategic differentiation, rather than
mimicry (Guillen 1999).
In the new institutionalism literature, one central question under active debate is how
institutional change takes place. The lack of focus on institutional change has in the past
been the main target for criticism in institutional theory (Zucker 1988; Powell 1991;
Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997). Recently, there has been a concerted effort made to
address this issue (Dacin, Goodstein et al. 2002), both theoretically and empirically
(Greenwood, Suddaby et al. 2002). And yet, the process of structuration, the main
mechanism for institutional change, remains theoretically under-defined, and empirically
unexamined. The question remains, what happens when an organization faces multiple
isomorphic pulls?
There are two related issues. First, there remains insufficient emphasis on
institutionalization as a process (Tolbert and Zucker 1996; Barley and Tolbert 1997).
There is a need for clarification about how a new institutional pattern gets created and
sustained in a given locale and be replicated. Second, there remains the issue of how
existing fields influence the structuration process. The question is what happens at the
boundary of multiple organizational fields and what individuals do at these boundaries.
In the past, these questions have been addressed principally through macro-historical
analysis based principally on archival data on the one hand (Westney 1987; Brint and
Karabel 1989; Holm 1995; Zucker and Darby 1996; Zucker et al. 2002; Greenwood,
Suddaby et al. 2002); and examination of micro-level dynamics at a given locale on the
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other (Barley 1986; Zilber 2002). A middle range analysis that straddles across multiple
levels of analysis, and historical and comparative case studies (Scott 1995), may add
important insights to our understanding of institutionalization process.
Culture theorists
Culture theories provide an interesting alternative to thinking about the underlying
structures. Based on traditions built in anthropology and sociology, this school of
thought focuses on the webs of shared meanings in communities (Geertz 1973). Geertz's
famous expose about how the meaning of twitching one eye could be perceived
differently, either as a wink or an inscrutable physical act, goes a long way towards
explaining that action is always interpreted in a context of shared (or not shared)
meanings. The strength of the culturists is exactly that: they take seriously the way
culture influences the very meanings of every thing we see. The literature on
organizational culture provides a useful focus on communities that are more confined
than nations or regions and provides some tools for analyzing interactions between local
communities. Schein argued that organizations can have their idiosyncratic cultures, as
represented by artifacts, values as well as shared assumptions (Schein 1992; Schein
1996). Schein developed a multi-level framework of culture comprising artifacts and
behavior that appear at the surface level, supported by espoused values held by
organizational members and basic assumptions that are shared, but that are often so taken
for granted, that they are rarely articulated. Schein's simple framework helps us
understand that the "behavior" as it appears on the surface can have very different
meanings depending on the supporting values and basic assumptions.
Schein's culture thesis has been criticized for its taking organization as a simple
monolith. An alternative perspective that organizations comprise multiple sub-cultures
was proposed (Van Maanen and Barley 1984), with the implication that there can be
internal boundaries within organizations between sub-cultures that are difficult to bridge.
Yet another alternative was that organizations do not comprise stable cultures or
subcultures, but that they are constantly in a state of flux (Martin 1992; Martin 2002).
Martin criticizes Schein's integrated and Van Maanen's differentiated culture
perspectives as static and simplistic, and argues that what is shared and what is not shared
remains highly ambiguous in the real world. Further she argues that boundaries are never
clear-cut, and that they are constantly changing, yet contends that the three perspectives
on organizational culture can be seen as complementary.
Cultural theories are helpful in clarifying that boundaries do exist between communities:
boundaries are what divide communities with different values. Scholars appear to agree
that examining cultural boundaries can provide interesting insight on culture and its
workings (Swidler 1986; Martin 2002). Like institutional theory, the cultural perspectives
have been criticized for their emphasis on stability and the lack of focus on change.
Schein argued that organizational leaders can bring in and tweak values and over time
may influence basic assumptions. However, the mechanism for doing so, he implies
rather than explains. Hatch proposed a dynamic model of cultural change, based on
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Schein's constructs, which is conceptually exciting, but remains highly abstract and yet to
become empirically grounded (Hatch 1993).
Practice theories and structuration
In the structuration framework of Giddens, he argues that structure and agency have
reciprocal influence, and that structure is not an objective reality but an enacted one
(Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984). When it comes to demonstrating the nature of agency,
however, there is still some ways to go. The theory remains abstract even with additional
constructs such as "scripts" (Barley and Tolbert 1997) or "interpretative flexibility", and
empirical data show little more than the fact that something other than "structural"
determinism is at work.
Bourdieu developed a more elaborate framework for understanding the reciprocal nature
of influence between structure and agency (Bourdieu 1977). He argues that habitus
represents a cognitive structure inside an individual, influencing the way he/she sees the
world, but that habitus influences individual action only as a mere disposition, rather than
as a deterministic structure. The real world comprises "fields," where various "games"
are being played out by people. As individuals engage in fields of play, they are
influenced by power structures inherent in them, and these in turn influence the further
development of habitus. In other words, habitus is a cognitive structure that is built
cumulatively through experience. However, to the extent that habitus reflects multiple
fields as experienced by the individual in the course of his/her life, its effect on individual
action is different from those of existing field structures. Also, Bourdieu argues that
individuals have agency to the extent there is a certain "fuzzy logic" with which these
structures relate to individual action. Fields are structures that exist out there, but have
fuzzy influence upon habitus, and habitus in turn shapes individual action in a fuzzy way.
This margin of error is then individual discretion. Bourdieu's framework is perhaps one
of the most comprehensive within social theory, and goes a long way to clarifying the
duality of structure and agency. Particularly interesting is his clarification of "fields"
which define interests and power. In Bourdieu's world, significant boundaries occur in
between fields defined by different games, interests.
Recently, Bourdieu's framework has been used by organizational theorists to add new
insight to the collaborative work across functional boundaries (Levina 2001; Black 2002;
Carlile 2002; Carlile 2002). Carlile argues that different communities of practice operate
as different "thought worlds" and create knowledge boundaries that are not easy to deal
with ((Fleck 1978 (originally 1935); Douglas 1986; Dougherty 1992). According to him,
it is not only that it is hard to communicate across the boundaries because meanings are
different. Different communities of practice have different interests and different things
at stake. The fact that players come with different goals and interests, creates complex
inter-dependencies between them that are invisible to the players, but powerfully at work
in their interactions (Carlile 2002a, Carlile 2002b). Through ethnographic work on
product development teams, Carlile argued that joint work among participants can be
facilitated by certain types of "boundary objects" (Carlile 1997). With these recent
empirical works, Bourdieu's framework has come a long way in illuminating the
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dynamics of change at the boundaries. While Carlile's boundary objects and Levina's
genre systems do much to push the frontier in understanding what boundary processes
look like, neither of them provide a focus on how the boundaries are crossed and how
new meanings get created. The mechanism for agency remains unclear, leaving the
framework looking more deterministic.
Narratives and storytelling.
I turn to the literature on narratives and story telling in search of this image of agency.
Narratives have come into limelight in social science in the last two decades, and appear
particularly suitable for expressing the "fuzzy" manner in which structures operate. As
the literature on the narratives and story telling has been expanding explosively, it is
critically important to understand and distinguish between different strands within it.
Several authors noted distinctions to be made along the functions of the narratives with
respect to research (Ewick and Silbey 1995; Czarniawska 1998): (a) narratives as outputs
of research; (b) narratives as inputs or data to be collected and analyzed; or (c) narratives
as a theoretical construct to describe a mechanism. Narratives are powerful outcomes of
research, ones that reflect underlying epistemological assumptions about the role of
researchers and how they relate to the field and data (Van Maanen 1988). Clark was one
of the first to introduce the concept of using narratives or stories in the field of
organizational theory (Clark 1971). He was followed by other researchers, who created a
progressively more rigorous tradition of using narratives as an input to research, for
instance, Martin et al in analyzing 7 types of uniqueness claim stories that arise in
organizations; or Boje who explored the embedded nature of stories and argued that
stories do not often come in tidy complete forms, but that they get developed and
performed in social settings through negotiation and enactment (Boje 1991). Others have
followed and developed much more detailed mechanisms and procedures for analyzing
narratives as created in organizations (Feldman and Skoldberg 2000), leading to a whole
field of discourse analysis, where the linguistic use in a given context is examined
(Putnam et al 2002). Most of these authors assume a certain social role of narratives.
Clark's piece on organizational saga argues that organizational narratives represent a
mechanism through which organizational ethos is created and reproduced (Clark 1971).
As Boje argued in his field analysis, "stories" often arise in incomplete forms, remain
implicit, and not all of them are articulated in a structured manner. In this sense,
"organizational narratives" may not be an empirical reality appearing in complete texts,
but a theoretical construct that is enacted as well as articulated (Boje 1991).
There have been theoretical developments in several distinct disciplines with respect to
social roles of narratives (Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska 1998). On the one hand,
narratives provide a mechanism through which people communicate, understand each
other, and create new meanings. On the other, narratives provide a mechanism through
which individuals make sense of themselves and their actions. Literary theorist Barthes
believed that the role of narratives was pervasive. Narratives help individuals construe
what they are and where they are headed. Narratives also contribute to creation and
maintenance of shared beliefs and transmission of values (Barthes 1966/77; Polkinghorne
1988; Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska 1998). In philosophy, Maclntyre argued that
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social life is a narrative and that human beings are distinct from other beings by the virtue
of their ability to account (MacIntyre 1981; Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska 1998). For
psychologists, the essential argument is that narrative understanding constitutes one of
the two basic modes of cognitive functioning along with the logico-scientific mode or
paradigmatic mode (Bruner 1986; Polkinghorne 1988). Polkinghorne argues that
"narrative is a meaning structure that organizes events and human actions into a whole,
thereby attributing significance to individual actions and events according to their effect
on the whole." The narrative turn also had a special appeal to psychologists and other
practitioners whose professional practice relied heavily on the use of individual narratives
(Polkinghorne 1988). Ricoeur proposed a conception of self-identity based on his
analysis of narrative (Ricoeur 1988; Ricoeur 1992; Ezzy 1998). For him, narratives
interact with "action" in two ways. Past actions lead to narratives that make sense of
them; and narratives prefigure future actions. In a social world, there is a third step
where these actions are observed by others who will in turn create other narratives to
interpret them (Ricoeur 1984; Ezzy 1998). Narratives provide a backbone of continuity
for individual actions as they live through time, creating coherence over time, but
remaining fluid and changeable. This conception of narrative identity has led to further
theorizing in the role of narratives in social settings. For instance, Somers argues that
there are social narratives that are beyond individuals' power to create, but they are
appropriated by individuals to form the basis of social identity (Somers 1994). Narratives
or stories are abstract entities rather than empirical realities. They represent both the
outputs and the mechanism of the "sensemaking" process that underlies both the
formation of individual identities and the sharing of understandings (Weick 1995).
In summary, there is a convergence of view on the dual roles of narratives. On the one
hand, narratives or narrating can function within an individual as a mechanism for
identity formation and a basis for future action, and on the other as a mechanism for
sharing and creating meaning among people. Pentland summarizes that the emergent
focus on narratives is about ability to be the "ether" of social existence (Pentland 1999).
Narratives are a multiple-level construct in the sense that they are a mechanism that can
operate at the individual, group and organizational levels. They can be instrumental in
individual identity formation, but can also play an important role in social life, as they
create new meanings and communicate them to others. There have been many implicit
and explicit theoretical claims on how narratives can play a role in institutional change
(Czamiawska 1997). However, past empirical work tended to focus on discourse
analysis (Putman et al 2002), treating existing narratives as inputs, which often implicitly
assumed certain roles of narratives in organizations, but without explicitly elaborating on
them. On the other hand, there have been many theoretical developments that are based
on the concept of narratives, as exemplified by Ricoeur's narrative identity, but without
the empirical grounding. The confusion is perhaps confounded by the fact that narratives
in Ricoeur's or Somers' discussions may not always appear in dialogues, but may indeed
be implicit. The terms "narratives" or "stories" are used as theoretical constructs rather
than empirical data. It seems possible to push this frontier a little further, to dwell on
"narrating" or "storytelling" as a metaphor for the process of institutional change, but in
the context of a specific empirical reality.
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Proposed theoretical lens
The grounded theory approach led me to a gradual formation of a theoretical lens, that
complements the existing literature. Specifically, I propose to draw on two conceptual
frameworks to highlight the interdependent nature of structure and agency as in
structuration theories (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Barley and Tolbert 1997):
boundaries that separate individuals; and story telling that helps individuals enact and
change the boundaries. By explicitly looking at structure and agency as separate
mechanisms, I will highlight the respective functions they serve. Boundaries stabilize
behavior and story-telling creates a new variation. And yet, these boundaries are not
independent of individuals; they are enacted by them.
I argue that in order to understand the process whereby people begin to share meanings,
one must first of all understand not only the nature of the different "thought worlds"
(Fleck 1978 (originally 1935); Douglas 1986; Dougherty 1992) but the nature of the
boundaries that separate them, and the manner in which boundary-crossing takes place.
Examination of boundaries has been highlighted as an important agenda (Abbott 1995;
Martin 2002). It makes empirical sense to view university-industry relationships from
this perspective, since academics and industrialists do indeed live in different worlds with
different values, norms, and interests, and it is precisely this sense of working with the
dual worlds, that makes them controversial and difficult. The two worlds can be
understood either as two cultures (Van Maanen and Barley 1984)or as different fields of
practice (Bourdieu 1977). Boundaries can powerfully influence the subsequent pattern of
interaction. I propose that boundaries that separate industrialists and academics can be
described in terms of three inter-related dimensions: membership, knowledge, and
physical space. These dimensions are not strictly orthogonal, in the sense that knowledge
cannot be isolated from people, nor physical space from the sense of membership. And
yet, they are categories of "things" that can "belong" to an organizations, and there are
distinct and tangible sets of rules and norms along these three dimensions. In other
words, they are conceptually separate, if empirically confounded and interdependent
categories.
There are also internal boundaries that separate sub-cultures inside each university.
Disciplinary communities create boundaries that are not easy to cross. Similarly,
administrators and academics can have powerfully different values, norms and interests.
Again, how these boundaries are defined and can influence the way they work together,
which in turn has a powerful influence on the way new relationships get institutionalized
in the university.
At the same time, organizational boundaries are not "fixed" structures. They are
sustained and changed through on-going activities of individuals (Giddens 1984).
Academics follow the rules and norms, or create their own interpretations, or even violate
the norms purposefully, and it is the locus of their and industrialists' or administrators'
actions that pave the notion of the boundaries today. Boundaries become boundaries,
because people enact them every day. I pay particular attention to the time when
people's enacting may diverge from the past in one way or other. I argue that there is
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then a need to "account" and explain to the others why the new behavior makes sense.
People enact the boundaries and create new ones by creating new relationships that in
turn give rise to new meanings. I propose to use the metaphor of story telling to highlight
the underlying mechanism for this boundary maintenance and change. More specifically,
I argue that collective work in such a circumstance begins with a process of meaning
making through story-telling and sharing.
In summary, I argue that structures as represented by boundaries among people or across
communities, and agency as represented by story-telling can help us understand the
nature of processes that underlie the emergence of new institutional patterns.
L
PART II: WHAT HAS CHANGED?
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Chapter 3:
National level perspectives
The overall purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of national contexts in shaping
university-industry relationships. To this end, this chapter examines the historical
developments in the three national settings to address three questions. First, what have
been the changes in the role of universities in national research? Second, what have been
the changes in university-industry relationships? Third, how have the commonly cited
factors, affect or not affect such an evolution? In this respect, there are three usual
suspects: (a) the changes in the overall level of government funding may prompt
resource-dependent universities to respond; (b) government regulatory policies and
funding programs specific to university-industry relationships may influence universities
to behave differently; and (c) changing industrial expectations to work with universities
may have influenced the pattern of collaboration.
The chapter is structured as follows. For each of the three countries, there are two main
sections. The first of these is a discussion of the national historical context, starting with
the overall role of universities in the national R&D followed by a description of the
historical changes in industrial funding of university research. This is to clarify the
nature of university-industry relationships in each setting as well as to describe the
changes that have been taking place. The second main section discusses the three
commonly cited factors as listed above, that could provide alternative explanations for
such changes. In the final section, I conclude that these factors matter, but they do not
operate evenly over time or across space, and that in order to understand their influence,
it is important to examine specific organizational perspectives.
3-1. US
3-1-1. Historical background in national R&D
In the US, the role of universities in research was shaped heavily by the experience
during and following World War II. Prior to the war, in 1940 for instance, national
research was dominated by industry, which undertook about 68% of total research, while
government and universities trailed behind at 19% and 9% respectively. Though there is
little evidence, the wide-spread understanding is that much of the academic research in
those days was applied in nature, and yet, specific collaborations across sectors were not
common. "Institutional partnerships among the Nation's three research sectors were the
exception rather than the rule." (National Science Board 2000)
The way in which the national scientific capacity was mobilized for military technology
during World War II was significantly different from the experience of the first World
War. As a result of strong recommendations from Vannevar Bush, the then Director of
the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development and former Dean of
Engineering at MIT, the US took a decentralized and collegial approach where scientists
54
were funded for various projects at universities and industries. This was strikingly
different from the approach taken during World War I, where scientists were recruited
and placed into federal laboratories. (National Science Board 2000). The new approach
was "superbly effective ", as exemplified by the development of radar in the Radiation
Laboratory at MIT, where scientists and engineers were brought together to work on this
national project.
In 1944, President Roosevelt asked Vannevar Bush for advice on how the experience of
the mobilization of science, including engineering, during World War II could be applied
to the peacetime goals of better health, wealth creation and improved living standards.
Bush's answer is encapsulated in his seminal report, "Science - the Endless
Frontier"(Bush 1945), which recommended strongly continued federal funding for
scientific research in universities to support the progress of basic science. Key
institutions such as the National Science Foundation were formed directly for that
purpose.
What happened subsequently was an unprecedented growth of university science with
federal support. Universities became more prominent as performers of research and their
overall share of the national research budget grew rapidly from 7.8% in 1953 to 11.8% in
1968 and again from 12.2% in 1985 to 16.0% in 1994, declining a little in the late 1990s
to 14.0% in the 1998 as shown in Table 3-1.
Changing university-industry relationships in the US
The picture of industry funding of university research is not surprising given such
national developments. As indicated in Table 3-2, during the post-war period, there was
a steady decline in the industry funding share of university research, from 7.6% in 1953
to the all time low of 2.5% in 1966-1967, showing how the modest increases in industrial
funding were dwarfed by large increases in government funding. In the 1970s, the
industrial share increased moderately from 2.7% in 1970 to 4.1% in 1980, accelerated in
the 1980s to 6.9% by 1990, and stabilized at just over 7% in the late 1990s, at about 1.9
billion US dollars in 1998 (National Science Board 2000). The examination of the
absolute level in constant prices provides a similar picture: a stagnation during the 1960s;
a modest increase in the 1970s, a double digit annual growth in the 1980s, stabilizing to a
more modest level of annual increase in the 1990s. Albeit small in the overall university
R&D, it has been the most rapidly growing source of funds in the last 30 years.
Government funding. The increase in university research income from industry is often
said to reflect a decline in federal support. However this pattern of industrial funding of
university research, when set alongside the reported trends in government spending, does
not support this view. As shown in Fig 3-1, federal R&D spending grew rapidly in the
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Table 3-1: US R&D expenditure shares by performing sector: 1953-98
year Federal Industry U&C FFRDC non-profit
incl.FFRDCs incl.FFRDCs U&C FFRDC all
1953 19.7% 70.3% 7.8% 2.5% 2.5% 2.2%
1955 15.5% 73.9% 8.4% 3.0% 5.1% 2.1%
1960 13.1% 76.6% 7.9% 2.8% 6.6% 1.9%
1961 13.6% 74.9% 8.7% 3.0% 7.5% 2.1%
1962 14.0% 73.3% 9.5% 3.2% 6.8% 2.3%
1963 14.6% 72.1% 10.0% 3.3% 6.6% 2.3%
1964 15.5% 70.7% 10.5% 3.3% 6.8% 2.2%
1965 15.6% 70.0% 11.0% 3.1% 6.0% 2.3%
1966 15.0% 70.4% 11.2% 3.0% 5.5% 2.4%
1967 14.8% 70.2% 11.7% 3.0% 5.7% 2.4%
1968 14.2% 70.7% 11.8% 2.9% 5.6% 2.4%
1969 14.6% 70.4% 11.6% 2.8% 5.5% 2.5%
1970 15.8% 68.8% 12.0% 2.8% 5.4% 2.6%
1971 16.4% 68.0% 12.2% 2.7% 5.3% 2.6%
1972 16.3% 68.0% 12.3% 2.7% 5.3% 2.7%
1973 15.6% 68.7% 12.3% 2.7% 5.1% 2.8%
1974 15.4% 68.6% 12.4% 2.8% 5.3% 3.0%
1975 15.6% 67.8% 13.0% 3.0% 5.7% 3.0%
1976 14.9% 68.4% 13.1% 3.2% 6.1% 2.9%
1977 14.3% 68.6% 13.6% 3.6% 6.4% 2.9%
1978 14.3% 68.2% 14.0% 3.7% 6.6% 2.9%
1979 13.5% 68.8% 14.1% 3.8% 6.6% 2.9%
1980 12.4% 70.3% 13.9% 3.7% 6.5% 2.7%
1981 11.9% 71.7% 13.2% 3.4% 6.1% 2.5%
1982 11.8% 72.6% 12.6% 3.2% 5.7% 2.4%
1983 12.0% 72.5% 12.4% 3.3% 5.7% 2.4%
1984 11.6% 73.1% 12.2% 3.3% 5.6% 2.4%
1985 11.4% 73.4% 12.2% 3.2% 5.4% 2.4%
1986 11.2% 73.0% 13.0% 3.4% 5.4% 2.4%
1987 10.8% 73.0% 13.6% 3.5% 5.4% 2.2%
1988 10.7% 72.5% 14.1% 3.5% 5.4% 2.4%
1989 10.7% 71.9% 14.4% 3.4% 5.3% 2.6%
1990 10.3% 72.2% 14.4% 3.3% 5.2% 2.7%
1991 9.5% 72.7% 14.5% 3.2% 5.1% 2.9%
1992 9.6% 72.1% 14.9% 3.2% 5.1% 2.9%
1993 10.0% 71.0% 15.6% 3.2% 4.8% 3.0%
1994 9.7% 70.8% 16.0% 3.1% 4.9% 3.0%
1995 9.4% 72.1% 15.3% 2.9% 4.6% 2.8%
1996 8.5% 73.6% 14.8% 2.8% 4.3% 2.7%
1997 8.0% 74.6% 14.4% 2.6% 4.0% 2.7%
1998 prelim. 7.6% 75.4% 14.0% 2.4% 3.8% 2.6%
Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2000
FFRDCs= Federally Funded Research and Developrnent Centers, U&Cs=
universities and colleges
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Table 3-2: US R&D expenditures in universities and colleges by funding source: 1953-1998
(Millions of constant 1992 dollars)
Performing
sector: Universities & colleges excluding FFRDCs
Industry as % Industry as
of university % of
Funding Federal 1970 annual 5-yr ave excluding university
incl.
sector: Total Govt. Industry index increase increase FFRDCs FFRDCs
1953 1,350 738 102 47 7.6% 5.1%
1955 1,649 921 130 60 13.0% 7.9% 5.1%
1960 3,028 1,945 172 80 0.0% 5.8% 5.7% 3.7%
1965 6,388 4,675 166 77 0.6% -0.7% 2.6% 1.9%
1966 7,082 5,201 175 81 5.4% 0.6% 2.5% 1.8%
1967 7,682 5,627 194 90 10.9% 2.7% 2.5% 1.9%
1968 7,912 5,738 208 97 7.2% 4.4% 2.6% 2.0%
1969 7,878 5,610 209 97 0.5% 4.8% 2.7% 2.0%
1970 7,931 5,530 215 100 2.9% 5.3% 2.7% 2.1%
1971 8,001 5,488 225 105 4.7% 5.2% 2.8% 2.2%
1972 8,250 5,655 236 110 4.9% 4.0% 2.9% 2.2%
1973 8,365 5,690 254 118 7.6% 4.1% 3.0% 2.4%
1974 8,358 5,615 270 126 6.3% 5.3% 3.2% 2.5%
1975 8,481 5,702 280 130 3.7% 5.4% 3.3% 2.5%
1976 8,751 5,879 294 137 5.0% 5.5% 3.4% 2.5%
1977 9,163 6,098 326 152 10.9% 6.7% 3.6% 2.6%
1978 9,816 6,541 357 166 9.5% 7.0% 3.6% 2.7%
1979 10,347 6,967 388 180 8.7% 7.5% 3.7% 2.7%
1980 10,699 7,185 437 203 12.6% 9.3% 4.1% 3.0%
1981 10,733 7,074 476 221 8.9% 10.1% 4.4% 3.3%
1982 10,834 6,952 517 240 8.6% 9.7% 4.8% 3.6%
1983 11,278 7,121 590 274 14.1% 10.6% 5.2% 3.9%
1984 12,057 7,570 682 317 15.6% 11.9% 5.7% 4.1%
1985 13,126 8,134 802 373 17.6% 12.9% 6.1% 4.5%
1986 14,321 8,721 925 430 15.3% 14.2% 6.5% 4.8%
1987 15,419 9,352 1,000 465 8.1% 14.1% 6.5% 4.8%
1988 16,516 9,980 1,084 504 8.4% 12.9% 6.6% 5.0%
1989 17,422 10,381 1,183 550 9.1% 11.6% 6.8% 5.2%
1990 18,093 10,614 1,246 580 5.3% 9.2% 6.9% 5.3%
1991 18,702 10,956 1,277 594 2.5% 6.7% 6.8% 5.3%
1992 19,383 11,523 1,321 614 3.4% 5.7% 6.8% 5.4%
1993 19,972 11,994 1,352 629 2.3% 4.5% 6.8% 5.4%
1994 20,579 12,379 1,378 641 1.9% 3.1% 6.7% 5.4%
1995 21,065 12,654 1,431 666 3.8% 2.8% 6.8% 5.5%
1996 21,656 12,946 1,511 703 5.6% 3.4% 7.0% 5.7%
1997 22,408 13,309 1,589 739 5.2% 3.8% 7.1% 5.8%
1998 prelim. 23,374 13,805 1,682 782 5.9% 4.5% 7.2% 5.9%
SOURCE; National Scienice Board, Science & Engineering Indiators 2000
FFRDCs = Federally Fun ded Research and Development Centers; U&C = universities and colleges
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Table 3-3: U.S. basic research expenditures by federal government by performers: 1953-98
(Millions of constant 1992 dollars)
Performer Total Index % 5 yr ave U&C
% of inci % of
(1970=100) increase increase U&Cs total FFRDC total
Calendar year"
1953
1955
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
prelim.
1,313
1,577
3,412
7,612
8,083
8,605
8,678
8,489
8,207
7,981
7,946
8,065
8,178
8,114
8,513
9,069
9,803
10,114
10,318
10,269
10,452
11,049
11,621
12,152
12,847
13,436
14,082
14,946
15,060
15,766
15,732
16,011
15,937
15,817
16,624
17,236
17,955
16
19
42
93
98
105
106
103
100
97
97
98
100
99
104
111
119
123
126
125
127
135
142
148
157
164
172
182
184
192
192
195
194
193
203
210
10.8%
17.7%
10.1%
6.2%
6.5%
0.8%
-2.2%
-3.3%
-2.8%
-0.4%
1.5%
1.4%
-0.8%
4.9%
6.5%
8.1%
3.2%
2.0%
-0.5%
1.8%
5.7%
5.2%
4.6%
5.7%
4.6%
4.8%
6.1%
0.8%
4.7%
-0.2%
1.8%
-0.5%
-0.8%
5.1%
3.7%
404 30.8%
562 35.6%
16.7% 1,463 42.9%
-17.4% 3,780 49.7%
14.4% 4,153 51.4%
11.0% 4,483 52.1%
7.7% 4,577 52.7%
4.2% 4,449 52.4%
1.5% 4,339 52.9%
-0.3% 4,318 54.1%
-1.6% 4,300 54.1%
-1.5% 4,217 52.3%
-0.7% 4,182 51.1%
-0.2% 4,201 51.8%
1.3% 4,319 50.7%
2.7% 4,457 49.1%
4.0% 4,714 48.1%
4.3% 4,923 48.7%
4.9% 5,073 49.2%
3.8% 5,046 49.1%
2.9% 4,952 47.4%
2.4% 5,042 45.6%
2.8% 5,383 46.3%
3.3% 5,864 48.3%
4.6% 6,355 49.5%
5.2% 6,654 49.5%
5.0% 6,895 49.0%
5.2% 7,156 47.9%
4.4% 7,357 48.9%
4.2% 7,625 48.4%
3.2% 8,056 51.2%
2.6% 8,438 52.7%
1.3% 8,741 54.8%
1.0% 9,006 56.9%
1.1% 9,313 56.0%
1.8% 9,621 55.8%
219 4.2% 2.3% 9,980 55.6%
582
803
1919
4651
5082
5476
5574
5389
5207
5104
5108
5189
5259
5331
5567
6003
6570
6873
7064
7013
6955
7211
7658
8182
8781
9229
9565
9820
10040
10419
10947
11330
11472
11481
11716
12037
44.3%
50.9%
56.2%
61.1%
62.9%
63.6%
64.2%
63.5%
63.4%
64.0%
64.3%
64.3%
64.3%
65.7%
65.4%
66.2%
67.0%
68.0%
68.5%
68.3%
66.5%
65.3%
65.9%
67.3%
68.4%
68.7%
67.9%
65.7%
66.7%
66.1%
69.6%
70.8%
72.0%
72.6%
70.5%
69.8%
12394 69.0%
Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2000
FFRDCs = Federally Funded Research and Development Centers; U&C = universities and colleges
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1960s in real terms, peaked in 1968 and was stagnant through the 70s, picked up in the
80s and has been growing since. The increase in industrial funding of universities in the
1980s clearly cannot be attributed to the declining federal support. The story of federal
funding remains essentially the same even when the analysis is narrowed to basic
research funding (Table 3-3). There was a spectacular increase in the university share of
federal funds from 31% in 1953 to 54% in 1972, declined to a low level of 46% by 1983
and then gradually grew again to attain 55% by the late 1990s. However, even during the
period of stagnation and declines in shares, the total level of funding increased robustly in
real terms, in contrast to the period of 1968-1977 when the total volume actually
stagnated and even declined somewhat in real terms.
If the pattern of change in industrial funding of university research did not reflect that of
federal funding, did it have more to do with the pattern of overall industrial funding of
research? Table 3-4 shows that industry funding of university research as a percentage of
total industry R&D spending declined from its 1% average in the 50s to 0.6% in the late
60s, rose slightly in the 1970s to 0.8%, more robustly reaching up to 1.4% by the end of
the 1980s, and has hovered about that level in the 1990s. The overall volume of
industrial R&D spending, on the other hand, scarcely grew in the early 1970s and grew
briskly in the late 1970s through the 1990s in real terms. The pattern of industrial
funding of universities, therefore, reflects more closely the pattern of industrial funding
of research in general, but even here, the phenomenon of the 1980s is unusual in that the
overall share of universities increased within the expanding pie.
In other words, the 1980s, which is the period when universities made the most notable
increases in industrial research income, do not coincide with a period when the federal
support was actually stagnating. One former senior administrator noted that one factor
that colored their perceptions was the rising competition for federal funds, as more and
more universities started actively seeking them. In other words, the fact that the total pie
was increasing was not enough of an assurance.
Charles Vest, current President of MIT, recollects how he and many others from research
universities stepped up lobbying in fear that the end of the cold war would lead to a harsh
decline in government support. Large-scale decline was actually averted, owing at least
in part to active lobbying efforts by the universities themselves. The sense of urgency
was sufficient, however, to initiate increasingly active seeking of partnerships with
industrial firms (Etzkowitz 1999).
There are two possible ways in which aggregate data may disguise the actual linkages
between federal funding and industrial funding at the organizational level. First,
individual universities may experience different crunch periods, leading to differential
responses to industrial funding, which may be difficult to see in the aggregate data.
Second, universities may respond to fears and anticipated changes, rather than the actual
declines, which will not be reported until later. In other words, changes in organizational
actions may depend on perceptions about what changes are taking place, rather than on
the reality.
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Table 3-4: Industry funding of R&D
1992 constant prices
univ non-
performer Industryb increase average univ share profit
increase in
5 years
1953 10,902 102 0.9% 129
1955 11,861 4.3% 130 1.1% 169
1960 19,029 9.6% 9.9% 172 0.9% 206
1965 25,821 9.1% 6.3% 166 0.6% 248
1966 28,111 8.9% 7.2% 175 0.6% 273
1967 30,276 7.7% 7.5% 194 0.6% 279
1968 32,088 6.0% 7.6% 208 0.6% 293
1969 34,060 6.1% 7.6% 209 0.6% 321
1970 33,753 -0.9% 5.5% 215 0.6% 312
1971 33,231 -1.5% 3.4% 225 0.7% 306
1972 34,515 3.9% 2.7% 236 0.7% 302
1973 37,122 7.6% 3.0% 254 0.7% 297
1974 38,126 2.7% 2.3% 270 0.7% 299
1975 37,021 -2.9% 1.9% 280 0.8% 297
1976 39,138 5.7% 3.3% 294 0.8% 303
1977 40,776 4.2% 3.4% 326 0.8% 316
1978 43,456 6.6% 3.2% 357 0.8% 324
1979 46,547 7.1% 4.1% 388 0.8% 326
1980 50,515 8.5% 6.4% 437 0.9% 332
1981 53,671 6.2% 6.5% 476 0.9% 341
1982 57,154 6.5% 7.0% 517 0.9% 356
1983 60,946 6.6% 7.0% 590 1.0% 376
1984 67,708 11.1% 7.8% 682 1.0% 426
1985 72,638 7.3% 7.5% 802 1.1% 479
1986 74,376 2.4% 6.7% 925 1.2% 521
1987 73,926 -0.6% 5.3% 1,000 1.4% 541
1988 77,445 4.8% 4.9% 1,084 1.4% 577
1989 81,923 5.8% 3.9% 1,183 1.4% 619
1990 87,182 6.4% 3.7% 1,246 1.4% 656
1991 93,074 6.8% 4.6% 1,277 1.4% 686
1992 94,388 1.4% 5.0% 1,321 1.4% 703
1993 92,158 -2.4% 3.5% 1,352 1.5% 703
1994 92,426 0.3% 2.4% 1,378 1.5% 710
1995 101,062 9.3% 3.0% 1,431 1.4% 757
1996 110,486 9.3% 3.5% 1,511 1.4% 814
1997 119,755 8.4% 4.9% 1,589 1.3% 869
1998 130,174 8.7% 7.2% 1,682 1.3% 932
Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2000
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Government policies on university-industry relationships. Various policy
developments are also seen as critical factors responsible for the increasing importance of
industrial funding of university research (Mowery and Rosenberg 1993; Bowie 1994;
Mowery 1998) (See Table 3-5 for summary). In the US, there had been growing concern
about manufacturing competitiveness since the 1970s, especially against rivals from
Japan. For instance, an Advisory Committee on Federal Policy on Industrial Innovation
noted in 1979 that "an ever-widening gap between the university and industrial
communities" posed a significant constraint to the innovative potential of the private
sector (Hane 1999). Three streams of government policies were to result from such a
national sentiment: funding support for university-industry partnerships; the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980; changes in the tax and other regulatory framework for industry for
collaborative work.
For the first of these, the National Science Foundation began to give emphasis to
industry-university partnerships as opposed to open-ended science, starting with the pilot
support of various collaborative schemes in the early 1970s. One outcome of this pilot
exercise was the success of the Polymer Processing Program at MIT, which was founded
in 1973 based upon consortium support by industries matched by NSF funding, and
which became the model for NSF support in the next two decades (Gray and Walters
1998). Indeed, the founding director of the Polymer Processing Program at MIT served
as a director at the NSF between 1984 and 1988, personally contributing to the
consolidation of NSF support for collaboration with industry in the form of Engineering
Research Centers (ERCs).
The 1980s was a period when policy makers at federal, state and university levels
attached increasing importance to university-industry R&D centers(Cohen and Noll 1998;
Gray and Walters 1998). The ERCs provided about 50 million dollars annually for the 25
centers (Rossner, Ailes et al. 1998). These federal programs were replicated by state-
level support for similar centers, for instance, Utah supported the development of over 20
such centers under their program for Centers of Excellence (Bowie 1994). Cohen et al
showed that there were over a thousand university-industry R&D centers by 1990, which
collectively spent a total of nearly 3 billion dollars. This was more than double the NSF
annual expenditure, and about half of all industrial support to universities was channeled
through them (Cohen, Florida et al. 1994; Hane 1999). Sixty percent of them had been
established in the 1980s(Cohen and Noll 1998). Some States have also been active in
fostering industry-university partnerships through science parks and other facilities
dedicated to inviting corporate partnerships, the most notable being South and North
Carolina with their Research Triangle and Centennial Campus.
The second government policy was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which simply allowed
ownership by universities and small businesses of intellectual properties arising from
federally funded research. According to Mowery et al., this was a strong Congressional
expression of support for the negotiation of exclusive licenses between universities and
industry, a point of policy disputes in the late 1970s. At the same time, it was an
enactment of Congressional belief that patent protection would help rather than hinder
commercialization. Mowery et al. argue that the effectiveness of the Bayh-Dole Act in
62
Table 3-5: Chronology of US policies
Year Policy action Policy content
1963 Presidential memorandum on More uniform guidelines to enable
federal patent policy universities to retain patent rights
1972 Pilot for the Industry To explore models for university-industry
University Cooperative collaboration
Research Centers Program
1978 The Industry University To promote university-industry collaboration
Cooperative Research
Centers Program by NSF
begins
1980 Bayh-Dole Act Allowed university ownership and small
businesses of intellectual property rights
from federally funded research
1980 Economic Recovery Tax Act Provided tax breaks for university research
support by industry
1984 Legislation Congressional legislation to allow
universities to hold patents for DOD labs
they run
1984 National Cooperative Reduced antitrust penalties for collaboration
Research Act among companies
1985 Engineering Research Center To promote engineering research relevant to
Program by NSF industrial needs
1986 Federal Technology Transfer Allowed federal research labs, scientists paid
Act (and its amendment in by the federal government and grantees of
1989) public research funds to conduct cooperative
research and development agreement
(CRADA) with private industry
1987 Executive order To reduce DOD discretion in patent
assigning policies
Source: (Mowery and Rosenberg 1993; Bowie 1994; Mowery 1998)
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leading to innovation and commercialization is overrated by the public - and that many
of the subsequent events might have happened even without the Act. (Mowery, Nelson et
al. 1999).
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the volume of patenting and licensing in the US
universities increased rapidly in the 1980s. According to a survey by the Association of
University Technology Managers (AUTM), the number of patents issued to universities
grew from less than 250 annually before the Bayh-Dole Act to over 5,545 in 1999
(AUTM). New licenses and options executed increased to 3,914 in 1999, an increase of
over 100% in a decade. More than 25% or over 4,000 licenses are currently active and
associated with product sales which amount to over $35 billion. In the 1990s, university
licensing took on a new meaning as technology-based start-ups experienced exponential
growth, especially in geographical areas with high support infrastructure such as angels
and venture capitalists. AUTM reports that more than 340 new companies were started
based on academic discovery in 1999, comprising about 12% of the total new licenses
(AUTM). Universities became hotbeds of new ventures as students and professors chose
to take entrepreneurial careers. It was only with the NASDAQ dive in March 2000 that
the enthusiasm for technology start-ups has abated.
Third, there were regulatory changes that changed the incentive framework for industry.
In 1980, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1980 provided tax breaks for university
research support by industry. In addition, the National Cooperative Research Act of
1984 removed concerns about anti-trust prosecutions for collaborative research activities
among companies. In effect, collaboration among competing industries for "pre-
competitive" research became a permissible norm. Subsequently there has been a rapid
increase in R&D alliances since the 1980s. In the 1997 survey, it was found that of the
total of $ 5 billion in cooperative corporate R&D expenditures, over 60% went to other
companies and commercial labs, with 22% going to universities (Jankowski 1998; Rahm,
Kirkland et al. 2000).
Economic and industrial circumstances. Another factor that may have contributed to
changes in university-industry relationships is the changing strategies of industrial
research. In the 1980s, one major response by US companies to aggressive foreign
competition was cost-cutting, which was often accomplished though heavy tolls on R&D
budgets (Florida and Kenny 1990; Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000). Subsequent corporate
restructuring, takeovers and mergers led to further downsizing of R&D activities (Fusfeld
1987; Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000). It is not surprising that universities began to be seen
as a cheaper substitute for internal R&D.
These changes led to new ways in which industry cooperated with universities. In the
1980s, new forms of collaboration emerged in which individual firms, mainly
phannaceutical companies, provide several million dollars a year of research support over
several years either to a specific department or for a given topic of their research interest
to a university (Table 3-6). Early examples included the $23 million 12-year research
agreement between the Harvard Medical School and Monsanto in the 1970s, and the $70
million cooperation in the early 1980s between Massachusetts General Hospital, the
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Harvard Medical School and Hoechst G.A., a German chemical company (Bowie 1994).
In the 1990s, large alliances continued to appear with increased regularity. Nationally,
the most well known example was the Novartis deal for Berkeley, which resulted in
campus-wide opposition in 1998 (Press and Washburn 2000). However, MIT's
experience in strategic alliances is unparalleled, as it now has 9 large-scale multiple-year
"strategic partnerships" with major corporate sponsors, ranging from $3 to$7 million per
contract per year, with a minimum commitment of 5 years. In contrast to the early
strategic alliances which were all connected with the pharmaceutical industry, MIT
broke new ground in partnering with other types of industry, including manufacturing and
finance.
Table 3-6: Major strategic alliances
Year Company University Size
1974 Monsanto Harvard 23.5M in 12 years
1981 Hoechst G.A. Mass General Hospital and 70M in 12-19 years
Harvard
1981 Johnson & Johnson Scripps 120M in 16 years
1982 Monsanto Washington University 1OOM in 12 years
1983 Monsanto Oxford 20M in 5 years
1985 FIDIA Georgetown University 60M in 20 years
1987 Squibb Oxford 32M in 7 years
1989 Squibb ULP 47M in 7 years
1989 Shiseido Mass Gen Hospital 85M in 10 years
1991 Eisai University College of London 75M in15 years
1991 Sandoz Harvard
1994 Amgen MIT 30M in 10 years
1997 Merck MIT 15M in 5 years
1997 Ford MIT 20M inf5years
1997 Sandoz Scripps300M in 16 years
1998 N MIT 18M in 5 years
1998 Novartis Berkeley 25M
1999 Merrill Lynch MIT 20M in 5 years
1999 DuPont MIT 35M in 5 years
1999 Trivoli Systems Universit of Texas 6.5M in 6 years
1999 Microsoft MIT 25M in 5 years
1999 IBM University of Ottawa 7M
2000 Nanovation MIT 90M in 5 years
2000 HP MIT 25M inS5 years
Source:(Bowie 1994; Etzkow:itz and Webster 1998; Webster 1998; Press and Washburn
2000), MIT press releases, University of Texas News& Publications,
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3-2. UK
3-2-1. Historical background in national R&D
Emergence of the dual funding structure. For a country that prides itself in having led
the world in the industrial revolution, it was hard for it to understand that its industrial
base had decidedly declined relative to other countries by the middle of the 19 th Century
(Walker 1980). Indeed, it was somewhat of a shock to the British government when
World War I forced them to recognize the nation's weaknesses in manufacturing in
comparison with Germany. A dual funding structure of science was established in the
early 20 century, in recognition of the need for stronger science and technology.
(Gummett 1991). The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) was
established to operate government laboratories, to administer industrial research
association schemes and to award grants to postgraduate students and universities
(Gummett 1991) with the objective of serving social and economic needs. In 1918, the
Haldane committee was commissioned to review the machinery of the British
government, and recommended the need for the government to access "intelligence and
research". More specifically, it was proposed that no administrative department should
be responsible for research that had implications for multiple departments, to ensure that
there will be no administrative biases. As a result, research councils were established: the
Medical Research Council (MRC) in 1920, the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) in
1931, and the Nature Conservancy in 1949. Haldane's idea began to be interpreted in an
exaggerated form: it became the Haldane principle of research council autonomy. The
result was the growth of government funding that gave science autonomy, through four
research councils.
In 1919, the University Grants Committee (UGC) was established to provide annual
general funding for teaching and research in universities (Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000).
The structure of dual funding for research as exists today was thereby established,
comprising some general institutional funding for research to universities from the UGC
and specific research grant funding from research councils.
The effect of World War 11. World War II further strengthened government-science
ties through wartime efforts on radar, jet engines and atomic energy (Gummett 1991).
However, the wartime experience was critically different in the UK from the experience
in the US for two reasons. First, scientists were assembled outside the universities and
summoned into military research groups organized around the country; thus the first thing
that scientists had to do during the immediate postwar period was to scramble back to the
universities and to initiate activities that had been stopped in the intervening years.
Second, some of the key research activities were taken outside the country, most notably
to the US, as the war intensified. The most well known example is that of radar
technology, where the British had a slight lead (Snow 1961). In August 1940, the famous
Tizard mission left the UK for the US with a black suitcase that contained the most up-to-
date radar technology in order to expedite the development of this critical technology,
which helped win the war. The UK scientists were therefore part of the research efforts
in the US rather than in their motherland.
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Nevertheless, the postwar period was a "golden era" for science for the UK with strong
government support. In 1949, the government created the National Research
Development Corporation, the predecessor to the British Technology Group, whose main
function was to provide funding for inventions. The British golden era, however, had its
own twist: government funding was heavily focussed on defense and a handful of big
civilian projects such as nuclear energy and aviation technology. While the total
government expenditure on R&D grew from 10 million pounds in 1939 to 76 million
pounds in 1945, 60 million of the latter was in defense, with only 9 million in civil R&D
and 7 million in universities. While government funding still dominated civil R&D,
industrial funding grew from about a quarter of the national total in 1955-56 to more than
a third in 1961-62. It should also be noted that while the government was the biggest
funder of science, research was actually largely conducted by industry. (Gummett 1991;
Williams 1991)
In the 1960s, the need to prioritize became an increasing concern. It was becoming
obvious that science was expensive. The research councils were put under the
Department of Education and Science (DES), so that the department would have a
coordinating function across them - though transferred to the Department of Trade and
Industry later. In 1971, the Rothschild report came up with the famous "customer-
contractor principle," in which government departments should pay for research for
which they were the customers and should decide on the content of research. The report
recommended that such a principle should apply not only to department-funded research,
but also to 25% of research council funding. This latter recommendation was
implemented through transferring research council budgets to departments, and provided
a considerable shock to the research community in their perception about availability of
funds for open-ended science.
The 1970s were a tough period of economic stagnation for the UK, in spite of repeated
attempts by successive governments to set a growth path. The worsening conditions with
high inflation and unemployment culminated in the intervention by the International
Monetary Fund, a rare occasion when an OECD member has required such assistance.
With the change of government in 1979, Margaret Thatcher introduced tough monetarist
policies on the nation, with an overriding goal to free the economy and to shrink the role
of the government.
For universities, however, it was more than a simple shrinking of the government role.
The memory that, in the 1970s, universities had rebuffed policy makers' demands that
they should become more accountable was still fresh among government officials'. To
make it worse, the Thatcher government saw universities as the stronghold of leftist
intellectuals, who represented all economic ills. The 1980s were a long decade of
shrinking government support for universities, with increasing requirements for reporting
and rigorous review. The Research Assessment Exercise was introduced in the mid
'As exemplified by Labor Minister Shirley William's 13 points of demand made to universities which
were completely ignored by the universities.
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1980s along with new formula-based funding that linked government funding to numbers
of students and to research quality (Hatakenaka 1999). In the broader research sector, an
annual review was introduced for government-funded research. The British Technology
Group was disbanded in 1986 to decentralize the responsibility of commercialization, and
some of the government laboratories were privatized (Cunningham and Nicholson 1991;
Gummett 1991).
It was also during the 1980s that the issues of selectivity among scientific fields and of
exploitability surfaced in policy debate. A study group under ACARD, chaired by Sir
Charles Reece, Director of Research and Technology, ICI Chemicals, was established in
1986 to report on major areas of science with large impact. An international comparative
study commissioned from John Irvine and Ben R. Martin of SPRU showed how other
countries addressed questions about priorities for science. The resulting group report was
focused much more on the process of prioritization than on the actual identification of
priority scientific fields. In practice, it took almost a decade before the Technology
Foresight Program was established through the 1993 government White Paper, entitled
"Realizing Our Potential." The Foresight Program was initiated through 16 field-specific
panels which were to review areas of relevant science; its results have had an impact on
focusing government funding in their programs (Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000).
3-2-2 Changing University-industry relationships in the UK
In the UK, the overall pattern of change is similar to that in the US, albeit on a smaller
scale and appearing with a slight lag as shown in Table 3-7. According to a study by
HEFCE and DTI in 1999, which appears to be one of the first reports in which
government made a serious effort to produce reliable time series data of industrial
2funding of research, the share of UK industry's contribution to total research revenues
grew steadily from 5.6% in 1985 to 6% in 1995 and 7.1% in 1999. Indeed, there is a
continuing strong trend of increases as the level of research support by industry grew by
almost 40% between 1995 and 1999, a much larger increase than from government or EU
sources. Since industrial support for research is highly concentrated among a small
number of institutions(the top seven universities accounted for over a third of total
revenues from industry (Howells, Nedeva et al. 1998), much more dramatic changes
might be expected in these highly research-oriented universities.
2 Consistent data are hard to obtain, partly owing to major historic developments that disturbed the time
series, such as the polytechnics becoming universities, and slow evolution of data collected by the
government on industrial funding. It was not until the early 1990s that industry funding of research became
regularly reported in government statistics in the early 1990s. Even then, the key item has to do with
revenues from the UK industry and do not include foreign industry.
Table 3-7: Research funding for higher education institutions in the UK
1984- 1988- 1989- 1990- 1991- 1992- 1993- 1994- 1995- 1996- 1997- 1998-
1985 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99£ million
Research infrastructure
Research Councils (1)
HEFCs (2)
Research grants and contracts
Research Councils (3)
Government Depts
UK industry
EU bodies
Other overseas (4)
UK based charities (5)
Other finance (6)
Subtotal
Grand total
UK government
UK industry as % of research
grants and contracts
UK industry as % of total
research support including
infrastructure support
148 81 91 104 111 133 145 150 156 168 175 173
505 830 830 863 950 963 968 1017 1017 1028 1033 1085
203 250 284 292 372 460 502 533 525 534 560
64 102 103 121 128 142 149 244 270 297 306 316
48 92 104 114 120 121 130 158 170 188 207 221
n/a 38 48 58 76 97 145 148 158 170 184
58 n/a 42 49 52 54 53 56 59 69 79 91
131 154 194 219 246 290 313 338 364 399 429
36 30 48 53 59 66 66 40 38 42 39 34
170 558 739 863 928 1077 1245 1458 1556 1643 1734 1835
859 1469 1660 1830 1989 2173 2358 2626 2729 2838 2941 3093
717 1216 1274 1372 1481 1610 1722 1913 1976 2018 2048 2134
28.2% 16.5% 14.1% 13.2% 12.9% 11.2% 10.4% 10.8% 10.9% 11.4% 11.9% 12.0%
5.6% 6.3% 6.3% 6.2% 6.0% 5.6% 5.5% 6.0% 6.2% 6.6% 7.0% 7.1%
Source: DTI, Science and Engineering Statistics, HEFCE Review of Research
2000
HEI data - Before 1994-95 data refer to the 'old universities' (source USR): all other HEI data are from HESA and are for academic
years.
Fig 3-2: Research support in the UK (million pounds sterling)
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University interest in working closely with industry is also shown in the establishment of
science parks. The number of science parks grew from one in 1970 (in Cambridge) to 2
in 1980, to 40 in 1992 and about 50 in 1997(Howells, Nedeva et al. 1998).
Government funding. In the UK, there have been many policy initiatives that directly
or indirectly have sought to promote university-industry relationships. The singularly
important event that led to the fast growth of such relationships in the 1980s, however, is
the budget tightening of universities under the Thatcher government (Cunningham and
Nicholson 1991). In 1981, the government announced an average 15% cut in the budget
over the following three years, which was implemented unevenly, with the top ranking
research universities receiving less heavy cuts. Overall, there is no doubt that the 1980s
were a period of severe cutbacks in government funding for higher education (Williams
1992). Even in the 1990s when the overall level of government funding started to
increase, the effect was not felt by all universities since the increases were allocated
preferentially to those institutions which were expanding, and universities continued to
perceive that increases in government support were inadequate given massive enrollment
expansion. There was a widespread sense of crisis within the higher education
community, which led to serious reflections about the way individual universities were
organized and managed and led ultimately to university-level efforts to strengthen their
ability to manage finances. Diversifying funding sources became a key activity for most
universities (Hatakenaka 1999).
Government special programs. The government has also been encouraging universities
to serve the economic needs, through several funding programs such as the Cooperative
Awards in Science and Engineering (CASE) and LINK whose objectives were explicitly
to strengthen university ties with industry. (See Table 3-8 for the summary). CASE is a
program that provides subsidy support for graduate students undertaking projects in
industry. Another well established scheme is the Teaching Company Scheme (TCS),
that has been in operation since 1975. TCS provides funds for academics to provide
technology transfer support to companies through students, and is unusual in providing
support for near-market activities. The LINK programme was established in 1986 as a
grant scheme to support pre-competitive research partnerships between UK industry,
universities and other research institutions. In its 12 years of operation, over 1,300 LINK
projects have been supported with over 500 million pounds invested. There have been
many other government funding schemes including support for establishing
interdisciplinary research centers that have explicitly targeted to foster industry-university
linkages.
In May 1993, the previously mentioned government report entitled "Realizing our
potential" was submitted to Parliament, and set the scene for further government
programs including those for collaboration between industry and universities
(Anonymous 1993). The report identified the national need to bridge the gap by
"developing stronger partnerships with and between science and engineering
communities, industry and the research charities," and proposed a set of reform measures.
Included were the re-organization of research councils to reflect greater sensitivity to the
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Table 3-8: Chronology in the UK
Year Events Policy content
1971 Rothschild report The customer-client principle emphasizing the role of the
departments in becoming active contractor of applied research
1975 Teaching Company By DTL Provides for industry-based training, supervised jointly
Scheme (TCS) by personnel in the universities and industry
1986 Privatization of the Ownership of patents arising from government sponsored research
British Technology was to be decentralized to universities
Group
1986 Research Assessment The introduction of formula-based funding for research
Exercise by the UGC infrastructure as distinct from funding for teaching, to be based on
performance
Government established the principle not to support near-market
research with public money
1988 The LINK program The LINK program started as the government's main mechanism
for supporting collaborative research partnerships between UK
industry and the research base.
Cooperative awards Cooperative awards in science and engineering (CASE) started by
in science and research councils to support post graduate students in projects of
engineering (CASE) joint interest to industry and higher education
1992 Further and Higher Polytechnics were upgraded to become universities, intensifying
Education Act the sense of competition for higher education funding
1993 Realising our Realising our potential - the white paper from the government
potential published
1994 The ROPA scheme The ROPA scheme initiated by research councils to reward
researchers who have received substantial financial support from
the UK private sector for basic and strategic research.
Foresight awards by Foresight awards by Royal Academy of Engineering for R&D
Royal Academy of projects
Engineering for R&D
projects
Biotechnology By DTI. Aims to encourage the syndicates of universities and
Exploitation Platform intermediaries to work together to build a portfolios of intellectual
Challenge property.
Joint Research By HEFCE. To support research infrastructure/equipment in HEIs
Equipment Initiative while promoting partnership with external sponsors of research
by HEFCE and industry
1997 Faraday partnerships Faraday partnerships started
1998 Competitiveness Competitiveness White Paper
White Paper
Science Enterprise Science Enterprise
1999 The Higher By HEFCE. Competitive funding to support higher education
Education Reach Out institutions to create the conditions and support structures for more
to Business and the effective links with industry
Community
(HEROBAC)__
1999 The University By DTI. To set up seed funds to support early stage
Challenge commercialization
____competition by DTI __________________________
2000 Higher Education By DTI and HEFCE jointly, incorporating Higher Education
Innovation Fund Reach Out to Business and the Community (HEROBAC)
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application of science and technology; the establishment of Foresight technology
forecasting panels involving both industry and university participants; and the initiation
of new government programs, entitled ROPA awards, to reward principal investigators
who had good collaboration records with industry. Existing programs such as LINK and
TCS, as well as new programs, became focused on technological fields as identified by
Foresight.
Partnerships. Although unrelated directly to these policy initiatives, large scale
partnerships began to be reported in the late 1990s, starting with universities with strong
engineering departments such as Cambridge and Imperial College, though some deep ties
may have existed even before without being advertised (Howells, Nedeva et al. 1998).
For instance, Microsoft opening a lab in Cambridge was one of the most heavily reported
partnerships, but there have been a number of other instances where large companies
have formed strategic partnerships with universities, for example through establishment
of their R&D laboratories close to the campus. Unilever developed partnerships with both
Cambridge and Imperial College, where they developed umbrella agreements within
which various projects were funded. Rolls Royce have established a number of
University Technology Centers around the country.
Licensing activities by universities became prominent after the break-up of the British
Technology Group in 1986, a break up which was in effect the British equivalent of the
Bayh-Dole act. One interesting difference from the American case was that the
regulatory changes did not include provisions for the tax-status for university licensing
activities. Whereas royalty incomes by universities did not conflict with the non-profit
status of universities in the US, there was no clear tax provision in the UK for other forms
of income. As a result, most universities found it necessary to establish private
companies outside the university, wholly owned by the university, specifically to deal
with licensing transactions. This was one practical way of avoiding possible problems
with university charity status. In 1997, over half of the 123 HE institutions surveyed by
PREST had such wholly owned or partially owned companies to exploit Intellectual
Property Rights (IPRs) (Howells, Nedeva et al. 1998) 3. The same survey showed that
the number of UK patents granted to HE institutions grew from 45 in 1996 to 56 in 1997,
with the number of new licenses rising from 139 to 177(Howells, Nedeva et al. 1998).
The total IPR income remained stable at about 11 million pounds (or 18 million US
dollars) in both years. These are still modest figures when compared with the 21 million
US dollars that MIT raised in 1997 through its technology licensing office.
In 1985, a report entitled "The Cambridge Phenomenon" was published by a private
consulting firm, providing documented evidence on the regional network phenomenon
around Cambridge, similar to Sillicon Valley and Route 128. The report provided
detailed qualitative and quantitative accounts of the university's contribution to the
phenomenon of highly concentrated technology start-ups (Segal Quince Wicksteed
3 The study by PREST covered 78% of 109 UK universities and 59% of 64 higher education colleges.
Since collaboration with industry tends to be concentrated within universities, the lower coverage of higher
education colleges is unlikely to be a major source of bias.
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1985), and concluded that the informal networks around the university were critical to the
phenomenon. Overall, there are conflicting reports about the number of spin-offs. The
PREST study found that the number of spin-offs reported was relatively low at about 20-
30 annually between 1993 and 1997. The survey for the Office of Science and
Technology, on the other hand, identified as many as 223 wholly owned businesses
spinning out from UK universities in 1997/98 (DTI 2000), with many more that are
partially owned or loosely affiliated with university technology.
Economic upturns in the 1990s have not reduced the government focus on innovation
issues. The first Foresight report in 1995 recommended further linking of government
funding to strategic areas. In the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), a new unit
was established to focus on innovation issues, in which university-industry linkages have
been one of the primary interests. In 1998, DTI issued a competitiveness White Paper
calling for greater partnership between industry and scientific sectors. Programs to
support collaborative research have increased further. In 1999, DTI, DfEE and HEFCE
jointly initiated a Higher Education Reach Out to Businesses and the Community
(HEROBAC) to encourage universities to develop better internal capacity to promote
collaboration with industry and to ensure effective technology transfer. In 2001, this
program was further developed into a University Innovation Program - with government
commitment to continue funding.
In 1999, the first round competition for University Challenge was organized by the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to provide government resources to set up local
"seed" funds to support the early stages of commercialization of academic research. A
total of 45 million pounds was made available, comprising 25 million from the
government, 18 million from the Wellcome Trust and 2 million from the Gatsby
Charitable Foundation. The University Enterprise Fund was also established to support
universities to establish entrepreneurship training. In November 1999, the UK
Chancellor Gordon Brown announced the government special initiative to support the
partnership between Cambridge University with MIT, in order to introduce a more
entrepreneurial culture into the British university system.
Economic circumstances and industrial research. Sluggish economic performance
was one preoccupation for successive governments in the postwar UK and well into the
1980s. In the early years, various policies including nationalization of key industries and
massive investments in projects such as nuclear energy and aviation were taken, in the
hope of rekindling economic growth. Most performance indicators of dynamism and
innovation such as export share or patenting show that British industry was in serious
trouble by the mid to late 70s (Pavitt and Soete 1980). The story of the Thatcher
government making a complete turn-around in national policies in promotion of the
private sector, the privatization of previously nationalized industries and reducing
government interventions and subsidies is well known. Her policies led to an inflow of
foreign firms, most notably in the automobile industry, and to a steady decline of
domestic defense and telecommunications manufacturers as a result of the reduced
government support (Patel and Pavitt 2000).
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These economic circumstances had important implications for the development of
university-industry relationships. There were few vibrant domestic companies looking
for scientific ties, but instead, UK universities were to meet an increasing number of
foreign firms, most notably from Japan, with interest in locating their R&D facilities in
the UK. The number of Japanese R&D facilities in Europe grew from 70 in 1990 to 250
in 1994, with nearly a quarter of them in the UK (Freeman and Soete 1997). The overall
consequence was the slow de-coupling "between the national science base in the UK on
one hand and both large UK owned firms and the UK production activities of foreign
owned firms, on the other. Instead, links have strengthened between the UK science
base, and both small UK based firms and foreign firms with R&D activities in the UK."
(Patel and Pavitt 2000).
3-3. Japan
3-3-1. Historical backgrounds and national R&D
What characterizes the history of Japanese national universities in general and Tokyo
University in particular is the centrality of their role in national development at the time
of their birth. Indeed their birth predates the development of any other national research
institutes. In the 1870s, various faculties, which later became Tokyo University, were
developed with massive infusions of foreign scholars as well as overseas scholarships,
with a view to creating organizations to train the critically needed technical expertise for
the country, both within government and in industry (Bertholomew 1989). Such drastic
measures were important because Japan saw a tremendous national need to catch up
quickly with Western science and its applications. The underlying fear was one of
colonization that swallowed up many of less developed economies including China.
University help for industry was not uncommon (Odagiri 1999). There are many
corroborating tales: it was a professor of Tokyo University who founded Toshiba, for
example, and the new iron mills also had substantive help from Tokyo University
professors (Odagiri 1999). The tradition of collaboration continued through the pre-war
period, when there were both significant industrial funding of universities and consulting
ties between professors and companies (Bertholomew 1989; Hashimoto 1999).
During World War II, virtually all university and industrial scientific researchers of
relevant disciplines were mobilized for military purposes(Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000).
There was a significant expansion of education and research facilities in engineering
fields, as exemplified by the establishment of a second engineering faculty at Tokyo
University. Many thematic research groups were developed on critical topics, which
included members both from universities and from industry (Hashimoto 1999). Though
university researchers made important contributions to military technology, towards the
end of the war, many younger men were pressed into military combat duty, constraining
further developments (Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000).
In Japan too, the post war experience has had a lasting influence on the role of university
research in relation to industry and to government. However, the influence worked in the
opposite direction. In striking contrast to the US, where the wartime success was
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translated into peacetime government support of university research, Japanese academics
faced the defeat with a profound loss of face. Their war-time role of supporting the
military government was a cause of deep shame. The General Headquarters of Allied
Powers in Japan (GHQ) quickly eliminated laboratories that had supported military
technology, and required all scientists to report their wartime research role (Rahm,
Kirkland et al. 2000). For example, aeronautical research was forbidden (Hashimoto
1999) and an institute attached to Tokyo University had to reconstitute itself immediately
as the Science and Engineering Institute. Interestingly, it is not clear if this technological
purge actually led to dismissal of people or disbanding of research activities, as witnessed
by the fact that the same institute re-constituted itself back into the Aeronautical Research
Institute about a decade later (Nano 1991).
The main lessons learned by academia were to be wary of government influence, and to
dissociate themselves both from the government and from industry. The main thrust of
reform for the university system in the post war period was to create an independent and
autonomous academic organization. Interestingly, several rounds of attempted legal
reforms to grant separate legal status to national universities since the war were aborted
on the grounds that they would jeopardize university autonomy (Kuroha 1993; Hada
1999). The years when universities were dissociating themselves were also the years
when new industrial activities were springing up all over Japan. Hashimoto (1999)
describes how Japanese industry in the post war period dealt directly with foreign
technology suppliers, through the purchase of patents and consulting services, thereby
eliminating the need for academics to act as intermediaries as they had done during the
pre-war period.
The post-war isolation of universities had a huge cost: industry developed by itself and
built internal research capacity rather than relying upon universities. Table 3-9 shows that
in Japan, industry began to foot a higher proportion of the R&D bill from the early days.
In 1971, industry funded 65% of R&D in Japan as compared with 39% in the US or 44%
in the UK, although by 1999, the difference narrows with 74% in Japan, 67% in the US
and 47% in the UK. The trend of universities as performers of R&D is less clear, as the
OECD data do not provide a consistent time series. However, the university share of
R&D performance in Japan appears roughly the same as in the other two countries.
In the 1960s, there was a brief period when the need for collaboration surfaced again, but
this was crushed during the student unrest in the late 1960s. Unlike in the US, where the
principal target of the student unrest was the university-military connection, the Japanese
students rebelled against American influence, capitalism and corporate control over
universities. It was perhaps not until the early 1980s that the stigma attached to
university-industry relationships disappeared. By the 1980s, Japanese R&D activities
were heavily concentrated in companies, with few ties to universities.
3-3-2. Changing university-industry relationships in Japan
According to the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES) statistics, university-
industry collaboration has come a long way. As shown in Table 3-10, the data
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demonstrate rapid increases since the early 1980s through published figures and graphs
which show: (a) joint research projects between public universities and industries which
are usually based on the placement of researchers on campus; (b) contracted research
which includes all research projects in public universities that were supported by non-
MOES sponsors; and (c) scholarship donations given by private bodies to public
universities. Indeed, these figures provide a rosy picture of robustly rising collaboration,
as shown in Fig 3-2.
Particularly impressive is the contrast between rapidly rising contracted research on the
one hand and stagnating scholarship donations in the late 90s. There has been a steady
and rising trend in the number of the Joint Research projects throughout the period since
1983 when the Joint Research scheme was introduced, whereby the government was to
make joint contributions for industrially supported projects.
Such published statistics disguise rather than demonstrate the true state of university-
industry collaboration. "Contracted research", which the MOES treats as representing
university-industry relationships, actually overstates the level of collaboration with
private industry, particularly in the last 5 years when contracts with non-profit semi-
governmental agencies have increased significantly. There are two confounding factors
that are likely to have led to what appears to be such a simple error. National universities
are legally part of MOES, and therefore cannot receive public funds from other
governmental ministries directly. As such, all the contracted research funds from other
government sources actually come through special non-profit bodies, which are
technically not part of the government, and therefore count as "private" and hard to
distinguish from, for example, non-governmental industry associations. There is also
likely to be a pervasive mentality within MOES that divides the world into "us, the
national universities and a governmental ministry" versus "them, anything that is external
to us."
MOES is becoming aware of this data problem and has just compiled disaggregated data
for the past three years. These figures, as well as the detailed unpublished breakdown,
show that (a) the percentage of contracted research with private industry has fluctuated
between 15-19%; the largest increase was seen in the amount of contracted research with
public bodies and corporations, which rose sharply from 280 in 1994 to 912 in 1996; and
(b) the volume of contracted research with private industry in the last three years was
quite low, and at a similar level to those in the early 1990s, indicating that there has been
little increase. Once the image of huge increases in contracted research is shed, then the
picture of university-industry relationship shows becomes one of stagnation, as another
important category of industry source income, scholarship donations have also been
stagnating in the past 5 years.
Table 3-9: Structural Change in the national R& D system 1971-1998
Source of R&D finances (%)
Industry Government Other sources
1971 1981 1991 1998 1971 1981 1991 1998 1971 1981 1991 1998
USA 39.3 48.8 57.5 66.7 58.5 49.3 40.5 29.8 2.1 1.9 2 4
JAPAN A 64.8 62.3 73.1 b 73.4 C 26.5 26.9 18 b 19.7 D 8.5 10.8 8.9 6.8 d
UK 43.5 42 50.4 47.3 48.8 48.1 34.2 31 2.3 3 3.6 21.6
Share of R&D performance (%)
Industry Government Higher Education
1971 1981 1991 1998 1971 1981 1991 1998 1971 1981 1990 1998
USA 65.9 70.3 72.8 74.6 15.5 12.1 9.9 7.9 14.5 15.4 14.4
JAPAN A 64.7 66.8 70.9 b 71.9 D 13.8 11.1 d 7.5 d 9.2 D 24.2 c 17.6 c 14 d
UK 62.8 63 65.6 65.8 25.8 20.6 14.2 13.3 13.6 15.6 19.6
Source: Mowery 1998, OECD 2000
Discontinuity in time series between 1971 (Mowery) and 1981-1998 (OECD)
1990 figure
Overestimated.
Underestimated
Table 3-10: Research funding for national universities in Japan
Year 1983 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Joint research 6.8 12.9 37.5 45.1 49.5 50.3
Contracted research 26 34.9 51.7 50.1 53.3 69.1
% private industry in number 12.8% 25.4% 17.5% 18.0% 14.5% 16.4%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
50.3 50.3 54.2 55.4 61.3 67.6
65.7 141.1 232.6 332.6 376.1 454.17
16.0% 18.2% 18.4%
Estimated contracts with private
industry * 3 9 9 9 8 11 11 12 14
* *
16 15 19
Scholarship donation
Industrial donation/contribution
Science research grant (kakenhi)
Research infrastructure grant (sekisan)
Total research funds
% of industrial research funds
Total research in universities
% of industrial research funds
150 224
160 246
426 457
473 511
501 500
558 562
489 487 484 465 467
550 550 552 536 543
460
547
1314
1576
3872
14.1%
17898 22970 24079 25763 27587
2.06% 2.12% 2.17% 2.04%
27526 29822 30131 30592 32229 33954
2.00% 1.84% 1.83% 1.75% 1.69% 1.61%
Source: Monbusho Gakujuchukokusaikyoku, Kiso data shu, May 1998, January 2001
Monbusho Gakujutsukokusaikyoku, Sangakurenkeino suishin, April 2000
* Up to 1994, estimated based on the ratio of the number of industrial contracts to the total number of contracts. For 1995-6 estimated as a straightline fit
between 1994 and 1997. For 1997-1999, actual figures.
Fig 3-3: Industry related research funding in universities in Japan
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There is another problem with the statistics from MOES: they exclude all activities by
private universities and by local government-supported public universities. While
national universities are stronger in science and engineering than private universities,
there are only 100 national universities as compared with 400 private and 100 other
public universities. It is difficult to justify such an omission, especially when there are
some private universities that are known to be research active. Waseda and Keio both
have significant scientific research and therefore great potential to work with industry.
Tokai University and Ritsumeikan are known to have been aggressively pursuing
university-industry relationships, with the former starting patenting and licensing
activities in the 1960s, and the latter through its innovative approach to working with
small and medium industries in the 1990s (College Management 2000). Clearly, the
story of national trends cannot be told without a more accurate examination of these large
omissions.
Government funding. Unlike the US or UK, Japanese universities never had a golden
period of government funding, in spite of their "national" status. Similar to the UK,
however, they did face severe budget tightening during the 1980s, when national
universities, along with other government departments, were subjected to "zero ceiling"
or the policy of no increases in budgets. The tight financial situation of Japanese
universities is reflected in the fact that as late as 1997, government spending on higher
education was 0.5% of GDP as compared with 0.7% in the UK and 1.1% in the US
(OECD 2000). The belt tightening of the 1980s was disproportionately borne by reduced
capital investments (Kaneko 1989; Kaneko 1995). While science and research funding
has been moderately growing throughout the period, this has not been sufficiently large to
counteract the tight conditions in the base budgets. The situation finally began to
improve in the 1990s, particularly in 1996 with the adoption of the Basic Science and
Technology Promotion Plan, which called for appropriation totaling 17 trillion yen before
2000.
Government policies for promoting university-industry relationships. The public
debate about the need to build domestic capacity for developing frontier technology
started in the late 1970s. The gradual shift in Japanese government policies is
summarized in Table 3-11. In the 1980s, the Japanese government went through the
"first wave" of promotion for university-industry relationships (Rahm, Kirkland et al.
2000). In 1980, MITI's report titled "The vision of MITI policies" highlighted the need
to move beyond the "catch-up" strategy, one that long characterized Japan's
development, towards the development of fundamental science. In the same year,
Keidanren called for collaboration between universities and industries (Kobayashi 1998).
In 1981, Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) was established by
the Science and Technology Agency (STA) as one of the first government programs to
support strategic research activities in the scientific sector which were relevant to
industry (Irvine and Martin 1984). While the program did not have a specific focus to
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Table 3-11: Japan policy chronology
Year Event Content Type
1978 Monbusho regulation on IPR Clarification of IPR ownership between Regulatory
the government and individual academics change
1981 ERATO Program By the Science and Technology Agency Funding
1983 Joint Research Program By the Ministry of Education and Culture Funding
1987 Joint Research Center By the Ministry of Education and Culture Funding
1995 University Linkages Unit Established in MITI Ministerial
organization
1995 Basic Science Law Huge government funding commitment Funding
for basic science and technology starting
1996
1997 Deregulation of external Enabled civil servant professors to do Regulatory
employment of university technical consulting, and to take a leave change
professors to work for private R&D initiatives
_______ ~~without affecting their retirement benefits _______
1997 Report by the Conference for Report by the Conference for Industry- Internal report
Industry-University University Linkages/collaboration in
Linkages/collaboration in Monbusho
tnln tdtMonbusho
1997 Greater flexibility in the Joint Greater flexibility in the Joint Research Regulatory
Research Progamrequirements Program requirements ien
1997 Legal change to permit fixed- Legal changye to permit fixed-term Legalregulato
term appointments and leaves appointments and leaves by Monbusho ry change
by MonbushoM
1997 Regional consortium for R&D Regional consortium for R&D program Funding
____program by MITT by MITTI______
1998 University linkages Industrial University linkages Industrial Science Funding
Science and Technology R&D and Technology R&D Program by MITT
ReerhPorProgram by MITT
1998 Revision of Research Exchange Possible land use at a discount by a Regulatory
Promotion Law private enterprise on national university change
_________sites
1998 De-regulation on externally Consolidation of line item budgets for Regulatory
supported research externally funded contracts and change
Tintroduction of multi-year contracts
1998 Law for technology transfer So-called Japanese Baye-Dole Law, but Regulatory
from universities to private enacted to enable special subsidies for change and
entities TLOs endorsed jointly by MITT and funding
_______ ~~Monbusho 
_______
2000 Industrial Technology to simplify procedural requirements for Regulatory
Strengthening Law external funding in national universities; change and
legalize TLO use of national facilities, funding
ossacademic discount on patent expenses Regul
2000 National patent related Increase in the university share of Regulatory
19 Dregulation oexrnly Conractdratin or pae t nuts in oe cheltr
200 Deultort ofeac externalEaldcii funedcntprofess to r egat r
employent oprofssors asibrddctiors mli-yeahr conrprteshag
1998ardswinocompaniesowhereatseir
inventonsiarebsinieommecializdaan
StrengtheningLawexternal udiintona nvriie; cagn
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foster university-industry linkages, many university scientists did join ERATO-funded
research teams.
One outcome of such activities was to make it public that the system of national
university support through the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), the
predecessor to MOES, was overly restrictive in terms of the ability to receive funds from
outside bodies, including from other government ministries (Rahm, Kirkland et al. 2000).
Perhaps spurred on by inter-ministerial competition, MOEC stepped up its activities in
promoting science for industrial use. In 1983, MOEC established its first program for
joint research between universities and private industries. Starting in 1987, MOEC has
also actively supported the establishment of Joint Research Centers with industries.
Interestingly, all of these MOEC programs were targeted at the 100 or so national
universities and ignored the 400 plus private universities - which enrolled 80% of the
students. This one-sided approach made sense, on the one hand, because scientific and
engineering research capacity was concentrated primarily within a handful of national
universities. On the other hand, such policies neglected the potential of several strong
private universities, as exemplified by Keio which traditionally had a strong medical
school, or Waseda which had a traditionally strong engineering school.
MOEC took several other steps to support university-industry relationships in the late
1980s. In 1987, Collaborative Research Centers were established in national universities
in order to facilitate collaborative research mainly with local industries in the region. The
number of such centers has been steadily rising, and today there are 53 of them. In 1987,
the concept of endowed chairs was introduced with the idea of creating new and relevant
fields of research, with donations from industry, in order to bring in new faculty members
for a fixed period of time. The number of endowed chairs rose from 5 in 1987 to 64 in
1993, though has been stagnating since then.
In order to ensure that national universities can cope with the increased administrative
burden of working with industries, MOEC has also been supporting the establishment of
new administrative units within national universities since 1988. Today, 5 national
universities received additional budgets to establish research collaboration directorates,
and 36 national universities have smaller research collaboration sections.
The most critical action on intellectual property rights took place as early as 1978,
through a relatively innocuous guideline issued by the Ministry of Education. For
inventions made under routine government funding, the intellectual property rights were
to be owned by the inventors, while for inventions made under government special
programs, the state would own the intellectual property rights (Yoshihara and Tamai
1999). The judgement call as to the appropriateness of ownership assignment was left to
university level invention conmmittees. In the absence of tight enforcement mechanisms
by the government to pursue licensing or to monitor abuse, these invention committees
tended to favor ownership by individual professors. Unless there was critical evidence
that inventions were made in government funded facilities, individual professors could
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claim ownership. This tendency can be seen in the final proportion of patent ownership,
about 80% by individual professors and 20% by the government.
University activities in licensing took a new turn with the passage of the Technology
Licensing Office (TLO) law in 1999, the so-called Japanese Bayh-Dole, which did not
change the legality of university licensing in substance, but endorsed the establishment of
university technology licensing offices through government subsidies. There are
currently 17 technology licensing offices (TLOs) which have just been established,
including 4 in private universities. So far, over 500 patent applications and over 30
licensing agreements have been made by these TLOs.
Economic circumstances. Many of the government programs were set up during the
1980s when there were other factors favoring university-industry collaboration. By
1980, there was awareness among industrialists that further technical innovation
necessitated university-industry collaboration, as reflected in a report by Keidanren, an
association of employers (Kobayashi 1998). The 1980s also saw a worsening of
relations with the US particularly on the imbalance in trade, as well as the so-called
"technological friction" which included the alleged free-riding on American science by
Japanese manufacturers. This was all happening at a time when Japanese universities
were being subjected to severe budget constraints, and the need to diversify sources of
funding was being debated. The most natural outcome would have been for Japanese
manufacturers to have started to work with Japanese universities.
What actually happened seemingly defies any logic. National universities took hardly
any action in the 1980s and Japanese industry went abroad to form stronger ties with
foreign universities. One study showed that between 1986 and 1996, Japanese industry
increased R&D expenditures abroad six-fold, while domestic R&D expenditures grew by
only 50% in nominal terms (Niwa 1999). The same study suggested that there were
considerable differences across industrial subsectors in their orientation to R&D, and that
communications and electronic equipment were particularly oriented towards foreign
sources of R&D. According to Hall, 155 out of 255 foreign R&D facilities in the US in
1992 were Japanese. To give an example, NEC's overseas R&D ventures started with
the establishment of a research center in Princeton in 1989, with new sites in Bonn in
1995, and San Jose and Heidelberg in 1998. Many consumer electronics firms took a
parallel path or followed suit - with Hitachi, Toshiba and Epson establishing research
labs in Cambridge, UK, Sharp in Oxford, UK, Matsushita, Nissan and Mitsubishi in
Cambridge, MA, USA. The number of Japanese R&D facilities in Europe grew from 72
in 1990 to 264 by 1994 with 83 of them in the UK (Freeman and Soete 1997).
To say that the national universities did not respond at all would be unduly negative.
With the news of Japanese companies donating expensive chairs abroad, NEC at MIT for
instance, Japanese national universities did take action. Endowed chairs were established
as a new mechanism for companies to donate to national universities. There were modest
increases in industrial funding of university research. It was only in the early 1990s that
the then President of Tokyo University, Akito Arima, began to appeal to the public about
the dire straits of the national universities, as summarized later in his book, "The Story of
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Poverty in Universities" (Arima 1996). There was, for instance, a TV program that
compared an MIT laboratory and a Tokyo University Laboratory. The political climate
gradually eased and led to a fresh focus on basic science and technology in the mid-1990s
(Kobayashi 1998).
With the onset of the economic slowdown in the early 1990s, government interest in
university-industry collaboration had a new twist. The need to establish a better basis for
economic recovery and national competitiveness had an additional meaning in the
prolonged recession. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
established a unit dedicated to university linkages in 1995, and has been active in
promoting new funding schemes and legal and regulatory changes to encourage
university-industry collaboration.
3-4. Towards the synthesis
The role of universities in the national R&D systems across the three countries has been
converging across the three countries over the last 30 years, with the share of universities
in R&D performance in the US and Japan at around 14%, while increasing to a higher
level at almost 20% in the UK. The growth in the universities' share of R&D in the UK
appears to reflect directly the decreasing share provided by the government. The data on
Japan appear too problematic for any conclusive trend analysis. The apparent decline in
the role of universities in R&D is puzzling given the renewed emphasis by the
government on investing in science and technology since 1996, which should have
increased rather than decreased the university share. It is also puzzling that the industry
share remains unchanged both as a source of funding and as a performer, given the
decade long economic stagnation. It may be prudent to assume that these trends are the
artifacts of inconsistent data series, rather than to see them as real.
The level of industrially funded university research shows a steady increase in the UK
and US as shown in Fig 3-3, but has been relatively stable for Japan in the past 7 years.
Fig 3-4 shows that the share of industry funding in university research appears to be
stabilizing at about 7% both for the US and for the UK. In the US, the largest increase
was in the 80s and it stabilized in the 90s; for the UK, there was a steady increase
throughout the 80s with another spurt in the late 90s. For Japan, there was a steady
increase in the 80s but it hovered at a low 2% level in the 90s.
What has been the influence of macro-factors on these trends? In the following section,
the overall implications from the analysis of the three countries and the organizational
cases are presented in terms of five categories of factors: historical legacy, general levels
of government funding, special government programs for collaboration, regulatory
interventions and industrial interest.
Historical legacy. World War II was a point of departure for the evolution of science in
all three countries in more than one way. In the US, the experience of successful
scientific involvement in military technology during the war led to a new paradigm where
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science was to be used for peacetime efforts. The trajectory for science in the UK is less
obvious - partly as the primary government attention had to be placed upon re-
construction of the country and the economy. Nonetheless, the dominant sentiment was
that the sciences had proved their worth to society, leading to generous government
funding in the subsequent years. For Japan, however, the conclusion reached was quite
the opposite. The collaborative effort between the government, industry and universities
to develop war technologies was condemned as evil, and universities had to purge their
association with such activities. Whereas the radar Lab at MIT was, and is still today,
celebrated as a source of national success, the aeronautical research lab in Tokyo
University had to be disbanded and re-structured into a new laboratory - to penalize it for
its success for air-fighter design during the war.
Both the US and Japan faced new turns in the 1960s as their students became vociferous
in criticizing the establishment; large industries and defense were particularly targeted.
Many campuses were colored by this new mood. But the effect of these actions was
different in each locale. The slow move towards re-establishing university-industry
relationships in the 1960s was again shattered and brought back to the starting point in
Japan. In the US, the impact of the anti-Vietnamese war movement had the most direct
consequence on the military-university connection. Research activities with direct
weapons linkages were removed from campus as a result. In the UK, there was less of a
student movement, as there were no obvious local causes for political unrest, such as the
Vietnam war in the US or the securities treaties with the US as in Japan. Universities in
the UK were also less connected to military research in the obvious way that universities
were in the US.
World War II and the student unrest are two historical events that appear to have had
differential impact on the university-industry relationships in the three countries. These
historic events appear to have shaped society-wide values about the role of science and
universities. World War II helped create different meanings for the role of science in
society. In the US, science was heralded for its wartime success. The belief was that
science could lead directly to applications that could improve national welfare.
Particularly important was the fact that the role of universities was recognized through
projects such as the Radiation Laboratory. There was a massive increase in government
funding for university research, including for defense related funding. In Japan, on the
other hand, science was to become autonomous from the government as well as industry.
The path for the UK was somewhere in the middle: science was regarded as important for
application, but subsequent government funding was channeled directly and separately to
defense research or specific projects, that were often separate from universities.
Similarly, the student unrest helped consolidate values about what is and what is not
acceptable on campus. In the US, secret defense-related research was expelled from
campus thereafter, while in Japan, heavy corporate involvement became the target.
There was a much gentler backlash in the UK - perhaps because there had been little
salient change in the role of universities, either in terms of their relationships with
government or with industry.
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General funding by the government What about the role of overall government
funding in driving universities to solicit help from industry? The popular view is that if
the government provides sufficient funding to universities, they will have little reason to
pursue industrial funding. This is certainly corroborated by the evidence coming from
Japan in the late 1990s during which time, abundant government research funding co-
existed with sluggish growth in industrial funding of university research. However other
case examples demonstrate that the way in which government funding affects university
behavior has more to do with the way in which universities perceive government funding
than the actual funding.
For instance, in the US, we can now see that government funding was sluggish
throughout the 1970s but actually grew in the 1980s. However, the perception of
universities in the 80s was that they faced a very uncertain federal support with the
mounting public debt and Reagan's call for smaller government. It appears that it was
the perceived uncertainty that led to greater diversification in funding with large increases
in industrial support. Similarly, the perception of heavy-handed budget cuts by the
government in the UK in the 1980s led to significant increases in industry funding of
research, though the government funding of research was actually increasing throughout
the period. To understand the way in which universities responded, then, it is critically
important to understand how these policies were perceived at individual universities.
Government programs of support for collaboration with industry. All three
countries have had a similar set of special regulatory measures and funding programs to
promote university-industry collaborations. The time span and sequence of their
introduction, however, are somewhat different. In the US, the federal government
interest in application oriented research started in the 1970s, with major regulatory
changes and funding programs starting in the 1980s. In the UK, the government
specifically developed a policy towards applied research starting with the Rothschild
report in 1970, and yet, while there were uproars and protests, it is not clear that these
policies led to tangible changes in university behavior. It was not until the 1980s with the
clear and tough policy stance taken by the Thatcher government that universities started
to look to alternative funding sources and to applied research. In the case of Japan, the
first wave of changes was introduced in the early 1980s, though with little impact. It was
only in the late 1990s, with the deepening recession, that government began to accelerate
a new policy focus on university-industry collaboration.
It is not clear what the contributions are of the regulatory changes such as Bayh-Dole.
While its effect on the increasing number of patents is well established, the role it has
played in encouraging universities to be better research partners for industry is unclear.
Indeed it is interesting the way late comers such as Japan identify Bayh-Dole as a critical
factor in American innovation. Their understanding appears at odds with detailed
analyses of both Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994) and the Cambridge Phenomenon (SegalQuince Wicksteed 1985), which indicate that the vitality of both of these regions was
founded in the informal networks among professionals and the flexibility with which a
university related to the local community. Indeed in the case of Britain, the Bayh-Dole
type change was introduced in order to minimize the role of central government through
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breaking up the British Technology Group; as a result, there was a period of considerable
uncertainty and concern on the part of companies who felt that they were facing
increasingly demanding university partners who wanted to claim both the money for
research and any resulting intellectual property rights. Establishing intellectual property
rights can be alienating rather than encouraging for partnerships. And yet the MITI sees
establishing the basis of IPR in universities as a critical first step to enabling the
commercialization of science and technology in universities. This raises the question
about the basis on which countries decide to imitate other countries.
Economic circumstances and industrial interest. It is equally clear that unless there is
industrial interest, university-industry relationships are unlikely to change. Hence it
might be expected that, during recessions, it would be difficult to develop industrial
funding in universities. However, there are other factors that make the link between
economic circumstances and industrial funding more complex. For instance, during
economic recessions, it is also possible that firms substitute their expensive internal R&D
for (cheaper) contracted research. There is also evidence of global mobility among R&D
intensive firms such that, even if local national companies are under economic stresses
and cut their R&D budgets, there may be other companies that would be interested in
investing globally (Patel and Pavitt 2000; Reddy 2000). Indeed the experience of
increases in industrial funding in the US and UK in the 1980s shows that economic
circumstances do not unambiguously lead to a decline in industrial funding.
3-5. Concluding remarks
I have shown that there has been a generally increasing trend in industrial funding of
research in universities in all three countries, particularly in the 1980s. The US and UK
appear to be converging to a level of industrial funding of about 7% of total research
funding. In Japan, the level is much lower, at about 2%, with no indication of increases
in recent years. In the US as well as in the UK, there have also been developments of
large partnerships between universities and companies that seem to go well beyond the
traditional model of contracted research.
What macro factors influence such a trend and how? Two historical events seem to have
shaped the societal values in critical ways that have defined both the role of government
and universities in science on one hand, and indirectly or directly the role of university-
industry relationships on the other. These are World War I and the student unrest of the
1960s. The three countries emerged from these events in different ways that had a lasting
impact on the way university-industry relationships were configured and perceived.
Specifically, the US came with the victorious legacy of the military technological
success, which in turn helped shape post-world war science policy in favor of
government support, and particularly for university science. Japanese universities on the
other hand were to learn from the loss of the war and reach the opposite conclusion about
the need to maintain a distance both from government and from industry. The UK case
stands somewhere in between, where the government was to support science, but not
necessarily in universities. These starting points get adjusted again through the student
unrest, which led to the expulsion of military research from campuses in the US, and the
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denouncing of corporate involvement in Japan. The UK was relatively unaffected by the
event.
If these historical events shaped the backdrop of societal values about the role of
universities in general and university relationships with industry in particular, there have
been other macro-level developments that have influenced the specific ways in which the
relationships evolved.
The most important factor appears to be the general level of government funding.
However, I have found that the manner in which this affects actual university behavior is
complicated by the perceptions that universities form. They may respond in anticipation
of changes that do not happen in fact, as much as to the actual changes. It is interesting to
note that all three countries appear to-have arrived at a similar set of policies, ranging
from funding programs to encourage university-industry relationships to the
establishment of a regulatory framework for intellectual property rights. However, the
precise manner in which the regulations are configured depends on historical legacy, and
their influence on universities also depends on the general perception that universities
have of the policy intentions.
The three countries have shown striking similarities in the range of policies that have
been put forward to encourage university-industry relationships, and also in the manner in
which these policies have been given even greater strength during economic recessions.
The timing and specific configurations of the resulting policies have been different,
reflecting differences in how the historical developments have defined the role of the
university and the role of government funding for universities.
Economic circumstances, such as recessions, were instrumental in bringing the attention
of policy makers into focus. Companies with significant R&D have been increasingly
mobile, and there has been sufficient interest on the part of industry to outsource research
to result in industrial funding of university research growing, even during a recession.
Clearly, part of the difference has to do with the fact that Japan is lagging behind the
other two in the development of university-industry relationships - again a specific
legacy of World War II. In the case of the UK, there have been periods such as the
1980s, when the policy makers were perhaps less conscious of the US model, and other
periods such as the late 1990s when they have been actively using the US model as a
template. However, for the question as to whether the differences are a function solely of
the temporal lag, the answer is a resounding no. There are two reasons why.
First, Japan is currently taking a dual track path which is a particular legacy of its past:
there is a new emphasis on basic science and technology, and at the same time, there is a
policy focus on greater linkages between university and industry. This duality is a result,
on the one hand, of the 80s when Japanese manufacturers faced the severe criticisms
particularly from the US, about free-riding on American science; and on the other, of the
sense of the need to catch up in the development of university capacity for generating
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relevant science. No other country has had this dual track focus - so the result cannot be
predicted on the basis of the experience of any "forerunners".
Second, imitations and learning from other systems do occur, but usually with significant
distortions. Imitations and learning depend precariously on the level of knowledge that
individuals have of the overall structures of the other systems. Often, the limited time
available for reflection, coupled with a general lack of understanding about how the
system works as a whole, lead to segmented learning where pieces do not lead to the
whole. Whatever practice that seems salient gets adopted with insufficient details about
how it is reinforced by the context within which it operates. Even with the best intentions
to follow the same path, there will be deviations that will be introduced along the way.
The UK and Japan are not simply behind the US catching up along a similar path; they
will be generating a very different set of responses, partly because they are responding to
a very different set of issues, but also because they will not know how to replicate the
experience.
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Chapter 4:
Organizational level perspectives
In Chapter 3, I showed that changing university-industry relationships could not be
simply explained in terms of national level changes. It is then imperative to look at how
universities responded at the organizational level and why. The objective of this chapter
is two-fold: to further clarify the nature of change at the organizational level, and begin to
ask what organizational level factors influenced and shaped such changes. Central to
these questions is how we understand the differences among the three universities. It is
easy to imagine that MIT, Cambridge University, and Tokyo University would have very
different responses, given their "culture" and historically inherited values. One is a
technology-oriented university that has a mission to support application. The other is one
of the oldest universities in the world with academic traditions that go back centuries.
The third is a national university with well-known links with government. It is therefore
tempting to simply say that all the differences are to do with the missions with which they
were founded. This chapter will begin to unpack what essential legacies arose out of
their foundation and function as organizational "imprinting" (Stinchcombe 1968), and
what changes have taken place subsequently and how.
To do this, the chapter begins with broad descriptive comparison of the three universities
as they exist today, highlighting the differences in terms of size, academic coverage, and
physical settings. Second, financial records of industrial sponsorships are compared both
in terms of what it is today and historical trends. Third, historical roots of the three
universities will be examined separately, with a particular focus on events that shaped
norms and values about their relationships with industry. I argue that while the effect of
founding missions is important, universities can and do change sufficiently over time that
subsequent historical changes are critically important in defining their present. In the
fourth section, I argue that two historical legacies play a key role in shaping the future
changes: the governance structures that influence the manner in which formal changes are
made in the organizational rules and policies; and norms and practices of university-
industry relationships. The final section summarizes the key changes in university-
industry relationships in the past two decades and begins to argue that "historical
legacies" by themselves cannot explain the directions of change today.
4-1. The three universities: size, academic coverage, and physical
settings
Table 4-1 provides comparative statistics in terms of the size, coverage, and physical
settings. The first difference to note is the size of the universities. In terms of the
number of faculty members or permanent academic staff, Cambridge is about 40% larger
than MIT, and Tokyo University is almost three times as large as MIT. Interestingly,
neither Cambridge nor Tokyo publishes statistics about the breakdown of the number of
academic staff by field. Cambridge statistics are particularly complex, given that
"Cambridge" comprises the university and the colleges, which are separate legal entities,
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Table 4-1 Basic comparative data: MIT, Cambridge, and
Tokyo I _MI _IT 
_ %_Cambridge_%_Tokyo_%
fMIT % ~Cambridge % [Tokyo %
Year
Academic staff
Faculty total
of which science &
engineering
of which engineering
Professor
Associate/assistant
professors
Lecturer
Research staff
Total academic staff
of which scientific
Administrative staff
Student
Total
Undergrad
of which engineering
Graduate students
of which engineering
Campus
Site (square meters)
longest distance across
campus
number of main campuses
longest distance bet campuses
2000
923 100%
588 64%
333 36%
584 63%
347
387
819
2129
1559
5830
9972
4300
2011
5672
2504
38%
100%
73%
43%
47%
57%
44%
9 | 622,429
mile
2000
1276 100%
797 62%
135 11%
304 24%
972
93
1889
3258
2230
19877
13548
1470
6329
535
76%
100%
68%
68%
11%
32%
8%
1999
2640 100%
2118
524
1387
1253
140
1313
4093
3284
2503
27746
16008
2195
11738
3036
80%
20%
53%
47%
100%
80%
58%
14%
42%
26%
1,287,000
3
30 km
Source: MIT Report to the President 1999, University of Tokyo Annual Report 2000, Cambridge
University Reporter
1 Faculty to include professors, associate and assistant professors in MIT and Tokyo, and lecturers
and assistant lecturers in Cambridge.
Cambridge and Tokyo figures are estimated using the overall proportion of scientists to the total.
The percentage for Tokyo, which was specifically obtained from the university, since it is not part
of published information, appears particularly high, but this may depend on the way in which they
2 defined "scientific."
3 Readers, lecturers, and assistant lecturers in Cambridge included.
4 Lecturers and instructors but not including visiting professors in MIT, unestablished academic
staff in Cambridge and koshi in Tokyo University.
5 Researchers include post doctoral fellows and research scientists/engineers in MIT (and excludes
visiting fellows/professors, affiliates, and non-tenure taching staff such as lecturers), joshu in
Tokyo, and unestablished research staf in Cambridge.
Those in School of Humanities and Social Science excluded in MIT, science and engineering
6 related estimated by UT staff,
MIT figure is estimated using the total number of employees, as reported in MIT facts. Tokyo
University figure comes from the annual report and excludes medical non-academic staff who
7 mainly work in their hospital.
8 Student statistics of 1999-2000 for MIT, as of May 2000 in University of Tokyo
For Tokyo University, the figure includes Hongo, Komaba, Roppongi, and Chiba - excluding
9 facilities such as agricultural farms and hospitals.
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with most academics holding dual appointments in the university and in one of the
colleges. Some academic appointments may work exclusively with their college as
tutors, though this is rare in scientific subjects where research requires departmental
facilities.
In terms of the estimated proportions of engineering as a percentage of the total, MIT is
the largest with 36%, or over 300 faculty members in engineering, while Cambridge is
the smallest, with 11% or 135 faculty members; Tokyo has 20% or over 500 engineering
faculty positions. However, when it comes to faculty members in the scientific subjects
including engineering as a whole, the universities are apparently not so different. MIT
and Cambridge have similar proportions of scientific faculty at between 60 and 70%,
while Tokyo claims to have 80%. The Cambridge numbers are possibly an overestimate
owing to college appointments in humanities. The size difference is also visible in
student statistics. Cambridge has almost twice as many students as MIT, and Tokyo has
nearly 3 times as many. Interesting is the fact that MIT is clearly more oriented towards
graduate education where 57% of the total student body are graduate students while at
Cambridge they form 32% and at Tokyo, 42%. Among undergraduates, engineering
students constitute 47% in MIT, 11% in Cambridge, and 14% in Tokyo. Perhaps, these
last figures reflect more accurately the sense of proportions of engineering in the
respective universities.
In terms of academic coverage, contrary to its image, MIT has four schools other than
engineering, comprising a total of 27 departments. Cambridge has 5 schools that cover
21 faculties and 4 syndicates, which in turn comprise 60 departments. Tokyo University
comprises 10 faculties and over 30 research institutes.
Another major difference between the three is their space configuration. MIT has a
single campus where the longest distance across the campus is about 1 mile, and with
many of the departments physically connected through corridors. Indeed, this
connectivity between different departments was put in place by design, to facilitate
communication. Cambridge University spreads over the entire city with different
departments and colleges occupying different corners. Departments are often separated
physically such that one would have to travel (traditionally on a bicycle) to get from one
place to another. Tokyo University is the most spread out, with 3 main campuses that are
as far as 30km apart, with 40-60 minutes travel time and/or several train rides in between.
This physical set up is clearly a legacy of past decisions. Former MIT president Paul
Gray reflects that having a single campus, which was enabled by a generous donation by
Eastman Kodak, as one of the three defining moments of MIT as it exists today. Having
secured the land, MIT leaders at the time went on to design a campus that suited their
philosophy. In contrast, it is hard to know if there ever was any conscious design in the
way Cambridge University is physically laid out. In the case of Tokyo University, which
started as a collection of colleges that had been founded separately brought together by
the government for their convenience, it continued to incorporate different campuses
mainly as a result of government level decisions.
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Table 4-2: Academic structure and coverage
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Academic 5 schools with 27 University and 10 faculties: law;
structure departments: colleges form a dual medicine;
and engineering; science; structure. Historically engineering; science;
coverage architecture and (though no longer), literature; agriculture;
planning; humanities colleges were economics; culture;
and social science; responsible for education; pharmacy
and management. teaching and the
2 affiliated research University examined There are 13 graduate
institutes: Lincoln the students. schools which largely
Laboratory and the 5 schools: physical overlap with the
Whitehead Institutes sciences; biological faculties and over 30
sciences; humanities research
and social sciences; in stitutes/c enters with
technology; and arts separate staff
and humanities.
21 faculties and 4
syndicates comprising
I about 60 departments
4-2. Patterns of industrial funding
As shown in Table 4-3, MIT leads the other two, whether corporate donations are
included or not, in terms of absolute volume, as a percentage of its total operating
revenue, as a percentage of its total research income, per head of members of faculty,
and per contract. More specifically, research support from industry is the highest at MIT
at 74 million US dollars', against 30 million in Cambridge, and 9 million in Tokyo in
absolute terms. The picture remains the same in terms of per faculty member, for which
MIT received $ 81,000 dollars per head from industry as compared against $ 23,000 in
Cambridge and $3,000 in Tokyo.
Interestingly, corporate donations are one category of industrial relations hip for which
Tokyo comes ahead of MIT at $ 56 million1I, and is the only case where MIT's lead is
reversed. However, when adjusted for scale either by comparing per capita figures in
terms of total faculty, science and engineering faculty, or researchers, MIT regains its
lead.
I okyoT Uivrty&professo~%rscanets muhve-.2-%1%1%AM*%n-C1efucion; eortacyIth
moreresricivec nrac nome Anthe ineretincotraT here the dongationste
of traitionsof foudation or oteruindvidualbenefations
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Table 4-3: Basic comparative data on university-industry relationships: MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo
MIT % Camb. % Tokyo %
Year 1999 1999 1999
Academic staff
All faculty members - 1 923 1276 2640
Of which in science and engineering -2 588 64% 797 62% 2118 80%
Researchers in science including non
faculty - 3 1559 2230 3284
Finance (million US $)
100
Operating Revenues - 4 911 100% 602 100% 1,620 %
Research grants and contracts 376 41% 190 32% 287 18%
Industry funded research 74 8% 29 5% 9 1%
Corporate donation 39 4% 56 3%
Finance per faculty (thousand US$)
Operating revenues per faculty 987 472 614
Research grants/contracts per faculty 407 149 109
Industry funded research per faculty 81 23 3
Income from industry in research grants and contracts
Total in thousand dollars 74,405 29,004 9,051
Per faculty (thousand dollars) 81 23 3
Per scientific faculty (thousand dollars) 127 36 4
Per scientific researcher 48 13 3
Income from industry in research grants/contracts and donation
Total in thousand dollars 113,405 65,071
Per faculty (thousand dollarsO 123 25
Per science and engineering faculty
(thousand dollars) 193 31
Per science and engineering researcher 73 20
Industry income for research grants and contract as % of
total research revenues 19.8% 15.2% 3.2%
total revenues 8.2% 4.8% 0.6%
Industrial grants/contracts (thousand US$) 5 74,405 29,004 9,051
Number of contracts 668 649 287
Average contract size (thousand US$) 111 45 32
Industrial donation/grants/contracts
(thousand US$) 113,405 65,071
Number of contracts 1,873 4,837
Average contract size (thousand US$) 61 13
1. American concept of faculty to include professors, associate and assistant professors. Lecturers and
assistant lecturers included for Cambridge.
2. Cambridge and Tokyo figures are estimated using the overall proportion of scientists to the total. The
percentage for Tokyo, which was obtained from the university, appears particularly high, but this may
depend on the way in which they defined "scientific."
3. Researchers include post doctoral fellows and research scientists/engineers in MIT (and
excludes visiting fellows/professors, affiliates, and non-tenure taching staff such as lecturers),joshu in Tokyo, and unestablished research staf in Cambridge.
4. MIT finance data are from FY1999. Cambridge industry source revenue includes a small amount of
revenues from non-EU government organizations. Tokyo finance data are from the annual report 2000.
5. For MIT, 2000 actual expenditure data from the Office of the Sponsored Programs.
For Cambridge from 1999 estimated from "Research wholly or partly supported by funds from outside
bodies." For Tokyo, from data in the engineering faculty
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Tokyo are usually given in direct support for individual professors, while they are
organizationally raised at MIT, and spent in ways that fit the institution's priorities, in
negotiation with the donors. MIT's donations therefore include money raised for shared
facilities, most notably for expensive pieces of equipment that individual laboratories can
ill afford. In Tokyo, benefaction is gracefully consumed by cash-strapped professors for
their routine activities. Tokyo professors seem fortunate to be recipients of such
voluminous benefaction, although it consists of small amounts which add up to a large
total; the individuals would not perceive themselves to be recipients of "large"
benefactions.
What is the picture for overall industrial sponsorship including both contracted research
and donations? Here, MIT comes back to the leading position, mainly on the strength of
its large industrially contracted income, at $ 113 million to be compared with $ 65
million in Tokyo.
The fact that MIT's lead is so robust across so many different indicators, means that the
differences are likely to be a reflection of the larger volume of MIT's relationships with
industry. It is possible to argue that MIT's lead is a reflection of the fact that it has a
smaller humanities component than the other two universities and humanities subjects
tend to have smaller industrial support than other disciplines. This would explain the fact
that industrial income as a proportion of total university expenditures is lower for
Cambridge or Tokyo. However, one would expect less of the humanities effect with the
industrial income as proportion of total research income, where humanities contribution
would be low both for the numerator as well as the denominator. Indeed, this is exactly
what we see, the differences across the three schools get narrower, and yet, MIT
maintains its significant lead.
The question is what these differences reflect. Interestingly, Tokyo University
professors, as well as many of the Japanese companies interviewed, are painfully aware
of the "price differential" between American and Japanese universities. "MIT is
expensive" as one Japanese industrialist noted. Another Japanese company pointed out
that even Cambridge is "cheaper" than MIT. The real difference appears to be explained
by what the "cost of research" includes in the respective universities. At MIT, the salary
costs of faculty and graduate students are included as an integral and important part of
research sponsorship, for which overhead is also paid at about 60% of the total costs.
The inclusion of the full costs of faculty salary is much more prevalent in North
America, where the norm is for professors to be paid for only 9 months of the year, and
they are expected to engage in outside activities for 3 months of the year. In research
universities, they often charge research contracts for their summer time.
In Cambridge, by contrast, salaries of full time academics are presumed to be covered by
grant income from the government, although their low levels have become a critical
survival issue in attracting and retaining good people for the profession. Interestingly,
industrially active academics often supplement their low official pay with consulting
incomes, often from sponsoring companies; in other words, industry may be paying more
than the formally contracted amounts through consulting salaries but through a route that
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is less visible or official. In addition, many of the students also come with, or are given,
fellowships and there seems to be a less wide-spread expectation for academics to support
their students through research grants/contracts. Overhead charges are at about 60%
(check) but only of salary costs rather than the total costs, and therefore cheaper in
Cambridge than at MIT.
In Tokyo, graduate students, including doctoral students actually pay tuition out of their
own pocket (thought the tuition itself is far below the level of that at MIT). Contracted
research costs include overhead at 30% of the total costs some of which goes back to the
Ministry. Tokyo is "the cheapest" for industry to ask to undertake contracted research.
Yet, even though it is cheaper, companies have been choosing to "donate" funds rather
than to contract research - evidently opting out of formal contractual relationships; this
may be because of the lack of clarity as to what money can buy in terms of the time
commitment either of professors or of students.
Past trends in industrial funding at MIT. The overall change in the importance of
industry as a source of research funding is shown in table 4-4. Industry was an important
source of research funding before and just after World War II at around 14-16%, similar
to the level reached in 1990-1995. The proportion of research activities to the total
campus revenue rose substantially from 0.8% in 1930 to 6.2% in 1946 indicating the
rising volume of research during the war period. In 1970, industrial funding, as a
proportion both of research funding and of total campus revenue, declined to all-time
lows of 3.4% and 1.9% respectively. Thereafter, industrial share of research funding has
been rising steadily with the sharpest rise in between 1980 and 1985 when it rose from
8% to 13.9%, and again between 1995 and 1999 rising from 15.5% to 19.8%.
Table 4-4: Research Funding at MIT (1000 dollars)
1930 1946
US Government
DOD
DOE
NIH
NASA
NSF
FRSP
FRSP
FRSP
FRSP
FRSP
FRSP
Other governments local/foreign FRSP
Industrial FRSP
Foundations/Non-profits FRSP
Other FRSP
Total Research Grants and
contracts
Of which industry
Total Campus Revenue
Industrial income
Annual increase
as % of research
as% of campus revenue
per faculty member
1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
15828 49504 71523 138410 189978 234163 273542 257163
2214 16010 12459 19183 38576 51158 55866 65718
3801 8674 11352 50004 56364 61098 67114 63138
1007 8158 14922 24365 39805 57915 61066 58246
321 6511 6940 9294 12315 18469 41292 27301
1403 6485 19623 25054 33628 38093 38564 35352
102 400 757 609 398 369 944 2344
1064 1994 5319 13058 33487 46223 56120 74405
773 6172 7473 9653 15282 25220 26430 35137
11 56 806 1390 2560 4684 4653 6997
FRSP 199 1547 17778 58126 85878 163120 241705 310659 361689 376046
FRSP 28 253 1064 1994 5319 13058 33487 46223 56120 74405
TR 3515 4051 60084 103422 139337 283104 456698 643552 890135 911171
28 253 1064 1994 5319 13058 33487 46223 56120 74405
14.7% 10.8% 6.48% 21.68% 19.68% 20.73% 6.66% 3.96% 7.31%
14.1% 16.4% 6.0% 3.4% 6.2% 8.0% 13.9% 14.9% 15.5% 19.8%
0.8% 6.2% 1.8% 1.9% 3.8% 4.6% 7.3% 7.2% 6.3% 8.2%
Source: Financial reports of sponsored programs and Treasurer's reports (various years)
1. 1930 and 1945 data from Treasurer's reports
2. Campus revenues excludes revenues of Lincoln and Draper Laboratories
3. Research grants and contracts do not include gifts for chairs, equipment donation, fellowship support, consortia support?
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As shown in Table 4-5, the number of industrial sponsors has risen steadily through the
1970s and 1980s, and appears to have stabilized in the 1990s, while the average size of
sponsorship per company continues to rise in the 1990s.
Table 4-5: Industrial research s onsorship at MIT
1970 1980 1990 1999
Total amount
(1,000 dollars) 1,994 13,058 46,223 74,405
Number of
industrial
sponsors 87 244 354 365
Average per
sponsor (1,000
dollars) 23 54 131 204
Table 4-6 shows the size of industrial funding from multiple-sponsor projects, which is
the closest accounting category to consortia and collegia, although it also includes other
projects with multiple sponsors and the research contract portion of strategic alliances.
Since some strategic alliances involve donations such as endowed chairs, and since these
alliances tend to require a considerable pump priming period, the amount shown is likely
to understate the contribution of strategic alliances. Nonetheless, these figures provide
the rough magnitude of changes taking place. Before the 1960s, there were no research
2
projects on record where multiple companies participated2. By 1970, there were three
"multi-sponsor projects" on record, which appear to be research contracts that happen to
have had more than one company sponsor. By 1980, there were over 30 multi-sponsor
projects, and the number kept on increasing up to about 100 in the 1990s. In terms of
their proportion of total industrial funding, it rose from virtually zero to 18% in 1980,
29% in 1990 to 38% in 1999. Collegia and consortia are the two new types of
relationships with multiple companies that emerged in MIT during the same period, and
these are explained in detail below. Though the records do not give breakdowns,
developments of consortia within the multi-sponsor project category is likely to have
been significant, given the central role played by consortia in key units such as the Media
Lab.
Table 4-6: Rise of multi-sponsor projects at MIT
1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
Number None listed 3 34 120 87
Total N/A 2 2,393 13,285 28,192
(thousand dollars) ______
% of total research N/A 0% 18% 29% 38%
supported by
industry 
______ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source: Financial reports of sponsored programs, MIT, multiple years
2 The only exception was the Industrial Liaison Program (ILP), MIT's campus-wide information service
program, where corporate members could get professional assistance in identifying and receiving
information about research activities of their interest for a modest annual fee.
Fig. 4-2: Industrial research contracts at MIT
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Table 4-7: Research Funding in Cambridge (thousand pounds)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000
OST research councils 1459 7587 8707 19226 37328 43481 46902
UK government 2121 3028 5206 6386 8748
UK central government 1856 2468 5187 6177 8286
Local governments 19 21 14 68 79
Public corporations 246 539 5 141 383
UK industry/commerce 1460 3209 6574 12500 12229
UK non profit 3081 8940 22284 31845 36224
UK based charities 3081 8619 21597 30771 35428
UK health and hospital 321 687 1074 796
EU government bodies 1275 8559 8873 6838
EU other 32 216 518 596
Other overseas 525 2692 803 1815 2752 5019 5637
less foreign
governments/charitable
bodies
Other sources
Total Research Grants
and contracts
Of which industry b)
Total
Industry funding
as % of research
as % of total
Annual increase
industrial revenue
Research revenue
total revenue
322 1831 744 570 1815 1524
240 262 240 348 564
1984 4023 10279 16413 49755 110649 108970 117738
203 861 1765 5025 7732 16654 18845
11728 22691 49995 83374 178800 315800 323800 372100
10.23%
1.73%
8.38% 10.75% 10.10% 6.99% 15.28% 16.01%
1.72% 2.12% 2.81% 2.45% 5.14% 5.06%
1980- 1985- 1990- 1995-
85 90 95 99
15.4% 23.3% 9.0% 21.1%
9.8% 24.8% 17.3% -0.4%
10.8% 16.5% 12.0% 0.6%
Source: Abstracts of Accounts (various years)
Note: The accounting system changed between 1985-90. Data series may not be comparable
Fig 4-3: Research funding at Cambridge
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Industrial funding in Cambridge. The available statistics on the industrial funding of
research at Cambridge indicate that there has been a rapid growth (Table 4-7)3. The
annual growth rates averaged 15% in 1980-85, 23% in 1985-90, 9% in 1990-95 and 21%
in 1995-1999. Government funding of research at Cambridge was stagnant in the early
1980s, but thereafter has been increasing robustly, with increases in industrial funding
exceeding that of the government funding only in 1995-1999, as shown in Fig 4-3. These
figures alonedo not support the simple story that industrial funding had to be increased in
order to cope with declining government funding. Rather, it seems to reflect both a
delayed reaction on the part of Cambridge to respond to the anxieties generated in the
1980s, and the continued perception of absolute shortages of funds in the higher
education sector in the UK.
Industrial funding of research at Tokyo University. As shown in Table 4-8, industrial
funding for Tokyo University in general, either in terms of scholarship donations or
contracted research, did not increase significantly in the 1970s, particularly relative to
increasing government funding. In the 1980s, scholarship donations did increase
significantly until the early 1990s. Contracted research has shot up since 1995, but this
increase is likely largely to reflect the increase in government funding of research. The
level of joint research indicates that industrial collaboration might have been modest and
not sharply rising during the whole period.
The 1990s has been a better period for Tokyo University. There have been successive
reform measures from the Ministry of Education in terms of relaxed curricular
requirements, and progressively reduced budgetary rules and restrictions. This has been
matched with real increases in the overall level of funding, particularly for infrastructure
and research.
There have also been rapid changes in the infrastructure for university-industry
relationships within the university. The Center for Collaboration Research was
established in the late 1990s as a joint center between the IIS and RCAST. Though the
center's main activity has changed considerably during the tenure of its three center
directors, the main objective has been to support industrially active faculty in IIS and
RCAST through the provision of needed space. One of the activities initiated was the
establishment on the web of a database of expertise available to the public, showing the
faculty areas of interest. Tokyo University's first technology licensing unit, CASTI was
established in 1998 as a private company owned by two non-scientific faculty members
in RCAST. With a new CEO in place, the company is positioned to become a profitable
business. In the meantime, a second competing initiative for technology licensing w as
proposed in 2001 by 118 to provide additional faculty-led licensing activities. Underneath
these developments are strong rivalries between the two institutes, 118 with 100 faculty
and RCAST with about 30 positions.
3 Although there are weaknesses in the time series as categories such as industrial sponsorship were refined
over the years, as can be seen in Table 4-4.
Table 4-8: Research funding at Tokyo University (million yen)
1970 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Scholarship donation a 473 1453 2966 5283 5668 6359 6170 5990 6966 6121 5677 5381 6381
Contracted research b 82 493 642 1030 1059 1117 1228 1193 2734 5827 7392 8455 10249
Joint research c 70 423 406 589 549 461 554 692 750 814 878
Research awards d 1225 5426 6275 7880 7725 9270 9783 10277 12977 13632 13718 14057 15178
Infrastructure support e 3275 6760 6820 7182 7343 7969 8498 9117 9817 10544 10960 10756 10844
Externally funded
Total research funds
Total expenditures
Percentage of total
research
Scholarship grant
Contract research
Joint research
Research awards
Infrastructure
Externally funded
f 555 1946 3678 6736 7133 8065 7947 7644 10254 12640 13819 14650 17508
g 5055 14132 16773 21798 22201 25304 26228 27038 33048 36816 38497 39463 43530
29869 100634 100056 117156 122099 139222 163619 161830 195331 174164 176608 210147 210042
9% 10% 18% 24% 26%
2% 3% 4% 5% 5%
0% 0% 0% 2% 2%
24% 38% 37% 36% 35%
65% 48% 41% 33% 33%
11% 14% 22% 31% 32%
25% 24% 22% 21% 17% 15% 14% 15%
4% 5% 4% 8% 16% 19% 21% 24%
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
37% 37% 38% 39% 37% 36% 36% 35%
31% 32% 34% 30% 29% 28% 27% 25%
32% 30% 28% 31% 34% 36% 37% 40%
Percentage of total
expenditures
Scholarship grant 2% 1% 3% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4
Contract Research 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Joint Research 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% (
Research Awards 4% 5% 6% 7% 6% 7% 6%
Infrastructure 11% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 5%
Externally funded 2% 2% 4% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5
Total research 17% 14% 17% 19% 18% 18% 16% 17
Source: Tokyo University
a shogaku kifukin, b=jutaku kenkyuhi, c=kyodo kenkyuhi, d=kakenhi, e=kohi, f=a+b+c; g=a+b+c+d+e
4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3%
1% 1% 3% 4% 4% 5%
)% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6% 7% 8% 8% 7% 7%
6% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5%
5% 5% 7% 8% 7% 8%
% 17% 21% 22% 19% 21%
Fig 4-4: Research funding at Tokyo University
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Contrasting the three: historical trends. Fig 4-5 shows the trend in research income
from industry over the past 30 years as a proportion of total research income. Clearly,
there has been a steady increase at MIT, with step changes in the early 1980s and again in
the late 1990s, as opposed to the trend in Cambridge for which the level hovered around
10% between 1980 and 1990, dipped once in 1995 and then began to increase again in
the late 1990s. The picture of trends in Tokyo depends largely on which time series is
looked at. Fig 8-2 shows three time series mainly because there are no disaggregated
data available that are comparable with those of MIT and Cambridge. Tokyo 1 is the
time series that would be used officially by Ministry and University administrators; it
gives a very rosy picture of a steady rise, indeed at a higher level than MIT or
Cambridge. The real trend is closer to Tokyo 2, which allows for the fact that the large
increase between 1990 and 1995 is mainly explained by government funded contracted
research. Tokyo 3 gives time series that are the most comparable with those of MIT and
Cambridge, excluding scholarship grants which is an ambiguous category of industrial
support more akin to donations in MIT and Cambridge.
Fig 4-6 shows the trend in industrially supported research income relative to the 1970
level. Interestingly, MIT shows a steady growth, while Cambridge shows a steady
increase but with a spectacular rise in the late 1990s. For Tokyo, the most distinct
characteristic of the trend is the stagnation in the late 1990s. There are two explanations;
the first concerns the economic stagnation in Japan, and the inability of Tokyo University
to attract many funds from foreign firms. The second concerns the generous levels of
government funding since the Basic Science Law, which left university researchers with
little need to seek additional funding from industry.
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4-3. Historical developments
MIT
Founding values. The frequency with which the name of MIT appears in the previous
chapter's description of national developments underscores the importance of MIT as a
player in national research, and specifically in university-industry relationships. In this
section, MIT's historical origin and the developments in its relationships with industry
will be examined.
MIT was founded in 1861 by William Rogers, with a founding philosophy to support
practical arts in engineering. Indeed, even today, MIT people explain the practical
orientation of MIT as arising from its founding spirit, symbolized by its seal comprising
the laborer at the anvil and the scholar with a book - representing "mind and hand." In
1891, MIT was authorized to receive one third of the federal funds provided to
Massachusetts for land grant colleges under the Morrill Act of 1862. Since the federal
government's intention in the Morrill Act was to establish higher education institutions
relevant to the practical needs of the country, the award of land grant funds was clearly
an indication of commitment to informing practice.
Less emphasized in historical accounts are MIT's scientific aspirations. Rogers was a
geologist who believed strongly in the role of science in supporting practical arts - indeed
he had little to do with practical arts himself. The charter of MIT was granted by the
state of Massachusetts for:
"instituting and maintaining a society of arts, a museum of arts and a school of
industrial science aiding the advancement, development and practical application
of science in connection with arts, agriculture, manufacturing and commerce."
Unconventionally at the time, Rogers saw the importance of combining scientific
principles with operational manipulations; until then, the two spheres had been isolated
from each other. His emphasis on the former distinguished MIT from peer schools which
focused merely on the practical side of things (Hapgood 1993)4.
Early years: heavy emfhasis on application. In spite of the initial emphasis on
science, by the early 20' century, MIT was decidedly leaning towards practical arts, with
little emphasis on science. .But in contrast to the rest of the nation, where university
research was relatively isolated from industry, many MIT departments were already
working very closely with industry. For instance, chemical engineers were extremely
active in the formative years of the chemical industry, and prominent scientists
successively left MIT in search for environments more supportive of science (Geiger
1986; Servos 1990).
4"This is a book written to describe the engineering ethos of MIT, and not necessarily written to be an
authoritative historical account. However, its section on historical origins is thorough and captures the
essence of the dual goals that are also evident in founding documents.
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It was not until 1930, when Karl Compton, a prominent physicist from Princeton, became
the president of MIT, that there was a swing back to science. One of the folk tales told in
MIT is how Compton met the chairman of Bell Labs when he was still unsure as to
whether he should accept the presidency at MIT. Compton decided to do so, taking to
his heart the industrial leader's comment that engineering schools were serving the
myopic needs of industry today but were failing to create the future of the country (MIT
various years). His commitment to bring science into engineering was reflected in key
appointments such as that of Vannevar Bush as Dean of Engineering. However, it took
much longer to change the nature of the place, which was so strongly oriented to training
students to enable them to work well for industrial needs. Indeed, seen from Compton's
perspective, one could say that it was his vision of science that led MIT to be involved as
critically in wartime science, and people whom he brought on board such as Vannevar
Bush who helped him achieve that vision, and shaped national policy on science later.
One could argue that it was Compton's vision that shaped the subsequent historical
development.
Effect of World War II: towards engineering science. The wartime experience was to
change the character of MIT permanently. The most significant experience was the
Radiation Lab. It was so successful in bringing together scientists and engineers to
develop military applications that it became a symbol of scientific success serving
national needs. Within MIT, the experience of the Radiation Laboratory had two major
ramifications. First, the recognition that it was physicists rather than engineers who
provided the critical inputs to developing military applications, led to serious self-
analysis on the part of the Engineering School. Eventually, Gordon Brown, the then
head of the Department of Electrical Engineering, strongly pushed for bringing science
into engineering disciplines in the 1950s. In 1949, the Committee on Educational
Survey, more commonly known as the Lewis Commission, made recommendations to
strengthen the scientific base in engineering curricula. The vision of Compton was
finally accomplished on campus and the era of engineering science began. It was as
though the wartime experience helped people understand the value of Compton's
insistence on science.
The second ramification was that laboratories as virtual structures became the
organizational norm, in which academics belonging to different departments and schools
could work together on a given theme of mutual interest. Laboratories thus provided a
mechanism to operate in a matrix structure, providing a flexible and convenient
organizational structure for undertaking interdisciplinary work. As with the Radiation
Laboratory, most of the large laboratories and centers at MIT were developed in response
to sponsors' calls, usually the federal government, to open up new research programs to
cope with different fields.
Student unrest in the 1960s. The 1950s through the 1960s were the golden period for
federally funded research for MIT, when the ties with industries generally took a back
seat. This blissful period of collaboration with the government was to change
dramatically in the late 1960s, through the nation-wide student unrest about the US
involvement in Vietnam and about university contributions to military technology
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(Johnson 1999). This also marked the time when the federal support for research began
to decline, as other government expenditures escalated because of the war on the one
hand, and the extended social programs of Johnson's "Great Society."
At MIT, student criticisms were focused on its relationship with the military. On
November 5, 1969, about 350 students picketed in front of the Instrumentation
Laboratory, known today as the Draper Laboratory, a symbol of military research.
Indeed, until that time, it was not uncommon for students to be engaged in secret
research. Libraries had special sections for dissertations that were written under
confidential conditions, so that they could control access. All this was to change. Draper
Laboratory was spun off to become an independent non-profit research agency. The new
credo at MIT was that all campus activities should be open and public, with definitely no
secret research where the results could not be made public (Leslie 1993).
The 1970s and gradual re-emphasis on working with industrial sponsors. The
beginning of the 1970s marked a financial crunch for MIT. Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society could not co-exist with large military expenditures and there were cutbacks in
government military expenditures. The spin-off of Draper Laboratory, which constituted
roughly a quarter of MIT in size, also created a serious blow to cost structures within
MIT. The result was a new focus on industry as an alternative source of funds, mainly
led by the administration with an intensive campaign during 1975-80 under President
Jerome Wiesner (Johnson 1999).
The Industrial Liaison Program (ILP), a program that had been started in the late 1940s,
to provide facilitated access to MIT research, was re-invigorated with a faculty member
appointed to head it. The mission and content of ILP has not changed since its inception.
It comprises a group of dedicated administrative staff who serve corporate members of
the program, who obtain facilitated access to MIT technology through information
bulletins; symposia and conferences; and exchange of visits (faculty members visiting
companies and company representatives visiting MIT faculty on campus). ILP officers
were to provide personalized services to client companies, for instance, by setting up
meetings for their visits and accompanying them. The decision to re-vamp the ILP arose
out of a confluence of factors. There was a desire to increase revenues from the program,
but in addition, working with Japanese companies also provided a unique potential for
MIT to diversify its contacts internationally. Several people in relevant positions had
good ties with Japanese companies already and were in a position to undertake such a
task. As a result of intensive efforts to work with the international corporate community,
especially in Japan, MIT opened its first overseas office in Tokyo in the late 1970s.
Emergence of consortia in the 1970s and 1980s. Initiatives to work with multiple
companies through establishing consortia began sometime in early 1970s. The Polymer
Processing Program (PPP), which started in 1973 was one of the earliest that people
remember as a consortium. Working with industry w as clearly gaining legitimacy. The
Laboratory for Manufacturing Productivity was established as a departmental laboratory
in 1977, taking over PPP, and was upgraded to represent all engineering departments
three years later. Another center with a strong focus on industrial application, the
ill-
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Materials Processing Center (MPC), was also established around the same time as an
engineering-wide laboratory. The consortium model of research funding was adopted by
the MPC, learning from the Laboratory for Manufacturing Productivity. The founding
faculty of the MPC, who had previously worked in the Industrial Liaison Program (ILP),
added an important new feature to the MPC consortia membership: MPC consortia
members could become ILP members at a discount or vice versa.
This marked the beginning of a period when new centers were created with industrial
funding rather than with funds from the government. The most visible example was the
Media Laboratory. The Media Lab today matches the size of the other two laboratories
with similar emphasis on information technology, the Laboratory of Computer Science
and the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, which had origins in government funding, and
yet its development was strikingly different from the other two. The Media Lab relied
heavily on industrial sponsors while the other two initially grew out of government
sponsorship.
The Media Lab in the 1980s. The early ideas for the Media Lab were developed by
Nicholas Negroponte in partnership with Jerry Wiesner, the former MIT President. As
Wiesner stepped down from office in 1980, he began to work directly with Negroponte,
traveling with him to solicit donations and support from a broad industrial community.
While the Media Lab activities date back to the late 1970s, the actual opening of the lab
took place when the new Wiesner Building was opened in 1985. The level of support
they commanded made the Media Lab famous in places as far away as Japan. The
subsequent development has been legendary. Its annual resource level grew to $18
million in 2000, reaching the size of the largest laboratories in MIT, and based almost
entirely on industrial funding.
An important innovation by the Media Lab that supported such growth was its own
consortia arrangements; these have three key characteristics. First, each consortium is
relatively large, with up to 50 member companies and a laboratory-wide total of about
150 industrial sponsors. Each member pays a large annual due - in the order of 200,000
dollars annually. Second, members collectively get exclusive rights to commercialize
patents arising from the Lab free of charge. Third, consortia are like windows through
which to look into the Media Lab and separate consortia do not necessarily have separate
research activities.
Partnership with industry for education. By the early 1980s, there was a national
competitiveness crisis prompted by strong competition from Japanese industry. MIT
became involved in this crisis through at least two separate avenues. Engineering
departments were pounded by industrialists in their visiting committees to do something
for the manufacturing sector, for instance, to establish a new manufacturing department.
As the Dean of engineering considered options, there were parallel activities on campus.
Several industrial trustees of the MIT corporation were also urging MIT to take steps. In
1986, MIT convened its "first commission on a major national issue since World War II,"
the MIT Commission of Industrial Productivity, comprising 16 faculty members from
around the campus. The rare interdisciplinary collaborative work resulted in the book
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entitled "Made in America." When the recommendations of "Made in America" also
included one to provide different types of education, MIT could not longer sit still. The
two parallel developments led to strong institutional support for a new educational
program at the graduate level: the Leaders for Manufacturing Program (LFM).
LFM was an unprecedented initiative in three distinct ways. First, it was based on
partnership with, rather than sponsorship from, industry. The stakes were high: 8
founding members were asked to put in up to 8 million dollars per company over 5 years.
They were also asked to sit on the governing board and the operating committee, where
they were expected to put in substantive "sweat equity." In striking contrast to their usual
advisory roles with respect to university activities, these industrial representatives were
asked to participate actively in the development of program vision and curriculum and in
the operation of the program through internships. Second, it was the first
interdisciplinary graduate program at MIT. Students had to satisfy admission criteria
both for engineering and for management; they were to work with faculty advisors from
each, and were to end up with two masters degrees. The LFM paved the way for later
programs such as the Systems Design Management Program, which was started in 199-, a
distance-education graduate degree based on engineering and management courses.
Third, it was supported by a widely held sentiment of national crisis.
Administrative Reforms: Technology Licensing Office and Corporate Relations.
From the 1980s to the early 1990s was also the period when various administrative
functions were streamlined in support of activities to work with industry. The sleepy
patent office was reformed into a vibrant Technology Licensing Office in 1986 with
technical assistance from the former TLO director at Stanford. The Intellectual Property
Counsel became a separate and professional function in 1990, and was given a separate
mandate, providing support to research sponsorship contracting. It provided a bridge
between the Office of Sponsored Research and the TLO on legal issues and worked on
legal issues related to computers and networks. In 1989, all activities related to
corporate sponsors were brought together in the Office of Corporate Relations, where
corporate development activities to solicit gifts and other special support from companies
were for the first time, brought together with the ILP in order to make a consolidated
corporate focus. The idea was to create a one-stop shop for corporate clients, and to
ensure that liaison activities are conducted not only to solicit ILP membership, but to
bring broader benefits to the MIT community through multiple avenues.
Emergence of Strategic Partnerships. In the 1990s, the concern that federal funding
was going to wane led to a brand new type of relationship with industry: strategic
alliances with individual companies. Starting with the announcement of a strategic
alliance with a pharmaceutical company (Amgen in 1994 for $30 million over 10 years),
there have been 9 such alliance announcements. Closer examination reveals that these
alliances have significant variations between them. However, they are similar in the
scale and duration of industrial commitment, as well as the management structure in
which higher level administrators are represented to help ensure their success.
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In the 1990s, more variations to consortia were formed, with some of them truly breaking
the mold in the size and nature of their activities. "42 volts" was based on modest
contributions, but provided an unprecedented technical forum for the establishment of
industry-wide standards among competing firms. More specifically, it was a global
consortium of about 40 automobile related companies, where competing companies such
as Ford, Toyota, and Mercedez-Benz came together to develop a technological consensus
about the move to a higher voltage system in cars. "Oxygen" combined the concepts of
partnership and consortia, developing a 6 member industrial sponsor group that supported
its programs. Currently, the Microphotonic Center is establishing a new mode of
industrial relationship that combines consortia with strategic alliances.
Institutional policies with respect to "outside professional activities." There are two
key legacies of the past that underlie MIT's policies about outside work by faculty: the
role of consulting and the concept of externally supported salaries. The MIT community
believes that academics have consulted for industry and earned external income
throughout the history of MIT, although there are no specific historical records to prove
this. As early as 1939, MIT's Policies and Procedures specifically described service to
industry through consulting as important, provided that it did not interfere with the direct
MIT responsibilities. One senior faculty recalls how it was normal for engineering
faculty to consult when he joined in the early 1950s. Former MIT President, Howard
Johnson recollects in his memoirs how he started to consult both "to supplement my
income and build my experience in the field of organization."(Johnson 1999) In addition
to his initial MIT salary of $10,000 in 1955, his consulting income was significant at
$6,000.
The loosely defined rule that faculty can allocate one day a week to outside activities
such as consulting is first mentioned in MIT's Policies and Procedures of 1945. However
there have been subtle changes in the application of these rules over the years. One
faculty member recalls that in the 1960s, intensification of faculty members engaged in
start-up activities led to serious concerns about conflicts of interest. There was one case
where one professor in mechanical engineering was specifically asked to choose between
working for MIT and working for his firm, and this led to the formation of a special
faculty Committee on Outside Professional Activities in 1963. In 1966, the policy that
faculty members should disclose their outside activities to their department heads is first
mentioned in Policies and Procedures.
Today, the norm is for faculty to submit annually to department heads, a signed form
describing all their outside activities and the amount of time spent, and stating that they
see no conflict of interest. In the 1970s, there were further clarifications made with
respect to the meaning of "one day a week" to specify the fact that it was one day per
calendar week, and not one day out of the 5 working days. This detailed clarification
may seem unnecessarily fastidious, but it followed a national scandal where some
academics at another university were found to be charging more days than were possible
in a year when consulting and campus days were added together. These rules are not
necessarily enforced, largely left up to the discretion of the individual faculty, and so,
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some faculty members suspect that there may be some divergence between the reality and
what is on the books.
Another practice that powerfully shaped faculty behavior was the traditional expectation
for engineering faculty to develop sufficient external research support to cover 50% of
their compensation. This was a practice that became adopted in the 50s and 60s, when
there was a massive expansion of MIT, particularly of its Engineering School. The
number of faculty members grew from just over 250 after World War II to 1,000 in 1970,
fueled by the massive support of federal government. The practice to charge some of the
salary costs to federally funded research became a norm among universities not only at
MIT. It was only in the 1980s that the requirement to have faculty salaries supported by
"soft money", or by external research contracts, began to be phased out, partly spurred by
the price competition among universities. As of May 2000, 95% of the engineering
faculty salaries were supported by "hard money," non-restricted money arising from
tuition and other institutional revenues. It is only for the summer 3 months that faculty
would charge externally funded research.
The most recent change in policies about potential conflicts of interest occurred 2 years
ago. Students are now not allowed to take part in work in which their faculty supervisors
have financial interests. This appears to have arisen with various scandals that came to
fore, including the aforementioned one where a student claimed that he could not do the
homework, because he was bound by the non-disclosure agreement to a company started
by another faculty (Marcus 1999).
Today, MIT's policies are quite clear. Faculty may engage in external work up to one
day a week. Faculty may not assume line management positions for outside
organizations. They can take a leave of absence, which is given quite liberally, should
they wish to concentrate on external activities such as start-ups. Faculty may not receive
sponsorship money from companies of which they are a part owner. Faculty members
are not expected to receive research sponsorship from companies for which they consult,
but this policy is somewhat more loosely applied: they can do so provided that there is no
conflict of interest.
Cambridge University
Foundations. Cambridge University is nearly 800 years old. Among many of its boasts,
one that is relevant to university-industry relationships is its historical tradition in
mathematics, accentuated by Sir Isaac Newton in the 1 7 th Century. Indeed, Cambridge
was so strongly dominated by mathematics that even classics students were expected to
first prove themselves through examination in mathematics. It was not until the
establishment of the Cavendish Laboratory and the Engineering Department towards the
end of the 19t century that experimental science and engineering became established in
Cambridge.
The Cavendish Laboratory was established in 1871 as Cambridge's physics department,
with support from a benefactor. In spite of its reputation in pure sciences, it also has a
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legacy of early spin-offs such as Cambridge Instruments (1881), established by two
graduates including the son of Charles Darwin, and Pye (1896), established by a
laboratory technician, as documented in "the Cambridge Phenomenon" (Segal Quince
Wicksteed 1998). This tradition lives to this day, as symbolized by the fact that the
current Cavendish Professor, the most prestigious chair in the Cavendish, is known for
two spin-off companies.
Although close in time, it was not as easy to establish the Engineering Department, which
was started in 1875 with an appointment of a professor of mechanism and applied
mechanics. The word "engineering" was rejected in the title with a disdain about applied
subjects. The founder of the Engineering Department had a difficult time with the
university, "particularly with regard to the value of the workshop in the teaching of
engineering" (Engineering 2000), and this eventually led to his resignation. His
successor, Sir James Alfred Ewing, was more adept at working with the university and
persuaded them to establish a complete School of Mechanism and Applied Mechanics.
World War II. World War II represented a less dramatic transition for Cambridge than
it did for MIT. Perhaps the only common factor across all departments was that there
was an inevitable gap in activities as scientists had to return from their military research
work and re-engage in their civilian research (Wilkes 1985). Indeed the impact of the war
was felt differently by different departments. For the Cavendish, the war represented a
period of reduced research activities as many scientists were taken away into wartime
research activities, most notably for the development of radar. The celebrated legacy of
atomic physics, from J. J. Thompson's discovery of electrons to Cockcroft and Walton
splitting the atom, was to come to an end as the war had transformed atomic physics into
"big science" that was unsuitable for Cambridge structures (Cambridge website
http://www.phy.cam.ac.uk/cavendish/history/). Recognizing the difficulty in regaining
its supremacy in atomic physics, the Cavendish leadership looked into new applications
of physics including molecular biology. DNA deciphering by Crick and Watson in 1953
shows the success of such new approaches that opened Cambridge's new era in
biological sciences, though they soon moved from the Cavendish to join other biological
research groups in Cambridge.
The Engineering Department was relatively successful in recovering from the war. The
department head appointed in 1943 had extensive work experience with the government
in wartime research as a scientific advisor, which had strengthened his belief about the
role of scientific methods in addressing practical problems. Based on his carefully
developed plan, the Department launched into an era of unusual expansion, particularly in
research (Engineering 2000).
Early work in computing had been undertaken in the Mathematics Laboratory established
in 1937, which was soon taken over by the government during the war. After the war,
Maurice Wilkes returned to head the laboratory and turned it into the Computer
Laboratory. His success in developing one of the first computers led to subsequent
efforts in software and applications. The Computer Laboratory became another hub for
technology start-ups, including Acorn Computers.
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Early developments in relationships with industry. It was not until the 1960s that the
University engaged in serious reflection on relationships with industry. The increasing
awareness that isolation from industrial laboratories was not good for the university led to
a report from a university sub-committee under Sir Nevill Mott, the head of the
Cavendish Laboratory in 1969. The report addressed the need to link teaching and
research to applications in industry and pushed the local planning authority to remove its
tight restrictions on industrial growth in the region. Following the Mott
recommendations, Trinity College established Cambridge Science Park in 1970 (Segal
Quince Wicksteed 1998).
Another notable development was the establishment of the Computer Aided Design
Center, supported by the Department of Industry. The Wolfson Cambridge Industrial
Unit was established in 1971 to demonstrate the technique to industry. The first notable
industrial liaison was probably the Whittle Laboratory, opened in 1973, which focused on
turbo-machinery with 10 year support from Rolls Royce.
Uncertain years in the 1980s. The 1980s marked an unprecedented change in
government policies for higher education with real budget cuts and increasing demands
for accountability. Cambridge was perhaps one of the fortunate universities with
successive leadership that led it through two decades of tight finances. As early as 1981,
the then Vice Chancellor (who later became the head of the University Grants Committee
where he introduced vigorous reforms in university funding as well as the Research
Assessment Exercise), Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, announced that "universities cannot
hope to pass through the next few years unchanged, and we shall all have to learn to live
with less resources than we have become accustomed to." He set forth an ambitious early
retirement plan, whose success saved the university from dire consequences in the first
few years. He noted that these funding changes reflected not just the economic
circumstances, but the government's belief that universities needed to reform and that the
only way to induce them to reform was through financing (Cambridge Reporter 1981).
Indeed, starting from that time till 1995, there was scarcely a year when the vice
chancellor did not lament the tough financial conditions, with funding increasingly used
by the government to reflect policy concerns (Cambridge Reporter, various issues).
Emerging focus on industry as a source of funding. Attention was gradually turned to
developing alternative funding sources, most notably through better linkages with
industry. In 1982, the organization of the Wolfson Cambridge Industrial Unit was
reviewed to explore possibilities for introducing an MIT type membership-based
industrial liaison program (Jennings 1991). Although the conclusion was that there was
insufficient demand to command fees from industrial partners, the unit was remodeled to
take overall responsibility for establishing better linkages between industry and the
University, and was moved out of the Department of Engineering to the University. By
1984, the University was hopeful of its assuming new roles in technology transfer. With
the break-up of the British Technology Group in 1986, the Wolfson Cambridge Industrial
Unit formally assumed all responsibilities for technology transfer, through a university-
owned company. In 1990, it was instrumental in establishing the Cambridge Quantum
Fund, a venture capital fund in support of early start-ups.
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Changes in governance. Another change was a direct response to the Jarrat Report of
1985, commissioned by the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals. It provided a
set of recommendations both to the government and to universities on measures to
improve efficiency. The initial Cambridge reaction to the report was favorable, as they
agreed on its recommendations to the government (Reporter 1987). It was only in 1987
that they realized that the real implications of the report: the government intention to link
increases in funding to efficiency gains as recommended by the Jarrat report. This meant
that Cambridge had to improve management and accountability of line departments, and
clearer leadership by vice chancellors.
For the first time, Cambridge recognized that any new activities of the university required
external support, which in turn required the University to have the ability to respond
quickly and with a single voice - in short the office of Vice Chancellor had to be
strengthened (reporter 1988). A syndicate to review university governance was
commissioned in 1988 and its recommendations were formally approved in 1990. Their
recommendations included strengthening the Vice Chancellorship from the current
rotated 2 year terms among college masters, to a full-time appointment of 5-7 years.
Although not all of the recommendations were adopted, in 1992, the incumbent Vice
Chancellor became full time, and various other organizational changes were made in
support of stronger central management.
There were also developments in organizing fund-raising. There was an early
recognition for the need for increased benefaction. In 1989, Cambridge Foundation was
established effectively to manage Cambridge's endowment funds. In 1990, the first
professional Development Office was established to conduct fund-raising and planning
effectively. In 1991, a strategic plan for developing real estate in West Cambridge to
house Cambridge's scientific and technological activities was approved by Cambridge's
governing body, the Regent House.
Evolution of embedded laboratories and its variations. Another change was the
evolution of "embedded laboratories" where industry supports university research
activities while locating its own laboratory on university premises. Because of the
Whittle Laboratory in the 1970s, the idea of having close relationships with support from
industry was not new. In the 1980s, as the need for external support for funding
expensive research became more acute, individual faculty members began to make
isolated efforts. For instance, in the mid 1980s, one lecturer who was also the research
director of a start-up company, was asked by another company which was about to buy
the start-up company, to establish an industrial laboratory. With support from the Head
of Department to assume such a responsibility as a faculty member, he became the first
faculty formally to hold dual positions overseeing both an academic laboratory within the
university and an industrial lab. Another entrepreneurial faculty member negotiated the
building of his laboratories with the support of Hitachi, Toshiba, and Schlumberger.
Since Schiumberger already had its premises in West Cambridge, it was no surprise when
Hitachi expressed interest in building its own laboratory there. What was distinct in this
plan was that the MIRL was to be built in a building shared by Hitachi. In other words,
Hitachi's Cambridge Laboratory was to sit next door to the MRL.
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These early examples of industrial laboratories with close ties with the university
occurred without much central attention. It was only when a bigger venture such as
Microsoft materialized later that the notion of "embedded laboratory" came to the fore.
The idea to work with large corporate partners was further experimented through BP and
Unilever, though resulting partnerships have very different organizational parameters.
Seiko- Epson was another company which opened its own laboratories in Cambridge
based on close collaborations with several laboratories of the university. Marconi is the
latest to be added to the series that have pledged to open their laboratories in Cambridge.
Getting the administrative infrastructure in place. There was another round of
administrative changes in support of better linkages with industry. The Research
Services Division was established in March 2000, merging the Wolfson Industrial
Liaison Unit and the contracting office, and considerably expanding its capacity.
Around the same time, Cambridge won its bid for the University Challenge Program, ,
from where it obtained seed capital for venture capital financing. It also won
government funding under the Higher Education Reach Out to Businesses and the
Community (HEROBAC) program to establish their own Reach Out Office - a new kind
of corporate liaison office. It also won funds from various government programs to
support the development of entrepreneurship.
Tokyo University
Foundation. Tokyo University was established in the late 19 1h century by the Meiji
government as a critical instrument for modernization. Initially established as separate
schools that were combined to become the first Imperial University in 1886, Tokyo
Imperial University had a focus on professional practice such as engineering and
agriculture. As Meiji reformers were selective in their choice of model countries
depending on the field, different colleges and disciplines had slightly different historical
legacies as to how they came to be established.
In industry, the UK had been advising the Meiji government about the need to establish a
Ministry of Industry together with a College of Engineering, with a view to establishing
critically needed expertise for government and the private sector alike. The 25-year old
Henry Dyer from Glasgow was nominated to become the first Principal of such an
establishment (Miyoshi 1983; Tokyo daigaku hyaku nenshi iinkai 1984; Odagiri and
Goto 1996). Though young, Dyer had had ambitions to reform engineering education in
the UK and had made some preliminary investigations as to how engineering education
had been done in other countries. According to him, engineering education at the time
followed either the continental European model with a focus on theory and sciences or
the British model based on crafts and practice. To him, neither was adequate and the
ideal was to be found in combining the two. It was this ideal school of engineering that
he established with his youthful energy in Tokyo in 1873. Its innovative approach won
instant fame and was reported as early as 1877 in Nature (Miyoshi 1983). Dyer himself
was so jubilant with the success of the school that he actively promoted the same
approach in some colleges in Scotland upon his return (Odagiri and Goto 1996).
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Early years. Graduates and professors from the Engineering Department of the
University of Tokyo were critical to the modernization and industrial development of
Japan (Tokyo daigaku hyaku nenshi iinkai 1984; Odagiri and Goto 1996). The Japanese
government invested directly in key production facilities such as steel and textiles in
order to prime industry with modern technology. While most of these facilities were
later sold off to private manufacturers, this period of government-led experimentation
made the role of the Engineering Department simpler - even the government employees
needed to have hands-on technological knowledge. From nameless small factories to
those that survived to become leading manufacturers such as Toshiba, Hitachi, and
Toyota, engineers from Tokyo University were the key executive and engineering
resources in the adaptation of foreign technology (Odagiri and Goto 1996). For example,
Toyota Motors was started by an engineering graduate from Tokyo University who
effectively used his ties to his professors and classmates to assemble the required
technical expertise. Clearly, the Engineering Department was built upon the ethos of
science informing practice.
There was an early interest in developing the aircraft industry. In 1909, six years after
the Wright brothers made the world's first flight, a study group called the Temporary
Research Committee on Military Balloons was formed, comprising the Army, the Navy
and the University of Tokyo, to conduct aircraft research (Odagiri and Goto 1996). In
1918, the Aviation Laboratory, along with a specialization on aviation, was established in
the Engineering Department. Tokyo University produced many engineers thereafter,
including graduates such as to Jiro Horikoshi, the chief engineer who designed the Zero
fighters which caught the world by such surprise during World War II.
Within the Engineering Department, a General Experimental Station was established in
1939 with a view to working closely with industry. There were many deep collaborative
engagements with industrial engineers coming to work in the center. During World War
II, the government mobilized all scientific and engineering resources from universities
and private industries alike (Tokyo daigaku hyaku nenshi iinkai 1984). Tokyo University
was forced to work with the military government, with an ever increasing need for
engineers. Tokyo University selected a former Dean of Engineering, who was then
working for the military, as their president, in hope of improving the tightening
government relations. He and his successor who was also an engineer, served as wartime
presidents and under their leadership, the engineering faculty expanded rapidly. Indeed,
Tokyo University was given enough resources to establish a second engineering faculty.
After World War II. The end of the war marked a striking contrast in the path for
universities between those in a winner country and those in a loser country. Whereas
MIT with its Radiation Laboratory was enjoying a new national reputation for success,
significant engineering facilities such in Tokyo University were meeting serious internal
scrutiny prompted by fear that the Occupation government may dismantle them as a
punishment for their involvement in war-time science (Tokyo daigaku hyaku nenshi
iinkai 1984). Academics went through a period of collective reflection with a new
awareness about the need to maintain academic autonomy from the adverse influence of
government or industry.
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Engineers moved quickly to rename all of their war-related divisions within a month of
the defeat. By the time the General Headquarters of Allied Powers in Japan (GHQ)
announced their policy to ban all aviation related research, most Tokyo University
aviation groups had been reconstituted into other groups. The first faculty of
engineering had renamed three of its divisions with strong military ties. The second
Engineering Faculty had also done the same, and proceeded to reconstitute itself as the
Institute of Industrial Science (Tokyo daigaku hyaku nenshi iinkai 1984) with a well-
articulated civilian mandate to serve the production needs of companies. The Aviation
Laboratory was reformulated into a Science Institute.
The post war period marked a period of relative isolation for Tokyo University from
industrial and governmental contacts. There were strong emotions of regret among the
intellectuals with respect to the military role played by universities during the war. The
general mood was to re-establish academic autonomy, rather than to serve societal needs.
This must have been a complex period for engineering related groups. On the one hand,
isolation from industry did not make sense given their engineering mandate. On the other
hand, their immediate legacy of working closely with the military government was
nothing to be proud of. The distance between industry and academia appears to have
grown slowly. The inability of faculty members to work for industry under civil service
law, and the lack of mechanisms for the university to receive external funds to conduct
research, all fed each other to further the isolation. In the development of university-
industry relationships, "we got behind (the other countries) by about 20 years" as several
senior academics pointed out.
Student Unrest. Twenty years after the end of the war, the engineering faculty members
were to meet another round of criticisms, this time from the students. The 1960s
represent a decade of leftist attacks and student unrest, culminating in the upheavals in
Tokyo University in 1968. It was so out of control that the central administration brought
in defense forces and police to calm things down, only to fuel anger among students.
Interestingly, the final reconciliation statement proposed by students and agreed to by the
university included a line that condemned academic collaboration with industry that
served their capitalist interests (Tokyo daigaku hyaku nenshi iinkai 1984). One
Engineering Dean who resigned in the aftermath, published his final reflections about the
whole affair: while clearly stating that engineering cannot survive without collaboration
with industry, he agreed to remain critical of engineering as a discipline contributing to
the creation of environmental hazards, or to capitalist interests (Moriguchi 1969).
Another engineering professor with active industrial involvement criticized the student
statement and proposed that only certain types of collaboration with industry were to be
avoided (Moriguchi 1969). The then director of the IIS also gave a cautious
interpretation of the joint statement that it is the loss of academic autonomy rather than
collaborations with industry that should be criticized (Isshiki 1969). The Engineering
Department had to renew its resolve to maintain its distance from industry. Interestingly
enough, because student protests were concentrated in the main Hongo campus, their
effect did not seem as strongly felt in the other campuses. The IIS, in its remote campus,
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where there were hardly any undergraduates, appeared to come out of the period
relatively unscathed.
Industry still valued graduate recruitment from Tokyo University, but was using it for its
selectivity process, rather than for its education. Indeed, there was a period until the early
1980s when industry actively spumed education by the University, indicating that they
had more faith in their in-house training than in university education.
During such a period of isolation, key collaborations took place through national projects
with multiple industries, typically sponsored by MITI, to which academics were invited
to contribute. Tokyo University professors actively participated in such projects.
However, since there was no mechanism for national universities to be able to receive
funds from other Ministries, their involvement did not lead to substantive research
collaboration. One exceptional example of collaboration took place with Hitachi, which
supplied a supercomputer for the University. The academics using the computer actively
engaged in discussions with engineers and managers from Hitachi, providing substantive
and technical feedback on the way the computer worked.
Developments in the 1980s. In the early 1980s, a Joint Research Scheme was
introduced by MOEC to enable private industry to work with national universities. Joint
research activities finally began to grow, slowly but steadily. Until then, there were two
other financial channels through which industry could work with Tokyo University:
scholarship grants and contracted research. The difference with the Joint Research
Scheme was that there could be explicit support from the government in a way that
matched industrial contributions to support collaborative research. Even then, there was
little budgetary support for activities such as patenting. Professors who wanted to get
their inventions patented were implicitly encouraged to go their own way or to do it
through corporate partners.
The most significant development in the 1980s was the perception that significant
investments were being made by Japanese industries overseas, particularly in American
universities. NEC's agreement to endow a chair in its name at MIT in the early 1980s
created an outcry in Japanese universities, which felt deprived and neglected as they went
through zero-budget increases throughout the 1980s. Tokyo University approached NEC
to obtain similar support.
In the late 1980s, the former Aeronautical Research Institute, which had been reformed
several times, was to be finally reformed into the Research Center for Advanced Science
and Technology. One key feature of the lab was to have endowed chairs, which were
introduced as new mechanisms to introduce mobility and to bring in fresh blood from the
outside. Based on corporate donations, a typical endowed chair was to provide several
fixed, typically 3 year term positions for visiting professors. There was significant
internal opposition to the proposed scheme, where the expressed fear was of
contamination by corporate interests. In the end, whereas NEC's chair at MIT meant a
full professor in the field of their interest who would give NEC special attention through
visits, Tokyo University did not agree to provide any such services.
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Several Tokyo University professors described how badly they were handicapped by the
internal opposition to establishing endowed chairs. Interestingly, to demonstrate the
extreme nature of the opposition, they refer to the fact that they were not allowed to
recruit people from the donating company into the positions. The fact is that such a
practice was not at all common, and would certainly be considered strange, even in the
Western systems. If positions were to be given to their own employees, why would a
company need to establish a chair in the first place? For Tokyo professors, however, the
idea of endowed chairs was naturally linked to the idea of placing people from the same
company - almost as though it were an extension of the company employment policies.
Developments in the 1990s. There has been a rapid change in the organizational
structures for collaboration with industry in the late 1990s. The Center for Collaborative
Research (CCR) was established in 1995, providing space for industrially active
academics for their collaborative research, and developing a database of the industrially
relevant research projects that were being proposed by the academics. Another
laboratory was established in 1999 to explore different ways to work with industry.
Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs) were also established in the late 1990s to support
academic patenting and the licensing of inventions.
There has also been a sea change in the regulatory framework for academics working
with industry, though through incremental changes over the decade. The most important
change in the rules concerning university-industry relationships is the permission for
faculty members to consult for industry. Although up front approvals are still needed, an
academic can now work as a consultant for any industry to provide technical advice or as
a board member in a company commercializing his/her inventions. There has also been
considerable deregulation in the financial controls, with a gradual relaxation of line-item
requirements and permission to use multiple year contracts. In the short term, however,
these incremental changes are hard to keep abreast of, as every year, there are slightly
fewer requirements, but they are introduced and implemented unevenly across different
categories of contractual relationships. For instance, most academics were not updated in
their understanding of the current rules about what categories of money can be used for
what. There has been an unevenness in understanding even among university
administrators, for instance, in terms of which category of money can be used for post
docs, and what are the applicable overhead rates. In the medium term, these measures are
consistent with the move to greater financial autonomy under the proposed legal
separation of national universities in 2004.
Contrasting the three organizational histories
There are three historical events, in particular, which exerted considerable influence in
shaping the norms and values as well as the governance structures of the three
universities: organizational founding; World War II, and the student unrest of the 1960s.
Foundation. Interestingly, the foundational values or mission statements exhibit the least
different legacy in the departments and groups that are relevant to university-industry
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relationships in the three universities. That the original organizational goal of MIT was
to contribute to the application of science is well-known and well-remembered. It is
interesting to note that the Faculty of Engineering of Tokyo University was built with a
similar emphasis on the applications of science. Henry Dyer realized his dream
curriculum by marrying theory and applications, believing it to be the first "modem"
program in engineering in the world. There is a much less direct emphasis on
applications in the founding of the Cavendish Laboratory. However, both the founding
father of the Department of Engineering and his successor, Ewing, explicitly attempted a
similar dual focus on applications and science.
One striking difference related to the foundations is the difference in governance
structures. MIT was founded as a private institution with its own board of trustees, called
the Corporation. By the time MIT was born, the norm of having lay boards accountable
to the public had long been established in the US (Bailyn 1991). Cambridge developed
as composite bodies of private colleges and a university that was responsible for
examining the students. The university had a legal status separate from the colleges, but
was a relatively weak body; it was governed principally by its own members. Tokyo
University was an amalgamation of various government bodies established in the late 19 th
century. Various schools and faculties had been founded independently, but were
brought together later to form an imperial university as integral part of the Ministry of
Education and Culture. Built as an instrument of the government to help Japan attain
economic growth, the imperial universities had no separate governance structures, but
were integral part of the government. This is the origin of the independence of the
schools and faculties on the one hand, and the nominal governance responsibility by the
Minister of Education and Culture on the other.
World War II. World War II was the next historical event that had a systematic
influence on the three schools. Dubbed the Physicists' war, this war was different from
World War I in the way science was systematically mobilized by all nations. The way in
which scientists were mobilized during the war, as well as the actual results of the war,
both provided a lasting influence on the three universities. MIT was central in the war
science effort, as the radar project, one of the large national projects, was housed in the
Radiation Laboratory on campus. Being a site for a major national war effort meant that
there was a large inflow of exceptional scientists throughout the period. The success of
radar became a firm source of pride for MIT, and its legacy, both in terms of the
importance of interdisciplinary work as well as the relevance of basic science to
application, was to shape MIT's subsequent actions.
The path taken by Tokyo University could not have been more different. The ultimate
loss of the war meant that all the technological glories that the university scientists could
have claimed were to go to oblivion as quickly as possible. Instead, the academics were
to face a new life of remorse and loss of confidence, from which stemmed a new
weariness of external influence and a resolve to remain autonomous both from
government and from the military. Many of the militarily successful laboratories and
groups were disbanded by the Occupation, and military research was turned out of the
campus.
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The experience of Cambridge was somewhere in between. There was far less sense of
glory or success for the scientists, and far more a sense of the need to re-assemble
scientific ventures back at the universities, but there was no loss of face on the part of the
scientists. The scientific enterprise at universities continued as it had been prior to the
war. 1945 marked the moment when the three universities began pushing science in
completely different ways.
Student unrest. The student unrest in the 1960s constitutes another historical event that
shaped the orientations of the three universities. In the US, student protests centered on
the role of the US in Vietnam, and at MIT their main target was military research. While
pickets and demonstrations on campus were mild in comparison with other campuses,
their focus on the military involvement of MIT eventually led to the spin off of the
Instrumentation Laboratory and a new principle of having no secret research on campus.
While the Lincoln Laboratory remained affiliated to MIT, students' involvement in secret
research there also became regarded as unacceptable.
In Japan, student unrest followed decade long criticisms about the American role in
Japanese national security. The national universities had already shed their
responsibilities in military research, which had been scaled down drastically since 1945.
The main target for students' criticisms therefore became focused on university
involvement with corporate sponsors. University-industry relationships as a direct target
for attack was followed by the subsequent administrative disputes in the 1970s. As a
result, working closely with industry became taboo for the academics. The student unrest
had a differential impact across the three campuses. Hongo, the main site for historical
clashes, was hit the hardest, while Roppongi and Komaba were relatively quiet.
Interestingly, Cambridge and the rest of UK universities suffered relatively little from
student unrest, aided by the fact that there was no specific socio-political debate that
pushed students to fight.
Clearly, organizational foundation is important but not all encompassing. As we saw in
the case of MIT or Tokyo, it is possible for a university to be built with one mission and
drift to another. Tokyo University is perhaps an extreme case, where they were almost
forced to change owing to external reasons. The point is however, that imprinting does
work, but it is not all pervasive.
4-4: Two historical legacies
Clearly organizational history matters, but how can we be more specific than that? It
seems that history influences the way things are done at any given time through two
distinct mechanisms: through governance structures, which influence the way new
decisions are made formally; and through existing norms and routines that are themselves
historical legacies.
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Governance structures
Governance structures are largely the legacy of the foundation and they tend to be
changed only under specific and subsequent reforms. They are very different in the three
institutions. As shown in Table 4-9: MIT has a clearly centralized structure with a single
board of trustees, while the Regent House, the governing board of Cambridge has a
considerably more dilute authority. For Tokyo University, the nominal authority rests
with the Minister of education, but in real terms, this level of decision making rarely
takes place.
MIT is a centralized structure, unusual even among American universities, in which the
Board provides active support and guidance to the central administration. Important in
this configuration is the fact that there are many individuals with industrial connections
who sit on the Board and who bring an industrial perspective into the operation of MIT at
the highest level. Another mechanism, related closely to governance, is the system of
visiting committees, each of which is a group of 20-30 individuals again including many
from industry, with a mandate to review the overall activities including education and
research in a department and report to the Board. This is another mechanism through
which industry perspectives are brought into the strategies at departmental level. The
budgetary and personnel processes are also centralized, whereby departments play
a significant role in proposing, but the final decisions remain in the hands of the central
administration. On personnel matters, it would be unusual for the central administration
to overturn departmental or school proposals. On budgetary matters, the central
administration plays a more significant role, particularly on expansion, with advice from
specialized committees.
The governance structure in Cambridge is communal, with Regent House as the supreme
university body essentially comprising most of the academics who have permanent
positions in the University. The Council consists of elected representatives of Regent
House. Traditionally, there was a "troika" system of the Treasurer responsible for
financial matters, the General Board and its Secretary with a mandate to oversee
academic matters, and the Registrar responsible for student affairs. The Vice Chancellor
post was little more than a nominal position held by one of the college heads, on a part-
time basis and only for 2-year terms. Since the 1980s, there has been a reform of the
governance, whereby the Vice Chancellor became a full-time position, to work with
appointed pro-vice chancellors. The administration is becoming streamlined with the
Registrar as the single administrative head, and the Council becoming an executive body
focused on policy issues.
Another characteristic of Cambridge is the traditional power of department heads, who
have considerable authority over resource allocation within their departments The
managerial responsibility of department heads also appears to have become more
pronounced through the tight budget years in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Table 4-9: Governance structures in MIT, Cambridge and Tokyo
MIT CambridgeTokyo
Highest authority The Board of Trustees, The Regent House The Minister of
known as the comprising about 3,000 Education, nominally,
Corporation comprises teaching and other though this authority
about 75 individuals, members of the has not been exercised
including many with university and colleges in practice
industry experience.
The executive
committee of the Board
meets monthly
Executive body MIT Academic Council The Council is the Senate, comprising all
serves as the President's principal executive heads of faculties and
cabinet, and includes body comprising 20 institutes, and 2 elected
about 20 senior elected members of the members from each
administrators, Regent House chaired faculty or institute..
including provost, by the Vice Chancellor
deans, vice presidents.
Central President (academic) Until recently, part-time President
administration Provost (academic) Vice Chancellor who Vice Presidents
Chancellor (academic) was also a college Secretary general
6 Vice Presidents master, with a 2-yr term
(academic and admin) Registrar (admin)
8 deans (academic and Secretary general of the
admin) General Board
Director of library (academic)
(admin) Treasurer (admin)
Budgetary Central administration Little discretion in the Ministry for the overall
for the main resource central administration allocation and special
allocation based on as it allocates resources projects
proposals from to facs/depts, following Faculty senate for
Deans and department the central government within-envelope
heads formula. Department allocation - tends to
heads have devolved equitable distribution
discretion within the
system.ic
Personnel Proposed by Faculty boards have the Proposed by faculty,
Teceeas a eto Icrainl,)h
findgsmearoitCeosingl uanimiyirequremen
thalecentpast ocpartiontsinthed posiiecmefull tVicetP d based on
Acdemiooncithe dtLitte istwtioner therm, nThemoernanc
pr ncial exeutiventh appinterao- tutr ob
body vice chace llots, reor e vapdis04weClearer rolesnistrytfo the uiestbcoeal
_____________ _______________ oucilleallyatonondsca
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Tokyo University is paradoxically both the most centralized and the most decentralized
of the three. Many of the budgetary decisions are negotiated with the Ministry which has
the final decision (with support of the Ministry of Finance). The detailed rules of
accounting and line-item budgets have been cast upon the university by the Ministry,
though there have been constant and incremental efforts to de-regulate in recent years.
However, there is also a tradition of allocating resources equitably to all professors,
which leaves no room for any discretion or strategizing between them. There is also a
tradition of the senate making all decisions based on consensus. This practice, by default,
means that every professor has power of a veto.
Norms in relationships with industry
Norms about how to relate to industry are another legacy of the past. In Table 4-10, I
summarize the norms as they existed circa the 1970s, before many of the "new wave" of
changes began to take place. At MIT, the main modalities of the relationships with
industry for faculty were through research contracts and consulting activities. As an
organization, MIT also had other distinct features: (a) an Industrial Liaison Program to
provide better access to MIT technology from member companies, (b) individuals from
industry represented on the Board of Trustees and departmental visiting committees, (c)
and student internships. These multiple avenues provided the possibility for some
companies to be particularly close to MIT.
In Cambridge, individual faculty members could have relationships with industry both
through research contracts and through CASE awards (in which research students worked
on a project in a sponsoring company), and through some advisory work and consulting.
Unlike regular internship, CASE awards appear to have provided another link between
faculty and their industrialist peers, as they are in a position to work jointly with the
student(s). Consulting was not a prevalent norm, though working with industry in an
advisory position was more prevalent, but not universally so.
In Tokyo, the normal route was for faculty members to have contracted research but
some academics also engaged in informal research or advisory work with companies - for
which they often received scholarship grants in which the money had least red tape
associated with it. It is not clear how prevalent the latter practices were, but it would not
be too far fetched to imagine that this is the kind of activity whose volume would be
affected significantly in times when there were open criticisms about working with
industry.
Graduate recruitment is another important route of relating to industry for all three
universities. However, it is also a route whose function does not appear to have changed
significantly over the years.
Particularly interesting is the differences in the role of consulting across the three
universities. At MIT, it is something that almost all engineering faculty members are
expected to undertake, partly to supplement their own income, but more importantly, to
keep up with practice. In Cambridge, there are no such expectations, and external
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Table 4-10: Norms related to relationships with industry in the 1970s
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Main modalities Regular research Regular research Contracted research
contracts contracts Informal research
Prevalent consulting Case awards: student support through
Industrial Liaison sponsorship scholarship grants
Program Some advisory Informal advisory work
Industrialists on the work/consulting Graduate recruitment
Board and on visiting Graduate recruitment
committees
Student internships
Graduate recruitment
Role of faculty Important to keep up with An individual affair left Not permitted
consulting industrial progress and to up to individual All external activities
supplement salary academics are subject to prior and
An annual list of external annualapproval
activities including including detailed time
consulting is submitted tables to show how they
ex post to department will not affect main
heads with a signed responsibilities
statement that there is no
conflict of interest
All engineering faculty
are expected to be
consulting
Key Industrial liaison and Wolfson Industrial Central administrative
administrative fund raising from Liaison Office, a small finance unit for
units corporate sources unit for promoting contracting and
Office of Sponsored contact with industry for monetary issues
Research for contracting Dept of Engineering Faculty-level finance
Patent office for units for actual contracts
administrating patents
and licensing technology.
New modalities Consortialcollegia Embedded laboratories Consortia
and changes Strategic alliances Institute/laboratories with New laboratories for
Educational partnerships collaboration with collaboration with
aLP reform, TLO reform, industry industry
Corporate Relations Strengthened WILO Establishment of
Establishment of the research support
Research Services division at faculty and
Division university levels
activtiesare rgardd lare ysindviduloafacir Nbdty iswlin revnges h50%.In oky, cvilserantproessrs eren tperittdtun etra padminisrtv
outsde te uiveritis ter han o miteetypetass fo whch teyna ceive smal
honoaria Thre yers lterthe umbe of aculyunertaing contng ctill low.
Severalacademismwhoswren ptongts pnnso ndsra ikgsesiae htte
wod expnect to tategicor thlanes o cdmc t naeatvlywt nuty
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Administratively, MIT had an Industrial Liaison Program Office staffed by liaison
officers, the Patent Office comprising several lawyers and the Office of Sponsored
Research responsible for research contracting - including those with the government. In
contrast, Cambridge only had a contracts office and the Wolfson Industrial Liaison Office
that served only the Engineering Department. In Tokyo University, contracts were
undertaken as part of the finance function by non-specialist units at the faculty and
central university levels.
It is against these norms, practices, and structures that changes have taken place. These
include, at MIT, the rise of consortia and collegia as well as strategic alliances, and
educational partnerships. At Cambridge, they are the embedded laboratories and new
institutes, and laboratories. In Tokyo, they are emergent consortia with external
secretariats, as well as new laboratories specially developed for collaboration with
industry. In each case, these new modalities of working with industry have been
accompanied by changes in the administrative infrastructures. It is these changes on
which the next three chapters will focus.
4-5. Concluding remarks
At MIT, the effect of World War II was to emphasize the importance of basic science for
technological applications. The assumption that it was good to work closely with
industry to help solve today's problems was replaced by desires to undertake science to
cope with future problems. Interestingly, adopting a more "basic" orientation at MIT did
not mean going against the notion of being application-oriented. The assumption was
precisely that one needed to be both. And yet, as MIT became accustomed to generous
government funding in the 1950s and 1960s, and as industrial connections became less
and less, a new framing that working too closely with industry could be counter-
productive to scientific accomplishment crept in. The new developments in the 1980s
and 1990s appear to represent the swinging back of the pendulum into the other direction,
the key change being the reassurance that working with industry can be structured so that
one does not have to sell one's soul.
For Cambridge, there have been fewer value swings after World War II. Government
funding had already been based on autonomy of science from the early 20t century, and
there was no discernible change in the government position, especially as the increases in
resources in the 1960s were complemented by increases in the number of universities. If
there was any tangible effect of WWII, perhaps it took place at individual levels.
Because most of the country's top scientists were systematically drawn into military
application, it perhaps led to a generation of scientists who were imprinted in this
direction. Nonetheless, on the surface level, the strong preferences for mathematics and
purer sciences continued to dominate in Cambridge. Starting from the 1 970s where the
customer-client principle was established for government contracted research, and as the
government increased emphasis on university relevance for the society during the 1980s
and 1990s, there has been a gradual increase in overall focus on application-orientated
fields. The business school was established as late as in 1990. However, there is no
universal comfort level about working with industry.
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Value swings in Tokyo University provide an interesting contrast to the above two.
Clearly, WWII was a watershed in shaping a new set of values that dictated a move away
from the military-industrial collaboration prevalent during the war. Subsequently, two
apparently opposing values appear to have developed: that science should be independent
of monetary matters, and the other that Tokyo University must contribute to national
development. Such values, however, are not uniformly and evenly held across the
university. Diversity of values held by individuals as well as different organizational
units will be revisited in Chapter 7.
PART III: HOW DID THESE CHANGES TAKE PLACE?
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Chapter 5:
The MIT Way
The purpose of this chapter is to characterize the nature of institutional change in
university-industry relationships at MIT and to understand the organizational factors that
have shaped these changes.
As described in Chapter 4, THE main changes in university-industry relationships at MIT
are the institutionalization of three types of relationships: (a) the emergence OF industrial
collegia and consortia in the 1970s and their proliferation in the 1980s; (b) the emergence
of educational partnerships in the 1980s followed by subsequent attempts in the 1990s;
and (c) the emergence and proliferation of strategic alliances in the 1990s. In this
chapter, I will explore what lies behind these processes of change. I conclude that
institutionalization at MIT begins through a specific relationship in a given locale, which
is sustained over time, scaled up, and/or replicated into new locales. In the second
section, I argue that the way in which MIT defines the organizational boundaries,
particularly with respect to memberships, knowledge and physical location, shapes
powerfully the nature of initial agreements and the nature of subsequent interactions.
Third, I argue that "administrators" play a critical role in sustaining and replicating the
new patterns of interactions. Administrators constitute a category that is in fact not well
defined or established in universities in general, and have somewhat different meanings
in the three universities that I examined. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use
the term administrators to include all the people who engage in administrative tasks,
including academic and professional administrators. By academic administrators I mean
all those who are academics who have administrative responsibilities such as the heads of
departments, deans, provost, or president/vice chancellor. Professional administrators
include all the administrators who join the universities without having had an academic
career. In the final section, I demonstrate that individuals do not simply play "expected
roles" as defined by the organizational boundaries, but provide real inputs in defining and
developing the initiatives through active dialectics, which in turn appear to influence the
way they are sustained, scaled up or replicated.
5-1. Multiple company relationships: emergence of Collegia and
Consortia
Collegia are membership mechanisms for research groups or centers to collect small
amounts of money that will be used to provide members with better access to new
research results arising from the group. Consortia are also membership-based, but tend to
command larger fees that are then used to support a specific set of research activities.
Whereas collegia may only give rise to regular annual conferences or newsletters,
consortia typically involve the establishment of advisory committees/boards where
industry representatives meet academics to discuss research priorities.
The case of a reported consortium is the Polymer Processing Program (PPP), which was
established in 1973, supported partly by the NSF as a pilot for university-industry
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collaboration (Lampe and Utterback 1983; Gray and Walters 1998). This earliest
consortium was initiated as a research program by a faculty member who came to MIT
with some work experience in industry. Realizing that there were no courses on polymer
processing, an industrial technology of increasing importance, he decided to start one,
only to find that there was not enough research material to support his teaching. All the
knowledge resided inside industry. He eventually persuaded his previous employer to
support his consortium by giving up his consulting fee, and persuaded 13 other
companies to come together to start a 1-2 million dollar research program. Members paid
membership fees calculated on the basis of the size of their polymer operations, and came
together once a year to discuss research priorities. The program was managed largely by
the single faculty member who brought in other engineering professors to work on
specific projects. The model for small consortia with significantly higher level of
membership contributions as well as participation was thus established.
A completely different model of a consortium was developed in the Media Lab, and
became a lynch-pin for mustering industrial support for this world renowned lab.
Following several multiple-company projects in the early 1980s, the Movies of the Future
and the Television of Tomorrow (TVOT) were established as membership-based research
programs with 8-12 companies. However, these early consortia were little more than a
collection of disparate research agendas that were too narrow to provide the basis for
bringing together a significant number of Media Lab researchers. It was not until the
News of the Future was established with 20 members in the late 1980s that the norm was
established for consortia to support a larger theme bringing multiple research groups
together. From then on, the Media Lab developed multiple consortia with an
increasingly greater level of membership and membership fees.
Consortia became a mechanism through which sponsors and researchers could be bound
to a given theme of research. However, in contrast to other centers such as the Material
Processing Center, where each consortium supported different activities, the Media Lab
consortia were more like different windows to look at the same set of research. All the
intellectual property rights arising from the Media Lab were owned by MIT with royalty-
free exclusive rights to commercialize shared among all consortia members. All the
money raised through the consortia were pooled together by the Lab and shared among
all research groups - which enabled the Media Lab to maintain a balance between the
high and low risk research projects. One senior researcher/administrator at the Lab
explains the role of consortia as follows.
"One purpose was as a way of telling a story that made sense...we used to
describe them as a lens surface to look at in the lab."
The Media Lab today has four large consortia each with 40-50 members at 200-250,000
dollars a year - "very expensive" in comparison with many other similar schemes. One
administrator familiar with the intellectual property arrangement of the Media Lab
consortia describes it as "one of a kind."
"It only works because it is a self-contained lab that can live.., sponsorship
funding is robust enough so that the lab doesn't need anything else. And that is
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why it's able to basically operate as an island under a totally different type of
agreement.",
Their consortia operate on the basic assumption that the Media Lab only produces basic
technology which could be shared by all. It is up to the industrial sponsors to develop
specific applications in which they could protect their own intellectual property. The
model also assumes that faculty and students working in the Media Lab cannot gain
financially from their inventions there.
If the Media Lab developed a model for attracting and coping with a large number of
corporate members, Oxygen represents the other extreme model characterized by a small
number of members who pay more and work closely together. Oxygen is a 50 million-
dollar research program, launched in 1999 with an objective to develop a human-friendly
computer environment, so friendly that it would be "like air." Only six companies were
invited to be the founding members, paying $1 million each annually. Organizers in the
two Computer Science related laboratories that are older and more established than the
Media Lab are careful to point out that they are partners, with expectations for intensive
and regular interactions. They would be loathe to admit any influence in the design of
Oxygen by the Media Lab. This is because the two older computer science laboratories
have long looked down at the Media Lab with a complex mix of disdain and envy. And
yet, the way in which Oxygen was announced at the Laboratory's 35th anniversary, with
its futuristic vision, is strangely reminiscent of Media Lab's THINGS THAT THINK, a
large and successful consortium announced at Media Lab's 10h anniversary four years
before. Interestingly, the idea of tight partnerships appears to come from the experience
that the two laboratories had in a successful strategic alliance with NTT. Clearly,
existing relationships matter in the selection of partners, as two other founding member
companies also had existing ties with the laboratories.
The final example is a pair of consortia that are currently in the making at the
Microphotonic Center. The prospectus for new partners is available on the Web,
describing how the center hopes to establish separate strategic partnerships with a limited
number of companies, each focussing on a specific technological application. Parallel to
that, there will be a consortium for companies to share the development of the technology
roadmap. What is not clear on the Web is the evolution of the second consortium, as the
negotiation with potential members and partners clarified the need for a more focused
membership group. The on-going negotiation is trying to determine simultaneously the
scope of the joint work, the nature of the intellectual property rights arrangements, and
the size of membership. The preparatory activity is orchestrated by the founding faculty,
assisted by a professional administrator specific to the Center, another administrator from
the contracts office and a lawyer from the Intellectual Counsel Office to advise on the
detailed arrangements, particularly on intellectual property rights.
The founding faculty brings managerial experience from working in an industrial
research laboratory. The center's professional administrator brings knowledge from 20
years of running other consortia, and also an intimate knowledge about the nature of
technology and science, as he himself obtained his doctorate through work supported by
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the center. In fact, he represents a category of "administrator" that appears to be quite
unique to MIT - fully qualified scientists/engineers who turned to "administrative" jobs
and opted to stay at MIT. The people at the contracts office bring in the initial template
contract for consortia at the stage of discussing the details. The lawyer from the
intellectual property office brings intricate knowledge on negotiating intellectual property
rights for all the strategic partnerships as well as for consortia, including those at the
Media Lab among others.
The birth of collegia is more recent. One collegium that several interviewees referred to
as being the earliest was started at the Material Processing Center in 1980, to provide
research information on on-going research activities of the center, for a small annual fee
of 10-15,000 dollars. The founding faculty for that collegium could not recall where the
idea came from - but he thought that it was nothing new and that similar activities were
located in other places within MIT.
What was new? So what is new in these collegia or consortia that did not exist before?
By and large, the term collegia applies to cases where multiple companies pay
membership fees in exchange for information about a given research group. Since the
concept of membership was already well established through the ILP, the new element in
Collegia is only that they pertain to a confined group of faculty and researchers.
Consortia are also membership-based, but support research programs whose agenda
industrial members can collectively and loosely influence, and whose results they share.
They also provided opportunities for companies to get to know students and their work,
which was useful to companies with recruitment goals.
What is new in consortia is the notion of "loose influence" and "sharing the results,"
though the level at which these take place can vary from low to medium. The new
practices would include annual advisory board/committee meetings where research
agenda would be discussed, and increasingly well-defined contractual arrangements
where the intellectual property rights would be owned by MIT but shared equally among
the members. Another key element that distinguishes consortia from any other practices
of the past is the fact that multiple faculty members might work on projects that were
related to each other.
And yet, the categories of "consortia" or "collegia" are not defined clearly and
unequivocally. There is still considerable confusion, especially among faculty members
who only come across a few examples indirectly through having their research funded by
them. For them, there is no reason to distinguish carefully among consortia, collegia and
centers - from their point of view, they have the same meaning: some group of external
sponsors who collectively fund their research and to whom they have to present once a
while.
For the faculty members who actively organize them, there are more distinct categories.
But again, their clarity is often limited by their own experience. For those who have only
organized a center, they know that a center is somewhat different from collegia and
consortia, but are not sure why and certainly not capable of distinguishing between the
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latter two. Only a small number of faculty who have organized all three categories - as
well as professional administrators who tend to come across many examples are capable
of distinguishing them. The ILP officers are clear about them, because they see them
emerge and disappear and are in the position to explain them to external constituents.
The contract officers live with multiple negotiations every day. The local administrators
may only live through a small number, but they are far more likely to go through multiple
cases during their career than faculty because of the nature of their work.
5-2. Multiple company relationships: educational partnerships
The preceding discussions of consortia and collegia have been largely focused on
research activities. There have in fact been several cases where multiple companies were
brought together for educational initiatives. These initiatives are described in this
section.
The 1980s were a period of anxiety for the US economy. There was serious concern
about national competitiveness, particularly that of manufacturing industry. One former
academic administrator recalls:
"Around 1980 - Japan is leading in terms of manufacturing. It's very clear that
we are behind and we had people who were in industry on visiting committees
here, railing and pounding the table that we should be teaching manufacturing.
This is what led to LFM."
He was not convinced of the need to start a department of manufacturing as requested by
the industrialists, and while he refused such a request.
"(I) began thinking about that with other faculty - many of us thinking about what
to do. I began and went out and started visiting a lot of companies - I think I
must have visited 70 over a year and half."
Their early proposal to study the situation was rejected both by IBM and NSF in the mid-
1980s. It became clear to the organizers that they needed not only to solicit sponsorship
but also to work with industry to address this problem. The Leaders for Manufacturing
Program was born out of this historical background and represented a multi-faceted
partnership with 6 large manufacturing companies. One senior industry representative at
the time recalls how he received the MIT proposal. He was unimpressed by the initial
proposal and made suggestions and comments, and it was when they came back 3-4
weeks later that he was struck by the real potential for partnership.
"And the thing that was so striking to us was this was the first time that we really
felt...that they listened to us... Not that they took all our points but it was
constructive. . .(and) at least provided this sense there was going to be real
dialogue."
The commitment to partnership with industry was reflected not only in the large amount
of funding that was requested from them, but in the real participation expected of them.
Industry representatives were to sit not on the "advisory board" which was a conventional
mechanism for industrial participation in universities, but on the "governing board" for
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the program. Industrial representatives also had to put in "sweat capital" and be actively
engaged in the development of the curriculum.
Another novel element of the proposal was the fact that two schools, engineering and
management, were trying to work together. Indeed, LFM is often referred to as a tri-
partite partnership between industry, the School of Engineering and the School of
Management. That MIT itself could not be an integral partner, but needed to be
represented by two partners is an interesting recognition of the kind of internal divide that
existed between the schools, especially when the third partner, "industry," was
representing 6 large companies.
While the companies agreed that there was a need for action, none wanted to come
forward, particularly to be the first to pledge the $40 million endowment. It was
companies with "deep ties" with MIT that were the first to jump. It required active
solicitation on the part of MIT - and having solid support from the President, as well as
two deans was very important for such an endeavor. Paul Gray, then President of MIT
recalls how there was another parallel development in which industrial representatives on
the Board of Trustees (called the Corporation at MIT) urged MIT to take action. One
immediate result was a multi-disciplinary committee of faculty to think about the issues
around national productivity - activities that culminated in the book entitled "Made in
America". He recollects that when the book's key recommendations included changing
education, he felt obliged to take action. LFM was not born in isolation - there were
other activities that implicitly or explicitly created the mood for various parties to come
together.
One industry representative had a strong sense that there was a kind of forged
understanding about the importance of LFM within MIT.
"It was clear to all of us that this was not a couple of faculty members off by
themselves without institutional support or institutional importance. I mean, they
(president, deans and other institutional leaders) knew about it when they would
occasionally meet with us or be at a dinner. Yes, they gave the speeches like
everybody else but you had a sense that they did not just read this thing before
they came in. They had some understanding that this was an important
innovation."
The program has been successful in attracting excellent students and has in fact been
replicated in other universities. There was a real need for combined education linking
engineering and business administration. One striking result of the partnership is the
changing careers of the three key champions representing the three partners at MIT. One
of the founding co-directors who represented the School of Engineering now teaches at a
business school. The other founding co-director, who represented the School of
Management is now Dean of Engineering. The former Vice President of manufacturing
in one of the active member companies is now the only remaining director of LFM at
MIT. "It had a huge impact" for all of them.
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Another program, System Design and Management (SDM) was developed in the mid-
1990s, following in the steps of LFM and again bringing together the two schools,
engineering and management. The champion of the new program was one of the
founding directors of LFM, who admits how heavily influenced he had been by the
experience of LFM. He had to do something new again. It followed similar footsteps in
its preparation - a multi-disciplinary committee, intensive company visits to develop the
key concepts behind the curriculum. While the program was successfully launched, it did
not do nearly as well in commanding the same kind of commitment from industrial
partners. While their views were reflected in the curriculum, their participation became
more like "sponsors" of individual candidates. The faculty champion reflects that this
time there was no sense of "national crisis" to pull people together. Another difference
was the lack of truly committed central academic administrators, who were willing to
campaign on the behalf of the program.
What was new? The question is how new were these initiatives? In terms of bringing a
small number of industrial partners together to sponsor a new program targeted at
working engineers or engineering managers, there are previous examples. One executive
management program, the Sloan Fellows Program, was established in the 1930s by the
Sloan School to provide education to senior engineering managers; it was strongly
supported by General Motors, DuPont and Goodyear. Another program, the
Management of Technology (MOT), was established in the 1980s, championed by a
faculty for a younger cohort of engineers with aspirations to become future chief
technology officers.
These two sets of program development provide an interesting comparison along two
dimensions. But before delving into the detailed comparison, one qualification should be
made: today, all four programs look to an outsider as equally successful, bringing in
excellent students and providing an interesting variation of the main theme of the MBA.
So, any comparison has to be with the internal perspective that is largely invisible to the
outsiders.
What was the nature of the "novelty" in LFM and SDM, as compared with their
predecessors, the Sloan Fellows Program and MOT? One striking difference is in the
level of collaboration among the three partners: industry, the Sloan School of
Management, and the School of Engineering. Companies were much more than sponsors
and actively influenced the nature of the curriculum in LFM and its successor program.
LFM perhaps benefited from the special local condition of other activities where school
boundaries were being crossed, through Made-in-America and other initiatives. The
detailed understanding of its need by the President, as well as the two key deans, paved
the way to massive boundary crossing between industry and university on the one hand,
and across the two schools on the other. It is for this reason that the birth of LEM is
considered by the MIT community as a significantly novel phenomenon. The crossing of
the two boundaries - allowing companies to influence curriculum (the legitimate
autonomy territory of the academics) on the one hand, and collaboration across the two
disciplinary spheres of social science and engineering on the other, were too visible and
meaningful a development for other local players to ignore.
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The second axis of comparison was the level of organizational support for the initiative.
The two programs that have organizational support, LFM and the Sloan Fellows
Program, managed to obtain far higher levels of external support than those championed
by individual faculty. The main claim to legitimacy was made by virtue of individual
persuasion and credibility - because while the organization may have provided the stamp
of approval, none other than these individuals were going to campaign actively for them.
Again the critical difference is the role of the administrators and the extent to which they
were active in the very planning of the initiatives.
5-3. Single company relationships: strategic alliances
The emergence of strategic alliances is often quoted as one of the most visible and
significant changes in MIT-industry relationships in the 1990s. 1994 saw the first
strategic alliance, with one company committing to an outlay of 30 million dollars over
the following 10 years. Since then, there have been eight more cases of such "strategic
alliances" (see Table 5-2). While nine may seem like a small number, no other
university in the country has yet reached this number. Other universities, such as
Berkeley, struggled to establish even one such case, and others are only emerging as a
result of observing the example of MIT. In 1994, for a company to invest several million
dollars annually was a huge departure from the previous norm - in which individual
research sponsorship contracts would typically be several hundred thousand dollars.
These alliances collectively produce sizable revenues for MIT. If all of the alliances that
were established between 1994 through 1999 were fully operational, their annual
contributions in 2000 would have been about $30 million, as compared with the total
industrially funded research of $74 million. In reality, all alliances experience
considerable pump priming periods, and the actual spending in the early years tends to be
smaller than originally envisaged. Nonetheless, this quick calculation shows the
significance of this new type of relationship.
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Table 5-2: Strategic alliances at MIT
Year Company Size Departments/fields
1994 Amgen 30M in 10 years Biology
Brain and cognitive science
1997 Merck 15M in 5 years Biology
Brain and cognitive science
1997 Ford 20M in 5 years All MIT
1998 NTT 18M in 5 years Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Computer Science Laboratory
1999 Merrill 20M in 5 years Sloan
Lynch Engineering
1999 DuPont 35M in 5 years Chemical engineering
Biology
Biomedical engineering
1999 Microsoft 25M in 5 years All MIT
2000 Nanovation 90M in 5 years Microphotonic Center
2000 HP 25M in 5 years All MIT
Source: MIT press releases
Origin of strategic alliances
"Success has many parents, and everybody will tell you a different story, but I will tell
you the true story," says one central academic administrator with a smile. " If there is a
hero anywhere in this, it is B" and he names one professional administrator, B. B was
recruited to MIT as a corporate relations officer in the early 1990s having had 20 some
years of R&D experience at a technology-intensive company close to MIT, and having
been an active MIT alum with two degrees from MIT. Because of the special
relationship between MIT and his previous employer and his personal experience as an
active alum, B was very familiar with the culture and organization of MIT. As he
reflected upon his new role, he developed the idea of forming a large partnership with a
single company. He was familiar with several examples of alliances between
pharmaceutical companies and universities and personally had the experience of working
with R&D partnerships in his previous jobs. All his instincts told him that there was a
real opportunity for starting a new kind of relationship. He identified one company as a
possibility and approached an MIT professor who had been a founding member of that
company. Through the professor, B was able to contact the company's CEO, who
indicated his willingness to explore options. B made his first visit to the company in
early 1992. Favorable discussions led to other meetings where the Provost and President
as well as other academic administrators representing relevant disciplines were gradually
brought in.
There was still a lot of work to be done to make the idea fit the MIT ethos. B remembers
many faculty critics who were fearful of industrial influence. The question was whether
it was possible to come up with an appropriate mechanism to match and link industrial
interest and faculty interest, without upsetting faculty autonomy. The active engagement
of one academic administrator who fortunately had a great scientific reputation was
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particularly helpful as he openly decided to exclude himself from the beneficiary group.
MIT interest was thereafter represented by an academic administrator with no personal
stake. The criticisms and concerns were reflected in the final design of the collaboration,
and effort was made to make the mechanism look similar to government funding. It was
to be proposal-based - so no faculty would feel pressured to conduct a specific kind of
research. Proposals from individual faculty members were then to be reviewed by a
committee comprising both MIT and industry representatives. Another concern was that
faculty may be stranded should industry be unpredictable in pulling out of its own will.
Some clauses were included in the agreement to protect faculty from the possibility of
industry withdrawing funding without notice.
The experience of developing this first alliance had a huge impact on the way the central
academic administration saw the future of working with industry. It happened right at the
time when MIT was exploring options to diversify its sources of funding. The strategic
alliance immediately became a new category of relationship that was potentially
replicable and multiple efforts were made to replicate it. Several discussions were
initiated by central academic administrators with senior executives in industry.
"By the time that (the first alliance) got moving,....we thought that this was a
terrific model. The next thing that happened, just as I was making my rounds....1
got to know (the chairman of the company) because we work on the board of
(another company) together. We were just getting to know each other. I went to
see him and I said to him "you know, we really should be doing things together."
(He) said, and this is almost a quote, "Well, I agree. You've got a group of some
of the smartest people in the world, and our people are pretty darn good too. I bet
if we put them together, they will find something worthwhile doing. Let's try. "
So we basically agreed that if two organizations could find something that added
value to the organizations, that were consistent with our goals as an academic
institution and had some long-term value for the company... that he would support
funding at....$3-5 million a year up front."
Faculty members in the relevant field of expertise would then be brought into the picture
to carry on the conversation at the technical level, supported by professional
administrators.
In another case, the initial visit to a company was made by a group of three, one central
academic administrator, a head of one MIT laboratory and a professional administrator.
Though the original objective of the visit was to solicit funding for a new building, it
became clear in the course of the meeting that an alliance was a more suited avenue given
the company's interest. The laboratory head then made a second visit together with other
academics in the relevant technical areas to push the discussion forward.
Professional administrators were also quick to catch on. Although the first alliance
agreement was put together in an exploratory manner, it became clear that it was an
"umbrella" agreement for all sub-projects. Clauses on intellectual property rights, for
instance, were to apply to all sub-projects to be funded by them, thereby avoiding
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repetition of lengthy discussions each time. The second alliance agreement was put
together more deliberately, and it became the model for later agreements.
By the time the fifth or sixth alliance was being negotiated, central administrators were
specifically targeting their visits around strategic alliances. There were several cases
where strategic alliances were negotiated but eventually aborted. In one case, the
company lacked a research culture and it was not possible to find a match of interest in
research activities between faculty and the company. In another case, the executive-level
interest was confirmed, but there was insufficient interest from the R&D group of the
company. In yet another case, all the preparatory work had been completed with
documents ready to be signed, only to have a sudden change in the corporate leadership.
The norm was established whereby the first step was to agree on broad collaborative
terms through top level discussions, to be followed-up with detailed discussions
involving interested faculty members in related fields.
Nature of relationships with industry under strategic alliances
The nature of the relationships varies significantly both within each of the strategic
alliances, as well as between them. This is partly because different alliances represent
different interests and objectives, and reflect different structures. Some alliances have a
narrow focus on research in a specific field, which means that they focus more on
specific departments or laboratories. One alliance has an almost exclusive focus on
recruitment of graduating MIT students, while others give less priority to recruitment.
Some alliances have a strong focus on training, and others hope to explore several new
fields through interdisciplinary research.
Relationships at the project level have also demonstrated a wide range in the depth of
interactions. In some projects, there were detailed interactions, with principal
investigators reporting how much they gained from their collaborative interactions, and
how novel a perspective the interaction brought to them.
"It was the most intellectually interesting interaction I had in that period of
time.... because I don't have company connections, and there was a whole
industry side of (the field). And, if I hadn't had that exposure, I would have been
excluded from that interaction, because I'm not on the board of any small
companies.... this was my access to it. And, I think, without it I would not have
been able to keep abreast of what was really happening in the field of (.). Yup.
It was essential to my whole way of thinking."
For others, it was business as usual with minimal interactions with the sponsors beyond
regular sponsorship meetings.
"So, it was pretty much unobligated money. They asked for a progress report
each year, which was one page... .It was really nice. And then, they did invite me
out to give a talk at (----). But they never required anything else of me, and they
have a (company)-MIT Symposium where, twice a year, they have some
scientists from (the company) talk and some scientists from MIT talk. And so,
I've given talks in that forum a couple of times."
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One structure common to all was a joint committee comprising MIT and industry
representatives to oversee all alliance related matters. For each alliance, there is one
central academic administrator designated as representing MIT along with a high level
corporate executive on the industry side. Several company representatives saw this as a
helpful device to deal with any issues as needed.
What is new? Even though strategic alliances were "new" in their contractual size, they
certainly were not the first time that MIT had had a close but bounded relationship with
individual companies. Indeed, every decade, there have been a handful of companies that
were close industrial allies with MIT. Examples would include the petro-chemical
industry in the 30s through the 1960s, and companies such as DuPont, Kodak, IBM,
DEC, GM in other periods. It is essential that the nature of these relationships be
understood so that the "newness" of the strategic alliances can be appreciated.
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) is a classic example of one such "close" industrial
ally for MIT. Ed Roberts, in his summary of his 25 years of research on high technology
spin-offs in Greater Boston, describes DEC as one of the most significant examples of
MIT spin-offs (Roberts 1991). In 1957, Ken Olsen, an MIT graduate and an employee
of Lincoln Laboratory, formed DEC together with another Lincoln colleague. They
obtained start-up funding from American Research and Development Corporation
(AR&D), the first institutionalized venture capital fund, which had been founded through
the heavy involvement of MIT President Compton in 1946. Thereafter, Professor
Forrester, an engineer, who headed the Digital Computer Laboratory group where Olsen
had worked, was on the board of directors for DEC from the beginning. Many key
personnel of DEC had come from MIT, several faculty members had close ties either
through executive education, research sponsorships or consulting activities, and there was
a constant flow of MIT students joining DEC as employees. Olson became a member of
the Corporation (MIT's Board of Trustees) in the 1980s and eventually became a life
member. DEC was not only a classic high-tech MIT spin-off but also a classic example
of a good and dense relationship based on multiple ties.
There were some large research sponsorship projects that entailed deep collaborations
between MIT and DEC, the most well known example for which is Project Athena.
Project Athena was an extra-ordinary six-year collaborative effort between MIT, DEC
and IBM to develop the computing infrastructure to support the entire campus
community. The project included 50 million dollar grants in kind from the two
companies, and represented the largest ever donation made by DEC. It was unique in
MIT's history of industry relationships for two large and competing companies to work
together. At the height of activities, there were 10 or so technical staff from IBM and
DEC working on campus on this project. How did such an unusual partnership come
about?
In the early 1980s, MIT came to realize clearly that they needed financial sponsors to
meet their computing goals. A year before the vision of ATHENA was developed in
MIT, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) had announced its Project Andrew with IBM
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as its exclusive partner. This news came to DEC as a shock, because they had also made
a generous offer to CMU to work on Project Andrew (Champine 1991). Following that
announcement, DEC was in fact in search of an alternative university to work with on a
similar project. The proposal for Project ATHENA arrived at the right time for DEC. It
was around that time that one high level executive of IBM learned about Project
ATHENA and the possible involvement of DEC during a research meeting with MIT.
IBM made it clear that they were also interested in working for Project Athena. MIT
eventually reconfigured their proposal to a more ambitious one that covered the entire
Institute, and negotiated with IBM and DEC to work together. What the story of Project
ATHENA demonstrates is the depth of MIT's underlying relationships. MIT had deep
enough relationships with both DEC and IBM to be able credibly to negotiate a joint
effort.
What is the difference between these deep relationships and today's strategic alliances?
There appear to be two key differences. First, there are contractual and organizational
norms in the latter that did not exist in the previous deep relationships, and which
developed organically over the years. Strategic alliances are characterized by joint
committees, stylized proposal solicitation processes, up-front agreements about the
intellectual property rights; and central academic administrators being formally
designated. Moreover, these organizational and contractual norms were replicated
through the administrators, both academic and professional. The most significant
difference may be the underlying change in the role of administration in managing the
relationships.
Second, at least some of these alliances were started "cold" and did not emerge over time
as did the traditional deep relationships. The relationships were sometimes "forged"
rather than allowed to emerge, except that even in these cases, underlying and existing
relationships played a key role in the subsequent activities. If one MIT faculty had not
been a founding member of Amgen, the initial meeting with the CEO may not have taken
place, or would have been more difficult to arrange. Another alliance benefited from
long-lasting informal relationships between the MIT research group and its corporate
counterparts. DuPont represents one of the oldest ties for MIT with many alumni at all
levels of the organization. Whenever the new "strategic alliance" was forged along the
contours of existing but largely unarticulated relationships, it worked well. Whenever
there were efforts to create one artificially without the underlying relationships, there
appears to have been tension.
5-4. Characterization of change
How can such changes be characterized? In this section, 1 will discuss: (a) the change in
underlying values about working with industry; (b) the degree of institutionalization and
why some initiatives remain single shot while others become more widely
institutionalized; (c) the level of engagement with industry and to what extent the
relationship has become more of a dialogue; and (d) the overall size in terms of the
number of faculty engaged.
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Underlying values: new but not so new. The change in values is difficult to document.
However there seems to have been a significant change in the overall values among
faculty in terms of working with industry, from one of suspicion to one of acceptance
over the last thirty years. One administrator notes that there has been an increasing
number of faculty members interested in working with industry.
"Another change is that a larger and larger fraction of them are getting interested
in working with industry and are realizing that you don't have to sell your soul to
do so. And that interaction with industry can be very beneficial to the academic
process if managed right. A lot of them used to think that it was inherently
contaminating."
One former academic administrator remembers
"Almost all my research has been supported by industry - but I was an exception
not the rule. Most of the faculty have had and still do have their money come
from the federal government. So, there was a suspicion of industry."
Another faculty member who undertook extensive work with industry in the 1970s recalls
distinctly how often he received discouraging or disparaging signals. Though there was
some variation across departments, by and large, engineers at MIT had become much less
industry-oriented through the 1960s and 1970s. So, it was only in the 1980s and the
deepening national competitiveness crisis that brought back to MIT the emphasis on
relevance to industry.
It is not too far-fetched to imagine that other universities may be going through similar
changes today. What is different in MIT's experience, however, is that the new set of
values was nothing new in the history of MIT. The values may have been new to specific
individual faculty members or administrators, but they were often those that existed at an
earlier period in the history of MIT. The fact that there were historical precedents
appeared particularly helpful in legitimating change. If it is not new, then it is reasonably
safe.
Images of Institutionalization. The three examples of institutionalization, namely the
consortia, the strategic alliances and the educational partnerships, appear to share two
common characteristics. First, in all three cases, the process involved an individual or
small groups of individuals establishing the first example in some locale. Second,
replication appeared to be mediated by administrators, both academic and professional.
Faculty members had to be central to each of the local initiatives, but professional
administrators played a critical role in enabling the actual implementation. "Imitation"
can have a negative nuance, as the attitude of individual faculty may be to prefer to be
"innovative" rather than imitating precedents; but it seems that professional
administrators were better placed than faculty to create "templates".
Salience of internal boundaries. The LEM case demonstrates vividly that there were in
fact two types of boundaries at issue in MIT-industry relationships. There are the
obvious organizational boundaries between MIT and industry, on the one hand. On the
other, there are the internal boundaries within MIT. The LFM experience showed that
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these internal boundaries can be as important in meeting the industrial needs, and as
tough to deal with, as the external ones. Indeed, discipline based communities in
academia extend well outside universities, and they engender a kind of loyalty from their
members that can be deeper than those engendered by a university. It is not surprising
that these disciplinary walls are difficult to cross.
One critical change in the past 20 years may be that the alliances and partnerships have
contributed to crossing such disciplinary boundaries. LFM and its successor program
have helped penetrate the disciplinary wall between engineering and management. One
strategic alliance with NTT brought together two large established laboratories, LCS and
AlL, to work together in a way they had not previously done. That collaboration across
the laboratories was made more solid through the joint creation of multiple partnerships
named Oxygen. The experience of collaborative work in one Center shows the critical
need of interdisciplinary collaboration if scientific work is to support technological
development with relevance to application. One professor describes the nature of
collaborative work he recently experienced as follows:
"I've been at MIT for 27 years and my first 17 years, (there was) nowhere near
anything like this. And all my other theoretical colleagues (have) nowhere near
this type of interaction. And the reason is because this field maybe is unusual in
that there is room for fundamental work, basic work, and immediate
applications."
Another professor with 20-years work experience in an industrial research laboratory
spoke about his surprise in finding little team work on campus when he joined MIT.
"What I found is that, typically at a university, a professor lacks the infrastructure
to support his full research. So, in response to that, they build that infrastructure
locally around their own group research effort. And the consequence of that is to
more or less isolate that professor's research from their colleagues who may have
similar or complementary interests. So, I would say that the one difference that I
found (was)...greater parochialism at universities.... Conversely, in industry,
particularly in (INDUSTRIAL LAB) environment, the resources are more
plentiful....(and) they are distributed in a way to encourage interaction among
very competent people...I think MIT has...competent people, but the fact that the
infrastructure encourages individual achievement makes it very difficult to take
the risk of doing something jointly that may not be supported adequately."
Even simple reporting sessions can be interesting to faculty who get to hear other faculty
present their work - something that does not happen in the daily life of an academic,
whose work is heavily channeled into a specific area. These are indicative of how
infrequently there are collaborative opportunities on campus or elsewhere across
disciplinary lines.
Level of Engagement: measured depth but definitely wider. Several observations can
be made about the level of engagement between MIT and industry. The emergence of
consortia clearly demonstrates a deeper level of industrial presence on campus as
compared with collegia or JLP. Similarly, both LFM and SDM involved industrial
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partners in a far deeper manner than before. Industrial perspectives were actively sought
in shaping the curriculum and program design. However, when it comes to the strategic
alliances, the evidence is far more mixed in terms of whether they represent "deepening"
of relationships in comparison with the other more organic relationships that MIT has
traditionally had. Indeed it seems appropriate to see some of these strategic alliances or
partnerships as arising from existing deep relationships, as in the case of Athena, LFM, or
DuPont. These are the cases where the formalized structure allowed far deeper
engagement than before. However, there are other strategic alliances that could not rely
on existing relationships and that have not reached the same level of depth in the
relationships.
The main change may be that the opportunity to work with industry became available
more openly and systematically to a broader range of faculty members, and not only to
those who happened to stumble into informal relationships. The strategic alliances also
provided a more systematic avenue for the involvement of companies in the selection of
research projects. Companies share selection responsibilities with faculty, providing an
opportunity to get to know and work closely with key faculty representatives on campus.
They can then influence campus research and education through funding and subsequent
interactions. There were cases where this was explicitly done, as in the case of LFM.
In most research activities, however, it was rarely "explicit demands" from companies
that influenced research agendas, since these tended to invoke the opposite reactions by
upsetting the sense of academic autonomy. It was informal interactions and active
interest expressed through discussions by industrial representatives that could subtly
guide researchers into new directions. One faculty describes the pull of an appreciative
audience as follows:
"Let me tell you what an MIT faculty member is most interested in. It's that
somebody walks in and says I am interested in what you do. [...] "I read your
paper, professor, and I am interested in what you do." Well I can tell you it's very
seductive to have a big important [INDUSTRIAL] company walking into your
office saying "I am interested in what you do, we are willing to pay you to do
more of it faster and we would like to work with you in that regards. Because,
well, I can't tell you the details, it is extremely interesting and important to us."
That's extremely seductive to an MIT faculty member. The alternative is I send
the proposal to NSF - there is a wall there. I don't even know who reviewed it...
I get the money and I am working on this idea in the hope that when I publish it
somebody will be interested. I think you can see the difference. There is a very
nice feeling of being appreciated while you are doing it. In fact in the other mode,
you may not be so appreciated because it is so very competitive. Your real
audience is the guy in Stanford or Berkeley and you are competing to do it before
they do. One is a negative push and the other is a positive pull."
5-5. Underlying institutions: External and internal boundaries
In the preceding section, the nature of institutional change in the last 20 years has been
summarized. In this section, I argue how various organizational practices and
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mechanisms within MIT influenced both the initial agreements for new relationships as
well as their evolution over time. More specifically, I argue that MIT's external
organizational boundaries are characterized by three distinct dimensions: membership,
knowledge and physical location. I then argue that administrators, both academic and
professional, played multiple and apparently evolving roles in managing, negotiating, and
crossing these boundaries. Finally, I argue that, for administrators to play such critical
roles, they had to work closely with the academics they support.
Crossing external boundaries: membership, knowledge and physical boundaries.
Many initiatives were undertaken around or by individuals who were penetrating the
organizational boundary from one direction or the other. Faculty members might serve as
board directors in industry, work as consultants, or have had direct industrial work
experience in the past. These "live" experiences appear to underlie many of the deepest
relationships, and influence heavily the formation of the others. Similarly, industrial
representatives could also be present on MIT campus, through the Corporation (MIT's
Board) or visiting committees. The experience of MIT seems to show, not that the nature
of boundary crossing changed, but that existing "deep relationships" led more
systematically to new structures such as strategic alliances, consortia or partnerships,
which in turn expanded the opportunities to work with industry to a greater number of
faculty members.
These formal structures also required up-front agreements about the nature of
collaboration between MIT and industry, particularly with respect to the main output,
knowledge. Central in all contract discussions have been negotiations about ownership
and user rights of intellectual property and confidentiality or publication clauses. A clear
understanding on those issues up front has been critically important in enabling
companies to commit significant resources.
If people and knowledge are the dimensions of the organizational boundary that shaped
the initial agreement for collaboration, physical space appeared to shape the nature of
subsequent interactions. One MIT researcher talked about his experience of working
with a visitor on campus.
"It's definitely best to have a visiting scientist here (with whom) we can be
collaborating on a day-to-day basis. It's so much easier when you can walk down
the hall, and not only that, it's so much better when you're working on a joint
project."
One representative from the partner company saw that it was very helpful in
collaborating to be able to make short or long visits and treat them as business trips.
There are several examples of Japanese manufacturers who invested in R&D facilities
close to MIT in the 1990s. These provide an interesting contrast to those that went to
Cambridge, UK. For one thing, MIT rules did not permit a significant campus presence
by companies beyond visiting scientists and liaison functions. These R&D laboratories
were therefore established outside the physical MIT boundary, a contrast to those in
Cambridge which are inside the university. There are different ways in which these
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companies tried to engage the MIT academics. One did so through consultancy
arrangements, which meant that they could not obtain student inputs in their work. The
other did so through formal contracts, which were not easy to maintain over time. All in
all, these labs remained at arm's length from MIT.
Role of administrators
Administrators, both academic and professional, appeared to play increasingly important
and multiple roles in MIT-industry relationships. There were three specific roles that
they appeared to play in supporting the relationships: (a) managing external boundaries;
(b) replicating the lessons of experience from one locale to another; (c) scaling up.
Managing external boundaries. The most obvious way in which administrators
managed external boundaries was through the establishment of norms for IPR conditions
and through negotiations on specific terms and conditions. For instance, the norm to
insist on MIT ownership, while allowing for the possibility of exclusive user rights for
sponsors was a practice that has been developed over the past two decades. The
administrators can even come up with standard explanations about why this is important
to MIT. MIT is mandated to own all inventions arising from federally supported research
work by law, and it is impossible to fence off these activities from those sponsored by
others. The default is that MIT must own everything. In the process, the administrators
also demonstrate that they are savvy enough to understand the nature of concern of
industries and assure them that their opportunities to commercialize would not be
jeopardized, and that it is in MIT's interest to have its technology commercialized.
As the industrial demands become harder to push back, new lessons are learned, and new
ways of persuading them are developed by these professional administrators. However,
the knowledge dimension is not the only dimension the administrators manage. Both
people and physical dimensions can be changed over time as there are changes in the
rules, norms, and practices about external work, conflict of interests or hiring. While the
practice of one-day-a-week consultancy dates back to the 1940s, the special scrutiny of
faculty's external interests, such as board representation or consultancy, and their role
with respect to students occasionally gets re-evaluated and changed.
How physical space may be used by industrial representatives on campus is another thing
that administration can directly influence. The Media Lab now has a concept of
"embedded laboratories" for industrial partners interested to be on campus. "Disruptive
Laboratory" is the name of the BT laboratory on campus, comprising one permanent
representative and various other visitors who visit the campus from time to time. The
idea is that these companies pay a higher level of membership fees, and in return obtain
some space on campus. The motivation for industry to come and live on the MIT
campus, however, is influenced in turn by the conditions associated with intellectual
property rights arising from their activities on campus. At MIT, all campus-based
inventions must be owned by MIT, lest MIT' s legal position as a not-for-profit
organization may be jeopardized. This means that BT will not conduct research and
development activities on campus that would be likely to lead to patentable inventions.
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Instead, they use the facilities as a point of access to the rest of the campus. In
Cambridge, this condition is relaxed, giving room for a much greater industrial presence
and a different version of embedded laboratories on campus, as we will see in the next
chapter.
Replicating experience. Administrators often carried over the lessons from one
experience to another. Whereas there is a limit to how many initiatives an academic may
experience in his/her career, administrators see a greater number of similar initiatives,
network more readily across departments or disciplinary boundaries, move from one
location to another, or oversee a larger number of similar cases. Specialized
administrative offices such as the Technology Licensing Office, intellectual property
counsel and contracting office can also strengthen the level of institutionalization.
Professional administrators seemed to play a central role in developing the "template" for
relationships, such as collegia, consortia, or strategic alliances. MIT is also characterized
by one type of professional administrator who looks very much like a member of the
research staff. These individuals may have started out as researchers or may be doing
research work part-time; they therefore live and understand the meaning of research
content and environment, but for one reason or another choose to undertake
administrative work on campus for their livelihood. These people appear to be a
particularly effective conduit for carrying the lessons of experience from one setting to
another, as they well understand the significance of the administrative arrangements on
the content of research.
Scaling up and crossing internal boundaries. Academic administrators such as the
provost and the deans play a dual role in affecting the overall scale of activities. On the
one hand, they influence the internal allocation of critical resources such as space and the
number of principal investigators. On the other, they can raise the level of sponsorship
by lending credibility to specific initiatives by actively engaging in front-end discussion
with sponsors. One professional administrator commented:
"if you're a company signing a $15 million dollar deal with MIT... you want to
make sure that MIT's President is aware of it and that you've got a personal
connection to the people in charge because you want to make sure that... it gets
the appropriate attention and the appropriate resources are allocated to it."
Scaling up usually also requires crossing internal boundaries - to engage faculty
members from other departments or disciplines. Academic administrators can facilitate
this structurally by designating certain programs/centers as institute-wide, school-wide or
departmental and providing resource support. When it comes to specific ventures,
particularly in developing educational programs, clearly support from academic
administrators would be critical in implementation.
Evolving administrative infrastructure
For administrators to be able to perform such critical and pervasive roles, they must be
able to work effectively with academics, at least in ways that did not upset the academics
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unduly. To be able to cope with inter-departmental work, they themselves had to be
seamlessly connected to the academics. In other words, the boundaries between
academics and administrators could not be too problematic. What are the factors that
enable them to operate in this way? In this section, this question will be examined for the
two classes of administrators, academic administrators and professional ones. In the
process, I will also highlight key changes in their roles and profiles over time.
Academic administrators. There is a strong current of sentiment that the power of
academic administrators has increased over time. One senior academic administrator
reflects:
"It seems to me that there has been an enormous shift... beginning in the 1960s
and continued. If you look back at the pre-war time, these jobs were part-time
jobs that people took on the side. But all of these academic jobs, department
heads, deans and provost, have become enormously more demanding steadily
since the war. All the interactions with Washington carried your own baggage,
regulations have piled up and up and up."
Against such a backdrop, people point out that so many more of the new initiatives are
centrally-driven, be they the nine alliances, the Singapore-MIT alliance or the partnership
with Cambridge University, UK. And yet, it is not easy to see how comparable such
voices are to those under previous administrations. For instance, when the Whitehead
Institute was created with the strong support of Paul Gray and with a controversial and
novel arrangement of having a separate governing board, what did these voices say on the
ground? When the Media Lab was created with strong handed support from Jerry
Wiesner? What about Compton when he brought back the scientific focus? All in all,
without the possibility to resurrect the voices of these times, it is not easy to compare
perceptions of the power of academic administrators.
However, it is possible to think about tasks that were not performed before that are part
of the role today. For instance, department heads have a much greater formal role in
monitoring and evaluating academic performance. The number of departments with
associate department heads has increased (give figures). The position of chancellor,
once an irregular position used only at times of conspicuously high demand, is today an
integral part of the central administration.
Within that "same"1 organizational structure, there have been several "unusual"
appointments in the choice of individuals. One was Chuck Vest as one of the first
external candidates to be appointed to MIT in the past 40 years, one that was particularly
conspicuous as he succeeded Paul Gray who had been part of the central administration
for an unusually long period (he was Chancellor for a decade before he proceeded to the
presidency for another decade). Another is the appointment of a Vice President for
Research, who was again an external candidate. These recent external recruits
corroborate the fact that academic administration is today a well-established career
ladder, with mobility across universities.
iTr.
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Professional administrators. There have been three significant changes in the
professional administrative infrastructure in the last three decades: the reform of the
Industrial Liaison Program in the 1970s, the re-formulation of the Technology Licensing
Office (TLO) in the mid 1980s; and general strengthening of administrative functions
such as the Corporate Relations and Intellectual Property Counsel.
Significant efforts were made in the 1970s to strengthen the Industrial Liaison Program
(ILP), a membership service program to provide information services to corporate
members dating back to 1948. The tight financial conditions prompted the need for
massive campaign efforts and the administration decided to rejuvenate the sleepy ILP by
appointing an academic administrator to head it for the first time. Supported strongly by
the then President, Jerome Wiesner, and by Chancellor Paul Gray, the new director
introduced a series of changes to invigorate the program. An ILP office was opened in
Japan to attract Japanese corporate sponsors. To elicit more active faculty participation, a
new mechanism to reward faculty for their participation, a kind of points system, was
introduced. The significance of having an academic, faculty member, to head what had
been an administrative office, was significant. It enabled "peer-to-peer" solicitation that
would be hard for non-academic administrators to provide. There were two other
academics who subsequently served as Directors. In the mid-80s, the ILP became once
again a normal administrative office, headed by a non-academic.
In the 1980s, it became evident that the patent office organized by lawyers was not
meeting the technology transfer expectations. The Technology Licensing Office was
virtually created anew and represented a sea change from a sleepy office that reactively
handled patent applications to a proactive office that actively helped in the process of
commercialization of MIT-owned technology. The process of change was as salient. A
new Director was brought in, together with a consultant who had shaped up the TLO for
Stanford, which at the time was seen as the most successful TLO among US universities.
Indeed, the same consultant was invited by the group who founded the first TLO for the
University of Tokyo a decade later, as the legitimate "guru" who helped the current TLO
director at MIT in developing MIT's TLO. There was also an active effort to bring in
"technology specialists" instead of lawyers, people with a significant background in
industry as well as in research. These people not only needed to understand the legal
aspects of licensing, but also needed to be able to engage in "techno-gossip," to
understand the nature of the potential for various inventions.
The third change was tangentially related to the changes of TLO. There had to be a place
for lawyers, but one that was not limited to licensing but also to research contracting.
Since MIT's organizational infrastructure developed not by rational design but through
historical evolution, there was a divide between the contracting office which handled all
research contracts and the patenting office which handled the licensing of inventions.
And yet, the Bayh-Dole Act, coupled with increasingly active university participation in
patenting and licensing, required there to be far more integrated thinking about how to
manage the intellectual property rights that arose out of MIT inventions.
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The office of intellectual property rights was thus created, outside the TLO and the
contracts office, but headed by a lawyer, who had worked previously both within the
patent office, the predecessor to the TLO, and also within the contracts office. At the
same time, the general corporate relations function was strengthened, following a set of
recommendation made by the out-going ILP Director, the last academic to head it. The
idea was that each corporate client should be served seamlessly by one representative
who could speak on behalf of MIT.
In 1989, the Office of Corporate Relations was created, merging the corporate
development, responsible for gifts, and ILP. The idea was that instead of having them
operate separately where they optimize for narrower program goals, they could work
together to effectively develop corporate contacts for all types of corporate support for
MIT. The informal role that used to be played by the ILP officers in bringing about
greater research sponsorship or consulting possibilities became more "formalized" by an
explicit understanding that these were the legitimate goals of Corporate Relations. In
other words, to be instrumental in the creation of new relationships became an explicit
goal, most significantly demonstrated by their officers' role in forging strategic alliances.
As mentioned previously, some professional administrators have extensive research
backgrounds, including doctoral training at MIT. Such people have tended to be working
on specific research program/center activities, but they could connect across the campus
readily and easily through the administrative network in a way in which academics would
not have the time or interest to do. They, along with those professionals with research
and industrial backgrounds in units such as TLP and TLO, appear to form an interesting
and informal human network within MIT. One administrator coined the term, "techno
gossip," to characterize those administrators who are interested and sensitive to the
content of on-going research work on campus, to such an extent that they would "gossip"
about it. It is not difficult to imagine what kind of backbone information flow these
techno gossips would provide to bind the campus.
5-6. Degrees of institutionalization: the role of individuals
So far, organizational structures that appear to influence the pattern of change have been
the focus of the analysis. Another important characteristic observable at MIT is the
different degrees of institutionalization. There are many initiatives being formed at any
given time. Some of them wither after a while. Some survive and are sustained over
time in a given locale. Others become scaled up and attain a visible status within the
community. Yet others become models and are replicated across time and space. The
question is what differentiates those initiatives in terms of their survival.
Two factors appear to influence the pattern of survival and replication. The first is the
role of individuals as founding fathers in shaping these initiatives. The second is the
process of debates about these initiatives, through which differences in the
understandings among key players are surfaced and dealt with.
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Getting started: founding fathers. Every major initiative had one or more individuals
who worked as founding fathers. Many of these individuals articulated their commitment
to the initiatives in very personal terms. One center was established by an academic who
come from many years of research experience in industry, where he witnessed major
technological breakthroughs. He explains the rationale for the center in terms of these
personal beliefs: he would like to see better work relationships between university and
industry; he would like to share with the students, in particular, the excitement of
technological breakthroughs; and the desire to forge another technological breakthrough
through organizing partnerships.
Another consortium was initiated by an academic who had come to MIT with a
substantive industrial background, where he learned that polymers represented a key field
for manufacturing. His belief about the importance of introducing the field for teaching
was so strong that when he realized that there was insufficient research being undertaken
to support teaching, he decided to do so himself. Since it was not easy to attract
industrial funding, he even negotiated with one company with whom he consulted that
the company could convert payments to him into contributions for a new consortium. He
was willing to sacrifice his personal income in order to get the activities started.
The former Dean of Engineering who was an active initiator of LFM developed his ideas
and commitment through active dialectics. Industrialists came to him "railing and
pounding" and demanded a new department of manufacturing. He disagreed but
proposed a research program based on extensive discussions with industry
representatives. When that proposal did not win support, he engaged in deeper debates
with industry, from which the raw concept of LFM as a graduate level program
developed. It is as though these debates helped him consolidate his commitment.
Getting both sides engaged. Individual commitment, however important, is clearly not
a sufficient condition for ensuring longevity of these activities. There has to be some
shared understanding between MIT academics and industrialists about the nature of the
joint activity and the roles they each play. Active debates in preparing LFM were not
only important for the former Dean to firm up his own commitment, but provided
opportunities for industrialists to voice their views, build ideas and develop commitment
on their part.
Interestingly, the importance of shared understandings often became apparent when some
external events shook up the relationships. In one strategic alliance, a top management
change led to a re-examination of their relationship with MIT, with a new company
representative placed on campus who asked many hard questions. It was the active
debates he initiated that helped surface the differences in a way that eventually led to new
understandings. In the process, the industrial representative admits to "going native"
where he came to develop a deep understanding and appreciation of MIT' s culture and
values.
Visibility. When initiatives are scaled up, they become more visible on campus.
Strategic alliances had certain visibility from the outset because of their scale, which
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implied that they affected a greater number of academics and administrators. The Media
Lab won visibility partly because of active publicity work they themselves undertook, but
also because the laboratory scaled up rapidly, culminating in having its own building on
campus. LFM was also visible partly because of its scale, but also because its activities
span two large disciplinary communities: engineering and management. Visibility is
helpful in sustaining activities, especially because it is important to attract new members
and participants.
Replication. At MIT, there were three types of replication: those undertaken by the
founding fathers; those undertaken through the use of a template developed through
earlier initiatives; and those undertaken without such clear mechanisms of learning. For
instance, one of the founding fathers of LFM went off and founded another educational
partnership program - where lessons he had learned were to be reflected. Strategic
alliances represent a case of replication through a template. The template here was a set
of stylized understandings about what organizational structures might help these alliances
work. The template was developed through debates among corporate relations officers,
lawyers, and academic administrators, who worked together to come up with acceptable
organizational and legal arrangements for a specific alliance initiative. Once a couple of
successful cases were established, and acknowledged publicly as such, these alliance
structures became a template to be replicated by others. Other corporate relations officers
began to play similar roles in initiating other ventures - in cooperation with successive
provosts, deans and department heads. What had been roles played by specific
individuals became "organizational" through the templates. The third type of replication
takes place without there being a clear understanding of what the "model" is. Early
examples of consortia perhaps fall into this category. Imitators were replicating through
observation without direct access to detailed knowledge about how the original model
worked.
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5-7. Concluding remarks
MIT's relationships with industry appear to have changed little in terms of depth. The
new patterns of interaction appear to be close but bounded, just in the way that MIT
academics have always had it. One major change is that the formal structures are being
replicated, such as joint selection committees and calls for proposals, which in turn
provides access to industrial sponsorships by a wider group of academics. The working
relationships with industry also are much more wide-spread today than they were before,
and much larger in size both in total and by average project size. In the process, there
developed a greater sense of assurance that one could work with industry without
jeopardizing the integrity of academic interests. The belief that academics could be
working on fundamental science even as they remain application-oriented became
endorsed through practice. Another important characteristic is the pattern of
institutionalization: some initiatives became not only sustained, but scaled up
significantly and replicated. Replication took take place either directly by the founding
fathers, through others imitating or through organizationally defined templates.
The initiatives were shaped by regulated external boundaries, and permeable internal
boundaries. These boundaries developed historically and appear to have become well
defined over the years. Particularly important were specific events such as public crises
or critical media reports that made the need for such "principles" more pronounced.
Today, while these rules and norms are not strictly monitored or enforced by .
administrators, there are processes in place to ensure that it is in the interest of individual
academics to take them seriously. Policies and procedures are written, articulated and
exercised through systems such as annual self declaration by academics of their outside
interests. It is interesting to note how much of the new developments, such as consortia,
strategic alliances or educational partnerships rest upon past experiences. It is the legacy
of past practices, such as faculty consulting and internships integrated into curricula, that
have provided the platforms for new developments.
The role of administration appears to be the singularly important characteristic that
differentiates MIT from the other two universities. Administrators at MIT include
academics such as deans and department heads, and professional administrators who
often come with either industrial or research experience. Together, they are a credible
source of new ideas and initiatives, as the cases of strategic alliances or LFM show. They
can more readily bring in resources from multiple disciplines or departments in order to
create larger ventures. They are professionals in their working with outsiders - as they
constantly come into play with industrialists, government officials and alumni through
their boards, visiting committees, meetings for capital campaigns and other miscellaneous
events organized to meet societal leaders in Japan as well as Europe. They form a
particular type of constituent who functions as the institutional glue for the organization.
They also play critical roles in extracting and developing templates, based on experiences
from individual initiatives, so that they can be replicated.
However, recent developments on large scale partnerships, largely the products of the
administration, are beginning to place certain pressures on the most vulnerable resource
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at MIT - faculty time (Lerman 1999; McKersie 2000). There is a disconnect between
time commitments implicitly made through large partnerships and the time that
individual faculty have to commit. Indeed, MIT faculty appear to be the busiest of the
three groups, often not answering emails, and allocating as little time as possible for
activities with little tangible outcomes, such as interviews for their graduate students.
This provides an interesting contrast to Cambridge, where there remains an ethos of
informal networks and timelessness, where academics appear to have more time for
reflection and informal dialogue.
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Chapter 6:
The Cambridge Phenomenon
"A century slips by, and we will be here when Microsoft is long gone."
(a senior academic, Cambridge)
In 1985, when the spin-off and start-up activities in Cambridge were examined in the
study "Cambridge Phenomenon", the authors noted several key characteristics of this 700
year-old university: informal communications arising from the collegiate structure,
flexible employment, and liberal policies on intellectual property rights(Segal Quince
Wicksteed 1985). They argued that these characteristics helped maintain the network of
people loosely connected with start-ups, and later called it "paradoxical permeability of
the University's medieval structures."(Segal Quince Wicksteed 1998). In this chapter, I
develop their argument further and argue that Cambridge's boundaries are not just
permeable, but indeed "fuzzy," and that these fuzzy boundaries enabled the development
of characteristically deep industry-university relationships. I do so through defining the
essence of "fuzziness" and by distinguishing it from the permeable nature of the
organizational boundaries characteristic in MIT on the one hand, and the impermeable
ones in Tokyo on the other.
In chapter 4, it was found that the main change in Cambridge's university-industry
relationships in the 1980s and 1990s was the emergence of the so-called embedded
laboratories and their variations. The purpose of this chapter is to characterize further the
nature of institutional change and to understand the organizational factors that shaped
these changes. The main argument I present here is that Cambridge's organizational
boundaries are fuzzy for all three types of boundary crossing: people, knowledge, and
physical space. These fuzzy boundaries allow the development of a variety of deep
relationships between university academics and industrialists. They permit companies to
bring in proprietary information and know-how, which sometimes lead to secret research
that restricts the academics and students from publishing, but more often does so without
jeopardizing the public nature of scientific production. Informal and sustained
interactions enabled by the sharing of people, knowledge and physical space, appears to
lead to deep engagement in which problems faced by companies are reflected in the
production of science, and where proprietary technology can be used for scientific
production. However, these deep, informal relationships are not ubiquitous. To the
extent that they are becoming more prevalent on campus, with recent arrivals of larger
partnerships, there is greater concern being voiced about the very fuzziness of the
boundaries.
One other feature distinguishes the Cambridge phenomenon from MIT's experience.
Relationships may cross departmental boundaries, but inter-departmental activities are
not easily sustained or readily scaled up. Contrary to the usual claim that the collegiate
structure facilitates interdisciplinary activities, I found few cases where academics from
multiple departments had come together to work on a joint theme. Some of the past inter-
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departmental initiatives took place by bringing in outsiders to occupy new structures
outside existing departments, rather than to help existing academics work together.
While inter-departmental initiatives are rare, disciplinary boundaries within each
department appear to be quite flexible, with room for individual academics to take on
interdisciplinary work within existing walls, but without needing to collaborate with
others from other departments. I argue that these reflect harder inter-departmental
boundaries, which in turn reflect both the decentralized university governance structure
with a relatively weak central administration and the strong leadership at the
departmental level.
I end the chapter by describing the key changes that have been taking place in the
governance of Cambridge since the late 1980s, mainly in response to tightening resource
conditions following government cutbacks. Triggered by a letter to the Council signed
by nearly 200 academics calling for reform, the governance of the university has been
reviewed and reformed with considerable strengthening of the central administration.
Moreover, these changes in the central administration appear to have led to new types of
university-industry initiatives that were larger in scale and inter-departmental in
orientation. However, causality runs both ways. These large ventures certainly appear
also to have made salient the need for stronger central administration, and to have fed
more changes.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I describe the emergence of embedded
laboratories and their variations. Then I examine the few examples of relationships with
multiple companies that exist in Cambridge. I summarize the characteristics of these
changes in terms of (a) the greater number, size, depth, and variability of these
relationships; (b) increased number of industrial academics; (c) the absence of change in
the multiple company relationships except in specific locations. In the third section, I
explain these changes in terms of organizational characteristics: fuzzy organizational
boundaries in terms of people, knowledge and physical space; and the role of
administration. I conclude by contrasting the Cambridge Phenomenon with the MIT Way
and the Tokyo Story.
6-1. Single company relationships: embedded laboratories and their
variations
The most pronounced development in relationships with individual companies has been
the rise of so-called embedded laboratories. Interestingly, in spite of frequent references
to them, users of the term do not necessarily agree on their definitions. The campus-wide
debate about one renowned case of an embedded laboratory made some people reluctant
to use the term, which gave rise to another term, "proximate laboratories". There is
distinct haziness about what these terms mean and what they represent, at least in part
owing to a lack of shared knowledge about what is happening in each of the operations.
While specific individuals and their associations with specific industrial laboratories may
be widely known, little is known about what their relationships entail and how their
laboratories are run. This section will describe their emergence and the nature of
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relationships, first to demonstrate their variability, and second to show how there have
been new developments in the recent past.
Embedded laboratories. The term "embedded laboratories" appeared rather late. One
Hitachi representative recalls hearing the term for the first time in the late 1990s when the
vice chancellor extolled his laboratory as one extraordinary example of embedded
laboratories, in which an industrial laboratory embedded inside a university contributed
significantly to the production of science (Mizuta 1999). Indeed, the arrangement for the
Hitachi industrial laboratory to be on the university grounds in West Cambridge in 1989
was somewhat novel, although nobody appeared to acknowledge it as such at the time.
Hitachi Cambridge Laboratory was to occupy half of the new building which was built
specifically to house them and another university laboratory. The industrial laboratory
was started with two representatives on site, and the team was gradually built up to the
current size of about 10 researchers, roughly matching the university team headed by one
professor with full time researchers and post docs, and with a total of about 30 students.
Industrial researchers were qualified to supervise students - and often did so with
government support under CASE awards. The industrial scientists and university
academics established a norm of weekly joint meetings where research agendas were
openly discussed.
What was novel in this arrangement, and why was it not acknowledged as such at the
time? It was new in the sense that the same building housed an industrial laboratory and
a university laboratory, with a single door separating the two. It was as though the
industrial laboratory was an integral part of the university. There had previously been
industrialists on campus, and there had also been close relationships with industrial
sponsors funding projects and exchanging personnel on campus. However, these prior
arrangements had taken place with far less conscious building design. The industrialists
had occupied rooms on campus, or had funded university scientists to undertake
proprietary research, but not in a way that created their own space for their own activities
inside the university. The new building design enabled seamless communication between
university academics and industrial scientists. They could informally meet 2-3 times a
week, and hold formal meetings every week. At the same time, the company could bring
some proprietary know-how onto campus without upsetting the university scientific
production.
From the perspective of the department (the Cavendish Laboratory), on the other hand,
nothing was new or unusual. West Cambridge already had an industrial laboratory (of
Schlumberger) whose researchers occupied a large conspicuous building. So, there was
nothing novel about industrialists occupying space on the same university grounds.
There had been other exclusive sponsors for university laboratories, the most famous
example being the Whittle Laboratory with Rolls Royce which had been on the same
West Cambridge site since the 1970s.
The university and the department paid more than 60% of the costs of the building shared
with Hitachi and so there was no sensitivity about high dependency. The professor who
headed the university lab had previously worked with a laboratory in Cambridge's
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Science Park which had had large industrial support, so this arrangement was also a
comfortable variation of the same theme for him also. Each of the two adjacent
laboratories has won recognition in the international scientific community for their work.
Interestingly, several observers speculated that the university laboratory, which had a
heavy engineering orientation at the outset, grew more scientific through its collaboration
with Hitachi. One mark of their success was their ability to draw good students into their
research activities - and it was clear to the others in the Cavendish that they were doing
well. Table 6-1 summarizes embedded laboratories and their variations in Cambridge.
Table 6-1: Embedded Laboratories and their Variations in Cambridge
Year Company Affiliation Initial funding Research funding
(sterling in 1999 *
pounds) (thousand pounds
sterling) 1
1973 Rolls Royce Engineering NA 942
(Whittle)
1986 Olivetti Computer Laboratory NA 178
Laboratory (later moved to
(later acquired engineering)
by AT&T)
1989 Hitachi Cavendish (physics) 0.5 million 477
1990 Toshiba Cavendish (physics) NA 266
1992 Glaxo Welcome Pharmacology NA 1,542
1994 Rolls Royce Material science NA 942
1997 Seiko-Epson Engineering, NA 155
Cavendish, Biotech
Institute
1997 Microsoft Computer Laboratory 12 million NA
1998 Unilever Chemistry 10 million 765
1998 BP Earth Science, 13 million 160
Engineering,
Mathematics,
Chemistry
2000 Marconi** Computer Laboratory, 10 million** 3 million**
Engineering etc.
(Source: Cambridge Reporter, University Press Release, Innovation Pamphlet)
Notes:
* Total sponsorship by the relevant company to the university as a whole, not limited to funding to
the partner laboratory. As reported in Research wholly or partly supported by funds from outside bodies,
Cambridge University Reporter, July 12, 2000.
** For Marconi, figures given are planned ones used in the announcement by the university, but were
subsequently cut back drastically owing to financial problems faced by the company in Autumn, 2001.)
Variations. Cambridge has witnessed other "novel" arrangements, for instance,
academics holding dual positions, one as an academic and another in an industrial
laboratory. The experience of two such cases provides a good illustration of three salient
characteristics of Cambridge. The first characteristic is that of the decentralized
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governance structure, which has meant that the central administration is often irrelevant
for key decisions. One department head made an informal inquiry about the legitimacy
of dual appointments to the Secretary of the General Board, the central university body
responsible for academic affairs, and was told that such arrangements were up to the
department. The department head saw no reason to reject the proposal and gave the
academic informal approval. The main rationale was that the academic was performing
more than satisfactorily for the university in teaching and research. In the second case,
the academic consulted another senior academic in his department as to whether to
contact the university office about his dual role. He was advised that it would be
unnecessary and merely "informed" the Secretary of the General Board two days before
the press release. In both cases, the duality of employment was seen as something that
had little to do with central university rules. It was largely up to the academics as long as
they were performing their duties.
The second characteristic is the lack of clarity as to whether these two industrial
laboratories, headed by academics, are in fact "embedded". The professors themselves
consider their industrial laboratories to be clearly distinct from the so-called embedded
laboratories. However, administrators and other academics do not see the clear
distinction and often refer to them all as embedded laboratories. Why is there any
confusion? Both the above professors with dual roles expressed their dislike of the real
"embedded laboratories" as causing confusion and bringing industry too close into the
university. They defined embedded laboratories as being industrial laboratories that are
adjacent to the relevant university laboratories, and see their own situations as clearly
distinct, since the industrial laboratories in which they work are geographically set apart
from their university laboratories. Other university people, however, do not see such a
clear distinction. To them, the very fact that the industrial laboratories are headed by
academics make them look as if they are very close and effectively "embedded" in the
university.
The third characteristic exemplified by the two cases concerns the different ways in
which industrial laboratories can be located in the university. One of the industrial
laboratories rents its space from the University in a building that only has miscellaneous
offices, although in the same building complex as another, but unrelated university
department. The laboratory looks as if it is part of the university complex, though the
building itself is not used for university activities. The second laboratory rents its space
in Trinity College's Science Park - which was built by Trinity to house companies in
Cambridge. Since Trinity College is a separate legal entity, the land has technically
nothing to do with Cambridge University as a legal body. However, colleges are
historically bound to the university through their symbiotic relationships and many of
them have properties scattered around Cambridge. (Trinity is particularly well known
for its wealth, which at one point gave rise to a famous story that people could walk from
Cambridge to Oxford on Trinity's land alone.) In other words, Cambridge University can
be a landlord to industry in the normal university buildings, or in buildings used for
commercial purposes, or in some combination of both. Colleges can also function as
landlords, leading to differing degrees of being "inside" the university.
168
Microsoft. In October 1997, the William Gates Foundation announced its intention to
donate funds for a new Computer Laboratory building, and Microsoft clarified its
intention to set up its European arm in the same building. The announcement had a huge
impact on the university. One former student remembers thinking how times had
changed, when she saw the university newsletter with a cover photograph of Bill Gates
and Sir Alec Broers, the Vice Chancellor (who had had 20 years of work experience in
IBM), on the Bridge of Sighs, an architectural symbol of Cambridge as ivory tower. For
many academics, this represented a far more serious threat. The image of Microsoft as an
aggressive American company made many academics fearful that their ideas might be
"stolen" in coffee room conversations. For anybody who understands the universality of
"elevenses" and tea times as institutionalized breaks in England, it is easy to see why to
be constrained in the informal conversations at these occasions would be viewed as a
serious breach of trust.
After a whole year of negotiations, the framework agreement reached was a mere
skeleton agreement that outlined the process of negotiation for subsequent individual
agreements. It was not possible to reach an umbrella agreement on tricky issues such as
intellectual property rights with terms and conditions acceptable to both sides. One
academic remembers how it was clear that there was no common ground - principally
because the university could not make an up front agreement on behalf of all the
academics. Individual cases had to be negotiated separately. The dust settled as
Microsoft Research grew too quickly to share a building and accelerated its plan to build
a separate building next to the Computer Laboratory. The fear of invasion gradually
subsided.
Microsoft Research Laboratory in Cambridge was novel in several ways. It was the first
case that could affect a large number of academics in a whole department, in this case the
Computer Laboratory. It was also the first time there was heavy involvement of the
central administration and the department head from the outset. Indeed, it was the
development office that organized the first discussion with Microsoft as part of fund
raising. Second, Microsoft Laboratory was headed by a well-respected Cambridge
academic, who did everything to recruit excellent academics from all over the world.
One researcher joked that the Microsoft Laboratory may even have more professors than
the Computer Laboratory. It looked almost like a second university department with
higher pay scales; indeed many of these "academic" industrialists enjoyed partial
affiliation to the University by being fellows of colleges or through supervising students.
The laboratory was very different from a heavily commercial group of industrial
researchers.
The third way in which it was novel was that it was the first case in which there had been
a campus-wide debate about an industrial presence. On January 19 ". 1999, a discussion
was held in the Council, the executive body for the university, where there was a more
than usual attendance and active discussions. Perhaps, one outcome of such an open
debate was the shared feeling that some principles needed to be articulated to maintain
the integrity of the university and individual rights of academics, while recognizing the
need to work with industry. In 2000, the administrative units that support contracting
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and industrial liaison were consolidated to form a new Research Services unit, and work
has been undertaken to clarify, articulate, and enforce general principles.
"Microsoft" variations. The arrival of Microsoft was so visible that it became an
instant benchmark for all the ventures that followed. One professor remembers how
another industrialist approached him saying "we want to do a 'Microsoft"'. Another
industrialist carefully analyzed his plan against what he perceived to be the Microsoft
model. And yet, as more companies "did a Microsoft", the category of embedded
laboratories became even more blurred.
One extreme was the BP Institute, which was based on a 25 million pound sterling
donation for a building and an endowment for 5 permanent positions in the field of fluid
mechanics. This was investment by BP in fundamental science. BP has no claims on
intellectual property rights arising from research activities of the Institute. The BP
Institute is an example where it went all the way to become fully a part of the university
with all its academic traditions.
The only part that may be different from the normal university operations is that there is a
single BP representative embedded in the structure who orchestrates events to encourage
academics and industrialists to work together. The role of this industrial representative
on campus is to make sure that the company "remain(s) passionately interested and
listen(s) like mad." It is like having an "aperture" to the world of academia, and indeed
BP has actively used the linkage through the Institute to reach out and learn from the
broader academic community. For instance, a series of executive seminars was
organized by the representative through the Cambridge Programme for Industry. Another
example was a workshop with business practitioners, who came to discuss their technical
problems with the academics from the BP Institute. These workshops turned out to be
mutually beneficial, since academics were interested to learn about technical challenges
faced by the operations so that they could then guide their exploration of fundamental
science - particularly as the operations would typically have important data to which they
could have access.
For operations people, these activities provide a unique opportunity to be questioned by
intellectually curious academics, which can help them understand the nature of the
problems they faced. The activities are not bound by contracts, and academics are by no
means obligated to undertake specific kinds of research. They are simply orchestrated
conversations to engage both parties, and it is left up to the academics to do what they
wish. There are no restrictions placed on their publications - they are expected to engage
in open science.
Another interesting case was Marconi, which in 2000 announced a 40 million pound
commitment to a relationship with Cambridge, but scaled it back to negligible levels
within two years, when the company faced a financial crisis. The original intention was
to donate about 10 million for a Marconi Building and several endowed positions, with
two million pounds to support the establishment of Marconi's own laboratory in
Cambridge, and 3 million pounds for supporting research activities within the University
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community through contracts, with the resulting intellectual property rights belonging to
Marconi. The use of such funds was to be overseen by an advisory board comprising
both Marconi and university representatives. However, the company suffered near fatal
financial problems in Autumn of 2001, which took place minutes before the framework
agreement was signed, and the inevitable scaling back resulted. In contrast to the initial
expectation of a laboratory with 25 staff, a smaller Marconi Laboratory with less than 10
people sits today within the new Computer Laboratory building, with a handful of
contracted research activities. They will negotiate the terms and conditions for
collaboration including intellectual property rights for each of their future projects, a
condition that would have been the same even if there was a framework agreement. What
may change, however, is the meaning of future negotiations, now that Marconi is clearly
not a large benefactor.
6-2. multiple company relationships
There appear to be far fewer examples of multiple company relationships in Cambridge
than at MIT or indeed at Tokyo. As shown in Table 6-2, the few that exist appear to fall
into two types: organizational structures such as institutes that are supported by multiple
companies through multiple projects, and membership-oriented activities where multiple
companies pay annual fees to participate in some activities. What is striking is that there
is no firm sense of "categories" among the organizers as far as relationships with multiple
companies are concerned. They are all different. They remain largely isolated structures
or efforts, often not well understood or known by peers within the university. They are
reviewed below with an emphasis on identifying the underlying constraints that prevented
them from becoming more prominent features in the university.
Organizational structures. Several of the examples are newly created organizational
structures that attempt to address interdisciplinary fields not covered by an existing
department. Behind each case have been one or more academics wanting to create a new
field that was not covered by their own departments. The fact that there are so few overt
inter-departmental efforts provides an interesting contrast to MIT, where there is
somewhat more of a tradition of creating inter-departmental laboratories and centers as
virtual and/or matrix organizational structures. Except for the Institute of Manufacturing,
which actually is an integral part of the Engineering Department, they are isolated
structures or are only loosely connected to a department with definite affiliations with
several disciplines. There seems to be no common route for the establishment of these
new organizational structures. Two of these examples were first established as informal
structures. It is only once their activities stabilized that they were granted proper official
status by the university:
"The way something becomes formalized in Cambridge is that an ordinance is passed that
governs it, but at the start we didn't know what this thing was going to do, how it would
work. And if we had an ordinance established, we would have risked the difficulty of
being entombed in our own ordinance. We wanted to have some years of experience
before we developed an ordinance." (a laboratory director, Cambridge)
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Table 6-2 Examples of relationships with multiple conpanies in Cambrid e
Name Year Type Number of Number
academics/resea of
rchers (2002) companies
Institute of 1982 - Professor Organizational 5 established 10+
Biotechnology hired structure 1 non-
1988 - institute established
established 30 post-docs)
Melville 1990 Organizational 2 established 3
Laboratory structure 8 post docs)
Center for 1995 Organizational 1 non- 6-8
Communications Structure established
System 8 post-docs
Research
Computer 1981 Department department 50+
Laboratory based informal
Consortium collegium
Cambridge 1989 Membership
University Local collegium
University Links
Cambridge 1993 Research 1-2 8
Vehicle consortium
Dynamics
Consortium
Center for Research 3 10-12
Technology consortium
Management
Institute for 1998 Organizational 20+
Manufacturing structure
With a
membership
collegium
Notes: 1. These are fixed term, full-time research positions.
Source: interviews, websites
And yet, it is not easy to fund these informal entities.
"And if I've learned anything in these last six years, I have learned that the core people in
any research arrangement should be on an established basis (paid directly by the
university)... And if I had those [core positions]..then I would be able to put some money
away and wheel and deal a little bit. But as it is, I have to run very hard to just pay for
salaries." (a laboratory director, Cambridge)
Some face difficulties in attracting funding from traditional government sources such as
research councils, which are organized along traditional disciplinary lines. Others were
designed to undertake application-oriented work, with explicit expectations about
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attracting industrial sponsors. But in these cases, relationships with multiple companies
have been established, not by design, but by default because a single company was not
willing to provide a sufficient amount of money for the desired scale of activities.
Membership-based activities. There are several examples of low-level membership
activities that date back awhile. The Computer Laboratory has had a small informal
membership collegium since 1981, for which companies pay a minor fee (around 1,000
pounds a year) to participate in social events and recruitment visits. It was established in
at the time of announced government budget cutbacks to fill the possible gaps in funding.
The Cambridge University Local Industry Links (CULIL) was established in 1989 and
has been running dinner seminars principally for local businesses. A more formal
consortium arrangement is rarer but some have sprung up in the 1990s. The Cambridge
Vehicle Dynamics Consortium is one such example, run principally by one academic
with 9 relevant companies. The Center for Technology Management also has over a
dozen members for its activities, in which members are expected to play more proactive
roles in their action-oriented research. The latter is becoming institutionalized with
administrative support from the Institute of Manufacturing, which has specialized
professional administrators in charge of industry liaison work. The professor in charge of
the former consortium, in contrast, complains of a lack of support and of having to do
everything himself. While other academics are also waking up to the value of working
with multiple industries, their ability to sustain such a relationship beyond a short-term
project may be limited without stronger administrative support.
6-3. Characterizing institutional change in Cambridge
What are the characteristics of institutional change in Cambridge? Over time, there has
been a growth of more, deeper and larger single company relationships, characterized by
at least partial relocation of industrial laboratories into Cambridge. However, the greater
number does not mean any standardization or similarity in the nature of the relationships.
Indeed, there appears to be as much, if not more, variability in the nature of relationships
with the rising numbers. Yet, in terms of multiple company relationships, there have not
been significant developments in the past, with exception of the Institute of
Manufacturing. In the following section, these points are elaborated.
While there has been a significant industrial presence on campus dating back to the 1970s,
most notably by Rolls Royce in the Whittle Laboratory, the number of significant
relationships on campus increased in the late 1990s. In contrast to the early relationships
that were confined to a particular disciplinary space in the University, the recent
relationships are larger, more likely to be inter-disciplinary and touch a broader group of
Cambridge academics than before.
Table 6-3 contrasts the characteristics of embedded laboratories and their variations
between 1980 and 2000.
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Table 6-3: Characteristics of Embedded Laboratories and their variations
1980 2000
Total 1 11
Proprietary research 1 3
Headed by academics 2
Open science oriented 3
Next to departments 1 8
Large (more than 1M) 14
Often, these embedded laboratories are "deeper" relationships because industrial
laboratories or representatives are located in Cambridge to sustain regular interactions.
The relationships involve more informal interactions, such as repeated seminars or
discussion sessions, rather than simply being organized around contracted research.
Interestingly, even where there are no formal contractual relationships, there can still be a
deep engagement as is seen in the case of BP. They are also "deeper" in the sense that
academics often work as consultants for their sponsors. As a result of such assignments,
academics learn more about the nature of problems faced by their industrial sponsors.
The arrangements also provide a better platform for industries to share their problems in
greater confidence than is possible in general research activities.
With the rise in the number of these cases, the types of arrangement have also widened.
Cambridge's relationships with individual companies now vary from highly proprietary
research to completely open science. Some are based in industrial laboratories on
campus, while others are based simply on mutual visitation.
Another significant change is the sheer increase in the number of industrial researchers in
Cambridge who have research ties with university academics. Whereas industrial
research centers are not new in Cambridge, their connections with the university were
often unclear. What is also characteristic is that many of these "new" industrial
researchers in fact look like academics. They are former doctoral students or post docs
who would have left Cambridge, or they are university academics who have been
recruited into these positions, attracted by the "academic" atmosphere of the job. There
has also been an increase in the number of university academics who have been
specifically recruited to undertake application-oriented research.
There is no evidence of increasing multiple-company relationships. Indeed, the
individual academics who work with them find them difficult to sustain as they demand a
lot of administrative attention. The only location where a membership-based relationship
appears to be institutionalized is in the Institute of Manufacturing, where one of the
centers developed an innovative membership structure. The center brings together a
handful of academics and their students to undertake research on technology management.
The concept of corporate members has now been adopted by the Institute as a whole and
increasingly by centers within the Institute. The industrial relationships in the Institute
are managed by the professional administrative unit specializing in industrial sponsor
relations.
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6-4. Underlying organizational factors
What are the underlying organizational factors that influence the way in which
Cambridge academics develop their ties with industrial partners? I argue that fuzzy
organizational boundaries have helped them to develop deeper relationships. The weak
central administrative infrastructure, on the other hand, made it difficult for Cambridge
academics to cross departmental lines and to sustain activities that involve multiple
academics. In the final section, the changing role of the central administration is
reviewed and its implications discussed.
Fuzzy organizational boundary defined
What do the organizational boundaries of Cambridge look like? And why are they
"fuzzy"? The fuzziness of Cambridge's organizational boundaries can be understood in
terms of the way in which three types of assets are "owned" by the university: people,
knowledge and physical space.
People boundary. In Cambridge, there are no clear rules about what academics can or
cannot do outside the university. In fact, even the meaning of what is legitimately inside
or outside the university is not well defined, because a typical academic in Cambridge
holds both a university appointment at an academic department and a teaching position
with a college. The academics can work as consultants for anybody, including their
research sponsors, or as executive managers of industrial laboratories, or they can run a
start-up company, as they please. There is no special limit as to how much time they can
spend on such activities. There are loosely defined minimum expectations in terms of
what they should do for the university, particularly in teaching - although the academics
who are externally active are often also highly productive in research and teaching and it
would be rare for any of these active academics to get into trouble on the grounds of their
service to the university. What is "appropriate" to do is left up to individual discretion.
The espoused belief is that Cambridge academics should have good enough judgement to
know what is appropriate. Another underlying reality is that neither the university nor the
colleges have sufficient resources to pay the academics at a level reasonable to claim full-
time commitment given the expected standards of living.
The People boundary is as fuzzy for industrialists as it is for academics within
Cambridge. Colleges can have many informal and formal ties with industrialists, and
indeed they have traditionally done so to keep good relationships with potential
benefactors. An industrial research scientist living in Cambridge could be a visiting or
even a formal fellow of a college, perhaps with teaching responsibilities there. Since it is
the colleges that promote key social functions in town, by hosting lunches, dinners and
various other events, even those who do not work for a university department can still be
part of the largely and loosely defined university academic community. If an industrial
R&D laboratory is established in Cambridge, it could attract academics from other
universities under the condition that they might still be loosely affiliated with this world-
famous university. "Fuzziness" runs in both directions.
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Here fuzziness appears to arise from the multiplicity of Cambridge as an entity. Since
Cambridge University comprises both the legal university and around 30 colleges with
their symbiotic relationships, no single legal body has the monopoly in determining
where the organizational boundary should be or what university members should do. In
addition, both the university and the colleges are willing to have a wide range of
memberships. The other aspect of fuzziness arises from the strong sense of individual
autonomy deemed appropriate for academics. Different ways in which academics and
industrialists can cross the Cambridge's organizational boundaries are summarized in
Table 6-4.
Table 6-4: Different ways in which people cross the organizational boundary
Academics Industrialists
Part-time work Part-time teaching
Consulting/serving as non executive Giving lectures
board member Supervising students
Consulting or working for industrial
sponsors
Dual positions Dual positions:
working as executive managers in industry college fellows
Quit university and move to industry Quit industry and join university
Fuzziness in the people boundary makes it possible for academics and industrialists to see
what the world on the other side of the boundary looks like, and therefore enables
relationships to be based on better mutual understanding. One industrial researcher
recollects the days when he was on the other side of the boundary, working as a
university academic. He was asked by an industrialist to think about why it was difficult
to identify good projects for the company to fund, when there was a lot of obvious
overlap in thematic interest.
"I have come to the conclusion that the problem was that there wasn't anyone
who actually understood what the company's real problems were in detail (inside
a university)... (There wasn't anyone inside industry who) understood the
university environment... I don't just mean the particular Cambridge environment
or group. But, generally, the thing that...drives and motivates academics and the
way in which they seek reward. It wasn't actually in anyone's economic interest
within [company] to fund projects...In the back of their mind they are thinking,
'Why on earth should I do all this work to get Cambridge funded?"'
He proposed that he work as a consultant for the company, so that he learned the
company's needs better and could then propose better projects as an academic. The idea
worked. That way, he could "write research projects that are appropriate for a university
context". The key issue was that the university environment is not a good place to bring
in too much confidential information, particularly when the students are involved.
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"In my view, the average research student is not trained at that point in their life,
career, to make the fine distinctions that are required between whether it's suitable
to talk about this thing or whether it's not. And it's very easy for them to get
confused... and Ph.D. students get more supervision from their peer group than
they do from their supervisor... If you're an industrialist sponsoring a Ph.D.
student and you sponsor them in such a way that they can't talk to any of their
peers about their work in the detail required to actually have a decent discussion
of it, then as an industrialist, you're not getting a good deal for your money
because this person is not working effectively. And as a student, they're isolated.
They're not getting personal development out of it."
The answer had to be to have someone in the middle, who understood both worlds. "One
way to do it is bring in an academic as a consultant." The other way is what he does
today, for a former university academic to work as an industrial researcher "performing
the same function, which is understanding the company's problems and being a
researcher." In other words, Cambridge's fuzzy people boundary allows different ways
for this intermediary function to be served.
There have been no specific changes on the people boundaries in Cambridge, although
people are beginning to talk about the need for academics to make their outside interests
explicit and public. One university committee is currently examining the possibility of
requiring all academics to state publicly their private affiliations and activities outside the
university (as is done at MIT).
Knowledge boundary. The fuzziness of Cambridge's knowledge boundary is somewhat
different from the fuzziness of Cambridge's other boundaries. First of all, there are few
fixed policies or expected norms about ownership or user rights about inventions arising
from sponsored research; government sponsorship is the only exception, where the
ownership will be held by the university. Every situation is considered to be different
and unique, and to deserve separate treatment and consideration. As such, intellectual
property rights may be assigned to sponsors in some cases, or owned exclusively by the
university in others. The ownership, subsequent user rights, and confidentiality
conditions are all negotiable - with the opinions of relevant academics reflected. In other
words, the knowledge boundary is variably determined in different locations and is
subject to negotiation.
There is also the possibility of change over time. One industrialist noted that Cambridge
negotiators are willing to recognize industry's past contributions in renegotiations of
contracts. Even if the original conditions were not so favorable to industry, if their
importance to the university is demonstrated in the meantime, they might get better
conditions. Conversely, even if the original conditions were favorable, they cannot be
taken for granted for good. The knowledge boundary remains negotiable over time.
Here, fuzziness arises not from the multiplicity of the university as an entity, but from the
fact that the conditions are variable across locations and time so that no-one can know,
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ex-ante, where the expected boundary might be. The only thing people know is that it is
negotiable.
Once IPR ownership is assigned to industry, industrialists feel "safe" to bring their
proprietary technology and know how into campus. The expectation on the part of the
industrialists is that when they themselves bring in a lot of knowledge, and if they are
also paying for the work, the intellectual property rights should be assigned to them. One
"industrialist" academic, who is a full time academic at the university while serving as a
research manager in a private company (and thereby personifying the fuzzy people
boundary of Cambridge), explains the logic as follows.
"We have more (knowledge) here than in the university by miles...We (the
company) require that universities assign the IPR exclusively and immediately for
any joint work... If it is not joint work - and we don't do too much of that
because it is waste of time....(but when we do give money without getting the
IPR, we say 'here is some money, you can have no access to us... Good bye.'
(Giving money like that works) only (as) marketing for students... But if I got
[the IPR], you can have access [to] everything I've got to help you make that
property better, because I own it, and you will get your cut."
Table 6-5 shows different ways in which knowledge can cross the organizational
boundary of Cambridge.
Table 6-5: Different ways in which knowledge can cross the organizational boundary
Type of rights Acceptable range
Intellectual property rights ownership University, individual academics and
industry
IPR user rights Individual academics and industries.
Publication rights Restricted with no time limit, to complete
Iopenness
Recently, the university has been making considerable efforts to strengthen its
management capacity of intellectual property rights. Related units were re-organized in
2000 to establish a much more cohesive Research Services group, whose responsibilities
range from research sponsorship contracting to patenting and licensing. One key activity
undertaken by the new group was to have its advisory committee produce a far clearer
statement with respect to the ownership of intellectual property rights. While the
statement issued in 2001 is not a "change" in policy, it clarifies the university position,
which is that all inventions under externally sponsored research would be owned by the
university, except when the university specifically agrees otherwise.
In fact, such a policy has been in place since 1987, though there were some ambiguities
in interpretation and it was not actively enforced. Particularly clearer is the position of
individual academics in terms of the ownership. It is only when academics invent
without explicit external funding (apart from research infrastructure support from the
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Higher Education Funding Council of England), that they could claim ownership. What
the policy statement does not clarify is the university position with respect to industrially
supported research, where the university could still agree to assign the rights to industry.
For the moment, the administrators voice their views that IPR ownership will continue to
be negotiable, with the possibility of industry ownership.
Physical boundary. The physical boundary of the university is as fuzzy as the other two
boundaries. Industry can reside in land or buildings owned by the university, or
colleges, inside or outside their "campus" premises. For instance, there are industrial
laboratories that rent spaces in commercial buildings owned by the university or colleges
in Cambridge; there are industrial laboratories renting space in university buildings or
college-owned science parks; there are industrial laboratories renting space from non-
university land-lords, which sit between departmental buildings.
The fuzziness of the physical boundary is a result of the multiplicity of the university as a
legal entity. However that is not the whole story. It is reinforced by the fact that
Cambridge as a town is relatively isolated geographically and dominated by the
university whose buildings are found all over the town. The result is that many of the
commercial buildings in Cambridge would be encircled by the university geographically.
The fuzzy physical boundaries have not only attracted industries to relocate their
laboratories to this small town, but have also allowed them to develop much more multi-
faceted relationships with the university.
One company started out with a research contract with one professor. When the
relationship turned out to be successful, they started working with several other
academics, introduced to them through informal networks. They eventually started their
own laboratory in Cambridge by renting space in two departments, with an office space
rented from a college in a commercial building. Now they are convinced that they should
go further; they are renting a bigger single space from the university near their West
Cambridge site, but just outside it. It is as though the university is willing to incubate
industrial laboratories inside it. Table 6-6 shows the different types of physical space
affiliated to the university that can be available to companies for their use.
Table 6-6: Types of space made available to industry
University owned College owned
Academic building Cavendish NA
occupied by relevant Computer Laboratory
Commercial buildings in West Cambridge etc. NA
the same ground as
academic departments
Commercial space set apart Buildings in town Science Park
from university buildings Buildings in town
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There has been no specific "change" in the way that space has been managed in
Cambridge. However, there is clearly a sea change in the way new buildings and
developments are planned. For example, a master-plan for West Cambridge was
developed under the leadership of the current Vice Chancellor and the land use was
approved by the local planning authority in April 1999. While the plan for West
Cambridge has been there in theory for a long time, this was the first time that it became
a reality to be implemented. The plan made the goal explicit for the first time: to create
an intellectual hub in the sciences, including industrial laboratories. Actual building and
relocation plans await specific benefactions; however, each of the departments is today
far better organized to raise funds for their "dream" development plans.
Image of a relationship affected by the fuzzy boundaries. For one company,
Cambridge's fuzzy boundaries were critical in setting up their own laboratory in
Cambridge. Two professors became their key research collaborators, and were also
appointed as consulting directors to their laboratory. This meant that the professors
provided assistance in setting research directions in the laboratory, and helped with key
issues such as personnel selection. Indeed, the first employees in the laboratory were
post docs who were working with one of the professors. They were happy to be recruited
by the company because their work was similar to what they had done before, but their
salaries went up. This was a seamless transition for them, almost an internal promotion,
because they continued to work in the same laboratory within the University, where the
company had rented space. They had to spend more time reporting to the company, but
they could still teach or supervise, because the department recognized their qualifications,
even though they were not on the university's payroll.
The same company brought its own technology into the university laboratory where they
had their employees in order to conduct research with proprietary technology under the
direction of one professor. The proprietary technology was used as an input for
developing new technology and also to explore a new set of phenomena. The availability
of the proprietary technology enabled their counterpart professor to explore science at a
level of precision hitherto not possible. It also prompted another professor to focus
research efforts in a new direction. Public science was being undertaken, but using
proprietary technology which would have been both expensive and time consuming if the
university had had to develop it by itself. The professor summarized the position as
follows:
"...(there was) a symbiosis between the university and the company... The company
does development and therefore has done engineering of materials... all the things that
make it work well, which are extremely uninteresting activities. The university had
access to most of that know-how. So the university has had a big leg up in terms of
having a platform of technology to exploit in order to understand the underlying (science)
and understanding the underlying (science) has actually generated a lot of understanding
which helps the technology." (Cambridge academic)
There are other examples where the sharing of technical infrastructure was mutually
beneficial. Several professors found that the partnership allowed them to access facilities
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of the partner companies which then enabled them to continue their line of research at the
frontier. The companies often benefited from extra analytical work on materials or
devices of the kind they would not have had the time or capacity to undertake internally.
There can be a symbiotic relationship between the academic need for facilities for
scientific production and the company need for technical analysis. But at the same time,
the academics have seemed to find ways to publish in comfort without jeopardizing
company secrets.
One company representative saw his role explicitly as one of translating the technical
problem of his company into a set of scientific problems that could be best addressed
through open science. He emphasized that the information about the nature of the
technical problems of the company can be very sensitive and that he can ill-afford it to be
leaked. And yet, without revealing something about their problems, they cannot engage
in productive discussions about possible solutions. While he was passing on more than
the usual amount of proprietary information to the university side, he also recognized
how it is in the best interest of both parties if he and other corporate side researchers
could "translate" the information well enough so to shield the interests of both sides. In
his own words,
"The real problems we have with our products, we cannot make public. The critical task
for us (the embedded lab) is to break down these real practical product problems into a
set of [academic] problems...These are the issues that are tackled through repeated
conversations between us (from the embedded lab), the central research laboratory and
business units. It is hard to involve university people directly into this."
What is interesting is that if he and others were not physically in the embedded
laboratory, daily encountering their counterpart academics, there may not have been
anyone in the company to engage in such intensive translation work.
Another company representative who used to work as a university academic also
emphasized the importance of proximity and constant monitoring.
"Someone needs to understand at the same time what's happening on the research
projects and what's happening in the business...If you're a corporate lab and
you're funding a university and you're 1,000 miles apart, you are not going to be
involved in the thought processes of that project because you simply will not be
there during the sort of formative meetings when the ideas are getting bandied
around. And the danger is, maybe you start turning up every quarter for a
presentation of, this is what we've done, but you've lost the tracking of what the
thought process was. So you can be a smart person, you can understand what the
company's problems are, but you're not actually very closely engaged with the
research that's going on. So now you're back to relying on reading the research
publications."
For another company, the key benefit of having the embedded laboratory was the sharing
of the intellectual climate. Through regular seminars, both at the university department
181
and at the industrial laboratory, there was a diversity in the kind of visitors they could
bring to the region, and through open academic discussions alone, industrial researchers
felt that they could get sufficient inputs from the university.
The image of relationships enabled by these fuzzy boundaries is one of close partnership,
where both the academics and the industrialists learn about each others' needs and
interests.
Role of administrators
In Chapter 5, the role of administration was described as critical for MIT in crossing its
internal boundaries, particularly across disciplines. In Cambridge too, there are strong
divisions that separate disciplinary groups, though moderated somewhat by social
functions provided by the colleges.
In this section, I demonstrate the weakness of the central administration in Cambridge,
and particularly its inability to facilitate activities that cross internal boundaries between
departments or individual academics.
Difficulty of crossing the internal boundaries. Cambridge does not appear to have
effective mechanisms for bringing together academics from different departments without
creating new structures outside the existing departments. One department head recollects
a case in which four heads of departments got together to create a separate laboratory
with external funding:
"Again and again there were projects, or intellectual projects that could well be
industrial projects... areas of interest that were not within the domain of one of
the departments. They had economic aspects, they had computer science aspects
or engineering or mathematical aspects. But they were not in one department....
Now, those projects were not really getting a proper kind of administrative
structure. There wasn't a way of sort of taking them on by the university and
managing the overheads and everything. And so we attempted to set up a
structure [the laboratory], whose aim would be to be interdisciplinary... So we
all had enough power in our own department to do anything and yet we all judged
that it would be easier to do this...joint thing... [the laboratory] has been very
interesting from my point of view and involved people from different disciplines
in a way that would have been very difficult for me to construct in my own
department."
Indeed there are at least three similar examples in the past 20 years where a new
interdisciplinary structure was created through recruiting new academic staff. In one
such case, the academic remembers how little support he got from the university, and
how he had to establish the center through hard work in attracting external resources. In
another case, academics from different disciplines were recruited to newly created
positions in a new interdisciplinary center. The center director from the sponsoring
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company is clear that the key challenge has been to make sure that these academics work
together, while maintaining ties to their disciplinary departments.
Two other cases demonstrate that it is not easy to sustain inter-departmental structures.
The superconductivity center, established with government sponsorship for multiple
departments, eventually got taken over by the Cavendish. Another inter-disciplinary
laboratory, Melville, was founded with collaboration among several departments but
eventually got absorbed into the Chemistry Department.
These examples point to another characteristic of Cambridge: the fuzziness of
disciplinary boundaries as defined by the departments. This was arguably the more
classic way of dealing with interdisciplinary work: simply to expand the disciplinary
boundary of an existing department. Indeed, Cambridge departments appear historically
to have had a large tolerance for expanding their disciplinary coverage. The Cavendish
Laboratory, Cambridge's physics department, went as far as housing biologists such as
Crick and Watson. One mathematics professor remarked that mathematics in the UK and
especially in Cambridge is a much broader field than in the US. Others noted that the
lack of structured teaching requirements at the graduate level provides perhaps a greater
flexibility in the choice of disciplinary contents within a department.
The difficulties of establishing interdisciplinary centers may stem from the long tradition
of established subjects such as mathematics and physics, which, in turn makes it difficult
to legitimate applied subjects.
The changing role of the central administration. One clear change over time in
Cambridge's relationships with industry is the increased role of academic administrators,
particularly department heads, in setting the tone of overall agreements. In contrast to
the earlier ventures, where academic administrators were brought in only when the
negotiations had some policy or space issues to be resolved, interactions between the
Vice Chancellor and CEOs, or department heads and high level industry representatives
have been decisive in shaping the nature of relationships in later ventures.
In the aftermath of the debate about Microsoft, department heads and central academic
and professional administrators all became much more actively involved in setting the
tone of the discussions. How did this happen? Was the change in the role of the central
administration the cause or effect of the changing relationships between the university
and outside bodies?
The beginning of the sea change in the role of the central administration in Cambridge
goes back to the 1980s. During the 1980s, central government applied repeated financial
cutbacks and demanded increasingly explicit and greater accountability as well as better
financial management by university administrations. It took Cambridge some time
before they realized that the government was serious about the recommendations in the
Jarratt Report of 1985. It was not until November 1987 that a recommendation to review
the governance of the University was sent to the Council signed by almost 200 members,
including some of the most respected academics in Cambridge. Their main concern was
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that the current arrangement was unsatisfactory for "the modem requirement for rapid,
firm and effective decision making."
A syndicate was established subsequently to consider the issues, and its recommendations
were delivered and adopted in 1990. The status of the Council was to be elevated to
become the main executive and policy making body, chaired by the Vice Chancellor and
comprising about 20 representatives elected by Regent House. The General Board,
which had always been responsible for all academic matters, and the finance committee
were both to become accountable to the Council. The Vice Chancellor's office was to
become a full time position with longer duration. Thereafter, the Regent House, which
comprises some three thousand teaching and administrative officers of the University,
became less managerial and began to take a more strategic role similar to that played by
the governing body of a university.
While the role of department heads is clearly important with respect to relationships,
what is less clear is whether the role itself has changed over time. Most departments have
had the tradition of long tenure for their academic heads - who had considerable authority
to get things done. There is no doubt that they played a leadership role in setting broad
disciplinary directions, particularly in the recruitment of new people. On the other hand,
it is also the case that the role of academic administrators changed considerably from one
of academic leadership to one of academic management. One head of department
acknowledged that his role evolved as more budgetary pressures developed, to the extent
that he had to assume a role in setting rules about resource allocation, particularly in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.
There has also been a significant strengthening of the professional administrative units.
In the early 1980s, the Wolfson Industrial Unit was re-configured to service the entire
university. The development office was established in 1988; the Cambridge Foundation
was set up in 1989, as an independent trust, but acting in the interests of the university to
seek voluntary funds for the support of education. These are developments that preceded
the sea change in the central administration of the university. Indeed they were
contemporary with the early evolution of Cambridge-industry, relationships. It is in the
mid-90s that they begin to play a much more proactive and critical role in prompting the
next round of developments, by supporting the Vice Chancellor in fund-raising visits to
potential benefactors, or in developing the master plan for West Cambridge.
What is interesting is that the development of the Microsoft and other relationships are
also putting additional responsibilities for the central and departmental administration.
Principles had to be clarified and administrative work had to be undertaken quickly. In
2000, a new unit called the Research Services was formed, integrating the contracting
office with the Wolfson Industrial Unit, with slightly increased staff. A new unit was
created to be responsible for corporate relations in 2000, and the Cambridge Programme
for Industry, a unit responsible for executive training, was re-configured to become a
university unit independent of any faculty, with a small management board to oversee its
activities.
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6-5. Degrees of instituionalization: the role of individuals
In Cambridge institutionalization does not take place as readily as in MIT. Rather, each
of the local initiatives provides a colorful and powerful variation and appears to have the
potential to be sustained for a long time. As in the case of MIT, these initiatives
invariably have visible founding fathers, who often stay with the initiatives for a long
time. Interestingly, there is a less clear image of active debates up front. Rather, debates
appear to take place through sustained interactions among key participants over time, and
provide a firm basis for personal relationships and mutual understanding.
Getting started: founding fathers. Lasting initiatives do appear to have committed
founding fathers, whose commitment can be explained in terms of their personal
experience and backgrounds. Interestingly, these personal reasons were more often
articulated by surrounding people rather than by the individuals themselves. For instance,
several people explained how one founding director of an industrially active institute had
worked with industry before re-joining Cambridge to explain his passion and suitability
for the task. Evidently, they observed personal commitment through his actions and in
between his lines - or through personal discussions over the years. For another academic,
the embedded laboratory relationship followed several attempts to work with other
companies, and lessons learned from these earlier experiences fed into the design of the
laboratory. Founding fathers appear to have personal backgrounds that explain why they
are more committed to the initiatives. However, they seem to be less willing to
communicate these directly or explicitly.
Getting both sides engaged. Academics and industrialists appear to develop personal
relationships and mutual understanding of each other's idiosyncrasies through sustained
debates and interactions. In one case, an academic demanded that his sponsor company
ensure continuity in resident personnel lest relationships have to be built from the ground
repeatedly. The company agreed and had one Chief Scientist positioned in Cambridge
for over a decade, with another manager having spent seven years in Cambridge.
Differences in expectations were worked out over the years through such personal
relationships and dialogues. Through a decade of partnership, industrialists learned about
the way academics would like to work, for instance their inability to cope with too much
proprietary information, and learned to translate proprietary knowledge into a form that
could be disseminated more openly to the academics by extracting only the essence of the
company's information base.
In another embedded laboratory the closeness with which one leading academic and the
resident industrial representative worked was evident from the fact that they each
understood what values they brought into the relationship and what they got out of it.
The academic and the industrialist both articulated clearly how their relationship was
symbiotic given the need for the academic to have access to production facilities, and
how the company needed better analytical expertise. The academic understood the nature
of industrialist concern about proprietary knowledge and the industrialist respected the
academic need to be open and to publish. This fine-tuned understanding appeared to rest
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upon very frequent and open communications. They often used similar terms in
explaining what they do, and referred to the same events as examples.
Scale and visibility. Early initiatives were typically small and demanded few
organizational resources such as space from the university. Indeed, in many cases, the
space was provided by industry, sometimes through donations for buildings. These early
initiatives remained largely unheeded by the rest of the university. With the governance
reform and strengthening of the central administration, central administrators became
more involved in the new initiatives, raising both the scale and visibility from the outset.
With scale and visibility came the need for a wider debate, as exemplified by the
Microsoft case, as many more people needed to be "bought in" to the value of these
initiatives.
Interestingly, in the four cases where I interviewed multiple representatives on both
university and industry sides, there seemed to be greater shared understandings on the
industry side than on the university side about why they needed to work in partnership.
In one company case, a resident manager, a resident researcher and an R&D Director in
their headquarters explained the rationale for being in Cambridge in ways that were
remarkably compatible with each other. And yet, it was not that they were articulating
an empty slogan. They all clearly articulated the need for the company to develop deeper
scientific expertise, in much the same way from each other, but were able to illustrate the
points with slightly different examples. They also articulated a different set of issues that
underscored their different roles in the organization. The R&D director was concerned
about institutionalizing the partnership beyond certain personalities, such as themselves.
The resident manager was worried about keeping his researchers focused on issues
relevant to the company, and the researcher voiced his hope about expanding his
relationships with multiple research groups. It was clear that there was a shared
understanding about the partnership with Cambridge, and yet, they each had a different
but compatible set of concerns and issues. Such consistency was underscored both by
close communications and on-going dialogue among them, and a sense of trust. In order
for a company to scale up its investment, not only in terms of monetary resources but
more importantly through committing its own human resources and time, it was
important that there was a shared understanding among the key players within the
company about why they were doing so.
Not replicating? In Cambridge, initiatives do not appear to be replicated readily
because of several reasons. Many founding fathers remained within their original
initiatives, and did not move on to new initiatives that replicated the successful patterns.
It was only in later initiatives where academic administrators began to operate as
founding fathers that replication through them became plausible. Indeed, the term
"embedded laboratory" was coined when the Vice Chancellor became actively interested
in the success of the model. Even then, the density of replication was not high, in the
sense that replication led to new variations, rather than the recreation of the similar
models. This pattern perhaps owes to the fact that there were no professional
administrators who were ready to develop "templates": they were either too busy and
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spread too thin, or not sufficiently interested in the substance of activities to care about
replication.
6-6. Concluding remarks
Compared with MIT, Cambridge's relationships with industry are smaller and fewer, but
appear to be deeper and more personal in nature. Initiatives may be sustained but tend to
remain in specific locales without scaling up, and replication takes place haphazardly.
One consequence of haphazard replication is that there is a greater variation among
similar types of initiatives in terms of the way they are structured. These characteristics
appear to derive directly from Cambridge's fuzzy organizational boundaries and the way
its administration is defined, and the pattern of dialectics among the key players.
Cambridge academics play a wider range of roles in their university-industry
relationships compared with MIT or Tokyo professors: as consultants, as managers and as
owners. At Cambridge, there is a much greater trust about professors and their academic
integrity, and the judgement call is essentially left to the individual. Similarly, there are
far less defined rules and principles about knowledge or physical boundaries. The
administration does not play a clear role in helping to scale up the initiatives nor in
creating organizational templates from them. Fuzzy boundaries allow sustained
interactions which in turn help establish deeper mutual understanding.
Institutionalization takes place at a given locale, but the lessons from the experience are
not readily learned elsewhere in the University.
The overriding sense of trusting individual judgement may be an artifact not only of the
University, but may also reflect the way UK society defines what is acceptable.
Interestingly, there appears to have been no significant public scandals about academic
conduct in its relations with industry, neither in Cambridge nor in the UK more widely.
In contrast, in Tokyo University, there is a constant fear about what the media would pick
up and how they would interpret existing practices, mainly as a result of the civil service
status of the professors. There have been several well-known cases of scandals, in which
civil servant academics were publicly criticized about their conduct with respect to their
relationship with industry, and in their use of external funds. The media also play a role
at MIT, albeit to a lesser degree than in Tokyo, with cases such as Akamai in 1999, in
which a newspaper article about one close relationship between academics and industry
(in this case, spin-off companies), was claimed to be jeopardizing the ability of students
to do homework because they were bound by a nondisclosure agreement. These events at
MIT have tended to lead the administration to change its policies - or at least to
scrutinize them more carefully (Marcus 1999).
Nonetheless, there is a definite change in the air in Cambridge. People are becoming
more articulate in voicing the need for clearer principles and transparency, if not for
rules. Also, in the aftermath of a financial fiasco related to the introduction of a
computerized accounting system, a new set of recommendations has been made further to
reform the governance structures. This will produce greater centralization in some
respects, and more decentralization in others. The initial reform process was started
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largely in response to government policies and a public climate that demanded relevance
and accountability. It was the same environment that prompted some academics to
venture into fund-raising or into deeper relationships with industry. In the late 1990s,
both sets of university responses to the environment, stronger central administration on
the one hand and increasing interest on the part of academics to work with industry on the
other, have begun to enable the development of larger partnerships with industry.
However, the manner in which these partnerships are shaped is significantly different
from MIT. Indeed, more non-monetary resources appear to be flowing into Cambridge
from industrial sponsors than is the case at MIT. Why is this the case?
I have explained the emergence of the deeper engagements in Cambridge in terms of its
fuzzy boundaries. The image I have portrayed is one of an organization that is expected
to outlive most of its partners and which is confident enough about its survival to keep its
boundary permeable enough to absorb the necessary energy, resources and knowledge
from other organizations. This picture leaves open the question of whether Cambridge is
better off than MIT, if Cambridge appears to be able to absorb more from the outside than
MIT can.
The answer is not clear - perhaps because the starting points were so different. Even
though MIT had its own era in which its engineering science was isolated from detailed
work in industrial applications, perhaps it was never as isolated from such work as
Cambridge was. Perhaps it managed to keep itself abreast of changes in industry and
technology through mechanisms unavailable to Cambridge. Indeed, that difference is
observed by some of the MIT scholars who visit Cambridge - they are surprised to see
the unevenness in the level of updatedness in different facilities across the university.
There is also an interesting contrast with Tokyo University. In Cambridge,
organizational boundaries are fuzzy. In Tokyo, they were impermeable until recently,
largely because legal restrictions on boundary-crossing between industry and the civil
service were applied to the national universities, all of whose employees, including
academics, were defined as civil servants. In the next chapter, the consequences of such
impermeable boundaries will be examined. Tokyo University also faces a period of rapid
change, which is expected to culminate in changes in the governance structures.
00 00
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Chapter 7:
The Tokyo Story
A hypothetical conversation among engineers from three engineering
units
Faculty of engineering: "Engineering as a discipline failed, because we
maximized production without regard to externalities such as the
environment and human welfare. We must reconstruct engineering as a
discipline that can cope with such larger issues."
Institute: "That is not the point. We are behind, but we must not just catch
up and follow the style of money-centered American universities. We will
go our own way, mindfully."
Center: "You pseudo-cosmopolitans! You speak as though you
understand what is happening in the world, but you don't have a clue
about the way markets work!"
7-1. Overview
The previous two chapters examined the experiences of MIT and Cambridge in
developing new types of relationships with industry. I also began to argue that the two
universities appeared to define their internal and external organizational boundaries
differently, and that these in turn appeared to have had an important influence in shaping
their new relationships. Where does the Tokyo Story fit?
The purpose of this chapter is the same as the preceding two: it is to characterize further
the nature of change in the university-industry relationships in Tokyo University, and to
understand the underlying organizational factors that shaped and influenced the change.
The Tokyo Story is a complex case, whose surface level changes appear contradictory
and difficult to interpret to an outsider. On the one hand, there are many highly visible
and celebrated changes, particularly in the administrative infrastructure, but often with a
certain twist that appears to make implementation difficult. For instance, a technical
licensing office (TLO) was established as a private company, outside the university
because it was not possible to link it to the university legally. A consequence of this is
that it led to competing initiatives for different units to build their own TLOs. As another
example, liaison activities were initiated through the creation of a database in a newly
created laboratory for collaboration with industry, but without central commitment to
sustain the database. There are also constant and incremental improvements in the
regulatory and procedural rules, which, contrary to their intent, appear to create a new
web of complexity about what is permissible to do, at least in the short term. For
example, faculty members have been permitted to consult since 1996, but even today, the
administrative processes for obtaining the annual ex ante approvals are cumbersome and
not encouraging (though some units have moved faster than others in dealing with this
problem).
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On the other hand, there are many local initiatives that are breaking new ground in terms
of relating with industry. These are usually undertaken by specific academics in their
respective fields of expertise, and seem to be increasing in number. Curiously, these
initiatives remain isolated from each other and even unnoticed by the rest of the
university. There are no official records, and most administrators are unaware of their
existence. It is only close peer academics who are vaguely aware of them.
What are the sources of these complexities? I argue that there are three primary ones,
each arising from one of the historical developments described in Chapter 4.
The first source is the supra-centralized governance structure in which Tokyo University
has no legal autonomy from the Ministry and many of the normal administrative tasks of
the central administration are divided between Ministry officials and university
administrators. This makes university activities subject to rules and procedures that are
apparently non-negotiable. While academic freedom has been respected, in the sense that
MOES has never used its power to influence academic personnel decisions, supra-
centralization, most notably in the administration of money, is an every-day reality that
everyone at Tokyo would know about. University administrators who deal with these
rules and procedures every day are too junior within the Ministerial hierarchy to be able
to use their discretion actively. Neither would they feel empowered enough to go back to
the Ministry to negotiate changes. They are left with the tasks of making ends meet on
the ground and of running a smooth operation without causing too much trouble. This
sense of heavy-handed micro-management in administrative terms paradoxically coexists
with a sense of extreme autonomy, in which individual professors are subject to
surprisingly few constraints on their teaching or research. This micro-management is
expected to change with legal autonomy in 2004, but it is not clear that this will resolve
all the complexities.
The second source is the manner in which the external history has affected the university
in dramatic ways that have left it with a motley concoction of values. The values are not
evenly shared, in the sense that individuals may secretly disagree with the espoused
values, and it is an open secret that there is hardly any consensus. One factor that
exacerbates the mix is generational. Younger academics, for many of whom both the war
and the student unrest belong to a distant past, are much more open to norms and values
more akin to those of US academics, for whom it is perfectly acceptable to work with
industry with real applications in mind. The events that prompted the dramatic change in
values were external, after all, and there were no social or other processes, either before
or after, among academics to enable them to construct shared values. Espoused values
have been forced on them, irrespective of their true beliefs. In effect, individuals enact
their own values as long as they can remain invisible to those who may be upset by them.
The third source of complexity is that espoused values have developed in different ways
in different locations within Tokyo University. As far as engineering is concerned, there
are three somewhat competing organizational units of varying size: the Faculty of
Engineering, the Institute of Industrial Science (IIS) and the Research Center for
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Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST). These are the legacies of the three large
engineering groups in operation during the war, the First Faculty of Engineering, the
second Faculty of Engineering, and Aeronautical Laboratory, respectively. As described
in Chapter 4, the post-war changes led the Second Faculty to remold itself into something
more directly useful for the industrial development of Japan, and the Aeronautical
Laboratory to reform itself into a generic engineering laboratory. The latter had to go
through several more rounds of reforms before it finally became RCAST, an event that
was publicized with considerable fanfare. Exactly what dynamics occurred in the
intervening years among the three is not something that can be readily recovered from
history.
What is clear today, however, is that this organizational structure has spawned a certain
sense of competition among the three units, with the Faculty perhaps the most oblivious
of it. Two of my interviewees used the metaphor of three brothers to describe the three
organizational units: the Faculty being the eldest brother, growing up without competition
and with all the attention being taken for granted; the IIS as the middle brother, squeezed
between the two, and with a fierce need to proclaim his own identity; and RCAST as the
little brother, brought up as a rebel in the family and a little spoiled with the attention he
always managed to get from the world. In the latter two units, there appears to be a far
clearer sense of organizational identity and shared values. Not surprisingly, shared
values are hard to come by among the three units. The Faculty may be best described as
"romantic." The IS's accomplishments as well as plans appear the most "grounded."
RCAST appears to be the institutionalized "rebel" that spins off daring initiatives.
I argue that in Tokyo, initiatives can be either formal or informal. Formal ones are those
which follow all the organizational rules, are visible on the surface, openly talked about
by peers in the community, and are sustained and replicated. Informal ones are based on
local initiatives, led by one or more academics, follow the organizational rules only
superficially, and bypass them in critical ways. The Tokyo Story is about the duality in
the spheres of action, formal and informal, with the organization called Tokyo University
being unable to have a firm grasp of the informal initiatives. It is a story about the lack
of connectivity between individual desires and organizational action.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section (II), I first discuss the formal
initiatives and changes introduced in the 1980s and the 1990s. Those are the ones that
people in Tokyo point to as examples of change. They comprise changes in the
organizational rules that allow new types of financial and contractual relationships with
industry on the one hand, and, on the other, the development of new organizational
structures to deal with university-industry relationships.
I then go on to discuss the informal, more local initiatives within the University,
originating from academics, in a manner which parallels the preceding two chapters:
initiatives to establish relationships with single companies; and initiatives to relate to
multiple companies. Most of the initiatives remained isolated and not known to the
community, and were short-lived. There have been a handful of these initiatives that look
as though they are going to have a longer life by the way they are structured. In my
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description, I pay particular attention to the nature of barriers that have prevented
initiatives from becoming sustained.
In the third section, I characterize the institutional changes in the University of Tokyo,
first, by characterizing the nature of "formality." Formality implies institutionalization of
organizational forms, usually introduced programmatically or system-wide by design.
Interestingly, formality does not necessarily lead to institutionalization of activities. As a
second characteristic, I discuss several breakthrough cases where activities are sustained
over time and attain a more permanent status with or without "formality." Third, I
discuss institutionalized low engagement.
In the fourth section, I discuss the organizational underpinnings that have been
responsible for shaping such changes. I argue that a set of institutions that collectively
define organizational boundaries shape both the initial agreements between university
and industry and the subsequent interactions. More specifically, I demonstrate that
certain sets of rules and practices define organizational boundaries in terms of people,
knowledge and physical location both internally and externally. I argue that academic
and other administrators are the critical actors in refining or changing these boundaries
over time.
Finally, I examine the role of individuals, using the apparent differences among the
initiatives in terms of their activity sustainability. Formal or informal, some initiatives
have attained a more permanent status, and appear to take a sustainable path, while others
remained a single shot and died a quiet death. The question is what differentiates the
survivors from the non-survivors. The full answers to these questions will be developed
in Chapter 10.
7-2. Formal initiatives
Emergence of new financial and contractual relationships
In the 1970s and 1980s, the most prevalent type of industrial collaboration came in the
form of scholarship grants (shogaku kifukin) from sponsoring companies. As the name
suggests, these were essentially philanthropic, and required no formal contracting
between industry and the university. The typical size of scholarship grants was several
thousand US dollars. In spite of the small sums, academics appreciated these grants
because they came with relatively few of the line item restrictions which were typical of
other monetary resources, and so could be used freely: for instance, for international
travel to attend conferences, which was difficult to finance from other sources. On the
part of industrial sponsors, a strong norm of equitable funding developed to such an
extent that there was a sense of "going rates" at 5,000-10,000 dollars a year. Scholarship
grants were almost like "name cards" or "a box of cookies" that companies brought to
academics to keep themselves acquainted for the sake of successful recruitment.
Patents arising from research supported by scholarship grants were owned by the
individual academics, according to a 1978 ruling by the Ministry of Education and
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Culture (MOEC). Individual academics therefore sometimes worked with sponsoring
companies with an informal understanding that the companies would take over the
patenting responsibilities along with the rights, with the names of the academics listed as
inventors. Some industrially active professors developed their own individual contract
forms with companies to clarify the conditions of collaboration and so that they could
earn their share of IPR provisions. However, these were strictly informal practices and
were not institutionalized.
Contracted research was another form of contract that existed from the early days, in
which academics conducted research as requested by outside bodies. Intellectual
property rights arising from research funded under such arrangements were to belong
principally to the government. There has also been a system in which industry could
send their researchers to the university to participate in the contracted research. It was in
this context that, in 1983, the Ministry of Education and Culture introduced 'joint
research" as a new format for collaborative contracts in which larger contracts had the
promise of matching government funding. "Joint research" allowed the sharing of any
resulting intellectual ownership between the government and industry, in contrast to the
traditional "Contracted Research", for which the ownership was exclusively with the
government. However, formalized relationships under "Contracted Research" or "Joint
Research" contracts brought in additional bureaucratic problems, such as time-consuming
contracting and line-item budget restrictions, and were unpopular among academics.
Several academics remember being told by the administrators that their projects fitted
into the Joint Research category. They do not appear to have understood the full
implications of the new schemes, or the differences that this represented in comparison
with the other existing schemes. They simply followed the words of the administrators in
preparing the necessary documentation, only to learn that the Joint Research scheme was
also fraught with rigidities in line item budgets, and did not bring in money that was easy
to use. Some academics admit to having reverted to scholarship grants, with informal
"memoranda of understanding" drawn up between the sponsoring companies and
themselves as individuals in order to avoid the problematic rigidities.
In 1987, a new category of industrial support called "Endowed Chairs" was introduced by
the University. It was a variation of scholarship grants and was administered in the same
way, but it could pay for 2-3 visiting professors over a 2-3 year period. The scheme was
proposed by the former Dean of Engineering to bring "liquidity" into the rigid personnel
system in Tokyo University, by enabling the recruitment of external expertise from
abroad and from industry in order to develop new fields needed in the society. Starting
from the first cases which were used to establish new fields for the revamping of the
Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST), the scheme has now
been used in a total of 55 cases by faculties all over the university, 18 of which are still
currently running. Endowed chairs represented unusually large-scale industry donations
with an annual commitment of 200-400,000 dollars (compared with the then norm of
5,000-10,000 dollars for donations normally expected under Scholarship Grants).
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As described in Chapter 4, the proposal met tremendous opposition within campus,
mainly from the political left who saw it as a possible infiltration by corporate interest
into the campus. After debates and modifications, the endowed chair system was made
independent of any influence or connection with the donating company. Indeed, these
endowed chairs are more philanthropic than those in MIT or Cambridge, where chairs are
created in fields relevant to donating companies in order to boost research in their areas
of interest. Endowed chairs in Tokyo usually have little to do with the specialization of
the donating companies. While chaired professors at MIT usually play some role in
maintaining informal relationships with the donating company through exchanging visits,
no such follow ups have been expected or provided in Tokyo University.
Another feature of the Endowed Chairs has been their administrative isolation. The
Endowed Chairs only provided sufficient funding for several positions for a 3-4 year time
horizon, and therefore could be used only for "visiting" professors, and not for regular
academic positions. Since there was no additional university budget allocated for the
Endowed Chairs, visiting professors had either to make do within the limited budget from
the industrial donation or to raise funds themselves. The short-term nature of their tenure
made it difficult for them to establish research programs with graduate students.
Since the mid 1990s, the government has initiated many incremental changes in the rules
about working with industry. For instance, in 1996, there were regulatory changes in
civil service practices to allow academics to work as consultants for technical advisory
activities. In 1998, there were further changes in the civil service regulations to allow
academics to become board members in companies in which their own technology was
being used. As of early 2002, these have been implemented within Tokyo University in
ways which are highly variable across the units. However, the bottom line remains that
"approvals" have to be obtained from the administration up front before academics can
engage in outside activities. Several academics complained that the approval process was
unnecessarily cumbersome, with bureaucratic requirements such as providing detailed
tabulations for their weekly use of time. It is only in a minority of units where academics
appear to get active support in undertaking such activities.
Evolution in organizational structures
The late 1990s were characterized by a rapid change in the organizational structures for
collaboration with industry. In this section, three examples of how these organizational
structures evolved are described: the Center for Collaborative Research (CCR); another
on-going initiative to establish a laboratory dedicated to collaboration with industry;
Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs). These initiatives highlight the gradual manner in
which organizational objectives are developed, and how organizational forms are selected
early and then dictate the course of subsequent organizational development. The manner
in which these organizations evolved provides an interesting contrast to MIT and
Cambridge, particularly with respect to the role of individuals, as will be discussed later.
Center for Collaborative Research (CCR). CCR provides an extreme case in which its
establishment was based on multiple organizational objectives that were not shared
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among the concerned parties. One of the early organizers thought that it would house
collaborative activities at a stage close to commercialization, by providing adequate space
to encourage joint research activities with private companies. Another recollects having
the image of the Media Lab with-its unique draw on industries. Several saw the CCR as
an administrative ploy and an incentive for IIS professors to agree to move from their
centrally located Roppongi campus to a new campus.
The center was started in 1995 with eight "industrially active" professors, who were
selected and seconded from two research institutes, IlS and RCAST. The first center
director, who oversaw the first three years, had a different rationale for the center's
activities - to examine the process of industry-university collaboration in order to
understand the nature of problems. His question was deeply rooted in the concern that
universities in Japan lagged behind many American peers in establishing linkages with
industry. The intention was that the eight professors were to return to their original
institutes in 2-3 years, with fresh people selected; for them, the opportunity to be part of
CCR was like having special status and rewards for being industrially active.
When the second director assumed office in 1999, he took up a new initiative to create a
liaison function through a database of professors and their research activities in UT. The
center's central activity then became to establish a database of the research of UT
professors, which would provide information to facilitate collaboration with interested
companies. The database activities required administrative manpower. Given that new
administrative positions were difficult to claim under the MOES budgeting process, the
Director opted to bring in local government civil servants on secondment and visiting
professors from companies. The role of the eight professors assigned to the center was
again unclear in the light of these new activities, though they began to provide an
effective advisory committee. One interesting outcome was that the academic senate of
the Center, comprising eight academics and six industrialists, became an excellent forum
for informal discussion. Even the most industrially active professors found it interesting
to hear industrialists' comments on the academic research data that were being collected.
The center started as an organizational structure, and not as a place for specific activities,
with its mission handed over through one leader to another, each contributing something
new. There seems to be an underlying assumption that individuals are replaceable.
There were no founding fathers who oversaw the planning and implementation, a typical
process of evolving centers at MIT, nor were there newly hired leaders brought in
specifically to lead the effort as in Cambridge. The two center directors were genuinely
committed to fostering industrial collaboration, and each has left an interesting legacy.
However, they had to work with organizational forms that were forced on them, and had
to work within the time limit to accomplish their own goals. Indeed, when all the
professors, including the director, change every 2-3 years, it is not easy to maintain
consistency of institutional goals. In 2001, with the third Director in place, the center
may again be experiencing a new direction.
Proposed laboratory for collaboration with industry. A similar pattern of gradual
evolution in the early planning days is also evident in the proposed laboratory for
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collaboration with industry. This laboratory was opened in 1999 by the previous
academic administrator, with a view to establishing a new field of engineering that would
examine the process of collaboration. A junior faculty member was appointed as the
temporary head of the lab. What the laboratory mission was going to be or how it was to
operationalize its mandate is still evolving. On the one hand, the former Dean had
aspirations that the laboratory might provide functions similar to those of industrial
liaison. The junior faculty member had to enact the new organizational goals - and he
experimented through working closely with various companies in his area of research and
through developing low-key ties with others working on university-industry relationships
across campus.
One year later, the new academic administrator came into office with somewhat different
ideas about the direction of the center. He has a more explicit vision to study the process
of industry-university collaboration through an examination of 10 or so cases of
collaboration, which has led to the appointment of another professor to head the
laboratory in 2001. Interestingly, everyone seems to agree that the laboratory's mandate
is to create scientific knowledge about the process of collaboration, rather than to
collaborate with industry. The aim is not to undertake specific collaboration projects, but
to study collaboration itself.
There appears to have been a constant discussion with the MOES, with the two
successive academic administrators actively seeking budgetary support from the MOES.
What is interesting is the apparent disconnect between the negotiation with the MOES on
the one hand, and the process of developing the activities, on the other, mainly because
these tend to be conducted by different people. The same disconnect was evident in other
examples where the academics were preparing proposals for the MOES. The negotiation
with the MOES has to do with obtaining resources, most notably for additional positions,
through presenting justifiable goals. However, the MOES appears to have developed
particular and peculiar ways in which plans must be 'justified," perhaps because the
MOES has to then turn around and justify the plan to the Ministry of Finance, who has
the final say in judging what is justifiable. This contrasts sharply with the image of MIT
or Cambridge academics developing proposals, which they would keep submitting until
they find the right sponsor. The meaning of proposal writing is apparently very different.
This is a case representing early days of organizational evolution. Again, there is a
notable absence of "a founding father," though the newly recruited professor may indeed
evolve into one. It also highlights the background "negotiation" that goes on with the
MOBS, that seems to distract, rather than help the process of planning the content of
activities.
Technology Licensing Offices. Relationships with industry in terms of patent licensing
had been insignificant or informal until the late 1990s. As mentioned before, patents
arising from research undertaken with explicit external funding were to accrue to the
university and hence the government, while those arising from research without external
funding were to accrue to individual academics. Licensing income from government
owned patents is still insignificant even at the national level, with a total of 1,142 patents
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producing licensing income of 191 million yen in 1999. There are no official records of
licensing income arising from patents owned by individual academics, since these are
considered private. This latter individual patenting activity became institutionalized
through the establishment of technology licensing organizations in the late 1990s.
In 1998, the first technology licensing office, Center for Advanced Science and
Technology Incubation (CASTI), was established through the initiatives of RCAST
academics. The original idea was developed by two RCAST professors who were
encouraged to come up with innovative proposals for the Ministry of Education, at the
inaugural party of their intellectual property rights laboratory at RCAST. They focused
on ideas that were relevant to their own specialization; one idea was to create an
organization that supported the development of intellectual property rights of academics.
Based on a careful examination of legal options, they proposed to establish a private
company, owned by a small number of academics. The owners were carefully selected
to be non-scientists - to avoid possible criticisms from the civil service commission about
conflicts of interest. However, as the private company became operational, it rapidly had
to expand its base to cover all relevant faculties and institutes within the University. The
original organizational structure, a private company owned by several professors from
one Institute, no longer made sense. A new organizational superstructure to enlist
"ownership" by a greater number of faculty members across UT became necessary. In
other words, three years into its existence, the organization had to re-establish and
reinforce its linkages with the university - another kind of "work-around" for the fact that
the university cannot legally own the company.
In 2000, the Institute of Industrial Science (IIS) announced the establishment of its own
TLO based in its affiliate foundation. Their TLO was apparently to compete against the
RCAST's TLO, which they deemed as illegitimate because of the "external" nature of the
company. They asserted the necessity for a TLO with more concern for technical liaison
activities, deeply embedded within the university. The central administration had to take
a clear stand with respect to these multiple initiatives. Their answer was to accept
diversity in responses, and to endorse multiple and duplicative efforts, particularly in the
light of the imminent future when the overall governance structure of the university is to
be changed.
Interestingly, here again, there was a political undertone with respect to the role of
Ministries. Any new TLOs under the TLO law could win an "approved" status from
MOEC and MITI, and obtain government subsidies. For the competing TLOs, the issue
was not only one to do with the central recognition in a general sense, but a specific
survival issue of obtaining start-up funds.
7-3. Informal local initiatives
The above section has described the most obvious institutional changes in terms of new
types of financial relationships with industry and organizational changes related to
working with industry. These were not the only changes introduced in the university-
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industry relationships. Indeed, even though there are no simple lists or official records, a
number of local initiatives have been undertaken by individual academics, leading to
different types of relationships with industry. In most cases, they remained one-shot
activities which were not sustained, or have not yet become institutionalized. In other
words, these are one-off and local institutional changes for which local practices and
behavior patterns may be changed for a period of time, but may not be sustained or
replicated over time or across space. In this section, I discuss such initiatives to
understand how and what kind of local institutional changes took place, and why they did
not become institutionalized in wider settings. I do this through the examination of three
types of initiatives for change: working with individual companies; working with
multiple companies; and administrative infrastructure.
Working with single companies. There have been relatively few visible cases in which
professors have worked with individual companies on large projects in the University of
Tokyo. A more common collaboration model has been that of a professor working with
multiple companies for pre-competitive research. Deeper relationships with individual
companies that have led to commercialization have been relatively rare, partly because of
the academic resistance to getting too close to individual companies, but partly because
the sponsoring companies want to appear fair and equitable in their relationships with
academics.
Nevertheless, there have been cases in the 1990s in which Tokyo University took an
initiative to solicit significant support and collaboration with individual companies. The
first, in 1992, was a research project with an electronics giant, Company A, initiated by
the then President of the University. The second case was a project in 1998, again with a
major electronics manufacturer, Company B, initiated by the Director of the Center for
Collaboration Research (CCR). This section examines each of these cases to clarify the
origin of the relationships; the obstacles faced by the relationships; and the outcomes,
including discussions as to what became institutionalized.
In 1992, the then President of Tokyo University came to an agreement with a senior
corporate executive of an electronics giant to implement a collaborative project. This
was an unusual event, prompted by the President whose platform was to rescue Tokyo
University from further infrastructure decline following the budget tightening during the
1980s. Various options were discussed including the possibility of setting up an
international research center. However, fear of negative publicity that could result from a
large corporate presence on campus was a constraint. Eventually, the idea of
collaborative projects was introduced to engineering professors through the Dean of
Engineering, who solicited specific proposals from the academics. One such proposal
ended up as an international tripartite collaboration between Tokyo, Cambridge, and the
company, involving annual support of the order of 400,000 US dollars , which was
unusually large for corporate support at the time.
The project implementation experience amply demonstrates the negative role played by
administrative support. Administrators were keen to make this project a flagship
international collaboration project under the Joint Research Scheme, and Cambridge was
199
duly selected as a foreign partner. The use of the Joint Research Scheme also required
the foreign partner, Cambridge University, to become a "sponsor" to Tokyo University,
since it was designed as a contractual device between the university and a sponsoring
organization. It must have been quite a vexing experience for Cambridge researchers
first to be approached for collaborative work and then to be asked to pay. In the end, a
portion of the corporate support for Tokyo University was channeled through Cambridge
to satisfy this administrative requirement.
Another issue arose regarding a patent that was filed in Cambridge under Cambridge's
name. The filing process was undertaken in a hurry with an oral understanding that the
ownership would be worked out later. While it has been sorted out between the company
and Cambridge, the company has not been able to negotiate with Tokyo University,
apparently because administrators were reluctant to deal with such messy irregularities
that were not supposed to have happened in the first place.
The project proceeded, based on two separate collaborative relationships: Company A
and the University of Tokyo which remained at arms lengths throughout the period, on
one hand, and Company A and Cambridge University becoming increasingly
collaborative with each other. The relationship with the University of Tokyo was readily
terminated when money became tighter owing to the deepening recession in 1997. The
relationship with Cambridge, on the other hand, survived for several more years, albeit
much diminished in scale as the recession deepened in Japan, squeezing R&D budgets for
many manufacturers.
The difference in survival between the two relationships may reflect the fact that there
was a fortuitous match in the research agenda between Company A and Cambridge.
There are, however, other differences between the two relationships that are likely to
have contributed to the difference in survival times. For one thing, the relationship with
Cambridge appears to have started with more active demands by Cambridge about the
nature of collaboration. Cambridge academics were initially reluctant to collaborate until
they saw clear areas of common interest. Even after they began collaboration, they did
not shy away from voicing their discontent, when they felt that the Company was
demanding too much from them. The other side of the coin is that the company
expectations in the two collaborations appeared to have been different from the outset.
The company was willing to provide financial resources to the University of Tokyo,
almost on philanthropic principles, while their contribution to Cambridge was motivated
more directly by their research activities, as they had initially hoped to establish a
research center there.
The second initiative was in 1998, when the then Director of the newly established CCR
decided to develop a model case of collaboration with an individual company. At the
time, the most common collaboration model was that of a professor working with
multiple companies for "pre-competitive" research in which technological issues were
sufficiently generic. Deeper relationships with individual companies were rare. The
director's intention was to experiment with an "American type collaboration" within the
Japanese cultural and regulatory context.
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Detailed discussions and examinations of options with an interested electronics company
led ultimately to the formation of a virtual laboratory, in which three UT professors were
to work with the company. However, none of the contract forms that the university could
offer was acceptable to the company, mainly because of the requirement that the resulting
intellectual property rights were to be owned by or co-owned with the government.
Government ownership was not acceptable to the company because the government has
little capacity to engage in negotiations about the subsequent use of its patents, which
makes co-ownership particularly cumbersome and unwieldy for companies. Final
agreement was only reached when the three faculty members agreed to consult for the
company. Under such an agreement, the project became the private activities of
participating professors rather than an official university activity with the university itself
playing a minimum role beyond providing clearance for the individual faculty members
to consult.
What do these two cases show? First, they appear to indicate a gradual change in the
shared values on campus about university-industry relationships. Compared with the late
1980s, when industrial collaboration was seen as negative, by 1992, joint research
activities could be undertaken more neutrally, and in 1998 individual collaborations were
actively sought. Even now, one of the academics who consulted for Company B still
admitted that he did not like to discuss his consulting ties publicly. The tradition of
isolated civil servant academics as a legacy of the war and of student unrest remains slow
to change.
A second interesting feature is the negative role of the university administration. The
first project experienced a series of confusions related to administrative complications.
With the second project, the original designers abandoned the idea of working within the
formal university structures early, and the project became virtual and external to the
university administration.
Third, these cases are surprisingly unknown among other academics within the
University. The first project was a flagship project for one of the research centers at the
University, and yet, the current director of the center knows only vaguely of its existence
and little about its substance, only 3 years after the project ended. The lack of
institutional memory is partly the result of the short tenure of center directors, which is
typically 2 years. It may also be due to the lack of any established medium through
which information about projects can be disseminated within the campus, which in turn
perhaps reflects the shared values about academics doing their own thing without heeding
others. The second project has been used as an interesting example, for instance, in a
public forum to discuss university-industry relationships, and is known among some
faculty within the organizational unit where it took place. There were also newspaper
articles written about the projects. Even then, the project is little known outside a small
circle, perhaps because the participating professors are less prone to discuss their
consulting activities openly, and perhaps because the director of CCR who first initiated
the relationships has since left the job.
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Relationships with multiple companies. There are more numerous examples of faculty
members who have worked with multiple companies. It is not easy to say exactly when
were the earliest examples of such activities. One source of ideas for working with
multiple companies may be the prevalence of MITI-sponsored national projects, in which
multiple industrial giants as well as academics from many universities joined forces to
work together. Indeed, the goal of obtaining national project status, with massive
government funding, was often lurking in the discussion when founding academics talked
about their consortia projects.
The earliest examples that I could find dated back to the mid-80s, during which several
projects were funded by the government that involved multiple companies. In the late
1980s, there was a rise of consortia funded solely by companies. One such case was a
consortium initiated by a young academic in 1989 with annual membership of 50,000 US
dollars involving about a dozen companies. Another one was started in 1990 by an older
academic with an annual membership fee of 20,000 dollars with each of 30 companies.
These were considered expensive, compared with the standard rate of Scholarship Grants
at 5-10,000 dollars.
Interestingly, both academics recount stories of their struggle in negotiating the
appropriate price. The senior academic's original aspiration was to collect 200,000
dollars each from 5 companies. Corporate sponsors persuaded him that it was not in his
interest to demand so much, because such a high price will inevitably raise corporate
demands for tangible returns. "I suppose I was taken aback," he said, but he backed
down to a figure of 20,000 dollars. The junior academic also faced a difficult corporate
audience who were saying that 5,000 dollars was the standard donation that junior
academics such as himself could legitimately expect. Infuriated that companies were
treating all academics and their research work alike, the junior academic stuck to his
proposal and decided to work only with companies who were willing to commit
significant resources as a result of their active interest in his research.
The resulting patterns of collaboration went along two separate trajectories. The young
academic had to work hard to satisfy his corporate sponsors, starting from the creation of
a detailed memorandum of understanding to clarify the conditions related to patent
ownership, confidentiality and publication rights. He also obtained many more inputs
from the companies, in the form of visiting researchers, equipment, and technical know
how to support the research. The consortium rested on a high level of industrial
participation. The senior academic managed the resources to encourage university
researchers from all over Japan to focus on research in a given field of industrial
relevance. It had less industrial involvement and the number of supporting companies
declined over the years as the recession deepened. Another academic who closely
observed the activities of the latter consortium remarked that if the price had been kept
high, perhaps companies would have voiced their views more actively, leading to more
solid collaboration. What these examples demonstrate is the fact that price can reflect the
level of industrial commitment: the higher the price the more serious companies may be.
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Though there are no official records, individual accounts indicate that the incidence of
multiple company activities accelerated in the second half of the 1990s. Another
consortium was started in the mid 1990s by a senior academic in collaboration with
academics from other universities, with about 11 companies paying 100,000 dollars each.
This consortium had the participation of academics from multiple universities, and
contributed significantly to better understanding of who was doing what kind of research
within the field. It was also carefully structured to ensure industry participation through
their presence in the operating committees and their on-going evaluation of the research
activities. Two junior academics, as well as an industrialist who participated in the
consortium, felt that while honest effort was made by the organizers to engage
industrialists, industrial involvement fell short of expectations, partly because their
participation was formal and pro-forma, rather than informal and active. One view was
that the amount of resources available was too small to produce any significant research;
another was that formal rules and structures made it harder for honest dialogue to take
place.
Another characteristic of this consortium was that the administrative function was out-
sourced to an outside non-profit body. This was because it was not easy to find a
mechanism for collecting membership fees and distributing funds across laboratories and
universities using the university administration. While research agenda as well as the
amounts to be allocated were established through the consortium structure, which heavily
relied upon leading academics within the University of Tokyo, the actual money was
collected by the outside body and distributed in the form of scholarship grants to
designated academics. This tendency to bypass university administration appears to have
become a definite trend. Three other consortia founded in the late 1990s each used
outside bodies to administer the finances. It was not only the isolated initiatives of
individual academics that took such an option; initiatives with significant University
support also resorted to such external administrative mechanisms, as will be seen in the
examples in the next section.
One common way of avoiding the internal administration has been to use an affiliate
body. Indeed, most faculties and institutes in Tokyo University have legally autonomous
affiliate bodies, whose links to the university are manifested through individual
academics working on their boards, and through the location of their offices being inside
the campus. They are subject to MOES supervision, as MOES has the authority to sign
off their continued existence. Interestingly, because their legal statutes do not officially
state their affiliation to Tokyo University, they can come under MOBS pressure to extend
the scope of their activities to work with other universities - not just Tokyo University.
There are some concerns about the legitimacy of such external options. One academic
jokingly referred to it as "money laundering." Another academic openly speculated about
the legality of such arrangements, since the use of these affiliates would allow them to
avoid the overhead that the government charges to universities on externally funded
projects1 . Yet another made it a point always to be talking openly about everything and
Because national universities are an integral part of the central Ministry, a portion of the overhead is
retained by the Ministry.
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trying to generate newspaper articles, so that the sense of secret dealings could be
avoided.
The rationale given by the organizers for resorting to external bodies is to avoid the red
tape associated with the normal finance administration within the university. As the legal
autonomy of universities from the government develops, these external administrative
arrangements are increasingly seen as a stop gap device while they await larger changes
in the administration itself.
7-4. Characterizing the institutional change
How can the institutional change in Tokyo be characterized? Clearly there is a difference
between new patterns of behavior that get sustained over time, and replicated across
space; and those that remain as a local initiative, with a limited lifetime. By and large,
the former include formal initiatives introduced purposefully at the system level with the
active involvement of the Ministry and its university administrators, and the latter include
those informal initiatives started by individual academics. There are some exceptional
cases, however, in which changes were introduced through local initiatives and were built
around individuals who actively sought them, but which subsequently managed to win a
more permanent status. The question is what differentiates the paths between those local
initiatives that remain local, and those that manage to win a wider and/or more permanent
status? Another question concerns what these changes mean in terms of the depth of
relationships between academics and industrialists.
In this section, I first revisit the meaning of formality. I then turn to several breakthrough
cases where a greater stability and permanent status were achieved for their activities
with or without formality. Finally, I discuss the nature of engagement between
academics and industrialists.
Formality vs. informality. The examples of the initiatives show that there are three
types of actors involved: academics, academic administrators, and professional
administrators. In all of the formal initiatives, administrators were active, most notably
Ministry and university professional administrators, as they handled changes in
government financial or personnel practices. What is interesting is that these changes
were mostly designed from the beginning to be applicable system-wide and by definition
to be "institutionalized" within the national university system. In no cases, were these
changes introduced as a result of a specific need expressed by individual academics.
On the other hand, informal and local initiatives arose from individual academics who
were interested in undertaking specific activities with industry support. Most of these fell
short of influencing University-wide mechanisms, though some do appear to have won a
more permanent status than others. This provides an interesting contrast to the more
evolutionary changes in the other two universities as have been shown in Chapters 5 and
6. At both MIT' and Cambridge, initiatives led by individual academics often did lead to
institutional changes over time.
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In other words, Tokyo University appears to represent an interesting case of separation
between initiatives undertaken by administrators that are motivated by an explicit desire
to change the forms of collaboration, and other initiatives that are motivated by activity
content, typically led by individual academics. The contrast between the two types of
institutional change may be a result of different institutional logics at work. The logic of
institutional change in Tokyo University may be provided by the government, which
introduces changes at a programmatic level with the intention of being applicable
uniformly to all beneficiaries in order to maintain fairness and impartiality - as a result of
the supra-centralized system with the Ministry at an apex. On the other hand, at the other
two universities, both of which are in effect private, the logic dominating the changes
may be professional rather than governmental, in which individual excellence, expertise
and skill may be more dominant than any concern about equity or fairness across the
system.
There appears to be one distinct trend among local initiatives within Tokyo University: to
obtain administrative assistance from external bodies. In other words, the university
administration appears to play less and less of a role as a secretariat for such activities.
This is largely a result of the initiators' desire to avoid red tape within the University
administration. By the same token, however, their informal status with respect to
university administration makes the activities much less directly visible to the rest of the
university. Many initiatives remain isolated and unnoticed, and do not readily come into
the organizational limelight. Even those initiatives that are backed from the outset by
organizational leaders such as presidents and deans are not necessarily institutionalized in
a formal sense. They do not become an organizational template for later activities.
Breaking through. While formal initiatives appeared to be better known than the
informal ones around the university, they did not necessarily produce stability in terms of
the content activities. Interestingly, there is a distinct group of initiatives that has won a
more stable status than the others, irrespective of whether they were formal or informal
initiatives. I describe below four examples.
Two of these examples are "hybrid" in the level of formality: they were initiatives
undertaken by academic administrators, but with little support from professional
administrators inside the university. The third example is one of the TLOs, which was
initiated as a formally discussed initiative, but grew external to the university, winning in
the process, a certain coherence of its activities. Fourth is an informal initiative, where
the founding academic stabilized the relationships and activities through establishing a
non-profit organization outside to support his activities. In each of the four cases, one
cannot help noticing an extra-ordinary passion and commitment of at least one individual,
whose sense of direction guided the subsequent developments.
One hybrid initiative that won a more permanent status is the Alliance of Global
Sustainability (AGS), which was the initiative of the then President of Tokyo University
to work with MIT and the Institute of Technology in Switzerland. The former president
explains that "environmental issues were something that I cared about." Such a statement
understates his personal commitment to the cause. Indeed it was he who had been
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instrumental in proposing to create the "Research into Artifacts Center for Engineering
(RACE)" in 1992. The underlying concept at the time was articulated as follows:
"The motivation of this research program comes from the irrevocable consequences on
our finite planet caused by the interactions among artifacts. These often lead to
unprecedented environmental changes and major accidents. When we think about the
fact that these artifacts were created through human knowledge, it is clear that we need to
re-think the structure and implementation of knowledge that created these artifacts in the
first place. The objective of RACE is to establish a new academic discipline for the
design and manufacturing of artifacts, and to clarify the use and recycling of the
manufactured artifacts."
The former President actively solicited participation of several engineering faculty
members in its first meeting in January 1994 in Boston, who in turn became the core
members who actively created the network of professors. There already was another
inter-faculty community among Tokyo academics with environmental concerns, which
was helpful in mustering people power in support of the AGS. However, it was not until
a larger conference was held in Tokyo in 1996 that a discussion about a formal tri-partite
agreement started. The organizers at Tokyo University recall how difficult it was for
them to host the meeting, with little budget or other support. They made extensive use of
campus facilities, which was not a simple task, because there were few administrative
precedents. The then president explains the administrative difficulty in terms of another
event that took place shortly before the AGS conference, where he had to work actively
with administrators to use Yasuda Hall, the biggest lecture hall in Tokyo University. The
point is that the administrative norm was that a major facility such as the Yasuda Hall
was used only for specific and recurrent annual events. One professor felt that it was the
success of the Tokyo meeting that helped demonstrate Tokyo's commitment to the other
two universities.
Even to enter into an agreement was not easy for Tokyo University as it had no legal
authority, nor the budgetary resources to commit. They managed to do so through two
separate agreements similar to the format they used for academic exchange with other
universities. For monetary support, the only option was to raise money from corporate
donors. With the full support of the President, the organizers managed to raise about
700,000 US dollars annually for the AGS research fund to support research activities.
This is rare internal funding open to proposals from individual faculty members at Tokyo
University. Though company participation was initially limited to financial support,
they became more active participants in annual conferences.
One organizer recalls how difficult it was to use the internal university administration.
For instance, they found it difficult to channel foreign source money into the university or
to keep financial records in the manner required by the international agreement. In the
end, they decided to use an external foundation affiliated to the faculty of Engineering for
administering money. AGS is currently in its 7 th year of implementation, with the second
5-year plan agreed in January 2002. The organizers feel proud of their success as
expressed by increasing numbers of participants - including a large number of students.
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One organizer remarked how essential it had been to have had the President's
commitment. Indeed, if it were not for his support and willingness to break new ground,
many of the above steps would not have been taken.
1998, the Institute of Industrial Science (IIS) introduced a new mechanism called the
Special Research Committees, for which individual academics invited multiple
companies to become members for a given research topic. This is a case in which
individual Committees may come and go, but the Committee structure remains stable
over time. This is an unusual case in several respects. First, it is an unusual case of
"institutionalization" where a new scheme was introduced top-down, but with bottom-up
inputs. Several members of US who were already actively working with multiple
companies were asked to start "model" Committees, including the junior academic
mentioned above who was the first within the institute to start working with multiple
companies. As a result, one professor started a new Committee. Another folded an on-
going activity into the new structure, only to find that the lack of contractual clarity of the
Special Research Committee was not suitable for undertaking extensive collaborative
activities.
The scheme is administratively supported through a foundation, the Industrial
Productivity Promotion Society, which is an independent legal body affiliated to IIS. As
with other cases, the nature of "affiliation" is somewhat informal. The foundation has no
"legal" link with Tokyo University, but is informally "linked" to IIS through the practice
of US Directors serving as its chairs, and through its location within IlS. It has
corporate members who pay small annual dues to receive information about IlS related
matters, such as its annual reports and event announcements. It was therefore in a good
position to advertise the scheme and to solicit new members to participate in this new
scheme. It is not easy to trace the origin of the Special Research Committees. The
administrators refer to them as an initiative of the Director of the Institute, who had been
a core member of a group of reform-minded junior professors who actively debated the
need for new approaches within US since the 1970s. The original design of the Special
Research Committee dates back a while, where the stated objective was to raise the
corporate commitments for scholarship grants. Before the current Director took office,
however, his predecessors did not buy into the idea. So, it was only after he assumed
office that the idea could be implemented. His commitment to working with industry is
clear from the time he was responsible for an external review of US by a panel of
industrialists in 199-, an unusually thorough event that led to a follow up meeting to
ensure lessons were being learned effectively.
The Special Research Committees rapidly increased in number, and by 2001 there were
21 of them with about 200 members. However, in contrast to some of the original
consortia activities in which tight collaborations had taken place, many of them appear to
be operating more loosely to facilitate conversations rather than solid collaborations.
Interestingly, even though the Foundation provides administrative support to these
Committees, the administrators there are not familiar with the nature or content of their
activities.
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The third example was the TLO which was established as a private company. As
described above, two professors were asked to come up with "an interesting proposal" on
university-industry relationships by the Ministry, and developed a plan to create such a
company. It is interesting that they considered the possibility of using existing "sleeping
affiliate bodies," but then decided against such an option on the basis that it would be too
complicated to change the existing organizations. Perhaps, the proposing professors had
too little power to do what the UT president or 11S Director was capable of doing: to
demand a change top-down.
The initial years were fraught with difficulties, particularly in finding the right expertise
to head the company. However, the founding faculty kept trying until he found a new
president, who had considerable expertise in technology transfer as he had worked
closely with a Guru from Stanford. While it is too early to assess the overall
performance, the company has won a certain senior status among its peer TLOs, and is
well on track in calibrating its organizational positions. The changes introduced by the
new president included de-emphasizing the corporate membership structure, which
provided undesirable restrictions for their marketing possibilities, and developing tighter
linkages with the broader Tokyo University community through formalized
representation of key individuals ex-officio.
Behind the story of this TLO appear to be two individuals who had considerable stakes in
making it a success. One was a law professor, who strongly believed that law as an
academic discipline should be reformed so that it was useful to the society. Intellectual
property rights represented a topic of critical importance in his ambition, and the TLO
was indeed an instrument through which he could accomplish his mission. The other
was the new President who came into office with considerable work experience in
services to support graduate recruitment from universities. The experience of thinking
about personnel issues from early on in his career made him think hard about his own
core competencies. He concluded that technology transfer, which had been his
undergraduate thesis topic, was the area in which he wanted to become an expert. He had
entered an internal company competition for business ideas, won it with his proposal to
start technology transfer activities from universities, and was eventually given a
responsibility to head an experimental unit to this end. He traveled extensively to the US,
a country which he thought was ahead in technology transfer, and managed to get one of
the experts to work for him as a consultant. When he was asked to join the TLO, he was
ready for the task.
The fourth example was a case of a group of professors who created a non-profit
organization to serve as the secretariat for their activities. The original idea was
developed by one professor, who had left a large corporate research laboratory to join
another university (and joined Tokyo University later), in search of greater freedom to
conduct research in an area of his own choice. He remembers his days at the corporate
laboratory with some anger against the inflexible bosses who did not see what he saw and
who were unwilling to take risks. He was already passionate about the area of his current
research as early as 1991, when he was interviewed by a magazine reporter. The reporter
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noted that the moment he started to talk about this area of research, his attitude changed
dramatically, from one of subdued intellect to passion.
If it wete not for his perseverance, red tape would have prevented him from creating the
non-profit organization. The group now has regular meetings and activities supported by
the organization.
Institutionalized low engagement. An important characteristic of these cases is that
there appear to be fewer inputs and less engagement on the part of companies than in
either Cambridge or MIT. While there is a tradition of industrial researchers attending
UT as visiting researchers or students, there is no evidence of these visitors playing any
significant research role on topics specific to their company's interest. Industrialists
appear more to play the role of an audience rather than be active participants in consortia
settings. There is little evidence of companies bringing corporate technology onto
campus in the form of hardware - although there are a few exceptional cases. Efforts
made by individual academics to reach deeper relationships get rebuffed by companies
either on the grounds of inadequate contractual conditions or more generally by the
culture of non-interaction.
This is not to say there are no instances of deep engagement. There are several examples
of consortia in which companies invested significantly in terms of employee time to work
together with the academics. The monetary contribution may be minor in comparison
with the contributions expected in consortia in MIT. However, these contributing
companies brought much to the experiment both in kind (through equipment) as well as
in staff involvement, with one consortium where each company sent two staff for a whole
month each year. There are other cases of individual academics who have managed to
sustain deep relationships with companies. One professor maintained unusually close ties
with companies through a network of alumni from his laboratory, who met on a regular
basis to discuss his research agenda. At one point, their comments prompted the same
professor to revamp his research portfolio, to make it more updated and relevant to
modem industrial needs. However, these appear to be isolated exceptions, rather than
the norm.
7-5. Organizational underpinnings that shape institutional change
The above cases have highlighted some of the difficulties academics face in getting
industry engaged, and the evolution of initiative objectives that often resulted in
incoherence with the organizational structures. How can these characteristics be
explained? In this section, I make two arguments. First, I argue that the sharply defined
organizational boundary has had a strong influence on the way initiatives could develop.
Second, I argue that the way the administrative infrastructure is organized, with weak
central administration, weak professional administrators, and the very limited extent to
which money functions as a medium of exchange, all contributed to difficulties for these
local initiatives to become diffused or be sustained over time.
Organizational boundaries
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Tokyo University has long been characterized by sharp organizational boundaries, in
terms of people, knowledge and physical space. In the late 1990s, there have been rapid
changes in all these boundaries, with them becoming more porous and more open. In this
section, I first describe the traditional boundary conditions before the change, and then
describe the nature of the changes taking place.
People boundary. The organizational boundary in terms of people's ability to move
across it was sharply defined first of all by a highly decentralized personnel decision
making processes. In the old system, the individual professor could essentially select his
successor from among his students, appoint one into the position of lecturer or assistant
professor within his Koza, and expect him to take over when he retired. While the Koza
system is now largely the product of the past, with larger groups similar to departments
emerging and with recruitment increasingly advertised openly, the legacy of the past
remains in the minds of existing staff as well as in some of the values that are hard to
change.
This old system created two types of barriers to the people traffic. First, it was difficult
for anybody to be recruited who had an unconventional background, including those from
industry. Second, the collective distribution of expertise was designed not to change over
time, thereby creating higher boundaries for those in new fields. One junior professor
laments that there is a large gap between the distribution of expertise in Tokyo University
and the distribution of needed skills in the society. Another remarks that it is scary that
the same field structure has been kept for over 40 years. In new fields such as
information technology, the problem has been particularly acute. One professor who
helped created the new faculty of IT pointed out that even with the new organization,
Tokyo can house 100 IT students compared with 1600 at MIT. When juxtaposed against
the societal skills shortage, this seems particularly ironic.
The hard people boundary was reinforced both by the culture of isolation and the civil
service ban on undertaking consulting activities. University professors expect to be
treated with respect and industrialists are not supposed to argue with them. Even today,
five years after the revision of civil service regulations to permit technical consulting,
there is little culture of openly discussing such activities. One professor who experienced
consulting for the first time was surprised to learn about the technical know how of the
company. Another professor who became involved in spin-off activities expressed his
surprise as to how much had been hidden behind the corporate curtains. Even the very
industrially active professors who are gathered around the CCR are finding the forum of
the CCR senate interesting because of the large presence of visiting professors from
industry. There may still be much that is hidden from the daily lives of Tokyo university
professors.
Knowledge boundary. The organizational boundary in terms of knowledge ownership
is impenetrable because of the government's position. All patent ownership and user
right conditions are automatically set according to the source of funding at the time of
contracting. Even though an invention committee, which plays the role of delineating
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government versus individual ownership, does so with considerable bias toward
individual ownership, companies still do not feel sufficiently protected unless their
ownership is stipulated up front in their contracts.
As described above, one company opted to take the route of virtual collaboration through
consulting when it became clear that joint ownership of patents was unavoidable under
any other form of formal collaboration. The problem was not so much the fact that they
could not claim the entire ownership, but the fact that the government was such an
unwieldy partner for negotiation. The lack of negotiation capabilities on the part of the
government is amply demonstrated by the case of one company awaiting Tokyo
University's decision on past patent disputes on ownership for several years.
Administrators in Tokyo University are clearly not equipped to handle these issues.
These formal boundaries co-exist with informal ones that are created by individual
academics who often develop informal understandings and agreements about
confidentiality, publication, and intellectual property rights with their collaborating
companies. Since patents arising from basic research support are owned by individual
academics, professors could obtain scholarship grants from companies, on one hand, and
develop informal agreements about IPR on the other.
Physical boundary. The physical organizational boundary has also been sharply defined
and has divided the university community from industry in two senses. No company can
claim space inside the university premises and no university professor can claim space in
a company. Tokyo University campuses are also located in the midst of the urban areas
of Tokyo where there is limited space for industry in the immediate vicinity.
Evolution in boundaries. Starting in the late 1990s, there have been rapid changes in all
these boundaries, and they are all becoming more porous. On the people boundary, there
are more industrialist researchers being recruited into professorial positions. Consulting
and serving as board members in technology transfer activities have become permissible
through regulatory changes in 1997 and 2000. A greater number of visiting
professorships have allowed more industry researchers to enter the university.
The creation of the TLO has led to a greater institutional capacity to examine and
negotiate terms and conditions of patenting and licensing systematically. Whereas in the
past, negotiation rested exclusively on the individual caliber of professors, they now have
professional resources to whom they can resort for advice and transaction.
For physical boundaries, greater allowances have been made for industrial research as
well as non-governmental licensing activities to take place on campus through regulatory
changes.
What is striking in Tokyo University is just how many of their boundaries are governed
directly by the central government, and how little is managed internally by the university.
This is perhaps the most striking difference between Tokyo University, as part of the
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central government, and Cambridge or MIT both of which essentially operate as private
universities, albeit with heavy government funding.
Internal boundaries
The internal boundaries are less visible but as pervasive as the external ones.
Interestingly, the academics at Tokyo University seem to be acutely aware about the need
to cross-disciplinary boundaries. There have been several major organizational additions
in the recent past precisely to address this issue: the Faculty of New Disciplines; the
Faculty of Information Science; and the inter-departmental group on information. These
perhaps reflect strong boundaries that existed in the past, not only between faculties, but
between divisions (senko). A division typically comprises 6-7 Kozas or 20 professors and
is the smallest professorial group with decision-making capability. While they rarely
make decisions other than to maintain the status quo, they are important units when it
comes to the survival of a given field. They are fiercely protective of the number of
positions in the division - presumably because it is one of the most scarce resources.
There also appear to be invisible barriers between senior and junior academics. Some
junior academics had comments about their joint work with senior academics that they
would not be prepared to voice face to face. Senior academics often made comments
about and to "junior" academics in a way that made it clear that they thought of them as
being "junior" and that indicated a lack of respect for their opinion. The Japanese
linguistic tradition of referring to anybody who is either a "peer" or a "junior" using
"kun" instead of "san" or "sensei (teacher)"also makes this division an important part of
everyday life.
Academics are also very conscious of their "cohort" - and about who joined before or
after them. Although there is a significant variation among divisions even within a single
faculty, the power of senior professors used to be absolute (until recently) with it being
necessary to obtain their unanimous agreement for anyone to be promoted to a
professorship. One junior professor recollects that it used to be the case that they needed
to make sure they made no enemies among the professors around them, lest their
promotion be blocked. Junior professors also often depend critically on the good will of
their patron senior professors to be able to establish their laboratories at the beginning of
their career. This is in contrast to MIT where junior faculty often have seed money as
part of their starting package to set up their labs.
How does administration relate to such internal boundaries? The role of administrators
appears to constitute the most pronounced difference between Tokyo University and MIT
or Cambridge. Professional administrators form a very different population within the
university from the academics. They are themselves divided into three layers: those who
are locally hired and employed; those who started as university employees but were then
promoted into a managerial cadre who rotate among the national universities; and those
who are MOEC career civil servants who are posted to term assignments in managerial
positions. Most administrators rotate and change positions on a regular basis - every two
years, if not more frequently - and so they rarely become experts in the area they serve.
Frequent rotations are justified in two ways: to avoid stagnation or the concentration of
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power which might lead to corruption and collusion; and to give individuals a fair chance
of promotion. While they pride themselves in their service activities, they rarely come
with specialist qualifications. Most of the managers have bachelor's degrees and
generalist career paths, in striking contrast to many administrators who come with
research qualifications and background both in MIT and in Cambridge.
Academic administrators exist, but only partially, in the sense that the academics hold
these positions as temporary diversion from their main research work. They rotate in and
out quickly from these offices, based on strong beliefs among the academics themselves,
that having people in these positions longer could lead to micro-management and
impingement on their freedom.
As seen in MIT and Cambridge, the administrative infrastructure can provide important
mechanisms to manage and modify the organizational boundaries by changing the
practices that affect them. Policies on outside activities may be changed, or stances on
intellectual property rights may be revised. What is striking in the University of Tokyo is
that there is no administrative infrastructure that is authorized to make such changes at
the level of the university. The organizational boundary is not only relatively harshly
defined at the outset, but it is also not changeable at the organizational level. This leads
to a forbidding and rigid institutional environment that constrains new initiatives.
Another differing characteristic is that, in the University of Tokyo, money is hardly
fungible within the organization. Each stream of budgetary resources comes with its own
strings attached, and even with recent rounds of deregulation, different categories of
monetary resources continue to have distinct identities, although some types of money
such as Scholarship Grants have long been more fungible than others. Further, some
types of expenditure items, such as post docs or research students could not be freely
"bought" with most of the monetary resources. Money arising from outside has clearly
been a weak medium of exchange for research activities. This has led to an interesting
consequence: when the money works less well as a medium of exchange, the demand for
it is not as high. This is in striking contrast to MIT, where monetary resources earned by
academics can help hire students and post docs, and go some way to influencing space
allocation.
7-6. Degrees of institutionalization: the role of individuals
In Tokyo, formal and informal initiatives were dramatically different not only in their
visibility but also in their sustainability and replicability. Formal initiatives were
programmatically designed for replication or entailed establishment of new
organizational structures which were expected to be sustained for a long time. The
expected duration was often part of the formal design, and those "schemes" that were
supposed to last lasted, while others such as endowed laboratories which were designed
to last about 3 years, typically lasted exactly that, with only minor exceptions. Informal
initiatives on the other hand, tended to remain isolated and invisible and while some
lasted longer than others, they were rarely replicated.
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Two factors appear to characterize these patterns of institutionalization in Tokyo: the role
of founding fathers, that has a different feel in Tokyo from that in MIT or Cambridge;
and the frequency and nature of debates that appear to take place around these initiatives.
Getting started: founding fathers. There were two types of founding fathers. The first
type was academic administrators who would develop these visible and formal
programmatic initiatives such as endowed laboratories, special research committees or
formal organizational structures such as the Center for Collaboration Research. These
founding fathers established the structure, rather than the content of activities. The
second type was similar to those found in MIT and Cambridge: individuals developing
initiatives with specific activity contents.
The founding fathers of programmatic initiatives of formal organizational structures were
academic administrators who were given the task to do so. Interestingly they appeared to
have had more debates with professional administrators within the university and at the
Ministry than with other academics or industrialists. The academics who were engaged
in the specific and first endowed laboratories, or those who started the first research
committees, never appeared to have strong commitment to the initiatives, as they were
brought in by the academic administrators to set them up. These were top-down
initiatives. Similarly, for the Center for Collaboration Research as well as the other
evolving laboratory, the central rationale for their existence, in terms of the specific role
that they were to play, changed continuously as there were no founding fathers who
stayed with the initiative for a sustained period.
It is not that the traditional type of founding fathers were absent in Tokyo. Most of the
"informal" initiatives were developed by individuals with active interest, and indeed
some of these appeared to "break through" into the realm of formality, winning visibility
and certain permanence. And yet, not many of these individuals explained their
motivation in the interviews, (although younger academics were more vocal than senior
academics). For those who were reticent, their motives could be inferred only indirectly
through other people close to them, or by learning about what they did over time through
other sources of information. For instance, the industrialist-turned academic, who
founded a non-profit organization outside the University, explained his current activities
at the University in terms of how he can now do what he wanted but was not permitted to
do in an industrial context. That was a comment that he made in passing, but not as a
purposive explanation for what he was doing. It was only when I read one article from
his former company magazine a decade ago, that I became aware of how serious his
passion for the topic had been and for how long. The article was about a major research
project the academic was responsible for, but included one tiny paragraph about his small
pet project, where the reporter noted that the academic became passionate.
The former president of Tokyo University, who founded the Alliance for Global
Sustainability (AGS) is described by an MIT professor as a "renaissance man," and is
indeed known for his romantic vision for engineering. He argued that the traditional field
of engineering failed in that it only helped individual industrial interest - and the
technologies created to serve industrial interests were exactly those that destroyed the
214
environment. He argues that the discipline of engineering must be re-constructed so that
broader human needs are taken into account. However, those explanations for his
motivation and philosophy are not given by him directly. They are provided by those who
are close to him. Archival sources, such as reports from the laboratory he created or from
AGS meetings that he participated in, give evidence of his words from the past, which
resonate with the image of a man who progressively developed that philosophy. His
philosophy lives today - but interestingly, in the words of academics a generation
younger, his philosophy now sounds less convincing. A senior faculty would refer to the
philosophy respectfully, but a younger faculty is more likely to paraphrase somewhat
mockingly "according to the great master."
Getting both sides engaged. Initiatives tended to cluster into two camps: those with
distinctly arm's length relationships, and those with close relationships. There seemed to
be two principal routes through which closeness could be attained: active and open
discussions between academics and industrialists; and the past industrial experience of
the academics. Close relationships appeared to be based upon trust relationships between
the founding academic and key industrialists. One academic who maintains several close
relationships with industry noted that one thing he does in all relationships is to spend
some time up front in discussing with the partner company about how to work out the
division of labor. Without such clear specifications up front, he felt that relationships
could easily sour later. It was also the case that many of the industrially active
academics had worked in industry previously.
More generally, however, there were not many signs of active debates between
academics and industrialists. When industrialists disagreed, they simply asked for lower
prices or simply exited and did not turn up for further meetings. Wherever there were
debates, they appeared to lead to more meaningful relationships, as in the case of the
young academic who did not give in to the demand to "lower prices."
Scaling up and visibility. Formal initiatives were those that were large from day one
and visible, as they would have resources from the Ministry. Informal initiatives were
those that tended to be small, lacked administrative support and were almost invisible
within the university community. For informal initiatives, scaling up was no trivial
issue, at least in part because it was difficult to involve more than a couple of academics
from Tokyo University. Given the legacy of traditional Koza, where a senior faculty is
directly linked with a junior faculty or a research assistant, that Koza-like pair or triplet
was often the base unit of participation in any given initiative. However, there was little
evidence of active debates even within Koza-like units. The founding senior academics
would see things one way, and their junior academics would often see things quite
differently, but did not question their senior. As for administrators, they had very little
ideas about the content of these activities. It was not easy to win additional resources to
scale up activities.
Replicating. In Tokyo, there were two types of replication processes going on. On one
hand, formal programmatic initiatives such as endowed laboratories were developed top-
down by academic administrators in collaboration with professional administrators with
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replication in mind, In sharp contrast with the top-down initiatives at MIT or
Cambridge, however, these programmatic initiatives did not include faculty founding
fathers in the initial debates. Faculty members were "asked" to fit their activities into the
schemes, rather than be active participants in the formulation of the templates.
Certain characteristics of informal initiatives appear to be replicated indirectly through
hearsay. For instance, it was clearly becoming common to use external secretariats for
handling the finances, mainly to avoid red tape associated with the university
bureaucracy. However, there was little shared knowledge about how the past initiatives
had been undertaken. New founding fathers appeared to be replicating without having
the access to details.
7-7. Concluding remarks
The Tokyo Story is characterized by an interesting duality of formal and informal
initiatives. Formal initiatives are visible, tend to represent detached relationships from
industry, and are designed either to be sustained or replicated. Informal initiatives are
usually invisible, with little administrative support and often with external secretariats
where sustaining and replicating them are not easy.
One set of organizational boundaries are defined through official rules and norms,
governed both by laws and by governmental regulations that are hardly negotiable. Even
with recent deregulations about academic consulting and financial accounting, the ethos
of civil servant professors remains strong. These conditions lead to relatively
impermeable boundaries that are only gradually opening up with recent reforms and
deregulations. The effect of such impermeable boundaries provides perhaps the biggest
contrast with either MIT or Cambridge, as a result of which, academics at Tokyo have
found it difficult to negotiate and sustain close relationships with industry.
This is not to say that all academics blindly follow these rules. Some academics have
developed different ways of working with industry through informally created
boundaries, sometimes through personal agreements about inventions and at other times
through the use of outside bodies. People can and do create and enact very different
informal boundaries for themselves. Such informal boundaries also clearly exist in other
places such as at MIT (whereas Cambridge's fuzzy boundaries encompass both formal
and informal boundaries), in the sense that academics may not necessarily adhere to the
rules and norms, and nor does MIT rigidly monitor or enforce the rules. However, the
distinction between "formal" and "informal" boundaries at MIT is likely to be much
smaller than at Tokyo, given the clearly stated rules and mechanisms through which
individual academics are held accountable if they diverge too far in their behavior from
the expected norms.
In Tokyo, informal boundaries are defined and enacted by individual academics, and
remain largely invisible. To the extent that formal rules have often been so restrictive as
to be ridiculous, there is a lesser felt need to abide by them rigidly, provided that the
informal activities remain invisible in the official books. The main source of trouble for
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these individuals in the past has been public scandals, most notably through media
reports. Indeed, there have been several cases in which industrially active Tokyo
University academics have been criticized for their financial arrangements - one as
recently as in 2000. In most of these cases, the problem arose when entrepreneurial
academics began to develop their own internal arrangement to avoid the red tape so that
they could spend more flexibly the money from external sources. The most well known
historical example occurred in 1967 when a reputed academic in Tokyo University was
criticized for his "irregular" handling of huge sums of scientific grants. A similar line of
attack was made in 2000 when another academic was criticized by a magazine for his
financial arrangements, even though the amount involved was very small. The point is
that Tokyo University academics continue to face public scrutiny that is actively
searching for misconduct.
Media criticisms are today even more sharply focused on the misconduct of civil
servants, as ministerial workings have been one of the targets for the blame for a decade
long economic recession. New regulations have been instituted to clarify what civil
servants can do and should not do. This climate is complicating the environment for
academics to work with industry. On the one hand, there has been de-regulation to allow
the academics to work as consultants to industry; on the other, civil servants face tougher
rules about "socializing" with private interests.
One interesting issue is the manner in which deregulation takes place in Japan.
There is a strong directive throughout the government to deregulate and streamline so to
reduce bureaucratic burdens. There are constant deregulatory changes within national
universities, and there are many things that professors can do today that they could not do
three years ago. However, because these changes have been introduced incrementally,
the net effect is to introduce more confusion.
For instance, it has gradually become possible for professors to use externally contracted
funds for hiring research staff. However, the extent to which it is possible depends on
the category of contracts and types of recruits, and it is not easy to understand why some
rules have been relaxed in one type of contract but not the other. At any point, it takes
some detailed understanding of the rules to figure out which money can be used for what
purpose. Indeed the need to learn the rules may have increased in the short term, because
of their constantly changing nature. The question is why it should be difficult to
introduce more comprehensive packages of de-regulation. It is as though no one has the
power to dismantle the complex structure of the regulations and laws. Individual civil
servants can only tinker with the rules at the margin.
With the accelerated pace of deregulation which is expected to culminate in the planned
legal separation of the University from the MOBS in 2004, the differences between
informal and formal actions is likely to shrink even in Tokyo. However, the tight
conditions surrounding civil servants may or may not be changed, depending on whether
national university employees opt to remain civil servants - an issue unresolved to date.
Another issue of strategic interest is whether different groups within the university could
be brought together to work as a single unit, as the university becomes an independent
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entity rather than an appendage of the Ministry. As shown in this chapter, different
groups have formed strong and different ethos, and often compete with each other for
funds, students and space. They have also begun to take different paths in creating their
own administrative arrangements in key areas such as technology licensing. Whether and
how these energies can be brought together to work as a single organization is another
tough issue facing the University.
00 00
219
Chapter 8:
Contrasting across the cases
Previous chapters have described the historical contexts as well as the detailed processes
of how new relationships have evolved. The objective of this chapter is to bring forward
similarities and differences across the cases at three levels: (a) the organizational level
where three universities are contrasted; (b) the level of institutionalized patterns, where
the institutionalization processes are contrasted; and (c) the university-industry initiatives
level where individual sub-cases are contrasted. For the three universities, contrasts will
be drawn both in the characteristics of emerging relationships and in the dynamics of
institutionalization. For the emerging institution level, the contrast is drawn in terms of
the degree to which certain behavior patterns became institutionalized, as measured by
the scope of replication elsewhere and whether there were sets of practices that form the
basic template for replication. Individual university-industry initiatives will also be
contrasted in terms of the extent to which they were institutionalized, but with a greater
focus on their longevity in a given locale and the degree to which they influenced other
initiatives. The differences as portrayed in this chapter will be the dependent variable, so
to speak, to be explained in Part IV.
Contrasting the university cases
Characteristics of emerging relationships. The three universities have undergone
significantly different developments in their relationships with industry. Table 8-1
summarizes the main changes and new developments since the 1970s as discussed in
Chapter 4, but incorporating the greater details described in Chapter 5, 6, and 7.
Table 8-1: Main changes in university-industry relationships
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Multiple Consortia and Few Formal: Research
company collegium/centers in committee (20+)
relationships the 1980s (50+) Informal: consortia
Educational Educational One in 1990s None
programs partnership (2)
Single Strategic alliances in Embedded Formal: Endowed
company the 1990s (9) laboratories and chairs (15+)
relationships variations (10) Informal: 2 cases
Organizational Numerous centers Several (inter- Several
structures large and small disciplinary (interdisciplinary
institutes) institutes and TLOs)
Administrative ILP revamped Wolfson industrial Research support
units TLO reform liaison office units established in
Intellectual property revamped External secretariats
rights counsel Research services being created in the
____________ _________________ created
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Table 8-2 provides a qualitative characterization of these changes in the three
universities. The size and number of the initiatives, be they strategic alliances or
consortia, have been increasing over time at MIT. This means that greater numbers of
faculty are likely to have the chance to get exposure to industry in their research work on
campus. Looking at the depth of these relationships, they are close but bounded, in the
sense that there are definite activities from which MIT faculty participation is ruled out,
such as secret research, or consulting extensively with their own research sponsors. The
variation among the relationships in terms of the size, structure, and depth is low, in the
sense that all the strategic alliances or consortia have some common features.
Table 8-2: Summaries of changes in relationships
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Size Larger Increasingly large No significant
change, remaining
small
Prevalence Frequent Few Formal: frequent
Informal: few
Depth Close but bounded Deep Formal: Detached
Informal: detached
or close
Variance (size and Narrow range Wide range Wide range
depth)
At Cambridge, in contrast, individual initiatives remain smaller in scale and fewer in
overall number, with a limited number of academics directly engaged. The depth of the
individual relationships, on the other hand, can be high. Academics and industrialists are
sometimes engaged with each other in a way that is almost personal. However, the
variation between relationships in terms of their structure, style, and depth is quite wide.
In Tokyo, new types of individual initiatives are small and/or harder to find, partly
because there are no official records that distinguish new types of activities within the
standard categories that are regularly reported. Most of the acknowledged changes are
formal changes supported by the government. There remains a certain distance between
the university and industry, and it is only exceptional cases in which individuals strike up
strong and deep relationships with industry. The variation across relationships is large.
Contrasting the dynamics of institutionalization. What about the manner in which
changes have taken place? Were there pronounced differences or similarities between the
three universities? Table 8-4 summarizes the characteristics of the dynamics of change in
the three settings. In all three settings, there is considerable freedom in what individual
academics can do. Innovative relationships are often developed simply on the initiative
of individuals. What is different is that, while at Cambridge and Tokyo these individual
initiatives are isolated and largely unnoticed, at MIT they appear to receive a good degree
of active organizational support and can be scaled up, through access to bigger space or
as a result of permission to hire more staff. Initiatives at MIT also get picked up as
organizational templates and become models for others to replicate. There is sufficient
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cross-campus information about what is going on for this to happen, perhaps owing to the
extensive network of administrators.
Table 8-4: Characterizing the dynamics of institutionalization in the three
universities
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Old Individual-led Individual-led Individual-led
initiatives become initiatives remain initiatives remain
scaled up, and lead to isolated and unnoticed isolated and unnoticed.
organizational Administrator-led
templates for schemes designed for
replication -rp ati
New Administrator-led Administrator-led Individual-led
initiatives initiatives beginning to initiatives increasingly
appear externally situated
In Cambridge, there are limited mechanisms by which the central administration can
support individual activities. It is interesting to note that Cambridge does have fuzzy
networks of people, particularly through the college system, but these networks do not
facilitate the mobilization of additional resources such as space or people. Initiatives may
be known informally by a wide group of peer academics from different disciplines, but do
not lead to any organizational support.
In Tokyo, individuals innovate as they do elsewhere, but their initiatives remain isolated
and unnoticed. On the other hand, there were initiatives, such as the creation of new
schemes, centers or institutes that had been largely proposed by academic administrators
in negotiation with professional administrators and Ministry officials, and that were
designed to be consistent with other national universities. Individual initiatives have
never turned into organizational templates, but instead, organizational templates were
created at Ministry level to ensure programmatic fairness across the nation. What is
perhaps new is the fact that individual initiatives are increasingly anchored in external
organizations, including brand new ones specifically created for that purpose.
Contrasting the institutionalized patterns
Previous chapters showed that there were seven new patterns of university-industry
relationships which originated in the three universities and that became institutionalized
beyond a single initiative. The degree of institutionalization between the seven is
significantly different, however, in scale, scope of replication, locus of initiation, and
degree to which organizational templates work. Some of them have indeed had external
impact beyond the three universities as shown in Table 8-5. In the US, consortia-type
multiple company relationships were replicated through the research center programs of
the National Science Foundation. LFM-type programs were established in 12 or so other
universities within the US in direct consultation with MIT. Strategic alliances have
origins in other medical schools in the country; MIT's innovation in going beyond
pharmaceutical companies is just being emulated in other universities also. For
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Cambridge, embedded laboratories provide one example of institutionalization,
notwithstanding their weakness in the sense of having high variability. The membership-
based activities at the Institute of Manufacturing are the only other pattern of interaction
that has been replicated - albeit within the confines of the Institute and limited to a
handful of cases. In the case of Tokyo University, endowed chairs were established as a
mechanism applicable to all national universities, and given that there were several other
endowed chairs that were proposed by other national universities around the same time,
the contribution of Tokyo University in its institution is not clear. Special Research
Committees, on the other hand, were definitely a product of Tokyo University, though
confined within the Institute of Industrial Science (IIS).
Table 8-5: New institutional patterns and degree of institutionalization
Scale Scope of Locus of initiation Organizational
replication templates
Consortia, MIT Large and MIT-wide Individual-led Loose, but
becoming Other becoming
larger universities tighter in MIT
Loose outside
Educational Large Few in MIT Administration-led Loose in MIT
partnership, MIT Other Loose outside
universities
Strategic Large MIT-wide Administration-led Tight in MIT
alliances, Other Loose outside
MIT universities
Embedded Small Cambridge-wide Individual-led Loose within
laboratories, becoming Increasingly Cambridge
Cambridge larger administration-led
Membership Small Few in number Individual-led Tight
groups, Institute of Increasingly
Cambridge Manufacturing administration-led
Endowed chairs Small UT-wide Administration-led Tight in UT
Other and outside
universities
Special research Small Institute of Administration-led Tight
committees Industrial
Science
Contrasting the initiatives
Another way of looking at the process of institutionalization is to examine the initiatives
in terms of their longevity and replicability. When the experience of individual initiatives
is reviewed, there appear to be three pathways: (a) local initiatives that die out (no
institutionalization); (b) local initiatives that are sustained over time but remain isolated
(local institutionalization over time); (c) local initiatives that become replicated elsewhere
(institutionalization). These survival and replication patterns appear to be influenced by
four factors that are mutually dependent: (a) the level of interest by the founding
223
individuals in sustaining the initiative; (b) the ability of the founding individuals to
define, articulate and enact the activity agenda of mutual interest to all participants; (c)
the degree to which the founding individuals can obtain administrative and organizational
support for the initiative; and (d) the degree to which the initiative becomes a template for
others. This third point of "administrative and organizational support" refers principally
to manpower and space; for instance, are there assistants who can help with the logistics?
Can the founding individual have enough space to house these assistants in a way that is
practical?
Personal commitment from the founding individuals appears critically important in order
to sustain his/her participation in the initiative. The more their personal experience was
in line with the content of the proposed initiatives, the more engaged they were, and the
more they appear to be able to persuade others to join in. These same individuals had to
make sure that their roles were consistent with those of their partners on the one hand,
and with their colleagues and managers on the other. In addition, dialectic discourses
appeared to play an important role in determining the level and kinds of support from
various parties.
While there were remarkable similarities in the roles of individuals as seen in all cases
from the three diverse settings, how they manifested themselves in the interviews was
very different. For instance, whereas at MIT, individuals often simply articulated their
personal commitment in an open way, at Cambridge, commitment was often
communicated during the interviews with close peers rather than by the individuals
themselves. In Tokyo, there was almost a generational difference between the older
cohorts, who tended to be as reticent as those in Cambridge, and the younger cohorts,
who were not shy to speak up, rather like their MIT peers. The older generation appeared
reticent to such an extent that the shape of, and reasons for, their personal commitment
only became apparent when several pieces of archival evidence were pieced togther -
such as speeches and past interviews.
Concluding remarks
If these are the differences that characterize the three universities, what could possibly
account for such differences? Chapter 9 will outline proposed explanations in terms of
organizational boundaries, both internal and external, and Chapter 10 in terms of the role
of individuals in story telling.

PART IV: WHAT WAS THE PROCESS OF CHANGE?
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Chapter 9:
Dynamics of University-Industry Partnerships:
External and internal boundaries
In chapter 8, I contrasted the key differences among the three universities in the way their
relationships with industry changed. In this chapter, I develop further the concepts of two
types of boundary, external and internal, that were introduced in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, and
argue that they influence and shape university-industry relationships. The external
boundaries stand between the academic and industrial communities, and represent
therefore the organizational boundaries of the universities. The internal boundaries stand
between the different academic disciplinary communities, and between the academic and
administrative communities within universities who need to work together to sustain the
partnerships. Boundaries stand between different communities and represent differences
in practices, values, and interests. And yet, it is these very differences that make
collaborative work that crosses boundaries interesting. Differences make it possible to
gain from a division of labor and are the reasons for complementarities and for working
together. Differences also complicate joint work. In other words, differences represent
both opportunities and risks.
There is nothing new in thinking about different cultural communities (Geertz 1973; Van
Maanen and Barley 1984; Martin 1992; Schein 1992; Martin 2002) and recognizing how
they require different initiation processes for new members (Van Maanen 1976; Van
Maanen 1977); or in thinking that different "thought worlds" can create difficulties in
collaborative work (Dougherty 1992). Some authors have noted the need for more work
on boundaries to examine what happens at the boundaries and how boundaries are
created (Abbott 1995; Martin 2002). To fill this gap, there is an emergent literature on
cross-boundary activities which looks at: what kind of boundary objects can help in
collaborative work (Carlile 1997; Carlile 2002); how different knowledge creation
processes must be at work at boundaries (Carlile 2002); the salience of boundaries
(Levina 2001); and how relative differences in knowledge can influence the learning of
the participants (Black 2002). Current research contributes to this emergent literature by
proposing the dimensions of these boundaries that may be relevant in determining the
dynamics of interaction.
In this chapter, I describe the dynamics of university-industry relationships in terms of
external and internal boundaries. For each type of boundary, I first describe the
differences in values and interests of the two communities. I then describe what these
boundaries look like in the three settings. Finally I describe how these specific
configurations of the boundaries affect the nature of the university-industry partnerships.
Two different communities: academics and industrialists
It is clear that most university-industry relationships involve an academic community on
the one hand and an industrial community on the other which are quite distinct in their
,* - I#,- a IF- . - - -,
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values and interests. Table 9-1 summarizes the stylized differences as have been
described by the scholars on science and technology and as confirmed by my discussions
in the three settings (Merton 1968; Allen 1977; Dasgupta and David 1994). Several
disclaimers should be made up front. These are stylized characteristics and therefore do
not explain the many variations that emerge in practice, such as academic industrialists,
or industrial academics. Academics in engineering, for instance, may behaviorally
subscribe to a scientific community, but in value orientation may be closer to
industrialists. Scientists at Bell Labs may have values and interests similar to those of
academic scientists in universities.
Nonetheless, the framework provides suggestions as to why it is interesting for the two
communities to work together, and why it is difficult for them to do so. For instance, the
key differences between the two communities can be described in terms of goals: while
academics aspire to create public knowledge to gain peer esteem, industrialists seek to
develop competitive advantage usually through proprietary knowledge (Dasgupta and
David 1994). The fact that they have different goals makes it easier for them to work
together in the sense that they are not necessarily competing along the same lines. On the
other hand, differences in goals make it essential that some coordination or compromise
be made explicit so that they are not working towards inconsistent goals.
Table 9-1 Differences between academics and industrialists in interest and values
Academics Industrialists
Goals Public knowledge and peer Value creation through
esteem as in publications private knowledge
Rewards Priority of publications Appropriateness
Problems Autonomously-defined and Directed by corporate interest
generic and specific
Outputs Papers Products/artifacts
Papers as by-products
Resources Students, post docs, money Professional researchers,
generated externally money generated internally
While the academics are rewarded (eg in terms of recognition) for priority in knowledge
creation, industrialists are rewarded for appropriability or ability to draw private gains
from knowledge(Merton 1968; Dasgupta and David 1994). Problems in science are
defined autonomously by scientists and tend to be generic and acknowledged by their
peers, with papers as their primary outputs, while technologists work to solve specific
problems as encoded in artifacts dictated by corporate interest (Allen 1977).
The differences in resources are hardly discussed in the literature, although strongly
reported in the interviews. Several academics with industrial experience in all three
country settings felt that critical differences in the production of knowledge were that
they had untrained students as the primary workforce as opposed to trained professional
researchers in industry, and that they had dependence on external monetary resources. On
the one hand, the academics would find it difficult to compete against the industrialists if
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they were working on the same set of problems. On the other, the very fact that students
are not trained and therefore not predisposed towards any solution, but are nevertheless
highly motivated to solve problems, makes it more likely that the problems will be solved
in unconventional ways.
While these differences appear to be relatively stable across the three country settings,
there were several distinct constellations of relationships that had been established to deal
with these differences. Philanthropic donations were found in all three places, in which
industrialists essentially give up their interest and the research agenda was set by
academics. Contracted and proprietary research was found in Cambridge, where some
academics had given up their interest and rights to publish, and the research agenda was
driven principally by industrial interest. Between these two extremes were collaborations
in which the two parties worked jointly to set the agenda.
What do the organizational boundaries look like?
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that there are differences in the way the three
universities define their organizational boundaries. These characteristics are summarized
in Table 9-2. MIT's organizational boundaries are clearly defined in the sense that
people know exactly where they are, and there are clear rules as to how they may be
crossed. The organizational boundaries at MIT are therefore described as regulated. For
Cambridge, by contrast, the location of organizational boundaries is often unclear,
making the issue of boundary crossing ambiguous. Their boundaries are fuzzy and have
few rules about crossing them. Tokyo also has clearly defined boundaries, where until
recently, boundary crossing was not easy and so was rare. Tokyo has additional
complications in the sense that some academics have traditionally managed to form
informal boundaries that are different from the formal ones in establishing their
relationships with industry (Odagii 1999; Yoshihara and Tamai 1999). This issue will
be discussed separately later in this chapter.
These organizational boundaries are further defined in terms of three distinct dimensions:
people, knowledge and physical space. Individuals cross the boundaries based on rules
and norms about organizational memberships. For instance, academics might be able to
work as a consultant (or not), or be an executive director of a start-up company (or not),
or be ready to leave the university to join industry. Industry employees can also cross the
boundary by becoming an adjunct professor or even moving permanently through
changing jobs.
Each of the three universities had different norms and rules about boundary crossing by
people. MIT, for instance, has clear rules about external activities: academics can work
up to one day a week for consulting and non-managerial positions outside. For MIT it is
not only clear that these constitute "outside" activities, but there are also clear rules about
exactly how far one is expected to go. Cambridge, on the other hand, provides no
specialized rules about external work, which means that the academics can hold
managerial positions in industry or consult without time limits, provided that they do not
neglect their university duties. In Tokyo, consulting and representation in private
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Table 9-2. Organizational Boundaries
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Type Regulated Fuzzy Impermeable formally,
Clear boundaries Unclear boundaries but permeable informally
Clear rules on arising from multiple Clear boundaries
boundary crossing but entities Non-negotiable rules
negotiable Unclear rules on but boundary crossing
boundary crossing increasingly
____________ 
____________________ 
___________________ 
permissible
Membership boundary
Academics Consuling/boad Conslting adboar
Pa-time Consulting and non-abor
work managerial positions membership including for membership permitted
________Up to one day a week reerh spnsors since 1997
Dual Not permitted Can work as executive Not permitted
positionsmanagebutboudarycrosin
Quit U to Sometimes Sometimes - visible Very rarely
join Increasi
Industrialists _________________________________ ________________
Pant-time Adjunct professors Pant-time teachers Visiting professors
teaching Giving lectures Giving lectures Giving lectures
iSupervising theses Supervising theses
Dual Adjunct professors College fellows Visiting professors
positions Board members
Visiting committee
members ___________ ___________
Quit Ito Sometimes Not often Increasingly common
join U
Knowledge boundary __________ __________
IPR University when University or sponsors University and sponsors
ownership significant use of facility own if externally funded co-own when externally
by contracts, but funded, but academics
individual own when no external
academics own otherwise funding
IIPR licensing Can be negotiated Can be negotiated Can be exclusive, but not
teac g including exclusivity including exclusivity easy to negotiate
Confidentialit Considered not right on No rules No rules
y_______campus ___________ ___________
Publication Delay up to 3 months No rules No rules
Physical boundary
bIldigs roietrsiy a tvit comercilciityyorfso mrnvriyadsosr
Commerial NoavaicbletAailabl butne by Ntd av ailaemc
buldngiondiverity/lleges  o xera
campus _______________academics___ ownotherwise_ funding ________
Commcnial Aailbe egtiaedabe egownaed by animied avalabivbtyno
includignexcluevity uncie xlsiity/clee eaytongoit
cauns proprietary___activity __commercial boiest from___________
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companies were not permitted for the academics under the civil service code until 1997,
when several categories of such activities became permissible. The norms and rules
about employment define the membership boundary, which in turn can influence the
overall level of inter-community understanding over time.
The knowledge boundary is also defined by the set of practices and rules about
intellectual property fights, confidentiality, and publications; these represent the level of
"knowledge sharing" that can go on between the two communities.
In MIT, all the knowledge generated on campus with significant use of MIT facilities
belongs to MIT, and this has been a clear ruling since the 1930s. Sponsors, however,
may retain the rights to license exclusively. Bringing proprietary knowledge into campus
is considered undesirable, and confidentiality agreements are agreed only with reluctance
and as an exception rather than a norm. The delay in publications to allow sponsors to
review the content to make sure that all the needed patent processes are set in motion is
acceptable only up to 3 months, though exceptional cases can be negotiated. There is a
clear sense of to whom the knowledge belongs or where the boundaries are. There are
also clear but negotiable rules about how far academics can go in accepting conditions on
confidentiality or publication delays.
In Cambridge, by contrast, the ownership of knowledge generated on campus is
negotiable. Companies may own it, if they bring substantive resources and expertise into
the invention. These ownership conditions may also change over time, as companies'
contributions change. Similarly, there is no single ruling against confidential
information. While publications are the expected outputs, the use of confidential
information as inputs is a matter of individual discretion.
The physical boundary is defined by rules about how external organizational units may
be able to reside inside the university premises. For instance, in Cambridge, the
university as well as the colleges can own land and buildings and be landlords both of
academic buildings as well as of commercial ones. There is nothing that stops a company
from renting space in the relevant academic department to undertake relevant research.
Boundaries as reflecting historically formed values
To the extent that these boundaries are accepted by organizational members, they must
reflect and be consistent with the underlying shared values and assumptions of the
organizations. Today's norms and rules reflect both the original views and values in the
organization at its foundation as well as those that have been shaped subsequently.
For MIT faculty, for instance, working for external organizations was long an expected
part of academic life, as described in Chapter 4. There is a strong value within the
organization that consulting for industry to work with practical problems enriches one's
understanding of the world, which can be helpful for developing educational curricula.
Such a value was also reinforced by the fact that MIT faculty members were historically
expected to find external funding for 50% of their salaries. In the 1960s, however, the
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upheavals of student movements led to a new understanding of the importance of
drawing a line between public academic activities and private and individual activities.
MIT rules were established, but in the spirit that protected faculty by establishing what is
legitimate.
Similarly, there was a time when faculty members were involved in outside interests to a
significant extent, especially in start up companies. Even though there was a ruling about
limiting such involvement to one day a week, this ruling had not been strictly enforced.
All this was to change in the 1960s, when external activities by faculty members,
particularly in start-ups became an issue. Starting with a case of a mechanical
engineering professor who was asked to choose between MIT and his company, time
limits on external activities became more strictly enforced. The norm became established
for academics either to take leave and concentrate on start-ups or to limit their external
activities. The clarification of the boundary was at least in part a result of the prevalence
of cross-boundary activities and the ensuing controversies. The community became less
tolerant with fuzziness, as it provided no protection of legitimacy to organizational
members.
In Cambridge, by contrast, the basic assumption is that every Cambridge academic has
good enough judgment to be able to choose to do whatever is appropriate. The rules as
well as the boundaries are fuzzy so as to permit maximum individual discretion. The
continuing fuzziness of the boundary also reflects the fact that there has not (yet) been a
sufficiently large number of problems raised for there to be a need for a firm policy. The
arrival of Microsoft was arguably the first time in recent history that the university had to
think hard about what is and what is not acceptable. The result was a strong sense of the
need to articulate basic principles to be followed. While the boundary remains fuzzy
today, the need for clarity with the possibly of rules is voiced by more than a small
minority of people. The boundaries as they exist today may indeed be at odds with
changing values. This tension is visible in the ongoing attempts to bring in a clearer set
of rules, for instance, with respect to intellectual property rights and outside professional
interests.
In Tokyo, the longstanding underlying value has been to ensure the autonomy of science
from industrial capitalist interest. Academics as civil servants were not to consult for,
nor play an active party in, industry. These employment boundaries may seem like a
natural consequence of the fact that Tokyo University is a government body. However,
Tokyo University itself had a very different relationship with industry until the end of the
war, even with similar government legal structures. Faculty members helped industrial
processes much more readily in the early days, either directly or through their students
(Odagiri and Goto 1993; Odagiri 1999).
The duality of boundaries in Tokyo University reflects the unevenness of the values and
interest among academics with respect to working with industry. Impermeable
boundaries as reflected in the legal and regulatory structures are consistent with the post-
war values about the importance of academic autonomy. To some academics, however,
working with industry was obviously important, and they enacted informal boundaries,
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sometimes through developing their own memoranda of understanding about intellectual
property rights and confidentiality, where closer relationships could develop, often based
on personal trust. The recent changes in the laws have made it possible for national
universities to rent space to companies at a discounted rate in order to attract them to the
campus. It is interesting that one of the de-regulatory measures allows national
universities to offer space to companies at a discount. This clearly demonstrates the
nature of the cultural divide between the two communities. If the universities were an
attractive enough place for industries to reside, why would space need to be offered at a
discount?
Characterizing the process of interaction: engagement
What difference do these organizational boundaries make? I argue that they influence
the level of engagement through which relationships may be developed. By engagement,
I refer to the depth of interaction between the two communities. Two illustrative cases
help illuminate the nature of engagement.
One example of engagement was observed during a company visit to a campus, where
multiple industrial representatives met with academics to discuss the potential
collaboration. In the course of the two-day visit, participants looked "engaged" on about
30 occasions. That is, they looked interested: they leaned forward and looked intently at
each other. They physically exhibited interest and their verbal responses showed that
they understood the content of the discussion and brought in new ideas or information
related to the ideas being discussed.
There were two types of engagement that were particularly prevalent. One where the
academics looked "engaged" in hearing comments from industrial representatives.
Academics' interest was sometimes triggered by the mention of facilities or data
available in the company that could help their agenda substantively, but was also
triggered simply by good questions that appeared to capture their imaginations.
Questions were "good" when they contained sufficient information explaining the
reasons why the particular problem being raised was relevant, particularly from the
company's perspective. The second type was when industrial representatives looked
engaged, mostly when they came across research topics with potentially relevant
applications. On some of these occasions, several industrial representatives were
"engaged" among themselves, with a member of their own research staff, with their
research theme manager and with their R&D director all discussing the implications for
the company's interest.
These engagements appeared to be "genuine moments" when people were thinking hard
about the same set of ideas. Though these are examples of momentary engagement, it is
not inconceivable that these substantive dialogues, if continued over time, could have
consequences for behavior. Academics, when engaged by those intriguing questions,
might eventually be persuaded to try out new directions in their research. Company
representatives, when engaged with each other, might be able to come up with a relevant
link between the research agenda and their own work. Engagement might thus be
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postulated as being a mechanism through which the conflicts between autonomy loving
academics and direction-oriented industrialists could be resolved: industrialists might
"direct" academics in their agenda, through good questions that capture their imagination.
Another example of engagement is a deep commitment made by one company. In one
university, a company decided to bring proprietary knowledge and technology onto the
campus. This was not an easy decision for the company. The knowledge was not only
proprietary, but it belonged to what the company considered to be its core technology.
And yet, unless they could openly use the technology with outside research groups, the
scientific potential for other applications could not be tested. The company took the risk
- with assurances coming from the university collaborators to respect some
confidentiality conditions. The technology was sufficiently novel and helpful for
research that two academic research groups modified their research agenda and
incorporated the company's agenda. Another group's research activities were guided by
proprietary information related to device fabrication. When the company saw the returns
to their risk, they decided to go further and bring in more people and technical expertise
to the campus. The company was learning that unless they committed their technology
and expertise in the collaboration, they could not gain from the research outcomes.
However, engagement does not necessarily mean an increased inflow of proprietary
technology or information. In another company case, several industrial scientists who
were on campus full time worked hard with their HQ staff to identify scientifically
relevant questions. They considered it inappropriate to bring too much proprietary
knowledge and information onto the campus, particularly that related to product
problems. Instead, they invested their staff time in identifying the research agenda which
would be of common interest. In this case, the key measure of engagement may be the
time and information committed by the company to the collaboration.
Consequences of organizational boundaries
Different organizational boundaries appear to encourage different constellations of
relationships. There are two processes through which the nature of relationships is
influenced by the organizational boundaries. First, the permeable membership boundary
in particular creates different levels of mutual understanding between the two
communities. Several Tokyo University professors who have begun to consult or work
as advisors to start-ups acknowledge that their worldviews have changed, and that they
now have a much better understanding of the industry and where their interests are
coming from. What this awakening indicates is the extent of misunderstanding that
would have existed without such practices. If the two parties understand each other and
their respective idiosyncrasies better, then the initial negotiation is likely to be different in
nature.
The second mechanism is that different organizational boundaries allow - or require -
different patterns of sustained interaction, which can influence the level of engagement.
If it is possible to have industrial scientists on campus undertaking their own research,
they can have daily interactions with the academic community and there are greater
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possibilities for engagement. In a steady state, one would expect there to be certain
levels and types of engagement and a configuration of organizational boundaries which
were at equilibrium. Table 9-4 summarizes the nature of engagement in the three
universities.
Table 9-3: Organizational Boundaries and relationship characteristics
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Organizational Regulated Fuzzy Impermeable
boundaries
Relationship Prevalent Few Few
characteristics Close but bounded Deep Detached
Narrow range Wide range Wide range
Single and multiple Single companies Multiple companies
Companies
For MIT, relationships through research contracts are close but bounded. Academics and
industrialists can work with reasonable closeness, but without completely sharing the
research agenda. As discussed in Chapter 8, there are more of these collaborative
activities in MIT than there are in Cambridge or Tokyo. The collaborations tend to fall
within a narrower range of engagement - mainly because there are clear rules and norms
about what is acceptable. Confidential research is unacceptable in general at MIT. There
is a strong resistance to getting too close. The close but bounded relationships also make
it feasible for multiple companies to come together without having to worry too much
about exposing themselves to competing firms who may also be around.
For Cambridge, relationships run deeper, with more information and personnel time
commitment by industry. There is also greater diversity in engagement. Some
collaborations are completely collegial with the key activities being weekly seminars in
which industrialists and academics participate with no contractual obligations. Others are
closer to being proprietary, with confidential information coming onto the campus. The
fact that each collaboration tends to entail deeper engagement than at MIT also means
that they tend to be with single companies; it is relatively rare to find multiple company
collaborations. However, the collaborative activities are still sporadic rather than
prevalent across departments.
For Tokyo, collaborative relationships are more detached, with multiple company
relationships dominating single company relationships. In one interesting case, a single
company partnership was forged with the active involvement of one senior academic
administrator, but it ended up taking place outside Tokyo University through multiple
consulting arrangements. The company explained that, given the IPR arrangement, it
was not feasible for them to have formal relationships with Tokyo University. However,
there are other informal ties in which professors work with industry without formal
contracts. Rewards are often passed back to the professors in the form of scholarship
grants, the form of money that has traditionally been least restrictive in its use.
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While I certainly came across cases of this kind in Tokyo, I argue that there are unlikely
to be many and that they are likely to decline in importance given that (a) more
professors spoke about standard operations in which companies gave scholarship grants
at the going rate, almost instead of name cards; (b) most Japanese industrialists whom I
interviewed did not acknowledge there to be deep ties through such informal
mechanisms; (c) both academics and industrialists spoke of the increasingly tight
conditions in which formal agreements are becoming preferable; and (d) the overall level
of scholarship grants has been declining in the 1990s, both nationally and for Tokyo
University. Also, as the overall values within Tokyo University become more accepting
of closer ties with industry, there are different avenues through which industry can more
openly work with the academics, and the need to resort to informal trust-based
relationships also diminishes.
Internal boundaries: disciplines, academics and administrators
Another set of important boundaries that emerged were those between different academic
disciplines. While academics as a whole share many of the values and interests
pertaining to the conduct of academic work, disciplinary spheres define specific topics
and methods of inquiry differently. It was also apparent that the role of administrators
was important in helping to bridge these internal boundaries. In Cambridge, there are
informal and interdisciplinary communications among academics, especially through the
structures of the colleges. However, these informal dialogues could not then be
developed into organizationally supported interdepartmental activities, since there was
little, if any, administrative support for them. If administrators, whose role could be to
provide a bridge between different departments, were themselves isolated from the
academics, they cannot play this role effectively.
Indeed, although often invisible to outsiders, there is a deep internal divide between
academics and administrators in all three universities. They are almost two separate
communities with their own respective practices, interests and values. The differences
between the two communities, however, are much more divergent across the three
country settings than are the differences between academics and industrialists, perhaps
reflecting the fact that administrators and their culture are much more localized.
Scientists contribute to international journals and attend international conferences and
come to share some of their practices and values across international borders. Similarly
industrialists readily cross international borders. In this study, I interviewed people from
22 companies, of which 7 out of 9 Japanese companies, 2 out of 8 American companies,
and 1 out of 5 British companies were interviewed for their relationships abroad. By
contrast, administrators are recruited locally, rarely go overseas or attend international
conferences. Even with this caveat, the stylized role differences with their underlying
values and interest can be summarized as in Table 9-4.
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Table 9-4: Differences in values/interest between academics and administrators
Academics Administrators
Goal Publications Process coherence
Loyalty Disciplinary Organization
Rewards Priority of Performance target
base publication
Value Originality and Fairness and consistency
diversity
Roles Production of outputs Organization of inputs (students,
I(papers, education) money, space, library)
Table 9-5 summarizes the characteristics of internal boundaries at the three universities.
Here, the interesting commonality is that there is one-way flow in boundary crossing:
academics can become administrators, but administrators do not usually become
academics, except some of the academic administrators who return to their original
positions as academics after their service as administrators. Again, the extent of
permeability was the largest at MIT, where there is tradition of senior academics taking
senior academic administrator positions, such as deans and department heads, but also
where there are researchers and post-docs who move into administrative jobs over time.
There is boundary crossing from academia to administration at multiple levels at MIT. In
Cambridge, in contrast, it is mainly at the level of department heads that academics
become part-time administrators. Vice Chancellor is practically the only academic
administrator position that is full-time. There is also a strong resistance on the part of
academics to see themselves as administrators . In Tokyo, even this was not significant,
since most academics held administrative positions for short tenure and continued with
their academic work part-time.
Table 9-5: Internal boundaries between academics and administrators
MIT Cambridge Tokyo
Boundary One-way permeable One-way fuzzy Impermeable
Clear boundary Unclear boundary Clear boundary
Penetrated one Penetrated one Limited
way and at all levels way at high levels penetration
Membership Academics Senior academics Academics
boundary become full-time are part-time become part-time
academic administrators, senior administrators
administrators. Administrators do for short terms.
Researchers ntbcm diitaosd
become rsacesntbcm
administrators Sm eerhr
Administrators do amnsrtr oe Idsrait
not become wt nutilicesnl odn
academics/researcher epnneamnsrtv oe
Seiracdmc
- .9- 110I.Ir - W- vwr - ww v - 'r, - - aw - 1- - -ev ,- -r -- q- - -, - - - wl- - . .- , -
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Significant
number of admin.
with industrial
exoenence
I I
Knowledge MIT owns all Cambridge owns Tokyo University
boundary inventions based on when externally own when externally
significant use of supported, and supported and
MIT facilities academics own academics own when
when no external no external funding
funding
Physical Shared Central Central
boundary administration in a administration in a
separate building separate building
Departments Different
located all around campuses
the city
Characteristics Diverse group Home grown Clearly separated
of with many tri- administrators with monolingual
administration linguals (academic, some bilinguals administrators
industrial and (academic,
administrative) administrative)
Another significant difference is that at MIT, there are many administrators with industry
experience working on relationships with industry, be they in the Technology Licensing
Office, in the Industrial Liaison Program, or in the Corporate Relations Office. This has
made the administration at MIT a diverse group comprising people with academic,
industrial as well as administrative backgrounds. In Cambridge, in contrast, the majority
of administrators are home-grown with little academic/research or industrial
backgrounds, though more professionals with industrial backgrounds are beginning to be
recruited. In Tokyo, none of the professional administrators had industrial experience,
making them more "monolingual" than in Cambridge or MIT. There has, however, been
a rise in "unofficial" cases where individuals with industry background came into the
university either on secondment to affiliate bodies or as visiting professors to the
university who then performed largely administrative functions.
It is possible to see the characteristics of the administration as cumulative results of
governance structures. For instance, at MIT, the centralized and private governance
structure appears to have led to professionalization of administration including academic
administrators. In Cambridge, it seems plausible that both decentralized governance
structures and the abundance of resources has meant that the central administration's
work has been far less contentious, leaving the administrative tasks to be more isolated
and less professionalized. In Tokyo, the supra-centralized governance dictated the
loyalty of professional administrators to the Ministry. An alternative way to look at it is
that internal boundaries over time defined specific sub-cultures of the administration.
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These differences appear to lead to two significant consequences. First, at MIT,
administrators appear far more capable of setting the rules, changing the rules and
holding negotiations about them for special cases. The expectation that administration is
there to serve the academic functions pervades the administration, and as such
administrators behave with a good understanding of academic practices, interests and
values. At Cambridge, administrators are far less legitimated to change the rules, and the
recent attempts to bring in greater uniformity have been undertaken with extreme caution.
In Tokyo, administrators can hardly negotiate or make judgments on any variable
application of rules.
Second, administrators can undertake resource allocation favoring some projects and not
others; they can create opportunities for some activities to scale up, and for others to
dwindle or even disappear. This was most prevalent at MIT, where money worked well
as a reasonable medium of exchange for research activities in purchasing manpower
(students and post docs) and to a certain extent, space also. At Cambridge, to some
extent, this takes place within each department, but there has been traditionally little
adjustment of allocation across disciplines undertaken by the administration. In Tokyo,
this takes place least, with the consequence that there are no clear mechanisms for scaling
up activities.
Concluding remarks
I have argued that the three universities have differently defined organizational
boundaries, both external and internal. Both external and internal boundaries can be
examined by reference to three dimensions: people, knowledge and physical space. I have
further argued that these boundaries have influenced the manner in which relationships
have formed, and have led to different characteristics in the three universities.
w
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Chapter 10:
Emergence of new institutional patterns:
The role of individuals in storytelling
In the preceding chapter, I argued that organizational boundaries shaped the patterns of
evolving university-industry relationships. While organizational boundaries could
explain some characteristics of change, they could not explain the dynamics of
institutionalization, and more specifically, why some initiatives appeared more
"powerful" than others in surviving longer, scaling up, or being replicated.
In this chapter, I use the concepts of "stories" and "compatibility" among them to
describe the dynamics of emerging institutional patterns. I argue that when a new
institutional pattern emerges, such as a new type of relationship, participating individuals
create a cover story to justify the collective action, and create sub-stories that account for
their individual roles. A new relationship is like a nested set of stories, comprising a
cover story for the overall partnership and individual role sub-stories of the cover story.
It is three different types of compatibility between stories that collectively determine the
general strength of the new behavior pattern and ultimately its sustainability and
replicability over time and across space.
Defining stories. A "story" is usually defined as a narrative that combines various
events through a sequential plot in a way that explains the significance of an outcome that
gives meanings to different events in light of the outcome1 . In my analysis of emerging
institutional patterns, I use the minimalist definition of a story as a narrative or an account
that justifies and explains an action (Scott and Lyman 1968). Every institution, defined as
a patterned behavior, must have some story or account associated with it, in order to be
sustained. The stories might be explicit or implicit (Boje 1991); indeed their existence
may not really matter until an opportunity arises to change the behavior (Dreyfus 1991;
Piore 1995). Stories are critical instruments for social construction because they facilitate
people's understanding (Bruner 1986; Polkinghorne 1988; Bruner 1990). "Stories" are
products of sensemaking that may or may not be articulated in speech. They reside in
people's mind as a way of understanding the past and as a way of projecting the future
actions.
Defining compatibility. Another important point about an institution is that every
individual involved in it may have different roles to play and therefore their individual
sub-stories about what they do may be different. Institutionalized actions require different
persons to perform different roles but in coordination. Compatibility among these role
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1988). Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences. Albany, State University of
New York Press. This is one of the minimalist definitions to be contrasted with more general definitions
which typically include: temporal order, a beginning, a middle and an end; characters; plot; narratora and
settings [something wrong with punctuation here] O'Connor, E. S. (1996). Telling Decisions: The role of
narrative in organizational decision making. Oraiainldcso makn. Z. Shapira. New York,
Cambridge University Press.
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stories means certain consistency or congruence, but can be defined principally as the
absence of conflict. Compatibility is not a binary state of whether there is compatibility
or not: compatibility can range on a continuum from weak to strong. Nor is compatibility
something that can be attained in a static sense. It is only possible to define compatibility
between behaviors that have already been enacted. Compatibility is strengthened by the
existence of shared assumptions underlying individual stories. The more shared the
underlying assumptions are the more compatible the stories are.
In the remainder of this chapter, key elements of the process theory of storytelling will be
described drawing on real examples. I argue first that there are two types of stories that
have different functions. (1) a cover story for joint action that is shared among all
participants to explain why they act together; and (2) individual role sub-stories that are
created by each participant that explain why he/she will take on a specific role within the
joint action.
Then, I submit that there are three types of compatibility that are important in making the
joint action sustainable over time: (1) individual role compatibility between the
individual role sub-stories and stories that define his/her identity; (2) partnership
compatibility between individual role sub-stories of people representing different
organizations, such as academics and industrialists; and (3) organizational compatibility
between individual role sub-stories of different organizational players, such as students,
academics, and administrators in a university; or researchers, managers, and top
executives in a company, which in turn can enable individual role sub-stories to develop
into organizationally recognized roles.
Strong individual role compatibility pushes individuals to sustain action over time. With
strong partnership compatibility, the coordinated pattern of behavior can be sustained
over time. Similarly, organizational compatibility ensures sustainability of the new
pattern of behavior across time and space within the organization, as stories become
organizationally shared. Finally, I argue that dialectics is a critical process that provides
opportunities for individuals to learn different types of compatibility needed for the
participants to work together. It is a process through which differences are surfaced,
giving opportunities to align them.
A cover story for joint action. Storytelling is usually initiated by an individual
interacting with at least one other. The act of storytelling engages the storyteller and the
listener/s in a way that they all agree on the need for joint action. For instance, an
academic might be talking to an industrialist about a possible collaboration. Their
interaction may result in a story of why they should work together - a cover story of joint
action.
An illustrative example is the creation of the Media Lab, one of the most spectacular MIT
success stories about engaging and winning industrial support. It all started from a
proposal that Nicholas Negroponte, the Lab's founding director, wrote, which caught the
attention of Jerome Wiesner, the then president of MIT, who needed to sign off on it.
Negroponte was still young, in his early 40s, but with bold ideas. Negroponte recalls
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"Rather than dismiss it as crazy, he offered to help...A great friendship began... Wiesner
pressed for more sophisticated linguistics and deeper commitments to art. By 1979 we
talked ourselves and the MIT Corporation into building the Media Lab (Negroponte
1995)." One senior academic at the Lab recalls:
"In 1978, Nicholas and Jerry first drew what I call, what we call the Media
Convergence Venn Diagram... This was a hypothesis that three industries were
on a collision course: print and publishing, television and broadcasting,
computing...And it was then that they said that by the year 2000, those three
industries would... almost entirely... overlap. .. In my mind, that diagram was
the origin of the Media Lab."
Wiesner, upon stepping down from the presidency in 1980, joined Negroponte in
extensive overseas trips in search of industrial support. Enough funds were raised from
corporate executives and high-powered friends of Wiesner to set up a building and the
Media Lab was officially started in 1985. In the five years, Negroponte and Wiesner had
traveled intensively "sometimes spending more nights with each other than with our
families" (Negroponte 1995). They had clearly established a proposition about the Media
Lab that was appealing to the corporate audience. Stewart Brand, the founder of the
Whole Earth Catalog, who spent three months of 1986 on sabbatical in the Media Lab,
summarized the message as follows:
"Negroponte's vision: all communication technologies are suffering a joint
metamorphosis which can only be understood properly if treated as a single
subject and only advanced properly if treated as a single craft. The way to figure
out what needs to be done is through exploring the human sensory and cognitive
system and the ways that humans most naturally interact. Join this and you grasp
the future" (Brand 1987).
"It worked," says Brand, and explains Media Lab's ability to persuade the corporate
audience as follows.
"How does a corporation get to the front of this risky business without spending a
hell of a lot of money? How can you peer ten years along a technological
trendline that might devour or starve your present cash cows? How can you
explore the crossover technologies where entire new businesses are being born
without becoming one of the stillborn? You read in the Wall Street Journal or the
Boston Globe how former industrial backwater Massachusetts is booming, with
unemployment down to 3.6 percent and a state budget surplus, and it's all being
attributed to MIT. Then Negroponte shows up keynoting somewhere with video
demos of MIT researchers test-piloting the information technologies at the edge
of the possible, flying in formation around a pattern vague and shifting but
emerging, hypnotic.... And you buy in" (Brand 1987).
The reality does not give simple counterfactuals, so it is not possible to know whether
Negroponte, today a brilliant fundraiser, would have been as successful without Wiesner.
The corroborating evidence is that it was Wiesner' s phone calls that prompted the NEC
chairman to respond in a day, and Negroponte himself recounts how much he gained
from Wiesner' s partnership. In his own words,
"For me this opportunity to learn from Wiesner and to see the world through his
eyes and those of his many brilliant and famous fiends was an education. The
Media Lab became global because Wiesner was global" (Negroponte 1995).
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A statue of Wiesner's head still sits on the office table of the Media Lab Director as if
someone still wanted him to participate in meetings even after his death.
Internalization: emergence of individual role sub-stories. What does a cover story
do? A cover story helps individuals to make sense of the significance of joint action in
light of a proposed goal/end. By the same token, the cover story provides a reason to
sustain particular behaviors. What academics and industrialists would do at the
negotiating table and indeed during the formative years of a partnership would be to
develop their own sub-stories about their participation in the partnership. It has to be
clear to their own internal audience how they would benefit and why it is important for
them to join. In some cases, this will require different stakeholders within the industry,
for instance, top executives, managers, and researchers, to develop multiple sub-stories
about why they should participate in the partnership.
In one partnership case, the partnership decision was made first and foremost by the top
executive. His vision was that a new type of knowledge alliance was needed to push the
company forward. To his managers and researchers, who were much more operation-
focused, the reasons for, and nature of, the partnership were not as clear. Some
employees resented the initiative because it was top-down, and others failed to see
benefits to the company. Some participated simply because they were told to do so by
the top executive, rather than to explore the benefit that the top executive saw.
What is evident is that the establishment of a single partnership requires the involvement
of multiple people, each with their own sub-stories about their roles in it: why and how
they should participate. It is evident that one can have sub-stories that stem from ulterior
motives, such as the subordinates participating simply to please the bosses. These sub-
stories may still ensure some level of participation, but the nature of participation is likely
to be weak and superficial. In other words, the compatibility between the main
partnership story and individual role sub-stories can be strong or weak.
Sustaining participation: Individual role compatibility. In any partnership, a group of
individuals must devote some energy to establishing and carrying on new partnership
activities. Individual commitment or motivation can depend on whether the sub-story
about participation is compatible with his/her personal values and ambitions. There has
to be certain compatibility between the new role stories and identity narratives.
In a case in which an industrialist formed a company to help university technology
transfer, the CEO expressed his motivation as being deep-rooted in the desire for self-
actualization. He had worked as a professional in a position to advise young people
about their career development, and had begun to question his own competitive
advantage and career goals. He selected technical transfer as his field of expertise for
three reasons: as an undergraduate, he had written a thesis on the topic. He already had
working relationships both with universities and with industry, and he wanted to
contribute to society through such expertise. He established contact with the world's
best-known consultant in the field, worked hard to learn by working with him, and, five
years later, became a CEO. In a case like this, it is not clear whether his personal
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motivation story was there to begin with, or was developed as he went along.
Nonetheless it is clear that it is the story that he uses to explain his own commitment to
the others, and probably to himself. When people are convinced that they are doing the
right thing for the right reasons, they are more likely to devote more energy to it and be
more mindful about it.
The personal ambition of the founding director is largely behind the establishment of
another center with an intensive partnership arrangement with industry. He explains his
personal motivation in three ways. He had joined academia, after a career in industry,
with the idea of helping the university establish better linkages with industry. He was
also interested in sharing with students the excitement of participating in technological
revolutions, which he had been privileged enough to have lived through. Finally, he felt
there was a critical need for academics in universities to learn to collaborate with each
other. The design of the new center was based exactly on these principles: it squarely
rests upon intense collaborations among faculty members; it attempts to ferment
technological revolution by bringing in industrial partners that cover every part of the
supply chain; and students have been central in the interdisciplinary technological
developments.
Coordinating across external boundaries: partnership compatibility. Partnership
requires multiple parties to take actions. Academics may need to recruit new post-docs
with skills appropriate to new research themes, to find administrators to assist in the
monitoring of finances, and to write reports and set up review meetings with
industrialists. Some of these may not be "new" behaviors, while others may be totally
new. Industrial researchers, on the other hand, may need to talk to the academics
frequently, to visit them and to read their reports. Industrial managers may need to
monitor progress to ensure company interest is protected, to respond to new requirements
for equipment and other resources and to engage in patent reviews. Industrial executives
may need to visit the campus every year to monitor progress and generally to ensure that
the partnership remains viable for the company and is seen to be so by the rest of the
company.
In other words, a new "institutional pattern" of partnership entails coordinated action
among a range of participants. And yet, what governs individual action is not only the
shared cover story about the partnership but also his/her own individual role sub-stories
for participation. These individual role sub-stofies are necessarily different across people
and give meanings to different tasks/roles. And yet, in order for the individual actions to
be "coordinated", these sub-stories must somehow be compatible with each other. There
has to be some partnership compatibility among individual role sub-stories of
participation for the various participants to behave in a coordinated way.
As the participants begin to enact the partnership and to respond to evolving
circumstances, any inconsistencies between their sub-stories may have an adverse effect.
In one partnership, where there was a weak understanding among industry employees as
to why they were participating, the initial projects were selected without their serious
engagement. As a result of not being compatible, some projects did not make sense;
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many were not monitored in detail by the industry people, and the company did not gain
much from the partnership.
In a contrasting case, there was a strong commitment by the responsible managers to
engage their researchers both in project selection as well as in their implementation. In
another case, industrialists and academics developed compatible sub-stories. The
academics did not have facilities and needed to have access to those in the industry. The
industrialists wanted the scientific properties of their materials to be examined. The
exchange of favors was therefore less problematic.
Coordinating across internal boundaries: organizational compatibility. Multiple
actors in each of the two organizations need to enact the partnership in ways that are
compatible with each other. For universities, these might include academics, students,
and administrators. For industry, they might be researchers, managers, and top
executives. On each side of the partnership, individual role sub-stories of different
organizational players must be compatible with each other in order for their actions to be
sustained over time. If a researcher, his manager, and the top executive all have
compatible views about the partnership with the university and their role sub-stories are
compatible with each other, the researcher will find his work for the partnership to be
organizationally supported and easier to sustain over time. If the organizational
compatibility is weak, then individual role stories remain specific to individuals. When
the specific individuals move on to other tasks, the roles performed will not be inherited
by other organizational members. It is only as organizational compatibility develops that
individual role sub-stories become organizational role sub-stories.
In one partnership arrangement, the department head, administrators, and academics had
developed compatible sub-stories about their participation. The department head saw his
role as disinterested manager. He declined to take any funding directly for himself from
the partnership, and focused on setting up the process to support faculty in his
department, paying particular attention to those who needed start-up assistance.
Administrators assisted in developing the contract to reflect most of the faculty concerns
about ensuring academic autonomy. In other words, the sub-stories about their
involvement, both of the department head as well as of faculty, were directly to do with
supporting faculty research.
Industry interests also need to be represented with compatibility among executives,
managers, and researchers. Any change in personnel could disrupt and destroy
compatibility in their participation. In two partnership cases, a change in top
management led to a sharp decline in interest in the partnership. In one case, new
management combined with changing financials resulted in the non-renewal of the
partnership. In another case, the change in management led to a serious re-examination
of the partnership arrangement and activities.
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Fig 10-1: Three types of compatibility
Building compatibility: dialectics and sustained contact. There appear to be two
principal routes through which differences between individuals may be surfaced: dialectic
debates among the participants; and sustained contact and observations. Open dialectics
appeared to be the more frequent route, as interviewees often recounted instances of
disagreements among participants. For instance, in several cases, academics had to lower
their "prices" when confronted by industrialists who argued that they could not pay so
much. In other cases, unwillingness on the part of industries to simply accept the
proposed partnership as given, led to modification of the terms and conditions in much
more elaborate ways. Similar states of "understanding each other" can be attained over
time through sustained contact and observations. A junior researcher "gathered" what his
reticent boss wanted in the partnership through observation over time. Several
industrialists located on campus admitted that they have gone "native" in academia and
understand academic interests far better than when they started. These remained notable
exceptions, where participants had the luxury of having enough time to make sense of
what they observed. More often, dialectics were the only viable route to surface and
reconcile differences.
A question may prompt a need for an explanation and a story can develop incorporating
different explanations for different parties. One center went through extended
negotiations with multiple companies about the nature of their participation and inputs.
The iterative process of negotiation was critical in establishing a central cover story, as
well as compatible participant role sub-stories. The initial discussions between the center
and partner industrialists led to an understanding that multiple strategic alliances needed
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to be put together in separate segments of the supply chain, but had to be structured in a
way that each individual company could get exclusive access to intellectual property
rights in some technological area. On the other hand, it also became clear that some
technologies needed to be shared by them all. A new cover story to form both individual
strategic alliances as well as a joint consortium had to be developed to reflect the
concerns of industrialists.
Another example illustrates the importance of dialectic debate through its absence. In
one consortium, the organizing academic said that neither the industrialists nor colleagues
that surrounded him asked him many questions about how the consortium was to work.
Most people merely voiced their respect for his proposal without critiquing it. As a
result, it was not possible for him to identify inconsistencies or conflicting interests. The
cover story of the consortium was accepted as proposed and did not take into account
different interests of participants. On the other hand, to the extent that industrialists and
other participants were willing to give the benefit of the doubt and participate in
consortium sessions, there were opportunities for sustained contact and interaction
through which differences could be surfaced and dealt with.
Concluding remarks
What is the role of individuals in institutional change? A new behavior can arise either
by accident or through reflection, but in order for it to be sustained, there has to be an
underlying story to explain and justify the importance of that behavior. A pattern of
behavior emerges, when backed with a story that makes sense to an individual. A pattern
becomes a shared one, if other people buy into the story. The role of the individual then
is creating a new story of action, using it to persuade the others, and interpreting others'
stories to develop one's story further. Sometimes, the new stories are created
purposively. Other times, new stories get created accidentally. Individuals can and do
play both a passive and active role in institutional change.
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Chapter11:
Conclusions
In this dissertation, I argue that university-industry relationships are evolving rather
differently in the three universities. At MIT, the main change has been the sheer rise in
the volume, with an increasing number of companies as well as faculty members working
with each other through proliferation of consortia in the 1980s and the emergence of
strategic alliances in the 1990s. While there are a greater number of faculty members
working with industry, it is not clear that the individual relationships are becoming any
deeper than before. In Cambridge, on the other hand, the main change has been the
development of a variety of single company partnerships, the so called embedded
laboratories and their variations, which led to deep and sustained interactions between
industrialists and academics, although the monetary scale of these relationships-is smaller
than that of MIT's strategic alliances. In Tokyo, there have been key administrative and
organizational changes in support of university-industry relationships, and developments
of multiple company relationships, largely outside the university.
I argue that these patterns of change can be explained in terms of two concepts:
organizational boundaries that shape the nature of interactions, and the role of individuals
in developing a pattern of interaction through story-telling. The objective of this chapter
is to bring these two concepts to a coherent whole. To this end, the framework of
organizational boundaries and storytelling is first presented at a fairly abstracted level.
Second, the tales of the three universities are re-told through this lens. Third, I discuss
my contributions to the understanding about the phenomenon and implications. In the
final section, implications for future research are discussed.
Summarizing the framework: organizational boundaries and storytelling
So far, I have talked about organizational boundaries and story-telling separately, as
though they were independent. Organizational boundaries represented a social structure
that shapes action or stories as told by individuals; and story-telling represents the role of
individuals in shaping new structures and boundaries. Individuals enact the
organizational boundaries, which in turn influence future individual actions. The content
of stories can be influenced by past interactions as structured by boundaries. New stories
can in turn shape new boundaries, by clarifying the rationale for them.
Boundaries are what separate distinct communities or sub-communities, stand between
organizational or professional sub-cultures, and represent divides between different
interests and values. External boundaries exist between university and industrial
communities. Internal boundaries stand between disciplinary communities or
administrators and academics.
These boundaries are physically invisible, but powerfully at work, conditioning all
interactions between the two groups. Specifically, there are three dimensions of
boundaries that influence interactions: membership, knowledge, and physical space.
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Membership and physical boundaries are parameters that condition the nature of
interaction that can take place. Cumulative effects of membership and physical
boundaries can be reflected in the level of mutual understanding among the two
communities, at any given time. If the two communities understand each other at the
outset, that understanding is likely to influence the nature of interaction, and the kind of
stories that can be told. Storytelling in turn justifies new actions and behaviors, which
can define new boundaries through new types of relationships. Consortia and strategic
alliances created new types of "membership" for industrialists on campus, allowing them
to have different types of claims in influencing university affairs. Embedded laboratories
changed the meaning of industrial presence on campus by bringing industrial researchers
to sit side by side and share space in an intimate way. Industrial research activities
became physically part of university activities.
The knowledge boundary is different in that this dimension directly touches on the core
difference in the interests between the two communities: academics and industrialists, on
the one hand, academics and administrators on the other. In Chapter 9, I explained that
both communities depend on and produce knowledge, but the meaning of "knowledge"
could not be more different. For academics, knowledge is the output of their work and
therefore something that one must exhibit to the world the moment it is produced. For
industrialists, it is a critical input for production, and the more secretive they can be, the
better. In other words, objectives, interests, and values of the two communities define the
meaning of knowledge differently, and indeed in conflicting ways. How knowledge is
dealt with at the boundary, therefore becomes significant in conditioning the interaction.
Stories are created to justify maintenance or change in the knowledge boundary. For
instance, it was not easy for MIT to insist on its ownership of all intellectual property
rights when the size of industrial contribution became so large. Various accounts to
justify MIT ownership were developed and can buttress MIT's position in future
negotiations. Another example is that the MIT community learned that MIT ownership
was different from company ownership, because inventors at MIT expect to retain certain
rights and leverage in the subsequent licensing decisions, even though MIT owns the full
rights legally. The tough negotiation experience that prompted such a debate became a
story to explain what MIT ownership means and why it was different from company
ownership, and will no doubt shape the way MIT will handle its intellectual property
rights ownership.
I argue that storytelling takes place to explain and justify new actions and behaviors. At
the boundaries, stories are particularly important as players from different communities
are likely to see different meanings in the same sequence of events. Stories that are
developed through active dialectics between different communities are more likely to
convey similar meanings to both communities. Storytelling at the boundary is not only a
mechanism for communicating the need for change, it is also a mechanism for translating
and creating new shared meanings.
Stories have a critical function in institutionalizing behavior: providing a stable reason or
a justifying account for a given behavior. Since institutions require "coordinated actions"
where multiple individuals play the same or different roles, whether these individuals are
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operating on the basis of compatible narratives or not is the critical issue that determines
the overall strength and robustness of joint action. If and when stories are understood and
accepted by people, they are more likely to engage in the behavior pattern and sustain it
over time. Once there are stories that are readily understandable for people, the chances
of the behavior being replicated over time and across space increase.
The three types of compatibility show different fault lines of joint action. Individuals
must create role stories that are compatible with their identity stories in order for them to
keep up the new behavior over time. The role stories of academics must also be
compatible with those of industrialists in order for the partnership to be sustained. The
role stories must also be compatible within each partnering organization among various
organizational players or across internal boundaries, in order for the partnership to obtain
the necessary organizational support for living beyond individuals and being replicated
elsewhere.
At the same time, it is not necessary that people remember and be aware of these
underlying stories all the time. Indeed, as time passes, and as some patterns of behavior
become "normal" there will be less and less reason to explicitly remember why they do
things the way they do. It is probably the case that stories surface only when questions
are raised, or when there is a need for change.
Exactly what degree of freedom does an individual have in telling stories? To what
extent is storytelling a real instance of agency and not an act determined by a set of
structures? Clearly the kind of stories individuals tell is heavily influenced by the
individuals' past experience. Organizational boundaries can have a cumulative effect on
the content of "typical stories" that arise from its members, because academics with
consulting or work experience in industry are likely to develop different stories about
how and why they would like to work with industry as compared with those without such
an exposure to industry. However, many stories are created on the spur of the moment,
almost as they are told. One industrialist I interviewed was amidst rationalizing about
what benefit the company was getting from its relationship with the university. In my
first interview with him, I got the impression that he knew what the answers were. It was
only two interviews later that he admitted that he was thinking aloud, and that my
questions were generating ideas to help him give an account of company action.
Serendipity, dialectics, and improvising can influence story development.
The MIT Way Revisited: Organizational compatibility for amplifying stories
The most powerful way in which MIT differs from the other two universities is its ability
to amplify and institutionalize activities. MIT more than the other two universities
manages to amplify the ideas that come from individual faculty. An idea can grow from
being a single faculty activity to a group activity, to a laboratory that comprises many
researchers. Negroponte, the founder of the Media Lab asserted "Wiesner amplified the
creativity of other people more than anybody before or since [Brand, 1987 #248]."
Indeed the story of the Media Lab is one of the most rapid growth from a small group in
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the late 1970s, to a laboratory comprising about 30 academic staff, 80 other staff and 170
students today.
What is the secret of amplification? I argue that the key difference is the organizational
compatibility within MIT. Administrators comprise both academic types and
professionals and they are quick to understand and add to cover stories generated by the
academics in comparison with those in the other two universities. They are a diverse
group comprising different types of bilinguals, sometimes even trilinguals, who
understand the motives and interests of different communities at work: academics,
administrators, and even industrialists. As such, they are uniquely capable of
understanding and translating stories in such a way that they make sense to different
communities. Even though MIT academics are -still likely to complain about the lack of
resources and the need to fight for them, the fact is that administrators can allocate
additional and critical resources such as seed money, space, and positions for principal
investigators. What begins as a highly personal and individualized initiative can quickly
become an organizational initiative as more organizational players subscribe to the cover
story, and individual role stories can develop into organizational roles, thereby making it
possible to be sustained over time and replicated across locales.
The Media Lab became a powerful story for joint action as it quickly gained support from
the central administration and organizational compatibility was attained across key
organizational roles. The support was initially given by Wiesner as MIT President, but
that presidential support was inherited by Paul Gray. The individual role story developed
by Wiesner for his own participation and support of the Media Lab led to justifications as
to why and how the building of the Media Lab had to be supported by MIT. Wiesner's
story became both compatible with the organizational strategy of MIT. Wiesner's
individual role story subsequently became an organizational role to be played by other
top administrators.
There were other idiosyncratic organizational norms and rules within the Media Lab that
were developed and supported by administrators and the Lab's academics. For instance,
the Media Lab developed unique rules about sharing intellectual property rights, where
all the sponsors collectively get royalty-free commercialization rights, and academics and
students get the name and publication rights but no royalty payments. Sponsors had to
agree to the story that they would pay money, knowing that all that they would get would
be collective rights shared with all the other sponsors. Central administrators had to
agree to the story that intellectual property rights arrangements at the Media Lab were to
be different from anywhere else on the campus. Academics in the Media Lab had to
agree to the fact that in return for receiving all the material, spatial, and intellectual
support from the Media Lab, they would give up their rights to receive financial returns
on their inventions. This is an example of MIT coming up with a specific ruling for a
given department, which is compatible with the organization-wide rules, but goes further
in stipulating details for a specific department to suit its own need. This contrasts strongly
with the experience of Cambridge in developing framework agreements, where there is
explicit acknowledgement that the university cannot come up with an overriding ruling
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on the intellectual property rights arrangements even within a single department, since
that would involve different academics ex ante.
If the Media Lab provides an institutionalization at a given locale, strategic alliances
provide an example of institutionalization through replication. A kind of template was
developed among academic and professional administrators in terms of how to develop
one, what organizational structure could support them, and what to avoid, complete with
a template legal agreement. Different types of administrators came together to develop a
generalizable template that was later used for other strategic alliances. In the process,
certain changes were introduced in organizational roles of administrators, to
accommodate this new task of developing and supporting the strategic alliances.
How does this happen? As discussed in Chapter 9, administrators and academics share
key values, by virtue of the permeable membership boundary where academics turn into
administrators. It is not difficult then for the administrators to understand the stories of
new activities as undertaken by individual academics. Any good stories would be picked
up by multiple organizational members and amplified. To summarize the role of
administration simply, it is that it provides the capacity to organize and sponsor new
ideas. Laboratory heads, department heads, provosts - while they cannot provide
"direction" in the classic sense, lest individual faculty autonomy be violated - can play a
key role in making resources available, particularly at an early stage and selectively: a
small start-up fund, space, and administrative support. The role of administration
becomes particularly salient when contrasted with a place like the University of Tokyo,
where the administration plays little role in resource allocation. As a result, all the
academics have equal claim to space and resources with a consequence that nothing can
grow bigger and nothing can disappear.
The Cambridge Phenomenon Revisited:
Compatible stories through sustained dialectics
In contrast, Cambridge's initiatives are characterized by deep engagement that emerges
through sustained contacts and interactions as permitted by the fuzzy boundaries.
Academics and industrialists develop compatible individual role stories that make their
partnership stronger and sustainable over time. What is interesting is the fact that
partnerships that get formed appear to be intensely personal, and are unlikely to be
sustained over time when specific individuals leave, or to be replicated across locales.
Institutionalization is much harder to accomplish as organizational compatibility is harder
to attain in Cambridge than in MIT. This may be because in contrast to MIT, there are
few university administrators who can help turn these individual roles into organizational
ones. The total number of administrators may be too low to cope with the kind of work
load that is implied. The recruitment policy is such that it is rarely the case that academic
researchers turn into administrators. There are relatively fewer "trilingual" players who
understand academic values, administrative logic, and industrial interests.
One interesting example of the deep and personal relationships characteristic of
Cambridge is the BP Institute, which, as explained in Chapter 6, was established with
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significant benefaction both to establish several chairs in the field of relevance to the
company and to build a new building to house these research activities. During my first
visit, the building had not been built yet, with a couple of academics on board. The
representative from the company was struggling to explain how his company was going
to reap the benefit from a relationship where they owned no intellectual property rights
and no control over recruitment. He was speculating that the company should-not dictate
the content of research because that would distort the essence of science, which had to be
curiosity-driven. He was proposing instead that the company was to "listen like mad"
and engage in on-going science. He had learned through his sustained contact with
Cambridge academics that engaging in the substance through discussions is the best way
to work with academia. By my second visit, the institute had recruited about half of the
total academic staff all housed in a brand new building. A series of meetings were being
held with visitors from the company to discuss their operational problems. The
academics seemed to know little about the specific details of technicalities involved in the
operations, but through repeated meetings they learned enough. What is more, these
dialogues were interesting both to the academics, who found operational problems as new
intellectual challenges and were happy to ask all sorts of questions, and to the operators
who discovered that the dialectics provided an opportunity for thinking out of the box. In
the meantime, both academics and industrialists were learning about each other's
idiosyncrasies, and learning to take those into account. By my third visit, the industrial
representative was happy to report that some of these visits were bearing real results in
terms of cost reduction.
Fuzzy boundaries between the university and industry give opportunities for academics
and industrialists to explore a much wider set of working relationships through sustained
interactions. There are greater opportunities to develop their individual role stories in
ways that are compatible with each other, to attain a high level of partnership
compatibility. It is also interesting that fuzzy boundaries are generating a new breed of
bilinguals in large numbers. Microsoft employs over 50 researchers many of whom had
been academics before, who understand in detail what it means to involve students and
what makes them tick. Another company is expanding its research activities by simply
recruiting post-docs both from Cambridge and other universities who then subsequently
work on campus.
The Tokyo Story Revisited: Story tellers without powerful stories
The image of the Tokyo Story was that at least some academics were making honest
efforts to change and live up to the new expectations to work with industry and to
contribute directly to the society. Yet, it was difficult for them to get to where they
wanted. What were the circumstances that stifled individual aspirations in Tokyo? The
final version of the Tokyo Story is that storytelling took place without the benefit of
dialectics. Academics lacked an audience that asked critical questions. There is a clear
difference between an audience that would argue back and demand explanations, and an
audience that would simply accept the story line as told. Stories develop in the
directions in which there are actively questioning audiences - so that they make sense to
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that audience. The lack of questioning meant that both the cover story and individual role
stories were not developed at the outset to ensure a certain level of compatibility.
Why does the Japanese audience not ask questions? One Japanese industrial researcher
who had the experience of working in Tokyo and Cambridge explained the difference as
follows. In Cambridge University, the academics actively debated what the collaborative
research theme should be. They would not agree to collaborate unless there was a match
of interest. In Tokyo University, on the other hand, the academics respected company's
autonomy in setting the research agenda and did not engage in debate with the industrial
researcher. Such reticence was also characteristic of his boss in the company, who was
also Japanese. His boss gave only the broadest instructions and left everything else up to
him to decide - and never asked questions. The researcher felt a great sense of respect
for his boss, precisely because of his reticence and implicit trust. The boss was a man of
deeds and not words. The researcher worked harder just because of that trust and
responsibility. However, he had to develop the substance of what to do in the absence of
any significant inputs from his boss. This story has a heavy cultural undertone of
traditional crafts in which a master never speaks and an apprentice simply guesses what
might be going through the master's mind. To ask questions or to be asked questions is
uncouth - only through enacting over a sustained period you will learn.
There are other reasons why dialectics were prevented. Industry representatives are hard
pressed to argue back to academics. Many of the Japanese company representatives
interviewed echoed the view that they needed to treat Japanese professors as superior and
that it is difficult therefore to engage in open discussions. One visiting professor at UT,
with 35 years of corporate background, remarked that it is hard for companies to speak up
against professors. Academic administrators also do not argue back to individual
professors since they have traditionally had little decision-making authority. They have
little reason or a basis for dialectics.
There are other internal boundaries. Junior faculty members generally would not engage
in debate, partly because the career of junior academics until recently depended on the
opinions held by senior professors. There is also a possible cultural undertone that it is
simply inappropriate for youth to voice strong opinions. There were several instances
where I explicitly heard senior professors making dismissive remarks about their younger
colleagues on the basis of their youth. The remarks were not malicious - only, they were
young. One "young" professor noted that in his field, a person must be over 50 to shed
the title of being young. There is also little peer interaction among professors in general.
Departments provide the most frequent encounters among professors - but there again,
deep-rooted respect for professorial autonomy prevents any active debate about what they
are doing.
The Tokyo Story is about the absence of powerful storytelling. But this does not mean
individual desires for change were lacking. On the contrary, there were individuals who
were passionate about their initiatives as described in Chapter 7. Their strong beliefs led
to sustained actions against many odds. However, these powerfully motivated
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individuals were nonetheless not given opportunities to develop powerful stories -
because storytelling takes both the teller and listeners.
There is one exception to the rule of silent audience. Administrative officers both within
the university and in the Ministry do engage in debate. MOES bureaucrats argue back,
because they are accountable for their budget requests to the MOF officials. Since they
are the ones who will have to explain and defend the budget plan, they in turn demand
from the academics "good reasons" why any expenditure is necessary. University
administrators argue back, because they are accountable to MOES for the proper handling
of finances. The laws about what is appropriate expenditure are quite complex and are
particularly hard to grasp for rotating officials. The tendency then is for them to stick to
the rules and precedents, so as to avoid trouble. Rotating administrative managers leave
much to the judgment of lower level administrators, whose judgment tends towards
conservatism. It is not that the lower level administrators want to be obstacles - some of
them expressed joy in being able to provide discretionary help to professors to facilitate
their work. They are, however, limited in their capability of providing such help.
The net result is that there is a pattern in the story development. The story gets developed
in response to administrative officers' queries about how it fits within the broader
contexts of law and government. But it is under-developed with respect to critical
stakeholders, industrialists, and other academics.
Contributions
The present research contributes to our understanding of the phenomenon in three
different ways. First, it adds to the past literature on university-industry relationships by
emphasizing organizational level factors, rather than national or individual project level
factors, and by bringing up front the role of individuals. The organizational perspective
is important given that many universities are today struggling with the very issue of how
best to develop relationships with industry.
Second, it provides a new way of conceptualizing organizational boundaries by clarifying
three dimensions that influence and shape the subsequent interactions between the two
communities. It adds to the past literature which had developed the key underpinnings to
understand the nature of communities that created boundaries, such as organizational
cultures or subcultures (Van Maanen and Barley 1984; Schein 1992) or communities of
practice (Bourdieu 1977; Carlile 2002; Carlile 2002). [Organizational boundaries may be
permeable or contested (Martin 2002), but the best way to examine the boundaries may
be to look at the process of bounding (Abbott 1995) By proposing that organizational
boundaries are defined by a set of norms, rules and practices, and by clarifying the three
dimensions along which meaningful permeability can occur, the current research enables
further understanding about the nature of organization-environmental relationships, and
contributes to the emerging literature on cross-boundary collaborations (Levina 2001,
Black 2002).
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Third, it pushes the metaphor of storytelling in institutional change further to advance our
understanding of the role of individuals. There is nothing new in claiming that stories
may have something to do with institutions and the way organizations operate and
change(Clark 1971; Boje 1991; O'Connor 1996) and indeed that stories may play a
critical role in institutional change (Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska 1998). Past
discussions have been either highly abstract and theoretical in the way it was hard to
relate to the observable phenomena, or exclusively focused on empirical analysis of
narratives to the extent that underlying theories were not pushed further. Middle range
theorizing to clarify what are the circumstances when "storytelling" leads to changes was
missing. I use the minimalist definition of stories as accounts for justifying and
explaining an action (Scott and Lyman 1968), and assume that stories may be explicit or
implicit (Boje 1991) but that they are critical inputs and products of sensemaking. By
proposing that stories form a nested set, comprising a cover story for the overall
partnership, and individual role stories that constitute sub-stories of the cover story, and
by introducing the notion of "compatibility" among the stories, the present research
enables us to discuss the "strength" of institutions and plausibility of institutional change
in a more concrete way. Furthermore, I argue that the opportunities to develop
compatible stories arise principally through dialectic discourses that can help to surface
differences between individuals in their values and interests.
Implications
Implications for universities. The principal implication for universities is that the way
they relate to industry is strongly influenced by the way they define their organizational
boundaries, which in turn have been defined through historical evolution, starting from
the foundation and various historical events, both national and local. The governance
structures, as well as norms and values stand as legacies of the past and strongly
influence ventures that can arise within the organization. It is therefore not a simple task
to start new types of relationships. The changes will take place slowly, through stories
that are created by individuals to propose and explain new behaviors. To accelerate
change, it may be important to create an enabling environment for individual initiatives,
rather than to do so through programmatic initiatives. It is critically important to allow
storytelling by passionate individuals - so that they can further persuade others to change.
Another significant implication has to do with the role of governance and administration
or management. Universities have historically been defined as communities of scholars,
and as such strong-handed governance structures that "manage" the academics and their
activities tend to induce weary reactions from the academic community. Through the
examination of organizational boundaries and their effect on academic-industry
relationships, I have argued that the implications of the governance structure are multiple.
The governance structure may indeed constitute key elements of the "membership
boundary" as in the case of the Board of Trustees and visiting committees at MIT, or the
collegiate system at Cambridge, which have no counterparts in Tokyo. The governance
structures condition the role of administration and over time define its culture. The
governance structures also provide mechanisms to define and refine internal and external
boundaries, by clarifying rules, encouraging some initiatives to grow, and by bridging
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between increasingly isolated disciplinary communities. If left to academics, it may not
be easy to allow some ventures to grow by allocating resources selectively, or to develop
structures to work together across boundaries. More specifically, given the pace of life
and given the strong allegiance of academics to their disciplinary communities, the role
of administrators in providing the institutional glue within universities may be critical.
I argue that the role of administration was important in three respects: in formalizing the
organizational boundaries over time; in bringing about sizable collaboration with
industry; and in devising mechanisms to support inter-departmental activities. If the
universities want to respond to the external environment, one prerequisite may be to have
an appropriate administrative capacity to support that. The picture Clark once drew of
universities changing constantly through changing subject matters even without
organizational structures changing may still be true (Clark 1983). However, in today's
world, when science is expected to be part of the economic institutions, the fragmented,
discipline-oriented structure may not be sufficient. This implication is consistent with
Clark's more recent study that demonstrates the need for a strong center (Clark 1998).
And yet, a stronger administration can also have adverse implications. Most universities
do not have internal mechanisms to coordinate between commitments made at the center
and capacity and/or willingness to respond at the periphery. Strengthening the central
administration could lead to over commitment or unmatched interests. Another
possibility is that if administration becomes the organizational glue, it may in fact reduce
the need for disciplinary communities to work together, thereby exacerbating the
centrifugal tendencies of academic communities.
Another practical implication has to do with the role of individuals and the strength of
agency. If the proposed metaphor of storytelling and various kinds of compatibilitie
among sub-stories has any validity, then the most powerful kind of institutional change
will emerge out of individuals undertaking actions that make sense to them. If those
individuals can then engage relatively freely in dialectics with other actors, to define their
own actions, then the resulting behavior pattern is more likely to be robust against local
disturbances or inertia against change. In order for the emerging pattern of behavior to
become institutionalized over time and across settings, there has to be some flexibility on
the part of the organization to allow organizational roles to be negotiated. This has an
important implication for the way administration is defined: their essential function must
be to support and enable individual actions, rather than to manage and control them.
Finally, there is one issue about the tradeoff between informality and formality. The
contrast between MIT and Cambridge demonstrated that formality tended to bound the
relationships while informality could co-exist with deep engagement. Informality can in
turn lead to abuse, misunderstanding, or fear, because there will be little legitimacy for
such behaviors. A lack of clarity about what is legitimate to do can also encourage
individuals not to take any action. Concerns to avoid all conflicts and clearly establish
legitimacy through rules, on the other hand, could lead to less engagement and
consequently less emergent relationships. If formality is taken too far, as in the case of
Tokyo where the rules are set in a way that is not compatible with the values of the place
or individuals, it may simply drive individual activities to become invisible, as
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individuals would choose to undertake activities outside of formal rules or the formal
organization.
Implications for industry. For industry, there are two implications. One, given that
knowledge is clearly an axis where there is a conflict of values with university academics,
is that it is important to have articulated strategies as to how and what the company
wishes to gain from the collaboration. In doing so, it may be helpful to understand the
characteristics of the university community and to capitalize on its strengths, rather than
to force changes through conditions. In other words, the critical part of the absorptive
capacity is to understand how academia works, so that the best outputs can be generated.
Many industrialists who have worked for a long time with universities commented that
partnership with universities should not be taken as equivalent to sub-contracting or out-
sourcing. Particularly important to understand is the role of research students, who
actually do the bulk of the work. They are untrained, but usually with deep personal
commitment to their dissertations. They are unlikely to be motivated by simple straight
jacket problems, and could end up anywhere in the world for their job. An important part
of the relationship management would be to harness their energy and know what they do
best. The discussion about engagement tells a powerful story about how industry can
influence academia: by asking intriguing questions. This is particularly important given
the powerful scientific ethos and values about academic autonomy, which puts an
immediate strain on industry as it would like to have the power to direct the agenda. The
key absorptive capacity for industry may be the ability to engage in a discourse with
academics, sufficiently to influence their research agenda.
Second, it is important to have organizational compatibility about the what and how of
the collaboration among the key organizational players. It is not enough that there are
people at the boundary, doing the intermediary work, these functions must be understood
and valued by management. Because it is easy to expect multiple things from an open-
ended partnership, it is even more important that there is a larger framework of
understanding about what is being accomplished within the organization.
Implications for the three universities. What are the lessons that each can draw from
the other two? For MIT, the biggest lesson may be about faculty time to engage. When
individual faculty members push for new initiatives, the time constraint of individuals
becomes a natural limit to how many activities MIT would undertake. When the
administration pushes independently for more initiatives, there may be even greater
burdens placed on faculty time. The biggest concern might be the image of MIT
professors who no longer can cope with all the incoming enquiries to such an extent that
they only deal with the obvious contacts. The informal dialectics as a source of ideas is
simply no longer there. The similar stifling of curiosity may be at work even at the
organizational level. There is a strong sense that MIT is doing the right thing, and can
lead and help the others. The question is should they also be learning? As Tokyo
University professors remain curious how others do things, should MIT also be curious
how others do it? The most interesting question may be not what Cambridge can learn
from MIT, but what MIT can learn from Cambridge in restoring some sense of
timelessness.
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For Cambridge and Tokyo, the most important agenda continues to be the shape and
structure of its governance to be able to cope with increasing contingencies that demand
organizational attention. The issue would be how to centralize, while preserving
individual autonomy. The most important lesson both universities can learn from MIT is
the ethos of full-time academic administrators on the one hand, and professional
administrators on the other, to serve the needs of the community. One important criterion
in governance structures is that they provide room for dialectics, where reasoned
arguments from individuals can have the potential to be heard.
Another important implication for Cambridge is that fuzziness does have its charm, one
that is both a reflection of its members who seek certain independence as well as the
broader national setting which tolerates differences among individuals. To tidy up rules
of the game may be tempting, but there is a risk of destroying some of the most
interesting characteristics of Cambridge- informality and deep dialectics - by becoming
more straight-jacketed. The other issue is that the historical tradition of trusting
individual members' instincts and permitting them to do what they like is at equilibrium
with other practices, such as low salaries.
For Tokyo, the biggest implication is about how to create an environment that supports
individual action. Clearly, one aspect of that has to do with configuring the governance
structures, such that principled dialectics can take place, to support reasoned
organizational actions. Professionalizing administrators and making them serve a
supportive role would be one critical change that is urgently needed in this respect.
Another issue is the creation of an environment where individual initiatives have an
option of obtaining greater organizational support, at the cost of other initiatives.
Future research
The present research was designed to be inductive, to be based on grounded theorizing
and to generate useful constructs. There are three general directions this research can be
pushed further. First is to deal with the issue of generalizability. Second is to deal with
theoretical clarification; and third is to look into the consequences of changing university-
industry relationships.
Findings were based on empirical data from MIT, Cambridge and Tokyo University. The
question is whether and to what extent they are generalizable to different types of
universities, other countries and indeed other types of organizations? The three
universities represent research universities of highest academic reputation. In less
research oriented schools, conflict of interest in agenda setting (i.e. autonomy versus
direction setting) between academics and industrialists is expected to be less. Similarly,
the three universities cover a wide range of governance structures, even in light of other
countries. However, it is also true that the three cases do not necessarily help distinguish
the effect of being public/private and the level of centralization.
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This said, the more abstract notion that differences between communities create
boundaries, which in turn powerfully influence behavior, is likely to be generalizable to
other organizational settings. This dissertation has already proposed that similar
dimensions can be used to examine external as well as internal boundaries. The
framework for conceptualizing boundaries is also compatible with the emerging literature
on collaboration across internal boundaries within commercial organizations (Carlile
1997; Black 2002; Carlile 2002; Carlile 2002) or on collaboration across external
boundaries between commercial organizations (Levina 2001).
There are several areas where further theoretical clarification would be of interest. First,
the metaphor of storytelling and the idea of individuals enacting compatible role stories
opens doors to a whole set of further theoretical and empirical analysis. Theoretically, it
would be important to clarify the construct of compatibility further. How do individuals
know if their actions are compatible? Or do they only know when they are incompatible,
leading to unintended consequences? More rigorous empirical analysis could be
conducted to re-examine the theorizing on storytelling through a more systematic
collection of narratives in the field. For instance, it may be possible to undertake an in-
depth longitudinal data collection from a small number of initiatives, where participants
are asked the same questions about their roles and why they participate, while keeping
track of the interaction that goes on among them. This may provide a way of analyzing
the changing narratives about their roles. I have focused on boundaries that exist between
communities. However, there is no reason why the same kind of theorizing cannot take
place simply among individuals. By examining the role of storytelling among a small
group of individuals engaged in collaborative work over time, it might be possible to
further illuminate the nature of agency, and how agency leads to further structures.
Another way of extending the theoretical frontier is to look into the cumulative effect of
organizational boundaries over time. Particularly interesting may be the effect of
practices such as consulting. Tokyo University provides an interesting opportunity for
further research in this respect. The other is the cumulative effect of spatial
configurations, where the three universities offer stellar contrasts. MIT has the tradition
of trying to connect all departments through corridors, Cambridge University is
ubiquitous in the town and requires bicycles for transportation between departmental
buildings. Tokyo University has three separate campuses requiring train or subway travel
to move from one to another.
Third, it would be important to look into the consequences of changing university-
industry relationships. The most obvious would be to consider the effect of these
relationships on the content of science. For this, it may be interesting to conduct a
structured comparison at individual, laboratory or departmental levels in terms of the
nature of interaction and changes in research agenda over a period. Another would be to
focus on a particular project and observe the evolution of the research agenda over a
period.
It would be also both interesting and important to extend the analysis on university-
industry relationships a step further by generalizing about university-environment
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relationships. University-industry relationships fall squarely into the resource
dependence relationships, where it is in the narrow survival interest of universities and
industry to work together. And yet, the need for autonomy was defined differently in the
past - namely that universities needed to stand sufficiently outside of the structure in
order to be able to be the independent voice and social conscience of the world. The
question is whether it is possible for a university to be that, while being part of an
increasingly complex web of inter-dependencies. This is ultimately a theoretical question
about collective agency - can a university be designed to be a social conscience, and if
so, how.
My dissertation examined the state of flux that universities find themselves in, the kind of
flexibility that is demanded by the changing economic environment; and the range of
responses universities were giving to this end. Because of the increasingly central role
"economic considerations" play in most countries, to adapt to new economic
circumstances -seems both-inevitable and good. One closing thought that I offer is a
reminder that this is not at all obvious. What if the road of this marketization is leading
to a place similar to where Tokyo University found itself at the end of WWII? What if
the systematic search for commercializable science leads to systematic elimination of
discoveries that could serve a greater public need? What if these "innovating
individuals" are simply telling stories that are new and innovative in their locales, but
ones that are in tune with the larger societal economic logic? They may be exercising
"agency" in that local environment, but their existence may be part of a broader
structuration of on-going "marketization". As the romantics in Tokyo University would
tell us, it is not obvious that adapting to the requirements of powerful economic interests
is the way to human happiness. From their perspective, to be conservative may indeed be
the way to exercise their agency.
0
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Appendix:
Social construction of a dissertation:
The power of an audience
"Making up stories was his ruling passion.... In the old days, not all of his
stories had turned out well... It was when Momo sat listening to him that
his imagination blossomed like a meadow in springtime."
-- from "Momo" by Michael Ende
Dissertation writing is a process of social construction. The extent to which this is true,
however, was something that I did not fully grasp until late in the process. In retrospect,
four streams of social construction appear to have been at work simultaneously. The first
stream has to do with my theorizing about story-telling - a process of which I was quite
conscious. The second one has to do with theorizing about organizational boundaries,
which took place in parallel, and of which I was far less conscious. The third stream was
a process of social construction that was going at the societal level, through media reports
and other debates, quite independently of my work, that nonetheless had a strong
influence on my work. The fourth stream was a process of social construction that went
on starting from my ideas, but over which I had no control. The four streams
collectively show how powerful an audience can be for a dissertation and its writing
process.
Storytelling
The beginning. Lotte was arguably the first person, as well as the first faculty member,
to be intrigued by my dissertation. October 2000 was when she showed the first sign of
active interest. I was presenting my first version of the Tokyo Story in a doctoral seminar
organized by her, which I had attended every year of my 4.5 year student life. I was half
way through my data collection and trying to make sense of it. My fellow doctoral
students were as ruthless as usual. They gave me the hardest time on the comparability
of my cases and why I selected them, why I framed my research question the way I did,
and what did I mean really. Sarah was asking with her characteristic clarity - "you say
you are worried about institutional change, but I don't see the change. Where is the
change?" She was, of course, absolutely right1 . It was not that I had not thought about
the question. It was that I had all sorts of questions and answers jumbled up in my mind,
and I could not present them in a coherent manner to an audience. In the end, they took
mercy and I was allowed to move on. By this time, I had given up hope to get to the end.
I proceeded to show some quotes - but I had no hope that any of them would make sense.
I had already forgotten the story.
II do not in fact know that this was the specific question she asked then. I have records to show that she
articulated this question in April and then again in May 2001, by which time I knew that it was a recurrent
question. If not this question, she would have asked some other characteristically incisive question.
I R- -1 v -,I . - -. , a
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It was something about the quotes that brought life back into me. These were real
words- they really meant something - and even though I had lost the sense of where I
was in the presentation, these words were so powerful in my memory that I began to
explain what I thought about them. The audience became quiet. In one of the last slides,
I was saying that the Tokyo Story was about the lack of powerful story telling and I heard
Lotte inadvertently mumble "nice." These last slides contained many things that
apparently appealed to the audience. They made positive noises - they physically looked
engaged. Sarah was excited. "Improvisation is a risky act of illegality!" She was
repeating my words. I understood that something was understood by this audience -
though I did not know what. I received congratulatory emails from Lotte as well as Sean
and Carlos, the two fellow doctoral students with whom I share institutional perspectives.
This was the first time I felt that anything I had said in that room had somehow hit a
chord. I began to wonder what on earth I did that got them to react that way. It was the
first time I actively observed the power of an audience. They could wear you out when
they are not with you. They can also energize you visibly when they are engaged.
Laura. October was a critical month. Around that time, Laura, a fellow doctoral student
and a close friend, was going through a tough transition in developing her identity as a
researcher. She was writing a beautiful article. She was applying the state of the art
modeling, system dynamics, the method that she cherished as a practitioner and the
reason for her coming to MIT mid-career, to one of the most sophisticated and fuzzy
French social theories, using the data from the quintessential article that everyone in the
field has read. When I asked her almost gasping how on earth she came up with such a
great idea, she smiled with her unpretentious eyes and said, "well, I really wanted to
show Paul the power of system dynamics." Paul is a junior faculty, who is heavily into
social theories. She thought that he could be engaged if she used Bourdieu's theory -
Paul's favorite, and she thought it would be neat to use Barley's data. Neat indeed!
Something about her motivation touched me deeply - she really wanted to explain to
Paul. There is something very creative about the need to explain something you care
about to someone you care for.
Another day Laura was exhausted, and with her eyes gazing mid-distance, she mumbled
- "I often wonder what made Rosa sit down that day on that bus." She was talking about
Rosa Parks - a story as a foreigner with which I was not very familiar. Somehow, she
was talking about Rosa's agency - the legendary story of one black civil right activist
who ultimately started a social movement by her defiant act of sitting down in the section
where the whites had priority for seats. In her telling me, I began to think about the
meaning of agency. Laura was gathering courage - to walk the first step as an
independent researcher and to do it the way she likes. There was a doubling of images -
Laura and Rosa - and I came to regard agency as something fundamentally personal.
The Tokyo Story. With the energy that I gained from the approval in Lotte's class, I
began to think about a broader theme of storytelling. The lack of powerful storytelling in
Tokyo and the existence of very powerful storytelling in Cambridge served as a base for
thinking about storytelling as a device for sharing and understanding ideas. Central in
my puzzle was one professor at Tokyo University, Professor B, whom I had interviewed
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twice already and was going to meet for the third time, and who was fighting the system
to set up a collaborative university-industry group - a kind of consortium. He
complained that it was as though he was inside the "cage." Clearly the rules were
against him and he was having to improvise quite imaginatively to be able to do what he
wanted. The image of him was haunting to me because while I described the Tokyo
Story in terms of the lack of powerful storytelling, he was definitely not a weak
storyteller. He appeared to have all the passion and conviction about what he wanted to
do, and he was evidently telling stories all the time. He was gaining "support" from
many individuals with whom he came into contact through his storytelling - and yet, the
whole group did not feel like a strong cohesive group.
Indeed he had asked me join his nascent consortia to which he was enticing individual as
well as corporate members as loosely defined supporters. I was somewhat taken aback,
but my thought process was roughly "I will have problems meeting his group in the
future if I say no. I don't like the idea of becoming a sponsor, but on the other hand, the
level of support he is asking for is so small that it is unlikely to create a conflict. It is
more like a token membership." I agreed and paid up before I left the interview.
However, something about the process left me with an uneasy feeling - I was subscribing
to the activity for the wrong reason. I started to analyze my own behavior. At that time, I
had not yet firmly grasped his research group's objectives and activities. Indeed, if I
were completely honest, it seemed to me that their proposition was somewhat half-baked
and not persuasive. They did not yet have a powerful story of collective action to
convince me that what they were doing made sense.
There was another side to the storytelling, a kind of sub-story, in terms of my own
participation. Even though I was not persuaded by their story, I felt obliged enough to
pay and became a member. My sub-story to justify my participation was that I wanted to
avoid confrontations with my interviewees. My joining was not driven by an interest in
the substance of the group activities. Rather, I had ulterior motives - that I wanted to
remain friendly to the key players. I realized that there were underlying stories
associated both with their initial proposition and with my own participation, and that
these stories seemed to play key roles in our subsequent behaviors.
Half baked stories on the part of organizers and half-baked participation on the
participants' side - this sounded familiar in light of other consortia cases in Tokyo. I was
hearing about companies joining only if the price was low enough - a procedural and
obligatory membership. I began to create a framework of nested stories around the
concept of "compatibility" between individual accounts for participation.
Laura again. I was so excited that I told Laura about my nascent theory of institutional
change at once. She was a little tired that day - and she said "it is interesting" in a flat
voice. As she was leaving, I could no longer hold back - I was excited by my idea and I
simply could not accept Laura to be complacent, even if she was tired. In my heart, I was
expecting her to show as much enthusiasm as I showed her on her Barley piece. I asked
her directly, isn't this exciting? Her eyes rested momentarily at mid-distance as she put
on her shoes. She said, "yes, it is interesting," in a very unconvincing way, and
268
continued, "But I don't understand how you can tell when an agency is institutionalized,
and when it is not." I must have physically jumped backwards. I waved my arms around
in desperation as I tried to answer her question. I said something like "it is not visible to
the others, but when Rosa sat down, it came from here" pointing to my stomach. I meant
deep down from one's heart but I knew that I was not really answering her.
Chikako. That was the day when I began to think more seriously about the agency part
of my theorizing. Fortunately, the first person I told the story in its full form was
Chikako, who had finished her doctorate at Harvard and who was staying with me on a
short visit. Chikako is an old-fashioned sociologist who believes in Weber and was
rediscovering Adam Smith at that time. She had heard my early version of the Tokyo
Story before and had already given approval that I was capturing and describing the
Japanese setting in a right way. Her first reaction was one of sincere interest. The way
she looked at me, I knew that she really meant it - something I said was making sense
somewhere inside her. I described the concept of compatibility and how it describes the
sense of institutional strength. In fact, all the key elements of nested stories were there in
raw form, and she gave a nod to each. We then engaged in a discussion about each
concept - applying it to other circumstances, back and forth. Her biggest contribution in
that discussion was that she was someone that I respected - and she thought that I was on
to something novel and interesting. I gained more energy to keep going. When you
believe that you are discovering something important, you are not parsimonious with the
level of effort you put in.
Lotte. When I had an outline of the Cambridge Phenomenon, I made an appointment
with Lotte to show her what I had. When I entered the room, I told her that I wanted to
tell her what I was finding in Cambridge; she looked so physically interested, she even
pulled up her chair closer to mine so that she could see my power-point slides better. She
also made the right noises in response. When I mentioned that something was puzzling,
she too looked puzzled. When I was excited explaining something, she caught on the
excitement and exclaimed "interesting." This is when Lotte became an indispensable
audience for me. It was simply so rewarding and energizing to tell her my findings. By
the end of the fall, it was clear that she simply had to join the committee to become its
fourth member.
One day, when I gained enough courage, I told Lotte that I was thinking of a little
grounded theorizing. When I began to tell her and as I got visibly excited, she stopped
me with her hand and asked, "Sachi, do you have data for this?" I must have
immediately looked uncertain. I said vaguely, "I think so." The next time I saw her, I
was prepared with several vignettes. When I told her about two of them and as I was
moving on to the third, she said "OK," and she needed no more. In a later meeting, when
I expressed my own anxiety about not having written down anything about storytelling,
she said with a certainty that only experience can give, "don't worry, it will keep coming.
Even if you want to stop it, it will come." She somehow knew in her bones that it was so
close to my heart that I could not escape articulating.
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Wanda. One December day, I woke up thinking that I would love to tell Wanda about
my storytelling theory - so it was almost a shock to my system when I ran into her at the
Medical Center. Wanda is a professor whose course on organizations is legendary among
doctoral students. "Awesome" - is the way one student described her course. The main
reason why so many of us found that course "awesome" was that she talked to us about
underlying assumptions in social science in a way others did not. Wanda cared deeply
about agency. As a result, she was one of the first people that I thought to talk to. As I
caught a glimpse of her in a waiting room of the MIT Medical Center, I almost attacked
her and told her about my little theory on storytelling. She listened attentively and
gracefully said that it was promising. Something about the way she responded, however,
made me realize that I had not really explained it well. Perhaps, she did not even
understand fully what I was saying. Somehow, I came away wondering about the power
of my examples. I figured Rosa Parks was better than the Tokyo Story, but perhaps it did
not work on her as a foreigner.
It was only about a year later, in Fall 2001, that I felt ready to explain it to her in a full
form. Wanda was probably completely oblivious of the fact that she had become one of
my target audiences. When I explained my theorizing on storytelling, she was
rewardingly attentive and abruptly asked "what do you mean by compatibility?" I jerked
and tried to explain, but found that I was utterly speechless. She looked up in her
dictionary and thought aloud - only to make it clearer that I needed to clarify the concept
better. It became another piece of homework for me to do. Later that year, when I
finally decided that I had a partial answer to her question, I organized a small informal
presentation to talk about my theorizing on storytelling. As she was leaving the room, I
asked her what she thought. She replied almost hesitantly - "it is nice, but I wonder if
compatibility is more like a process - something that you practice?" I must have looked
terribly uncertain, she kindly added "it may not be relevant, and you may not need to go
there, but you might think about it." More homework. By this time, I knew that the role
of the audience was to demand and create more work. The key constructs as well as the
general storyline of the thesis developed as I engaged in more and more conversations,
and the more I took seriously what they said.
Sarah. The next thing I did was to write up about storytelling in a three page note to
show to Mike. Mike is an advisor who always had a very clear idea as to what my goals
were, but was often delinquent as far as timely reading of my half-baked products were
concerned. It had to be short - it had to be simple. I wrote up a piece based on Rosa
Parks. Before I sent it, I wanted to make sure that it read OK. I phoned Sarah, a fellow
doctoral student and a close friend, to ask her if she would read it quickly. She
interrupted her task of the day - reading Foucault - and called back an hour later to give
me comments and suggestions. Her overall comment was that it was a nice piece, but I
did not explain why Rosa sat down that day and not before or after. "What do you
mean," I asked, a little irritated. She proceeded ruthlessly, "you know, why did it happen
then? Was there no one else who sat down before? If yes, why did it not work then?
Why just work this particular time?" Sarah was asking a classic social movement
question - without herself knowing it. I was a little annoyed because I thought the
elements to answer her question were in place and yet when I pointed it out, she did not
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buy it. I gave up delivering my half baked answers and thanked her courteously. For
now, it was enough to know that it was good enough to be sent to Mike. However, for
the first time, I understood that this was a pattern to be reckoned with - my fellow
doctoral students were going to ask the most awkward and intuitive questions, that were
out of context - because none of us yet had a context. Sarah was also a little agitated
about the use of Rosa Parks. There was something weird about a Japanese woman
writing about the race issues - and if it was to go to a more public arena, she would need
to look at it with more critical eyes to make sure that I would not raise eyebrows. The
theory itself - it was nice but secondary to these other concerns. Of course that is not
what she said. But with friends you know what they are really thinking no matter what
they say. Laura had similar reactions. Her reading of it was such a non-event, I don't
even remember what she said. I decided that I would never write about agency using
Rosa Parks again - even though I thought it was very elegant.
Mike. Mike was evidently excited to read the piece. I say "evidently" because I never
really got his reaction. He called me to say that he liked it, and that I should call him
over the weekend at his Cape home. For some reason that escapes me now, I never
managed to call him back, and by the time he saw me, the excitement had long worn off.
Instead, he asked if I had data for this. I told him why and how I came to think about
storytelling based on the consortium case in Tokyo and other corroborating pieces from
the field. Interestingly, some of these had to do with the way I related to the
interviewees.
My relationships with the field: importance of questions
I noticed that Professor B was visibly intrigued by my questions the third time I
interviewed him. He remarked that nobody had previously asked him such questions.
This was puzzling indeed because my questions (about the benefits to different categories
of industrial members) seemed very obvious ones. He explained,
"when people see these diagrams, they are struck in awe. They say, 'wow, this is
great.' In that sense, there are rarely questions that cut into the issues. They see
this and say "wow, how do you manage to develop such ideas all by yourself?"
.... They rarely ask what this means exactly or what I am really intending to do."
And yet, he was clearly interested in having such questions asked, so that he could
develop good answers.
I wondered if he was so isolated that he lacked critical colleagues and industrialists who
would dare to ask such simple questions. The picture of his isolation was very consistent
with the general picture I was developing about Japanese industrialists who were a little
weary of interacting with Japanese professors. They regarded the academics as being too
pedantic to engage in serious technical discussions but nevertheless as important sources
of students. It was also consistent with the image of junior academics that I was
developing. They had clear, justifiable, and sometimes even devastating criticisms about
some of the activities of senior professors in which they had participated, and yet had not
voiced such criticisms directly to them.
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I soon noticed that I made my own judgments about whether stories about partnerships
made sense or not. Some partnership stories sounded convincing, others sounded half-
baked. Some seemingly half-baked ideas began to make more sense as I understood
more about the local contexts. Others remained half-baked even at the end. I
extrapolated that industrialists who are approached by academics might also have similar
reactions, finding some stories convincing and others not. For industrialists to be
persuaded to participate, and make a significant resource commitment, the story had to be
powerful.
One entrepreneurial professor in Cambridge had told me that in order to get financial
support one must have a story about why it is important and why it makes sense. His
laboratory was a kind of incubation space for start-ups. One research staff explained later
that most of the things they do cannot be understood unless there are stories, however
wacky, to give images of how these new technologies might come into use.
I also encountered many interviewees who thanked me for asking good questions. One
went as far as to ask for the interview tape and another explicitly thanked me for
engaging in discussions that evidently helped him think through the role of the
partnership. Another thanked me in my third visit for providing him with opportunities
to think through things. It was interesting to me that what they appeared to enjoy was not
so much my advice or conclusions, but their own words and reflections about what they
were doing. My interviews evidently provided good opportunities for them to think in a
way that was structured and yet not threatening. In other words, they needed to tell a
story so that they understood themselves, and my questioning provided an occasion to
construct such stories.
Back to convincing Mike. I told Mike about some of these field tales - perhaps in less
polished forms - as well as case examples such as the Media Lab, for which two
powerful "agents" got together to weave a central story. By the end of that conversation,
Mike was ready. "You have it!" he said. Then we talked about how I might present the
case. I wanted to present various cases and then end the thesis with this theorizing about
storytelling. Mike thought that was too ambitious and that once I started thinking that
way, it was very difficult not to tell the cases that way. I proceeded - somewhat
misunderstanding our conversation to mean that I should not foreshadow anything about
storytelling until the final conclusion chapter - only to get into trouble later.
Keiko. Keiko is a close friend, who had become something like a little sister to me over
the dissertation years and who had just finished her doctoral dissertation in SUNY. We
talked frequently on the phone about life and about our dissertations. She was always
curious and unfailing enthusiastic. She would habitually ask what I was up to in my
analysis or theorizing in minute detail. She was one of the first to understand the
practical implications of my nascent theory of storytelling: the importance of dialectics
for story development. One day, I was saying "I am fuzzy about this bit" and she wanted
to know what was fuzzy and why I thought it was fuzzy with her usual enthusiasm. As I
answered her questions, she and I simultaneously saw that I could articulate it much more
clearly than I had feared. It was as though I just needed to be asked, and I just needed to
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articulate it in front of an audience with whom I felt comfortable. Without saying a word,
we both knew that we both understood this new ritual - of her asking questions so that I
could clarify my thinking. Thereafter, she was always attentive and unfailingly
enthusiastic - she became MOMO for my dissertation.
Eleanor. I had no trouble writing the first draft of the chapter describing storytelling - it
was one of the easiest chapters to write. I had conviction about what I was saying and
clarity of the concepts, based on a year of thinking it through. Though I had not spent
much time explaining my theorizing to Eleanor, my committee chair, I was not at all
worried, because she was very familiar with circumstances in Tokyo and in one earlier
discussion when I explained Tokyo in terms of the lack of powerful storytelling, she
nodded in the way that made me think that she liked it. She looked reflective and I was
convinced that something that I said made sense with some of the other things that she
knew about Japan. Because she has in-depth knowledge of Japan and Japanese culture,
when she appeared to buy what I was saying about Tokyo, arguably the most difficult of
the three universities, I felt very reassured.
In November 2002, Eleanor read the first draft and came back with a rude surprise. "I
don't like it," she said definitively, "it sounds as though you have solved the puzzle of
institutional change. This is the best thing that has ever happened and you know it all.
And yet, it is not as if to say you heard them articulate all the stories as they went about
life - you have no data on the actual stories as told." This was roughly her objection. I
tried to tell her - but it did not work. Her advice was to diminish its importance - call it
the emergence of institutional patterns - not institutional change, call it a process theory,
not a meta-theory. Even with all these changes, I had the sense that she accepted it
grudgingly.
The real problem was that Eleanor was right. I honestly did believe that I had discovered
the theory of institutional change and all by myself. I took in her comments slowly but
seriously - and made all the changes as suggested. However, it was not until much later
that I understood why these were important changes. How difficult it is for us doctoral
students to accept and appreciate advisors who command us to diminish our claims! It is
usually much later that one realizes how little one is actually adding and how much has
already been discovered by our predecessors.
John. It was the latest draft, which satisfied even Eleanor, that met another
uncompromising critic, John. John was another advisor who was known as a guru of
qualitative methods. Though he never raised many questions, when he did, they were
intriguing questions that were qualitatively different from those raised by others. It was
as though he entered the worlds that I was describing through my texts and identified
aspects that did not somehow fit. I often described to friends, "John reads my papers as if
he was licking them." There was almost a physical texture to the way he related to .a text.
When he said "this is convincing" having read these texts, it was very reassuring. He was
always gentle in posing questions, so I never felt threatened, and sometimes even
wondered if he took me seriously. Having read the first draft once through, he asked to
read the second draft in small doses as chapters became ready, and I had sent him draft
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chapters 9, 10, and 11. He liked chapter 9 - "I really like this table" he said, pointing to
the table that listed characteristics of organizational boundaries. His smile turned into a
hateful expression as he turned to chapter 10 on storytelling. "I really don't like this" he
said. I could see how much he hated it. He looked as though he was about to spit on it.
It was painful and devastating to watch and hear him - and all this for my favorite part of
the thesis too!
Institutionalists. Around the same time, two fellow doctoral students who were also
studying institutional change were reading the same chapters: Carlos and Kate. Carlos,
who was doing the initial rounds of data collection, was independently getting interested
in the role of narratives in institutional change. When he read Chapter 10, he said
"You've got it!" and was very excited. Kate, who practically revamped my last three
chapters through her matter-of-fact comments, was most excited about Chapter 10 and
the way I tied in identity with institutional change. They both said "it makes so much
sense." Another institutional doctoral student, Sean, had given me a green light on an
earlier version by saying that it was "cool." All of us were interested in tying the
concepts of individual identity with institutional change. It wasn't just students who
liked it - Susan, a sociologist faculty whose recent research was based on narratives also
liked the ideas I presented. I had a difficult time understanding why John was so
unhappy.
All the apricots ripen at the same time. My initial reaction was to respond
subversively: divide and conquer. I discussed John's objections extensively with Lotte -
but not with Eleanor who had concerns similar to John's. I was afraid that if the two of
them got together, they might amplify each other and come up with stronger objections. I
used the fact that Eleanor was very busy at the time and only reported cursorily to her
about his comments and what I was doing about them. All this was probably not
essential, because by the time I saw John for the next couple of chapters, he was less
forceful in his objections. In the grand scheme of the dissertation as a whole, John was
probably willing to drop his charges at least somewhat.
In the mean time, I also worked hard to understand the nature of John's objections. He
said "this came out of nowhere! You have no data for this! And you are there alone!"
His suggestions were two-fold, drastically cut back on the chapter, and relate it to the
literature. He thought that it was futile to try to relate it to my data, since I didn't have
the data for it. I disagreed with his last comment.
As I engaged in reading the literature to cope with one of his demands, a new awareness
was beginning to dawn on me. "Storytelling" was in the air! It was in the air because of
the way in which intellectual discourses had developed across several disciplines, and
because of the rise of post-modernism, where positivist ideas were giving way. Although
I came up with it "all by myself," I clearly did so because of the environment within
which I was thinking. This was an instance of "agency" that was institutionalized.
Carlos, Kate, Sean, and I were like apricots ripening at the same time, as the Turks would
say.
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The second puzzle was the contrast between the two conclusion chapters. How come
John liked Chapter 9 on boundaries but not Chapter 10 on storytelling? As far as I was
concerned, they were both equally grounded and essential for explaining the
phenomenon. So why did he like the one but not the other? I slowly realized that the
social construction of "organizational boundaries" took place in quite a different way
from the one on storytelling. It was only when I reflected on the whole process, and then
recollected the way John reads texts, that I understood the nature of his objection.
Boundaries
My twin conclusion chapter on boundaries was based on a different kind of social
construction process. For one thing, there was far less dialectics with external audiences
during its formation, except with Eleanor, who provided key conceptual underpinnings
for it. The first time I articulated that the three universities appeared to define their
organizational boundaries in different ways was in the doctoral seminar at the Industrial
Performance Center (IPC) in May 2001. The IPC had provided me with a fellowship
earlier that year and so I had been part of the graduate student group involved in regular
seminar presentations. This was the second time I presented on my dissertation, and in
many ways a critical one, as three of my advisors, Eleanor, Lotte and Mike and one of my
shadow advisors, Richard engaged actively in its discussions. Sarah and Laura were
there of course, representing my fellow doctoral wisdom.
It is interesting the way these seminars usually have two types of outcomes: one on issues
that people are actively unhappy about - in my case these often pertained to
methodological issues around case selection; and the other on issues that people were
intrigued by. On the former, I worked systematically. Sometimes it was on the issue of
presentation, at other times, I had to re-think my approach. The second type of issues
was often generative and I drew more energy from people's expressions of intrigue. The
notion of differently defined organizational boundaries was the hit in that session.
Richard liked the idea that Cambridge seemed to have a very different type of
boundaries. Mike also thought that what Cambridge showed was a kind of tolerance or
confidence about not needing to police its boundaries.
Eleanor again. Eleanor was the one who pushed me to try to characterize these
boundaries more clearly. Eleanor had a very interesting ability to be generative on the
spur of the moment, and when I least expected it. For instance, the notion of boundaries
being permeable or fuzzy was something that Eleanor had suggested very early.
One evening over a drink, she was suggesting that I think more about the difference
between permeable and fuzzy boundaries. I asked "what do you mean?" As we had run
out of time, she was picking up her bags to get to the airport, she speculated aloud, "oh,
maybe with permeable boundaries you are at least clear about where the boundaries are,
whereas fuzzy boundaries - you don't even know where they are." Whenever she would
make these seemingly off-the-cuff comments, she would always add, to get rid of my
defensiveness, "you don't have to use these specific ideas, but just think about it."
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How many of these ideas actually later served as cornerstones for my theorizing! Eleanor
was the one who wondered aloud if external as well as internal boundaries were at work.
I remember vividly that moment and my first reaction, "more work!?" It was in the
conversation with her that the notion of top-down and bottom-up initiatives or early ideas
about informal and formal boundaries in Tokyo arose. More work to refine the concepts
and yet more re-writing! She kept on pushing until the day I wrote all the case chapters
and a summary chapter on boundaries.
Three days before my defense - she was still pushing - though with a smile to help me
not to get defensive. I also discovered in the process that what had seemed "off-the-cuff'
remarks were actually based on years of thinking about these issues.
Writing the cases. The key elements of boundaries and how they work emerged much
later in the process and as I wrote up the chapter cases. As such, there was one critical
difference between the chapter on boundaries and the one on storytelling: the former was
developed as I wrote the actual case chapters that became the key part of my dissertation,
while the latter was already in place by the time I started writing the case chapters. My
committee members observed the development of boundaries both in discussions and in
writing, while there was less need to "write aloud" to work out the storytelling concepts.
For John, who loved to see the case stories ground up, the story-telling chapter suddenly
appeared without having the case chapters lined up with the content. He had also been
away during the previous year and had missed out on most of the early case studies as
well as conversations about them, which were more directly geared towards storytelling.
He was absolutely right: in my first draft, not enough was documented to make a case for
the storytelling chapter.
Jean Jacques. A week before my defense, even after I submitted my draft to the
committee, I was still worried about whether Eleanor and John would buy the story-
telling aspect of the thesis - which in my view was a central piece in my dissertation. In
my daily conversations with fellow dissertation writers, this particular concern was
discussed quite extensively, but it was Jean Jacques who ultimately put it to sleep.
Having listened attentively to my latest concerns and my mumblings about John's
reactions, he said with an uncharacteristic firmness: "you know, Sachi, if you believe in
what you are saying, there is only one thing you can do. Defend it. At the end of the
day, not everyone will agree with what you find - but then your role is to defend your
perspective as best you can." Such words, delivered with a gentle French accent, were
enough to shake me out of my anxiety and take me to a new level of dissertation writing.
Power of the phenomenon
There was another level of social construction that had little to do with my own work but
that had a powerful influence. University-industry relationships were topical among
policy makers and practitioners in a way that made it "topical" for the day. MIT was
clearly a model that many countries and universities looked up to. MIT had a
partnership with Cambridge - both sets of academics were learning about each other.
Tokyo professors were visiting MIT to learn about how it worked. There was an
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emerging story about university-industry relationships and how different universities
dealt with it differently through which many faculty around me were actually living. The
phenomenon became a powerful story in its own right, with or without my dissertation.
I observed that power in the level of interest people expressed about my research.
Until January 2000, my dissertation was framed as organization-environment
relationships, with universities as organizations, in which I was examining how
universities changed in response to environmental changes. I could not help noticing that
some themes had a greater appeal to people than others. For instance, university-
government relationship was the topic of my second year paper, where I compared the
experience of the UK and Japan. I usually had to explain in great depth why this was an
important topic to examine, and how it could be interesting to a broader audience than the
practitioners in those countries. The audience would generally give me the benefit of the
doubt, and listen suppressing the yawn. I needed a captive audience to get reactions.
When I said that I might look into university-industry relationships using MIT as a case
study, it was a whole new game.
Richard. Richard was one of the first to show signs of interest. He was a rare member
of faculty who had independent research interests on the changing role of research
universities. He was also British. He was one of the most policy-oriented faculty I knew.
Even then, a comparative analysis of higher education reforms in Japan and the UK was a
hard sell for him. One day, when I mentioned the possibility of looking into MIT's own
experience in working with industry, particularly the strategic alliances, his face lit up.
Since then, he has been a supportive faculty and a shadow committee member, who was
always willing to engage in discussions about my research.
Others. By fall 2000, I discovered that more people showed signs of interest in what I
was doing. One faculty commented in one seminar, "Sachi, your phenomenon is
interesting enough. You don't need to justify it so much - you sound defensive." His
message was: just get on with it and tell us what the story is. The most amazing incident
was when I told Michael about my thesis topic. Michael was a faculty member who had
originally been assigned to me as an advisor, but none of my research interests,
universities as organizations or higher education reforms, made sense to him. He was
also a business historian with a keen sense of what is current. He wrote about Japan at
the height of the Japanese miracle, he was writing about Microsoft as the company made
a meteoric rise, and he published a book on Netscape just as the Microsoft-Netscape war
took off. In our early discussions, he used to try to sound and look patient, but invariably
ended up asking "why is that interesting?" This time, he did not even need an
explanation. Instead, he looked up and said, "that's interesting." This time, I sensed that
it was not really the way I was telling the story about my dissertation or framing, but that
it was the subject matter of my thesis that was somehow interesting in its own right.
There can be certain face validity to the phenomenon you examine. It was as though
your dissertation could piggy back on the power of the phenomenon itself. That power
was there or not there depending on the kind of social construction that had gone on
about that phenomenon. The point of your dissertation then was to ride on it.
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The power of the concepts
Quentin. Quentin, my partner in life and work, was usually one of the first readers for
every version of my chapters. He is an education consultant, who undertakes a range of
strategic consulting tasks for governments and educational institutions including
universities, some of which are more appropriately termed "advisory". He is a
practitioner with little patience for obscure terms that do not make sense to him, who
likes me to get to the point. And yet, he was also one of the most ardent and earliest
supporters of the idea of storytelling. One day, he told me that he had an exciting
conversation with one of his clients, a chairman of a university, with whom he happened
to meet at the train station and walked together to the meeting they were both attending.
Quentin had evidently used that 15 minute opportunity to explain about my dissertation.
"And he thought it was very interesting," he concluded. I asked somewhat doubtfully,
for I was not yet sure what my dissertation was about at that stage, "so what did you tell
him?" Quentin was very robust in his answer "oh, about how there are these boundaries
and how you need to tell stories to cross them." I was surprised - because of all the
things in my thesis, these concepts were what I expected practitioners to have least
interest in. I tried to quiz him about exactly what he said and exactly why the Chairman
was intrigued. Quentin explained - but I did not really understand. This was one of the
first moments when I understood that I will not always understand what my audience
carries away from my thesis. Even when I know the person as well as I do Quentin.
The power of the faceless audience
The final phase of dissertation writing was all to do with negotiating with the existing
literature. Lotte pointed out that I should be contributing not to the literature, but to the
understanding about the phenomenon. I disagreed. Academic writing is targeted to
academic audiences and tailored to the particular manner in which academics
"understand" - through the literature. What is understood by people in their respective
locales but not written in academic writing is not yet "understood" by academics. So, it
is not enough for me to add to general understanding, I had to add to academic
understanding too. This was the toughest audience - faceless and silent, and yet
demanding. I simply read and read and read - through the first draft, and then the second
draft, and then the final draft, and through the defense. Ultimately, it is to the process of
social construction through academic literature that this dissertation must add.
To the finish line
My defense was a glorious event, well attended both by faculty and by students with
diverse backgrounds, and complete with a Champagne celebration afterwards. I was
particularly pleased that several Management of Technology professors attended the
session, given that I had put in a semester of real effort to get to know that community
and their literature. My committee said that they were proud and happy with both what
I had done and how I presented - or at least that is what I heard on the day.
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A couple of days later, Lotte was saying a lot of work was still needed. I did not
understand. Yes, there was a lot of editorial details to correct, but these were procedural
and required little energy from me. What struck me was the fact that she truly looked
anxious when I said that I was turning in a final draft in two weeks. Mike was saying
that I had better work really hard to get it into shape.
If these were the demands coming from the side of the committee that I thought was more
supportive of my thesis, I dreaded to think what Eleanor and John might demand.
Indeed, I avoided asking them in case that triggered further thoughts. The most upsetting
was Mike's comments. He had said that "You have done more than I could do with the
amount of data" which I took to be a compliment. And yet he was ruthless in saying that
he had a lot of problems about the way I talked about storytelling. My first emotional
response was simply "what do you mean?" I felt betrayed by his comments. "You too?"
was my reaction. As I deciphered his comments in the margins of the text, which were
universally negative, I was ready to throw the entire thesis into the air. I was devastated.
When I gave up the idea of feeling good about my thesis, I noticed an irritating fact. The
irritating fact was that both Mike and Lotte were actually asking very interesting
questions. As I drifted further into their questions, I realized that these were questions
that they could not have asked before. It was because I had clarified things from the final
version that these questions could now be asked. My clarity was my vulnerability - the
clearer I was in explaining my ideas, the greater the degree of understanding on the part
of readers, and hence the better the questions they ask. This was the first time I realized
that I was working with a moving target, and with an audience who will never be
satisfied but will always encourage you to go on the next step. Dissertations are never
finished and everything one writes is a half-told story.
Another discovery I made during this final stage, particularly through writing this
appendix, was the extent to which emotions influenced the way I interpreted the
comments that I was given. In retrospect, I could have taken everything that my advisors
or friends said as comments, and dealt with them professionally. Somehow, that was not
how things happened. I was always on the edge, feeling the need to defend, and afraid
that I may not be right. Dissertation writing has been a process through which I found
my own voice and confidence to make assertions before a powerful collection of multiple
audiences. And I feel much better for having gained that confidence through this process.
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